4 December 2011

Counterspy Equipment Export Crime

These are excerpts from a federal civil court suit by James M. Atkinson (www.tscm.com), a technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) professional, against Research Electronics International (www.reiusa.net), a firm which sells TSCM equipment, the City of Rockport, MA, and other parties. (USDC District of Massachusetts (Boston) Case #: 1:11-cv-11073-NMG.)

Sections 765-781 describe Kazakhstan's covert supply of nuclear materials to Iran and transport of weapons-grade nuclear materials with comsec assistance from State Department, FBI and CIA. More on the transport operation:

http://cryptome.org/eyeball/bn-350/bn-350.htm

Plaintiff is Atkinson, Defendent is Research Electronics International.

Date: Sat, 03 Dec 2011 21:48:41 -0500
From: "James M. Atkinson" <jmatk[at]tscm.com>
To: tscm-l2006[at]googlegroups.com
Subject: [TSCM-L] {5858} Recently Filed in the Case (VERY Interesting Details of TSCM Equipment Exports)

Go though this very slowly and very carefully and let me know what you think.

-jma

674. Defendant unlawfully exports controlled munitions and controlled
devices in violation of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
(22 CFR, Sections 120 - 130) in that they are legally defined as defense
articles on the United States Munitions List (USML). Defendants have
violated, are violating, have conspired, or conspiring to violate the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Licenses are issued by the U.S.
Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC).
Sec. 121.1 General. The United States Munitions List.
“(a) The following articles, services and related technical data are
designated as defense articles and defense services pursuant to sections
38 and 47(7) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 and 2794(7)).”

Category XI--Military [and Space] Electronics
“(b) Electronic systems or equipment specifically designed, modified, or
configured for intelligence, security, or military purposes for use in
search, reconnaissance, collection, monitoring, direction-finding,
display, analysis and production of information from the electromagnetic
spectrum and electronic systems or equipment designed or modified to
counteract electronic surveillance or monitoring.”

675. Research Electronics has unlawfully subverted this by repeatedly
claiming that the “electronics counter-measures equipment” which they
make is merely “general purpose test equipment” when it is in fact
“electronic counter-measures equipment” as defined by Section 121.1,
Category XI(b) as “equipment designed or modified to counteract
electronic surveillance or monitoring.”

676. Further, Research Electronics does not advertise this equipment for
any function other than for the purposes of “counteracting electronic
surveillance or monitoring,” and the equipment is purpose built for that
sole function along, and no other.

677. Neither does Research Electronics train students at their school on
how to use this equipment for any function other than to find, locate,
and to counteract eavesdropping devices.

678. All products which the Defendant offers for sale, has a primary use
described by the Defendant as being that of finding, locating, and
counteract eavesdropping devices.

679. The Defendants have not only violated International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, but they have also committed including, but not limited to:
Wire Fraud, Mail Fraud, Scheme to Defraud, Obstruction of Criminal
Investigations, Obstruction of Law Enforcement, Interference with
Commerce, and Transactions in Property Derived from Specific Unlawful
Activity in furtherance of this illegal exportation, and misrepresented
to the federal government of the nature of their goods.

680. This scheme to defraud, and to falsely classify in order to export
counter-surveillance equipment as mere “general purpose test equipment”
on the part of the Defendants has caused harm to the business and
property of the Plaintiff and others, represents the conduct of a
continuing unit, by an enterprise, through a pattern, of prohibited
activities, which resulted in income for the Defendants, and damage to
the Plaintiff business and property.

681. Had Defendants not engaged in this fraud, other parties (including
the Plaintiff) would have been able to apply for such licenses, and then
to export an estimated $28,774,000 in goods, which the Defendant
illegally exported to foreign customers between June 2007 and June 2011.

682. As this illegal export, and violations of the RICO statutes were
committed by the Defendants, trebles damages for the illegal exports
alone is expected to exceed $86,322,000.

683. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H.
Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee
Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and
various John Does makes, builds, imports, sells, resells, possesses,
offer for sale, operates, ships in interstate and international commerce
goods and devices sold for detecting hidden cellular phones or other
electronics on or in the human body by means of non-ionizing radiation,
and which are not approved medical or radiological devices, and which
are expressly prohibited by Federal Guidelines due to the likelihood of
very grave health risks in violation of Federal law.

684. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H.
Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee
Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and
various John Does makes, builds, imports, sells, resells, possesses,
offer for sale, operates, ships in interstate and international commerce
goods and devices manufactures medical equipment for the purposes of
radiological or radiating devices to examine humans which are not
approved for human use, and which are specifically prohibited by federal
guidelines for human use, and which are expressly prohibited by Federal
Guidelines due to the likelihood of very grave health risks, in
violation of Federal law.

685. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H.
Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee
Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and
various John Does makes, builds, imports, sells, resells, possesses,
offer for sale, operates, ships in interstate and international
commerce, goods and device claimed to be able to detect bombs or
explosive devices by means of non-ionizing radiation, which present a
high risk of accidental detonation. Defendants recklessly endangers the
life and limbs of U.S. Military forces and members of the intelligence
community by selling defective equipment, and make false claims about
products to obtain federal funds.

686. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H.
Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee
Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and
various John Does encouraged, endorsed, organized, and/orchestrated an
ongoing criminal enterprise.

687. Any veil of immunity, which this defendant may have previously
enjoyed by virtue of their office or position, or government connections
is “pierced and ripped asunder” due to their infringement and
deprivation of the Constitutional Rights of the Plaintiff, and thus this
Defendant (and all other Defendants) stands fully naked and vulnerable
before the court, with no immunity of any form.

688. Defendants Research Electronics, A and L Enterprises, Thomas H.
Jones, Bruce Barsumian, Michelle Gaw, Trish Webb, Pamela McIntyre, Lee
Jones, Arlene J. Barsumian, Darlene Jones, others named herein, and
various John Does, in combination, contracted to, engaged in, conspired
to engage in, created trusts and agreements, engaged in monopolistic
efforts, rigged contracts, inflated market price, price fixing, and
restraint of trade among the several States, or with foreign nations, in
violation of the law and contrary to public policy. Defendants demanded
that the Plaintiff not deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities of their competitor or competitors, with
the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.

689. Defendants engaged in a long term course of fraud and conversion as
follows to include stealing customers, refusing to pay contracted
commissions, unduly delaying international and domestic shipments, and
other acts which harmed the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff’s business.

690. Plaintiff began dealing the Defendant Research Electronics and
Defendant Barsumian in approximate late Fall of 1981 as a retail
customer of the company purchasing products for use in the performance
of TSCM services and bug sweeps. At that time, Defendant Barsumian
operated the company in the form of “Research Electronics, Inc” and
alternately under the name of “Security Research International” with an
address in and near the Tampa, Florida area. At the time, the Defendant
stated that he was in the profession of performing TSCM (bug sweeping)
services as well as the profession of making bugging devices and TSCM
equipment.

691. In 1983, (by his own admission) Defendant Barsumian suffered a
catastrophic financial collapse of his business in Florida, and moved to
Tennessee to be supported by his wife’s parents. At that time the
Defendant produced only the most primitive of TSCM products, and the
quality was grossly inferior to those produced by the competitors of the
Defendant.

692. In the April 1988, the Plaintiff discovered that the Defendant was
now operating in Tennessee after moving from Florida and contacted the
Defendant in order to arrange for a visit in the Fall of 1988 while the
Plaintiff would be working at a project in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
Defendant at this time disclosed to the Plaintiff that his business had
collapsed, and that his father-in-law had to rent a U-Haul truck to move
him and his wife from Florida to Tennessee and that he and his
father-in-law had restarted the “Research Electronics” company, but was
no longer operating the under the “Security Research” company name. At
that time the Defendant disclosed to the Plaintiff that the Defendant
was wholly unable to perform a TSCM inspection or bug sweep and stated
to the Plaintiff that he “would be restricting his activities to the
making of bug sweep devices, not of rending TSCM service, as he
discovered too late that he was no good at it, and that it was at the
center of his bankruptcy problems”.

693. In the late Fall of 1988, the Plaintiff visited the Defendants
factory in or near Cookeville, TN in order to purchase a new model of
device which the Defendant had described to him and was marketing to
replaced the inferior quality equipment previously purchased by the
Plaintiff from the Defendant in 1983. While the product still performed
inferior to that built by competitors, it was an improvement on the
product purchased roughly five years previously. During this visit, the
Defendant quizzed the Plaintiff in regards to the “other equipment” the
Plaintiff was using to perform TSCM services for clients, and the
Plaintiff agreed to demonstrate several items, which the Plaintiff had
designed and built for his own use to provide TSCM services. Among the
items demonstrated was a silver Halliburton briefcase into which the
Plaintiff had built a computer controlled receiver, with a swing out
panel that positioned the antennas and receivers well away from the
computer so that it did not pickup electrical noise the from computer,
and the small printer/plotter which was also built into the case. The
Plaintiff also demonstrated a sophisticated antenna system, whereby the
antennas, filters, and preamplifiers were built into the “swing out
wings” that would normally hold screwdriver blades. The Plaintiff
discovered to some horror in 1990, that the Defendant actually took the
Plaintiff design and use, claimed it as his own, and fraudulently filed
a patent for it mere weeks after the demonstration by the Plaintiff.

694. In approximately 1992, Defendant again began dealing with
Plaintiff, and through Plaintiff’s web site allowed an Internet presence
(www.tscm.com) in which Plaintiff provided detailed descriptions,
photographs, etc. of Defendants products as well as other competing
manufacturers of such equipment to the TSCM, Intelligence, and private
sector communities.

695. At that time, the Defendant lacked any kind of a website, lacked
any sort of on-line representation of its products, lacked even
primitive E-mail of their own, and lacked the technical ability to
provide same.

696. As the relationship developed between the parties, in approximately
December 3, 1994, Plaintiff began buying and reselling Defendants
counter-surveillance products under a non written agreement in which
Plaintiff received a 31.5% to 38.9% discount on all of Defendants
products he purchased and was free to sell at whatever price Plaintiff
desired. Plaintiff did however; refuse to have anything at all to do
with the illegal bugging devices, which the Defendant was offering for sale.

697. Pursuant to this non written agreement, Plaintiff’s sold Defendants
products to the United States Government, the U.S. Government
Intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Department of State, Secret
Service, Department of Energy, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force,
U.S. Marine Corps, Defense Contractors, Research and Development
Companies, Think Tanks, Lockheed Martin, Harvard, Raytheon Corporation,
MITRE Corporation, Lawrence Livermore Labs, Lincoln Labs, Sandia Labs,
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and others.

698. During this same period, Defendant developed a product known as the
“OSCOR” which is an Omni Spectral Correlator, Model 5000 or OSC-5000.
Plaintiff took an OSCOR (which he owned), designed and modified the
circuits and chassis, and thereafter showed it to Defendant suggesting
the modification be made to their production units to make it more
saleable to U.S. Government entities. Defendant implemented Plaintiff’s
designs and modifications.

699. In 1995, the Defendant contacted the Plaintiff by phone and asked
Plaintiff if he had any suggestion on how to resolve a technical issue
in raising the frequency coverage of the OSC-5000 product, which the
Plaintiff had successfully performed on other similar systems for
defense contractors. The Plaintiff described to the Defendant a very
simple, and inexpensive design which he had used in the past on other
equipment whereby the local oscillator of the OSC-5000 could be used to
drive a simple microwave down convertor that was attached to an 18 GHz
AEL blade style log periodic antenna that was commercially available.
Further, the Plaintiff cautioned the Defendant that the product would
not be taken seriously by the TSCM community unless it could cover up to
40 GHz or above, which would require the use of three antennas, each
with a slightly different downconvertor, and some kind of switching
circuit. The Plaintiff advised caution with the product, and stated that
merely building a downconvertor was of limited value in the electronic
countermeasures application as a system to automatically rotated the
unit would also need to be provided due to the highly directional nature
of the signals at those frequencies, and that a simple two-axis servo
assembly could be used.

700. In approximately 1999, Defendant made additional modifications to
the OSCOR and increased the price. Plaintiff, an authority in TSCM,
continued to purchase and resell Defendants products and gave individual
discounts to other practitioners in the TSCM field while maintaining
normal pricing structure for non-TSCM professionals. Because of
Plaintiff’s professional courtesy, Defendant became upset and expressed
its upset with Plaintiff; however, the relationship continued.

701. In early July 1998, an FBI Agent in Boston, MA (to whom the
Plaintiff had previously rendered TSCM services) approached Defendant
and asked advice as to how to approach Research Electronics in a way
that would allow the FBI and CIA to harvest customer information more
effectively as the agents he spoke to acknowledged that Research
Electronics had been provided this information to them for years, but
that it was often incomplete, and they had caught Defendant Research
Electronics not being forthcoming on the export information to the
intelligence agencies of equipment which they had previously provided.
Plaintiff explained to the FBI Agent that the only effect method to do
this was to have at least one agent in place (overtly or covertly), by
way of the training department so that not only would that person have
access to equipment sales records, but could also assess and direct the
training of foreign nationals by way of this agent-in-position. This
agent-in-position was chosen by the U.S. Army as one of their own TSCM
instructors and overtly put in place a few months later to act as a
conduit and liaison. Additionally, in the years that followed, several
additional agents were put in place inside the Defendants firm from the
U.S. Army, with the Defendants permission as a type of undercover
operation, with these later operatives being controlled by the Central
Intelligence Agency instead of the U.S. Army.

702. Essentially, the U.S. Intelligence community has sought for decades
to control the TSCM marketplace, and the manufacture of related goods
and in turn to provide training so that there would be only a single
control point, or monopoly on all TSCM and related equipment that was
being exported to foreign countries for use by their intelligence
agencies, government agencies, military, and corporations.

703. In December of 1999, the Defendant requested the assistance of the
Plaintiff and attempted to use the Plaintiff to contact the manufacture
of a CODEC (digital coding and decoding) system which the Defendant has
seen the Plaintiff use to examine digital phone systems during TSCM
inspections. The Defendant sought to develop an eavesdropping device
based on the CODEC system, which the Plaintiff refused to assist in, or
to have anything to do with in any way. The Plaintiff did demonstrate to
the Defendant how to instead utilize near-end and far-end cross talk
analysis to locate eavesdropping devices, but refused to assist the
Defendant in eavesdropping methods or equipment development which they
were seeking.

704. Defendant restructured the company in 2000 and in the following
year, Defendant confected a Manufacturer’s Representative Contract in
which Defendant now claimed that all government sales were “in house”
clients of Defendant. Plaintiff discussed the improper and unethical
wholesale blanket of “in house” contained in the agreement with
Defendant Tom Jones, a managing member of Defendant, informed Plaintiff
that if he didn’t agree Defendant would severe all ties with Plaintiff
and he would be prohibited from any further purchases. In short,
Defendant informed Plaintiff he could “take it or leave it” with respect
to that provision and every other provision of the contract.

705. In addition, during visits made almost yearly after that point,
Defendant maintained a huge inventory of illegal bugging devices (i.e.
illegal devices designed primarily for the unlawful and surreptitious
interception of wire and/or oral communications), which is a felony to
possess, and which the Plaintiff personally examined, and in some cases
covertly and/or overtly photographed. Defendant repeatedly solicited
Plaintiff to purchase and deal in these illicit eavesdropping devices
from them, but Plaintiff strongly refused. Further, Defendant repeatedly
illegally bugged and eavesdropped upon Plaintiff during his visits in
contravention of applicable State laws of the State of Tennessee and
Federal law.

706. During the Plaintiff visits to the Defendants business location in
1999, 2004, 2005, and in 2007, Plaintiff photographed these illegal
bugging devices, which drastically upset the Defendants as they stated
that were concerned the they could get into trouble if the photographs
were ever published, put on the Internet, or provided to the authorities.

707. Beginning in 2001, Defendant entered into a manufacturer’s
representative agreement, which continued until October of 2010. A
review of the terms and conditions imposed by Plaintiff pursuant to its
inclusion of adhesion clauses in said contract required to be executed
by Defendant on a “take it or leave it” basis is illustrative. For
example, Defendant required Plaintiff to agree that “In the event of any
dispute or controversy regarding whether a commission is due, Plaintiff
“will have full authority and final discretion regarding same. REI’s
decision regarding the payment or non payment will not be appealable
(sic) or actionable even if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and or
motivated by REI’s self interest.” In addition, Defendants provided the
following: “REI may freely solicit any customer directly, even in
competition with the MREP and no liability will be incurred to the MREP.”

708. After 2006, annual renewals were signed but Defendant retained all
copies refusing to send copies to representatives who executed same,
even after multiple requested to be provided copies.

709. Defendant required that Plaintiff provide it with a Pending Order
Form on all sales of Plaintiff pursuant to the Manufacturer’s
Representative Contract. In approximately 2004, Plaintiff discovered
that on orders he had made with third parties, Defendant was under
reporting commissions due to Plaintiff. Further, Defendant restricted
Plaintiff’s ability to provide Pending Order Forms limiting him to only
ten (10) per month since Plaintiff was submitting more than any other
dealer in the United States (i.e. approximately 250 per month) as a
result of him selling more product then any other venue outside of the
Defendants business.

710. In 2004 and 2005, Plaintiff went to Defendants business to attend a
two-week series of classes, and then a one-week course relative to
Defendants equipment. Prior to Plaintiff’s arrival, he was told that
Defendant would assist him in dealing with clients to close more sales
and would also train Plaintiff in doing basic repairs on the OSCOR such
as replacing batteries and alignments and would do this over a three day
period over the weekend of the two week course (the “service” course was
to take place on Friday Afternoon, and then all day on Saturday and
Sunday). Contrary to Defendants representations, when Plaintiff arrived
he was shown how to repair broken hinges; however, Defendant not only
did not provide any instruction on any other repair or alignment
techniques as promised, Defendant did everything to hide from Plaintiff
anything related to repairs of the OSCOR.

711. In 2007, Defendant had developed another product, the TALAN (which
was based on the aforementioned CODEC of the Plaintiff). Plaintiff,
prior to his arrival at Defendants business, was told to bring
photographic equipment because Defendant wanted Plaintiff to take
extensive photographs of the TALAN in order to promote the product on
the Plaintiff’s web site. Prior to this date, Defendant had published
only computer mockups since Defendant was experiencing considerable
problems getting a final, production model. Upon arrival, Defendant not
only refused to allow photographs by Plaintiff, Defendant further
prohibited Plaintiff from using photographs from Defendant brochures,
even though Plaintiff was still a manufacturer’s representative. Over
the two week course, Plaintiff witnessed the TALAN products used in the
classroom and laboratories exhibiting catastrophic failures due to
serious design flaws, and the course instructors state to the Plaintiff
that the all of the units that the company was selling were having the
same problems, and that all of the units which the Plaintiff had sold to
the FBI as eavesdropping systems had been returned as defective.

712. In April 2007, after Plaintiff testified as a nationally recognized
technical subject matter expert in TSCM and TEMPEST for the “Deepwater”
Congressional Investigation and engaged as a subject matter expert for
the Congressional Oversight Committee a situation unfolded which
eventually resulted in the Defendant threatening to “destroy “ the
Plaintiff by a series of actions the Defendant initiated in August 2007
and coordinated on behalf of the certain elements of the U.S. Government
who were found to be involved by the Plaintiff in the “Deepwater”
matter, while the Plaintiff was engaged by and acting on behalf of the
Congressional Oversight Committee.

713. The Plaintiff asserts that this is the same pattern of retaliatory
behavior by the FBI an other government agencies, which was used against
Martin L. Kaiser in 1975 (and others since) after he also testified
before Congress in a similar fashion about government corruption and
rampant contractor fraud. This retaliation represents a long term
pattern of conduct by an agency, agent, or contractor of the government
in order to “pay back” or attempt to discrete the person who testified
before Congress and who performing their civic duty by providing such
testimony. Plaintiff further asserts, that this was a long term course
of conduct of a continuing enterprise, though a pattern, of racketeering
(including but not limited to: mail fraud, wire fraud, scheme to
defraud, obstruction of justice, interference in commerce, witness
tampering, whistle-blower retaliation, and monetary transactions in
property derived from specified unlawful activities), and have caused
injury to the business and/or property of Plaintiff.

714. The project to “destroy” the Plaintiff by this Defendant thus
appears to have been instituted in August of 2007, and possibly as early
as July 2007 (after the Plaintiff received a barrage of threats from
three defense contractor who had just lost a contract valued in the tens
of billions of dollars as a result of the Plaintiffs testimony before
Congress in April 2007).

715. The Plaintiff did not become aware of this pattern of criminal
behavior of the Defendants until it manifested itself on December 1,
2009, and discovered the injury to the Plaintiff at that time. Plaintiff
asserts that this pattern of specific, organized criminal acts (in order
to destroy the Plaintiff) took place from 2007 until the present date,
but also that the conduct took place over a long period of time spanning
a continuum of acts from October 2001 to the present time, and acts
which form a pattern even prior to September 2001, and in fact dating
back over a period of nearly thirty years.

716. After the Plaintiff testified before Congress in April 2007, the
Defendant began to suddenly complicate Plaintiff’s sales by kicking back
or rejecting end user certificates on overseas sales of products,
revealing at one point, that Defendant had “not received approval from
Washington, D.C. on the end user certificate.” The Defendant repeatedly
stated that these “End User Letters” or “End User Certificates” were
required to export the equipment, and to obtain the licenses from the
government for export (under 22 CFR 121.1XI(b) the export of these goods
are strictly controlled and licensed). This tactic continued to be
employed by Defendant such that simple transactions often were
complicated by Defendant to cause delays in the transactions resulting
in Defendant capturing the client and sale and denying Plaintiff
rightful commissions, or profits.

717. In January 2011, the Plaintiff discovered that in fact, the
Defendants did not have a license to export the goods as required by
law, and that they had repeatedly misreported the goods to the U.S.
Government as to the nature and capabilities, and had fraudulently
obtain classification as “General Purpose Test Equipment,” when indeed
it was not.

718. As far back as 1996, the Defendant repeatedly represented that
“they had the export license,” and that the Plaintiff did not discover
this fraud until extensively researching the matter in January 2011.

719. When Plaintiff questioned the Defendant concerning these suspected
illegal shipments and ITAR and munitions control list violations, RICO,
and related violation, the Defendant filed a vexatious and frivolous
lawsuit in Putnam country court (in Tennessee) in an attempt to muzzle
the Defendant, and to seek country level judgment, on what was indeed a
federal matter, and to cover-up their wrong doings.

720. Several transactions regarding sales made by Plaintiff are
illustrative. In approximately mid 2005, Plaintiff was contacted by a
national company interested in his advice relative to their needs and
TSCM equipment available from a number of manufacturers, including
Defendant. After spending a substantial period of time with the client,
Plaintiff submitted the Pending Order Form to Defendant for this
particular sale. After submission of same, Plaintiff made an inquiry to
Defendant on the status of the order and was informed no transaction
took place. This was approximately a $100,000 sale of equipment in which
Plaintiff should have been paid $25,000.00 commission. After being
informed no transaction took place, Plaintiff was on the premises of
Defendant subsequently for a training course and was greeted by one of
the national company’s employees who told Plaintiff they had tried to
purchase equipment from him; however, his boss had been contacted
directly by Defendant who told the company they had to buy it directly
from Defendant, not Plaintiff. Thereafter the sale went through directly
with Defendant who retained the entirety of the transaction and informed
Plaintiff that no sale had occurred.

721. A national pharmaceutical company consulted with Plaintiff in a
similar manner. After the company agreed to purchase Defendants
equipment from Plaintiff, Plaintiff submitted the pending order
notification to Defendant.

722. The purchase order was made with the pharmaceutical company’s
employee charged with providing not only budget requirements but also
recommendations to the company. As soon as Defendant received the
pending order notification from Plaintiff, Defendant immediately went to
a higher up in the pharmaceutical company took the order, concluded the
transaction and reported to Plaintiff that no sale had taken place.

723. Later at a trade show, Plaintiff encountered the pharmaceutical
company’s employee, with whom Plaintiff had dealt, who informed
Plaintiff that Defendant had called the company’s executive and told him
they had to purchase direct with Defendant, not Plaintiff.

724. Plaintiff was contacted by a foreign government who sought his
advice and counsel who desired to purchase equipment. The foreign
government flew not only their representative but also a number of their
TSCM personnel who came to Plaintiff place of business. The result of
Plaintiff meetings with this government resulted in the sale of 16
complete sets of Defendants equipment. Defendant, after receiving the
order, restricted Plaintiff’s commissions to only two of the sixteen
sets thereby depriving Plaintiff of some approximate $318,000 in
commissions earned.

725. In approximately September of 2007, and then in March 2008,
Plaintiff was directly contacted by a foreign government for the
purchase of approximately $1.5 Million dollars of Defendants equipment
to be delivered directly to their Embassy in Washington, D.C. In
addition, the Embassy desired Plaintiff to provide two weeks of training
to their personnel. The Embassy; however, desired that a small fraction
of the actual order be sent as a test transaction to ensure the
confidentiality of the transaction. Again, upon receipt of the test
transaction, Defendants went directly to persons inside this foreign
government to take over the entire transaction (and to cut the Plaintiff
out of the transaction). As a result of Defendants actions, the entire
transaction was terminated with an assurance made to Plaintiff that this
foreign government’s purchase would never be used in any of their
Embassies throughout the world as the direct result of the methods used
by Defendant as their operational security had been breached by
Defendant (the purchasing of this kind of equipment requires great
secrecy, or the equipment will be rendered of little or no value).
Plaintiff was deprived of approximately $500,000 in direct commissions
as well as the additional monies which were to be paid for Plaintiff
training of these intelligence officers.

726. Because of the nature of the business of the Plaintiff, the
agencies of the United States government who may or may not have been
involved with Plaintiff, and the nature of the transactions, Defendant
has been intentionally non specific relative to the specific details of
these transactions disclosed herein. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff has
provided TSCM services to virtually every intelligence agency of the
United States government as a recognized GSA contractor up until
December 1, 2009.

727. Upon information and belief there are hundreds of transactions
which were similarly handled by Defendants who maintained no
transactions occurred, when in fact they did resulting in commissions
being due and owing to Plaintiff well in excess of $3,150,000.00. The
conduct described herein by Defendants is submitted to have breached the
contract existing between the parties. Defendant is entitled to an
accounting for at least the past ten years prior to the filing of this
suit, and damages for the entirety of the thirty years, as the injury
was not fully discovered until December 2010 and January 2011.

728. Defendant has demanded an accounting of the aforementioned
commissions due from Plaintiff, but Plaintiff has failed and/or refused
and continues to fail and/or refuses to render such an accounting and
pay the monies due as reflected in the demand letter transmitted to
Defendant.

729. In 2004, Plaintiff advised Defendant of Ariyani Nawardi with the
Intelligence service for Indonesia. Mr. Nawardi and his entourage flew
to the U.S. and met with Plaintiff for several days. The result of
Plaintiff’s efforts was a contract calling for an international sale
with overseas delivery with Mr. Nawardi to purchase $916,880.00 of
Defendants countermeasure equipment. After Plaintiff Atkinson registered
his client with Defendants in accordance with written contract with
Defendant, and disclosed the entirety of the sale, the end result was
that Plaintiff drop shipped to Indonesia two sets of gear remitting to
Defendant the price less Plaintiff’s profits on those two sets.
Thereafter, Defendant fraudulently and tortuously interfered with
Plaintiff’s relationship with Mr. Nawardi and converted the remainder of
the order by entering an agreement with Mr. Nawardi converting the
remaining 14 sets which realized $819,000.00 to Defendants of which
Plaintiff received -0- commissions. To effectuate Defendants fraud,
tortuous interference with the contractual rights existing between
Plaintiff and Nawardi and the government of Indonesia, Defendant
transformed Mr. Nawardi magically into a “house client” shorting
Plaintiff of $316,000.00 commissions due. Specifically, Mr. Nawardi did
not want to deal with Defendants directly and so that sale was clearly
Plaintiff’s for which money is and has been due and owing.

730. In early November of 2009, Plaintiff booked a large sale to a
client and obtained a $66,000.00 sale of Defendants countermeasure
equipment. His commissions due were approximately $17,000.00; however,
being in the hospital from multiple heart attacks as a result of the
Defendant actions combined with his already being a disabled Veteran,
when Plaintiff did place the order, Defendant refused to remit to him
the commissions he earned and converted the customer completely.

731. Repeatedly throughout from April 2003 through October of 2010 the
Plaintiff requested a written accounting of the sales and commissions
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, but the Defendant refused
requests for same, and the Defendant suddenly “terminated” the
agreement, when Plaintiff more strongly requested an accounting to which
he is and has been entitled, Defendants threatened to terminate any
further association and bar Plaintiff from continuing to service his
clients as a further means of attempting to enforce the adhesion clause
relative to monies due.

732. The commissions due to the Plaintiff from the Defendant at this
point would have been well in excess of three million dollars, and by
Plaintiff refusing to do further business with the Plaintiff they
essentially retained the commissions that were due the Plaintiff.

733. Additionally, the future lost profits and commissions, which the
Plaintiff could reasonably earn are in the area of in excess of fifteen
million dollars in addition to moneys already owned.

734. Plaintiff asserts that between 2005 and 2007 Defendant, confected a
scheme to defraud the Plaintiff out of sales and commissions, and to
remove him as a market influencer, for their own benefit, and that in
August of 2007 they launched their scheme.

735. During the calendar year of 2010, Plaintiff sold approximately
$220,000.00 of Defendants equipment and earned at least $54,000.00 in
commissions, none of which have been paid or properly credited to his
in-house account, which Defendant had established for its convenience
since Plaintiff was the largest seller of Defendants equipment.

736. In March 2010, the accounting department at Defendant stated that
Plaintiff had a credit balance of $43,115, which was earmarked to
purchase new demonstration gear and to attend classes from the
Defendant, although the Plaintiff was somewhat wary of the “new
products” the Defendant was trying to promote and began asking technical
question about the equipment; however, the Defendant could not answer
the questions to the Plaintiffs satisfaction.

737. In order to avoid payment of past monies due to Plaintiff and
alternatively to avoid any accounting which had been repeatedly
requested by Plaintiff, Defendant engaged in an abuse of process.

738. Specifically, in February 2009, the Plaintiff contracted for the
sale of over $30,000.00 of Defendants equipment to a client located in
Switzerland and an ultimate destination in Uzbekistan.

739. Upon receipt of payment by the Swiss client, Plaintiff properly
registered the sale in accordance with the required disclosure to
Defendant and immediately remitted full payment in the sum of over
$20,000.00 to Defendant who received same.

740. Defendant has previously judicially confessed that these funds were
for the entirety of the order bound for Switzerland and thence to
Uzbekistan, and that the transaction had been paid in full at the time
and was financially cleared for immediate shipment.

741. In order to avoid any accounting or payment of monies due to
Plaintiff, Defendant required that the shipment of the Defendants
equipment must be preceded by what is referred to as an “end user”
certificate, rather than ship the purchased items to the address
provided, and then repeatedly rejected the supplied documents without
submitting them to the U.S. Government.

742. Plaintiff was repeatedly told that the shipment was “on the loading
dock” and requiring only the end-user certificate to effect release.

743. In truth in fact, due to Fraud by Research Electronics and
employees of Research Electronics under the U.S. Commerce classification
of the equipment purchased at the time, no end user certificate was
actually required. Further, neither Switzerland nor Uzbekistan required
any end user certificate.

744. It has since been discovered that while no “end user” certificate
is legally required, the goods are still required by law to be shipped
under a State Department issued approval, which the Defendant had
unlawfully subverted by falsely claiming the equipment was merely
“general purpose test equipment” when in fact it was rather “electronic
counter measures gear” which is tightly controlled and regulated by the
U.S. Government.

745. It is by this deception, that the Defendant was engaging in tens of
millions of dollars in illegal exports, as an long term organized
criminal enterprise.

746. To make matter worse, under ITAR 121.1 XI(b) and international arms
control treaties the goods are not actually controlled by the U.S.
Commerce Department, but rather the U.S. State Department and then in
turn controlled secondarily by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency though the Department of Defense.

747. The Defendant Research Electronics registered fraudulent ECCN
(Export Control Numbers) with the U.S. Commerce Department to deceive
the U.S. Government as to the true nature of the goods, and thus to
maintain control under the umbrella of the U.S. Commerce instead other
U.S. State Department. These fraudulent ECCN codes were then used to
subvert U.S. Export controls and international treaty, and remove
oversight, licensure, and control of the goods from the U.S. State
Department, when in fact the U.S. State Department was required both by
law and international treaty to control these goods, not the U.S.
Commerce Department.

748. The mechanism by which the U.S. State Department controls these
goods is by way of an End User License, which is obtained by making a
formal application by the manufacture and exporter (in this case
Research Electronics) to the U.S. State Department and including an End
User Certificate or Letter along with relevant documents.

749. Thusly, a purchaser of such equipment would be required to provide
an End User Certificate at some point in the transaction to effect the
obtaining of the required U.S. State Department License. Additional
documents in regards to the transaction would also be supplied to the
U.S. State Department to obtain this license, which would vary based on
whom the end user would be and their prior relationship with the U.S.
diplomatic, military, and intelligence services.

750. Very often a purchaser of this equipment would initiate an initial
End user Certificate to the U.S. State Department mere to inquire if it
would be possible to obtain mere information about a product or to
obtain technical manual to review as by Federal Statute detailed
technical information or users manuals also require the same licenses,
although they are not as strictly enforced.

751. As customers tend not to purchase good on which they have not been
trained the end user also must obtain a license is order to attend
training, which normally precede actual acquisition of the equipment.

752. Therefore, one End user Certificate will be issued and carried to
the U.S. Embassy in the country where the actual end user is located to
start the process of licensure.

753. Once approved, the end user can then obtain detailed technical
materials on the equipment they seek, and obtain technical manuals to
review.

754. Once the end user determines several systems which they will be
interested in they will then initiate a license to attend training, and
the organization which will be providing training will seek a license to
be allowed to provide the same training (to better understand and
evaluate the proposed equipment).

755. Once the end user is comfortable that the equipment will fulfill
their requirements an initial purchase of the equipment will be made,
and yet another End user Certificate issued, for the final equipment
purchase. It is therefore not uncommon for there to be four or five End
User Certificates issued over a six to nine month or even several year
period to effect the purchase of a single piece of equipment. The last
End User Certificate of course being the most vital of these.

756. By Defendant Research Electronics requiring an End User Certificate
on foreign transactions they provided a complex illusion that they were
applying for U.S. State Department licenses, when indeed they were not
doing so. This is a very grave violation of both U.S. Law and a
violation of International Treaties on Arms Control.

757. Defendant Research Electronics and their agents and mpeoyyes
repeatedly stated they had the proper licenses in place to effect export
of these goods, which indeed that did not. They further promised they
all exports were being made in accordance with U.S. Export laws, when in
fact no shipment of goods, materials, or providing of training was being
provided legally.

758. Indeed, the entirety of the business operations of Defendant
Research Electronics is a complex and organized criminal enterprise
involved in international arm smuggling and money laundering.

759. Defendant, upon information and belief, directed the customer in
Switzerland to contact the Rockport Police Department in Rockport,
Massachusetts, and the Cape Ann Chamber of Commerce in Gloucester,
Massachusetts and to file a criminal complaint alleging that Plaintiff
was attempting to “steal” the customer’s money (when in fact the
Defendant was in possession of the funds, and was delaying shipping the
goods, and in full control of the transaction).

760. In addition, Defendant further rejected the first and second “end
user” certificate which Defendant required in order to delay the
shipment which Defendant knew the customer wanted as quickly as possible
since it formed a portion of a time sensitive contract via the cut-out
in Switzerland for a sale that the Swiss customer had with the
Government of Uzbekistan.

761. Due to the delays in the Defendant shipping the goods to the
client, the Plaintiff received a number of threatening phone calls, in
an attempt to speed up shipment, and the caller (from Switzerland) even
threatening bodily violence (and made terroristic threats against the
Plaintiff) if the goods were not in his hands by November 6, 2009, so
that the goods could in turn be provided to the end user. Further, the
Plaintiff was told that he would be “severely punished” because of the
delays in the shipment, which were in fact caused by the Defendant.

762. In fact, the transaction was out of the Plaintiff hands at that
point as the Defendant had the entirety of the Plaintiffs funds, and was
awaiting the End User to provide a legitimate End User Certificate
(which was issued by the Government of Uzbekistan until November 23, 2009).

763. It has since been discovered that while Defendant Research
Electronics was provided with this End User Certificate they did not in
fact forward to the U.S. State Department in order to obtain an Export
License for the transaction, and indeed the Defendant did falsify export
documentation that was provided to the U.S. Customs Department in order
to smuggle the arms out the United States.

764. Further the Defendant Research under declared the value and the
nature of the goods, and even knowing that the End User Certificate
indicate that the end user was in Uzbekistan, fraudulently listed
another country as the end user.

765. For a number of years the Government of Kazakhstan had been
covertly supplying weapons grade radiological materials to the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to facilitate the development
of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Numerous shipments were being
made out of the strategic stockpiles of the Government of Kazakhstan
over both land routes and by way of the Caspian Sea. These illicit
transaction of nuclear materials where often brokered by politicians and
businessmen in Uzbekistan and Switzerland. Much of these radiological
materials were originating from the old Soviet stockpiles of
decommissioned nuclear weapons and mining and refining operations that
were still located in Kazakhstan. With minimal effort on the part of the
Iranian nuclear engineers these materials could then be crafted into at
least a hundred or more Iranian high yield nuclear warheads, spread over
(at the time) several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles. In
order to cripple the Iranian nuclear weapons program it was thus vital
to relocate these nuclear materials well away from the Caspian Sea and
well away from the Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan border and to a more secure and
remote storage location in the far north of Kazakhstan.

766. In 2007 and 2008, the Islamic Republic of Iran was also
internationally procuring the materials by way of front companies in the
United Arab Emirates from source companies in China, North Korea and the
United States sufficient to produce deuterium oxide foam and tritium for
use for roughly 130 two and three stage thermo-nuclear-pressure devices
or high yield nuclear warheads for deployment on their inventory of long
range Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM).
These raw materials for this project were inside Iran prior to February
2009, at a nuclear weapons fabrications facility just to the north of
Tehran.

767. Then in 2009, and 2010 the Islamic Republic of Iran completed the
procurement of raw materials to fabricate in excess of 150 completed
warheads and re-entry vehicles, and made this purchase again through
front companies in the United Arab Emirates from source in China and the
United States of America.

768. In August and September 2011, the Islamic Republic of Iran started
the procurement of additional raw materials to fabricate additional
nuclear warheads and re-entry vehicles.

769. The Government of Uzbekistan had agreed to provide
counter-surveillance services to the Government of Kazakhstan in
preparation for the movement of sixty casks of nuclear weapons-grade
plutonium and highly enriched uranium (sufficient to make 770+ nuclear
bombs) by rail starting in Mid November 2009 (such transactions, sales,
and services for such counter-surveillance goods and services are within
the normal course and scope of the Plaintiff’s business and area of
expertise).

770. Such equipment sales or counterintelligence services to the
intelligence agencies of one country, so that they may render services
to a allied or semi-allied country is the mainstay of the intelligence
community and which forms a type of “diplomatic quid pro quo” where the
nation with greater technical capabilities provides services to the
inferior nation.

771. In this case, the Government of Kazakhstan lacked the ability to
detect tracking devices and eavesdropping devices on the transport rail
cars, and requested the assistance of the intelligence agencies within
the Government of Uzbekistan, who then procured the equipment through
the cut-out company in Switzerland, who in turn placed the order with
the Plaintiff, and thus the Plaintiff placed the order with the
Defendant Research Electronics who performed the manufacturing and export.

772. As the test runs of these rail cars and casks were to begin in Mid
November 2009 with live runs starting in February 2010 and completing in
February 2011, and it was vitally important that the
counter-surveillance equipment supplied by Defendant arrive a week in
advance of Mid November 2009 (the equipment had to be in the hands of
the Government of Uzbekistan, not later then November 6, 2009).

773. The Government of Uzbekistan and the Government of Kazakhstan opted
to utilize a “Chinese Wall” in order to procure the equipment for this
project, and in February 2009, the Government of Uzbekistan CEMA
contracted with the intermediary in Switzerland for the equipment purchase.

774. The Government of Kazakhstan had been obstructing the movement of
these casks for years, it took supreme diplomatic and political pressure
on the part of the United States Government to move the casks, and the
U.S. State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Department of
Energy were strongly involved in manipulating this project to get it
moving forward.

775. In short, the Government of Kazakhstan did not want to move the
casks and was doing everything possible to obstruct the project.

776. The casks being close to Uzbekistan gave the country political and
diplomatic power as they were accessible to Uzbekistan should they
choose to make any move on the weapons grade materials or to make
purchases and smuggle same.

777. Moving the nuclear materials away from the Caspian Sea moved them
well outside the reach of Uzbekistan and Iran. The government of
Uzbekistan did not want to move the casks and was doing everything
possible to obstruct the project as it weakened them politically, and
diplomatically.

778. In turn the U.S. Government requested that the Defendant, delay and
interfere with the shipping the Plaintiff’s goods destined for
Uzbekistan, so that the shipment arrivals would take place well after
the window of opportunity (after Mid November 2009). To this end, the
Defendant repeatedly and needlessly rejected the un-needed end user
certificates, and created drama about the transaction to enable this delay.

779. It was presumably in the best interest of the U.S. Government
diplomatic efforts for there to be no counter-surveillance gear
available to the Government of Kazakhstan for use on this project, which
is why, even after the Plaintiff provided Defendant will all of the
funds to cover the shipment, and all of the documents requested, they
claimed that the documents were not sufficient, and Plaintiff now
asserts that Defendants were fully acting as agents of the U.S.
Government in delaying the goods.

780. In turn, the U.S. Government applied pressure on Defendants
Research Electronics (and co-defendant agents, and employees of Research
Electronics) to cause these delays in order to deprive the Government of
Kazakhstan of their sweep gear so that they could not detect the bugs
and tracking devices that the U.S. Government would have placed on the
rail cars.

781. Ultimately, Defendants Research Electronics (and co-defendant
agents, and employees of Research Electronics) were acting as an agent
of the U.S. Government (the FBI), the U.S. State Department (outside of
PM/DDTC, the normal approval authority) and the Central Intelligence
Agency and Plaintiff merely got caught in the middle of a legitimate
business transaction whereby the U.S. Government wanted to delay the
shipment, but knew that Plaintiff too honest to play games with his
clients, and hence went to the less ethical supplier of the goods, the
Defendant Research Electronics (and co-defendant agents, and employees
of Research Electronics) to effect the delay.

782. But these illegal manipulations, and delays, and interference with
Plaintiff international shipments, along with wire fraud, and scheme to
defraud, qualify this as a Racketeering Offense involving both private
and government entities.

783. Thereafter, upon information and belief, Defendant Research
Electronics (and co-defendant agents, and employees of Research
Electronics) was in communication with the Rockport Police Department,
specifically Robert J. Tibert, who handed the matter to

Patrolmen Daniel
Mahoney, and other law enforcement agencies, manipulating their
investigations to obtain the specific result of effectuating Plaintiff’s
arrest to not only damage Plaintiff’s good name and reputation known
worldwide as not only an expert and market influencer in TSCM, but also
to obtain the result of not having to account for or pay for large sums
of monies due and owing to Plaintiff Atkinson.

784. Indeed Defendant Research Electronics has actually judicially
confessed that such a conspiracy was confected, and that they worked
closely with the Rockport Police Department to create un-needed delays
for the sole purpose of setting up the Plaintiff so that he may be
arrested on false charges, and have his civil rights violated, even
though the Plaintiff had done nothing wrong.

785. Indeed Research Electronics had been paid in full by the Plaintiff
for the goods and that Research Electronics working with the Rockport
Police Department created delays in the shipment.

786. In turn, once the Plaintiff Atkinson had been arrested, the
Defendant Research Electronics went ahead and immediately released the
shipment they had been delaying without cause (under the guise of
non-existent licensing that they were not applying for, but which was
indeed required), and all of the goods in the hands of the end-user a
few days later (while the Plaintiff was in the hospital due to the
actions of the Defendants).

787. On information and belief, Plaintiff asserts that this conspiracy
was initiated and coordinated through FBI Agent Christian McDowell and
ICE Agent Jamison Wiroll operating out the Boston, MA.

788. The U.S. Government had previously approached the Plaintiff to
effect similar delays on foreign transactions, which the Plaintiff had
always refused to take part in as a matter of ethics. The proper legal
mechanism for a proper delay was to request the PM/DDTC office at the
U.S. State Department to delay the license approvals, but the FBI was
not doing this and was seeking extra-legal delays, which were improper.

789. After these goods where released in early December 2009 by
Defendant Research Electronics, starting on or about Mid-December 2009,
and running through March and April 2010, virtually all of the
Defendants Research Electronics in-transit shipments were seized or
delayed by U.S. Customs due to “irregularities in the export documents”,
presumable due to fraudulent export documents having been repeatedly
filed by the Defendant in violation of 22 CFR 121.1 XI(b).

790. In conjunction with an abuse of process (i.e. using and
manipulating the criminal process to obtain a result for which the
process was not intended ­ avoid payment of monies and accounting of
monies due), Defendant further refused to ship to a customer from China,
a Defendants product which was to be shipped to Arizona inside the
Territory of the United States.

791. In accordance with terms and conditions of contract, which
Defendant has judicially confessed, the sale of the Defendants product
to the Chinese customer to be delivered to Arizona, Defendant refused to
ship the product to Arizona, even though there sufficient credit balance
on the Plaintiff account to fully fund the transaction.

792. Defendant again communicated with the Rockport Police Department
and provided misleading, false and inaccurate information to Patrolman
Daniel Mahoney in its singular scheme to avoid any accounting, payment
of monies due Plaintiff from Defendant, and utterly destroy the
competitive viability of Plaintiff in the marketplace as a strong market
influence for which Defendant was keenly aware.

793. Plaintiff submits that he is entitled to declaratory judgment that
the clauses in MREP Agreements described herein are adhesionary and
contra bones mores such that they are legally unenforceable.

794. Plaintiff submits that he is entitled to an appropriate order from
this Court commanding disclosure for inspection and copying by Plaintiff
of all pending order forms submitted by Plaintiff to Defendant as well
as all sales records, communications relative to sales, shipping, and
export records of Defendant for the past ten (10) years.

795. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has committed tortuous
interference with the contractual rights of Plaintiff contracts, to
Plaintiff detriment causing damages.

796. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has converted Plaintiff’s funds
due and owing both through refusing to remit the funds maintained in
Plaintiff’s “house” account, commissions due, and via conversion of
Defendants customers and clients.

797. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has committed fraud by
intentionally falsifying the status of sales made by Plaintiff and
falsely claiming sales made by Plaintiff as Defendants and/or other
third parties.

798. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has abused the legal process by
falsely reporting information to the Rockport Police Department with the
intended purpose of destroying Plaintiff’s good name, business
reputation, business, market influence, and accomplish the conversion of
Plaintiff’s money and goods; a purpose for which the legal process was
not intended to achieve with full knowledge of Defendants actions.

799. Plaintiff asserts the Research Electronics, and individual
employees and agents of Research Electronics acting both in their
individual capacity, and of their official capacity as agents of the
Rockport Police Department and the FBI violated the civil right of the
Plaintiff while acting under color of authority.

800. Plaintiff submits that Defendant has breached the laws of the State
of Tennessee or/or of the United States by illegally possessing bugging
devices as well as using those illegal bugging devices to intercept wire
and/or oral communications of Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s consent
contrary to law, doing so within and throughout at least the past ten
years while Plaintiff was on the premises of Defendants establishments
in Tennessee.

801. Further, this Defendant has engaged in conduct and as a continuing
unit of an enterprise, through a pattern, of racketeering enterprises
(including, but not limited to: mail fraud, wire fraud, scheme to
defraud, robbery, kidnapping, extortion, obstruction of justice,
interference in commerce, also involving monetary transactions in
property derived from specified unlawful activity), and have caused
injury to the business and/or property of the Plaintiff Atkinson. These
Defendants have violated the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiff,
infringing and deprived him of his civil rights

--
James M. Atkinson
President and Sr. Engineer
"Leonardo da Vinci of Bug Sweeps and Spy Hunting"
http://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=15178662
Granite Island Group
jmatk[at]tscm.com
http://www.tscm.com/
(978) 546-3803