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31 January 2011
[Federal Register: January 31, 2011 (Volume 76, Number 20)]
[Notices]
[Page 5439-5466]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr31ja11-130]
[[Page 5439]]
Vol. 76
Monday,
No. 20
January 31, 2011
Part III
Department of Justice
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Antitrust Division
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United States, et al. v. Comcast Corp., et al.; Proposed Final Judgment
and Competitive Impact Statement; Notice
[[Page 5440]]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Antitrust Division
United States, et al. v. Comcast Corp., et al.; Proposed Final
Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement
Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final
Judgment, Stipulation and Order, and Competitive Impact Statement have
been filed with the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in United States of America, et al. v. Comcast Corp., et al.,
Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-00106. On January 18, 2011, the United States
filed a Complaint alleging that the proposed joint venture between
Comcast Corp. and General Electric Co., which would give Comcast
control over NBC Universal, Inc., would violate Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The proposed Final Judgment, filed
simultaneously with the Complaint, requires the defendants to license
the joint venture's content to online video programming distributors
under certain conditions, relinquish its management rights in Hulu,
LLC, and subject itself to Open Internet and anti-retaliation
provisions, along with other requirements.
Copies of the Complaint, proposed Final Judgment, and Competitive
Impact Statement are available for inspection at the Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Antitrust Documents Group, 450 Fifth
Street, NW., Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-
2481); on the Department of Justice's Web site at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr; and at the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia. Copies of these materials may be obtained
from the Antitrust Division upon request and payment of the copying fee
set by Department of Justice regulations.
Public comment is invited within sixty (60) days of the date of
this notice. Such comments, and responses thereto, will be published in
the Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be
directed to Nancy Goodman, Chief, Telecommunications & Media
Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 450
Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7000, Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-
514-5621).
Patricia A. Brink,
Director of Civil Enforcement.
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
United States of America, United States Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7000, Washington,
DC 20530; State of California, Office of the Attorney General, CSB
No. 184162, 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702, Los Angeles, CA
90013; State of Florida, Antitrust Division, PL-01, The Capitol,
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050; State of Missouri, Missouri Attorney
General's Office, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65109; State of
Texas, Office of the Attorney General, 300 W. 15th Street, 7th
Floor, Austin, TX 78701; and State of Washington, Office of the
Attorney General of Washington, 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000,
Seattle, WA 98104-3188, Plaintiffs, v. Comcast Corp., 1 Comcast
Center, Philadelphia, PA 19103; General Electric Co., 3135 Easton
Turnpike, Fairfield, CT 06828; and NBC Universal, Inc., 30
Rockefeller Plaza, New York, NY 10112, Defendants.
Case: 1:11-cv-00106.
Assigned to: Leon, Richard J.
Assign. Date: 1/18/2011.
Description: Antitrust.
Complaint
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the
Attorney General of the United States, and the States of California,
Florida, Missouri, Texas, and Washington, acting under the direction of
their respective Attorneys General or other authorized officials
(``Plaintiff States'') (collectively, ``Plaintiffs''), bring this civil
action pursuant to the antitrust laws of the United States to
permanently enjoin a proposed joint venture (``JV'') and related
transactions between Comcast Corporation (``Comcast'') and General
Electric Company (``GE'') that would allow Comcast, the largest cable
company in the United States, to control some of the most popular video
programming among consumers, including the NBC Television Network
(``NBC broadcast network'') and the cable networks of NBC Universal,
Inc. (``NBCU''). If the JV proceeds, tens of millions of U.S. consumers
will pay higher prices for video programming distribution services,
receive lower-quality services, and enjoy fewer benefits from
innovation. To prevent this harm, the United States and the Plaintiff
States allege as follows:
I. Introduction and Background
1. This case is about how, when, from whom, and at what price the
vast majority of American consumers will receive and view television
and movie content. Increasingly, consumers are demanding new ways of
viewing their favorite television shows and movies at times convenient
to them and on devices of their own choosing. Consumers also are
demanding alternatives to high monthly prices charged by cable
providers, such as Comcast, for hundreds of channels of programming
that many of them neither desire nor watch.
2. Today, consumers buy video programming services only from the
distributors serving their local areas. Incumbent cable companies
continue to serve a majority of customers, offering services consisting
of multiple channels of linear or scheduled programming. Beginning in
the mid-1990s, cable companies first faced competition from the direct
broadcast satellite (``DBS'') providers. More recently, firms that
traditionally offered only voice telephony services--the telephone
companies or ``telcos,'' such as AT&T and Verizon--have emerged as
competitors. The video programming offerings of these competitors are
similar to the cable incumbents' programming packages, and their
increased competition has pushed cable companies to offer new features,
including additional channels, digital transmission, video-on-demand
(``VOD'') offerings, and high-definition (``HD'') picture quality.
3. Most recently, online video programming distributors (``OVDs'')
have begun to provide professional video programming to consumers over
the Internet. This programming can be viewed at any time, on a variety
of devices, wherever the consumer has high-speed access to the
Internet. Cable companies, DBS providers, and telcos have responded to
this entry with further innovation, including expanding their VOD
offerings and allowing their subscribers to view programming over the
Internet under certain conditions.
4. Through the JV, Comcast seeks to gain control of NBCU's
programming, a potent tool that would allow it to disadvantage its
traditional video programming distribution competitors, such as cable,
DBS, and the telcos, and curb nascent OVD competition by denying access
to, or raising the cost of, this important content. If Comcast is
allowed to exercise control over this vital programming, innovation in
the market for video programming distribution will be diminished, and
consumers will pay higher prices for programming and face fewer
choices.
5. Attractive content is vital to video programming distribution.
Today, consumers subscribe to traditional video programming
distributors in order to view their favorite programs (scheduled
[[Page 5441]]
or on demand), discover new shows and networks, view live sports and
news, and watch old and newly available movies. Distributors compete
for viewers by marketing the rich array of programming and other
features available on their services. This marketing often promotes
programming that is exclusive to the distributor or highlights the
distributor's rivals' lack of specific programming or features.
6. NBCU content, especially the NBC broadcast network, is important
to consumers and video programming distributors' ability to attract and
retain customers. Programming is often at the center of disputes
between subscription video programming distributors and broadcast and
cable network owners. The public outcry when certain programming is
unavailable, even temporarily, underscores the damage that can occur
when a video distributor loses access to valuable programming. The JV
will give Comcast control over access to valuable content, and the
terms on which its rivals can purchase it, including the possibility of
denying them the programming entirely.
7. NBCU content is especially important to OVDs. NBCU has been an
industry leader in making its content available over the Internet. If
OVDs cannot gain access to NBCU content, their ability to develop into
stronger video programming distribution competitors will be impeded.
8. Comcast itself recognizes the importance of the NBC broadcast
network, which it describes as an ``American icon.'' NBC broadcasts
such highly rated programming as the Olympics, Sunday Night Football,
NBC Nightly News, The Office, 30 Rock, and The Today Show. NBCU also
owns other important programming, including the USA Network, the
number-one-rated cable channel; CNBC, the leading cable financial news
network; other top-rated cable networks, such as Bravo and SyFy; and
The Weather Channel, in which it holds a significant stake and has
management rights.
9. Comcast faces little video programming distribution competition
in many of the areas it serves. Entry into traditional video
programming distribution is expensive, and new entry is unlikely in
most areas. OVDs' Internet-based offerings are likely the best hope for
additional video programming distribution competition in Comcast's
cable franchise areas.
10. Thus, the United States and the Plaintiff States ask this Court
to enjoin the proposed JV permanently.
II. Jurisdiction and Venue
11. The United States brings this action under Section 15 of the
Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 25, to prevent and restrain Comcast,
GE, and NBCU from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
12. The Plaintiff States, by and through their respective Attorneys
General and other authorized officials, bring this action under Section
16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 26, to prevent and restrain Comcast,
GE, and NBCU from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.
The Plaintiff States bring this action in their sovereign capacities
and as parens patriae on behalf of the citizens, general welfare, and
economy of each of the Plaintiff States.
13. In addition to distributing video programming, Comcast owns
programming. Comcast and NBCU sell programming to distributors in the
flow of interstate commerce. Comcast's and NBCU's activities in selling
programming to distributors, as well as Comcast's activities in
distributing video programming to consumers, substantially affect
interstate commerce and commerce in each of the Plaintiff States. The
Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action and these
defendants pursuant to Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15
U.S.C. 25, and 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337(a), and 1345.
14. Venue is proper in this District under Section 12 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 22, and 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1) and (c). Defendants
Comcast, GE, and NBCU transact business and are found within the
District of Columbia. Comcast, GE, and NBCU have submitted to personal
jurisdiction in this District.
III. Defendants and the Proposed Joint Venture
15. Comcast is a Pennsylvania corporation headquartered in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. It is the largest video programming
distributor in the nation, with approximately 23 million video
subscribers. Comcast is also the largest high-speed Internet provider,
with over 16 million subscribers for this service. Comcast wholly owns
national cable programming networks, including E! Entertainment, G4,
Golf, Style, and Versus, and has partial interests in Current Media,
MLB Network, NHL Network, PBS KIDS Sprout, Retirement Living
Television, and TV One. In addition, Comcast has controlling interests
in the following regional sports networks (``RSNs''): Comcast SportsNet
(``CSN'') Bay Area, CSN California, CSN Mid-Atlantic, CSN New England,
CSN Northwest, CSN Philadelphia, CSN Southeast, and CSN Southwest; and
partial interests in three other RSNs: CSN Chicago, SportsNet New York,
and The Mtn. Comcast also owns digital properties such as
DailyCandy.com, Fandango.com, and Fancast, its online video Web site.
In 2009, Comcast reported total revenues of $36 billion. Over 94
percent of Comcast's revenues, or $34 billion, were derived from its
cable business, including $19 billion from video services, $8 billion
from high-speed Internet services, and $1.4 billion from local
advertising on Comcast's cable systems. In contrast, Comcast's cable
programming networks earned only about $1.5 billion in revenues from
advertising and fees collected from video programming distributors.
16. GE is a New York corporation with its principal place of
business in Fairfield, Connecticut. GE is a global infrastructure,
finance, and media company. GE owns 88 percent of NBCU, a Delaware
corporation, with its headquarters in New York, New York. NBCU is
principally involved in the production, packaging, and marketing of
news, sports, and entertainment programming. NBCU wholly owns the NBC
and Telemundo broadcast networks, as well as ten local NBC owned and
operated television stations (``O&Os''), 16 Telemundo O&Os, and one
independent Spanish-language television station. Seven of the NBC O&Os
are located in areas in which Comcast has incumbent cable systems--
Chicago, Hartford/New Haven, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, San
Francisco, and Washington, DC. In addition, NBCU wholly owns national
cable programming networks--Bravo, Chiller, CNBC, CNBC World, MSNBC,
mun2, Oxygen, Sleuth, SyFy, and the USA Network--and partially owns A&E
Television Networks (including the Biography, History, and Lifetime
cable networks), The Weather Channel, and ShopNBC.
17. NBCU also owns Universal Pictures, Focus Films, and Universal
Studios, which produce films for theatrical and digital video disk
(``DVD'') release, as well as content for NBCU's and other companies'
broadcast and cable programming networks. NBCU produces approximately
three-quarters of the original, primetime programming shown on the NBC
broadcast network and the USA cable network--NBCU's two highest-rated
networks. In addition to its programming-related assets, NBCU owns
several theme parks and digital properties, such as iVillage.com.
Finally, NBCU is a founding partner and
[[Page 5442]]
32 percent owner of Hulu, LLC, an OVD. In 2009, NBCU had total revenues
of $15.4 billion.
18. On December 3, 2009, Comcast, GE, NBCU, and Navy, LLC
(``Newco''), a Delaware corporation, entered into a Master Agreement,
whereby Comcast agreed to pay $6.5 billion in cash to GE, and Comcast
and GE each agreed to contribute certain assets to the JV to be called
Newco. Specifically, GE agreed to contribute all of the assets of NBCU,
including its interest in Hulu and the 12 percent interest in NBCU it
does not currently own but has agreed to purchase from Vivendi SA.
Comcast agreed to contribute all its cable programming assets,
including its national networks as well as its RSNs, and some digital
properties, but not its cable systems or its online video Web site,
Fancast. As a result of the content contributions and cash payment by
Comcast, Comcast will own 51 percent of the JV, and GE will retain a 49
percent interest. The JV will be managed by a separate board of
directors initially consisting of three Comcast-designated directors
and two GE-designated directors. Board decisions will be made by
majority vote.
19. Comcast is precluded from transferring its interest in the JV
for a four-year period, and GE is prohibited from transferring its
interest for three and one-half years. Thereafter, either party may
sell its respective interest in the JV, subject to Comcast's right to
purchase at fair market value any interest that GE proposes to sell.
Additionally, three and one-half years after closing, GE will have the
right to require the JV to redeem 50 percent of GE's interest; after
seven years, GE will have the right to require the JV to redeem all of
its remaining interest. If GE elects to exercise its first right of
redemption, Comcast will have the contemporaneous right to purchase the
remainder of GE's ownership interest once a purchase price is
determined. If GE does not exercise its first redemption right, Comcast
will have the right to buy 50 percent of GE's initial ownership
interest five years after closing and all of GE's remaining ownership
interest eight years after closing. It is expected that Comcast
ultimately will own 100 percent of the JV.
IV. The Professional Video Programming Industry
20. The professional video programming industry has had three
different levels: Content production, content aggregation or networks,
and distribution.
A. Content Production
21. Television production studios produce television shows and
license that content to broadcast and cable networks. Content producers
typically retain the rights to license their content for syndication
(e.g., licensing of series to networks or television stations after the
initial run of the programming) as well as for DVD distribution and VOD
or pay-per-view (``PPV'') services. In addition to first-run rights
(i.e., the rights to premiere the content), content producers such as
NBCU also license the syndication rights to their own programming to
broadcast and cable networks. For example, House is produced by NBCU,
licensed for its first run on the FOX broadcast network, and then rerun
on the USA Network, a cable network owned by NBCU. These content
licenses often include ancillary rights to related content (e.g., short
segments of programming or clips, extras such as cast interviews,
camera angles, and alternative feeds), as well as the right to offer
some programming on demand (both online and through traditional cable,
satellite, and telco distribution methods).
22. A content owner controls which entity receives its programming
and when, through a process known as ``windowing.'' Historically, the
first television release window was reserved for broadcast on one of
the four major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX), followed by
broadcast syndication, and, ultimately, cable syndication. Over the
past couple of years, however, content owners have created new windows
and begun to allow their content to be distributed over the Internet on
either a catch-up (e.g., next day) or syndicated (e.g., next season)
basis.
23. In addition to producing content for television and cable
networks, NBCU produces and distributes first-run movies through
Universal Pictures, Universal Studios, and Focus Films. Typically,
these movies are distributed to theaters before being released on DVD,
then licensed to VOD/PPV providers, then to premium cable channels
(e.g., Home Box Office (``HBO'')), then to regular cable channels, and
finally to broadcast networks. As they have with television
distribution, over the past several years content owners have
experimented with different windows for distributing films over the
Internet.
B. Programming Networks
24. Networks aggregate content to provide a 24-hour-per-day service
that is attractive to consumers. The most popular networks, by far, are
the four broadcast networks. The first cable network was HBO, which
launched in the early 1970s. Since then, cable networks have grown in
popularity and number. As of the end of 2009, there were an estimated
600 national, plus another 100 regional, cable programming networks.
More than 100 of these networks were also available in HD.
1. Broadcast Networks
25. Owners of broadcast network programming or broadcasters (e.g.,
NBCU) license their broadcast networks (e.g., NBC, Telemundo) either to
third-party television stations affiliated with that network (``network
affiliates''), or to their owned and operated television stations or
O&Os. The network affiliates and O&Os distribute the broadcast network
feeds over the air to the public and, importantly, retransmit them to
professional video programming distributors such as cable companies and
DBS providers, which in turn distribute the feeds to their subscribers.
26. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992 (``1992 Cable Act''), Public Law 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992),
gave broadcast television stations, whether network affiliates or O&Os,
the option to demand ``retransmission consent,'' a process through
which a distributor negotiates with the station for the right to carry
the station's programming for agreed-upon terms. Alternatively,
stations can elect ``must carry'' status, which involves a process
through which the station can demand to be carried without
compensation. Stations affiliated with the four major broadcast
networks, including the O&Os, all have elected retransmission consent.
Historically, these stations negotiated for non-monetary reimbursement
(e.g., carriage of new cable channels) in exchange for retransmission
consent. Today, most broadcast stations seek fees based on the number
of subscribers to the cable, DBS, or telco service distributing their
content. Less popular broadcast networks generally have elected must
carry status, although recently they also have begun to negotiate
retransmission payments.
27. In the past, NBCU has negotiated the retransmission rights only
for its O&Os, but it has expressed interest in and made efforts to
obtain the rights from its NBC broadcast network affiliates to
negotiate retransmission consent agreements on their behalf. NBCU could
also seek to renegotiate its agreements with its affiliates to obtain a
share of any retransmission consent fees the affiliates are able to
command.
[[Page 5443]]
2. Cable Networks
28. In addition to the broadcast networks, programmers produce
cable networks and sell them to video programming distributors. Most
cable networks are based on a dual revenue-stream business model. They
derive roughly half their revenues from licensing fees paid by
distributors and the other half from advertising fees. The revenue
split varies depending on several factors, including the type of
programming (e.g., financial news or general entertainment) and whether
the program is established or newly launched.
29. Generally, an owner of a cable network receives a monthly per-
subscriber fee that may vary based upon the popularity or ratings of a
network's programming, the volume of subscribers served by the
distributor, the packages in which the programming is included, the
percentage of the distributor's subscribers receiving the programming,
and other factors. In addition to the right to carry the network, a
distributor of the cable network often receives two to three minutes of
advertising time per hour on the network that it can sell to local
businesses (e.g., car dealers). A distributor may also receive
marketing payments or discounts to encourage greater penetration of its
potential consumers. In the case of a completely new cable network, a
programmer may pay a distributor to carry the network or offer other
discounts.
30. Over time, some video programming distributors, such as Comcast
and Cablevision Corp., have purchased or launched their own cable
networks. Vertical integration between content and distribution was a
reason for the passage of Section 19 of the 1992 Cable Act, 47 U.S.C.
548. Pursuant to the Act, Congress directed the Federal Communications
Commission (``FCC'') to promulgate rules that place restrictions on how
cable programmers affiliated with a cable company can deal with
unaffiliated distributors. These ``program access rules'' apply to a
cable company that owns a cable network, and prohibit both the cable
company and the network from engaging in unfair acts or practices,
including (1) Entering into exclusive agreements for the cable network;
(2) selling the cable network to the cable company's competitors on
discriminatory terms and conditions; and (3) unduly influencing the
cable network in deciding whom, and on what terms and conditions, to
sell its programming. 47 CFR 76.1001-76.1002. The prohibition on
exclusivity sunsets in October 2012, unless extended by the FCC after a
rulemaking proceeding. The program access rules do not apply to online
distribution or to retransmission of broadcast station content.
C. Professional Video Programming Distribution
31. Video programming distributors acquire the rights to transmit
professional, full-length broadcast and cable programming networks or
individual programs or movies, aggregate the content, and distribute it
to their subscribers or users.
1. Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (``MVPDs'')
32. Traditional video programming distributors offer hundreds of
channels of professional video programming to residential customers for
a fee. They include incumbent cable companies, DBS providers, cable
overbuilders, also known as broadband service providers or ``BSPs''
(e.g., RCN), and telcos. These distributors are often collectively
referred to as MVPDs (``multichannel video programming distributors'').
In response to increasing consumer demand to record and view video
content at different times, many MVPDs offer services such as digital
video recorders (``DVRs'') that allow consumers to record programming
and view it later, and VOD services that allow viewers to view
broadcast or cable network programming or movies on demand at times of
their choosing.
2. Online Video Programming Distributors (``OVDs'')
33. OVDs offer numerous choices for on-demand professional (as
opposed to user-generated, e.g., typical YouTube videos), full-length
(as opposed to clips) video programming over the Internet, whether
streamed to Internet-connected televisions or other devices, or
downloaded for later viewing. Currently, OVDs employ several business
models, including free advertiser-supported streaming (e.g., Hulu),
[aacute] la carte downloads or electronic sell-through (``EST'') (e.g.,
Apple iTunes, Amazon), subscription streaming models (e.g., Hulu Plus,
Netflix), per-program rentals (e.g., Apple iTunes, Vudu), and hybrid
hardware/subscription models (e.g., Tivo, Apple TV/iTunes).
34. Consumer desire for on-demand viewing and increased broadband
speeds that have greatly improved the quality of the viewing experience
have led to distribution of more professional content by OVDs. Online
video viewing has grown enormously in the last several years and is
expected to increase. Today, some consumers regard OVDs as acceptable
substitutes for at least a portion of their traditional video
programming distribution services. These consumers buy smaller content
packages from traditional distributors, decline to take certain premium
channels, or purchase fewer VOD offerings, and instead watch that
content online, a practice known as ``cord-shaving.'' A smaller but
growing number of MVPD customers also are ``cutting the cable cord''
completely in favor of OVDs. These trends indicate the growing
significance of competition between OVDs and MVPDs.
35. OVD services, individually or collectively, are likely to
continue to develop into better substitutes for MVPD video services.
Evolving consumer demand, improving technology (e.g., higher Internet
access speeds, better compression to improve picture quality, improved
digital rights management to fight piracy), and advertisers' increasing
willingness to place their ads on the Internet, likely will make OVDs
stronger competitors to MVPDs for greater numbers of existing and new
viewers.
36. Comcast and other MVPDs recognize the impact of OVDs. Their
documents consistently portray the emergence of OVDs as a significant
competitive threat. MVPDs, including Comcast, have responded by
improving existing services and developing new, innovative services for
their customers. For example, MVPDs have improved user interfaces and
video search functionality, offered more VOD programming, and begun to
offer programming online.
37. GE, through its ownership of NBCU, is a content producer and an
owner of broadcast and cable channels. Comcast is primarily a
distributor of video programming, although it owns some cable networks.
Through the proposed JV, Comcast will control assets that produce and
aggregate some of the most significant video content. Comcast also will
continue to own the nation's largest distributor of video programming
to residential customers.
V. Relevant Market
38. The relevant product market affected by this transaction is the
timely distribution of professional, full-length video programming to
residential customers (``video programming distribution''). Both MVPDs
and OVDs are participants in this market. Video programming
distribution is characterized by the aggregation of professionally
produced content, consisting of entire episodes of shows and movies,
rather than short clips. This content includes live programming,
sports, and general entertainment
[[Page 5444]]
programming from a mixture of broadcast and cable networks, as well as
from movie studios. Video programming distributors typically offer
various packages of content (e.g., basic, expanded basic, digital),
quality levels (e.g., standard-definition, HD, 3D), and business models
(e.g., free ad-supported, subscription). Video programming can be
viewed immediately by consumers, whether on demand or as scheduled
(i.e., in a cable network's linear stream).
39. A variety of companies distribute video programming--cable,
DBS, overbuilder, telco, and online. Cable has remained the dominant
distributor even as other companies have entered video programming
distribution. In the mid-1990s, DirecTV and DISH Network began offering
hundreds of channels using small satellite dishes. Around the same
time, firms known as ``overbuilders'' began building their own wireline
networks, primarily in urban areas, to compete with the incumbent cable
operator and offer video, high-speed Internet, and voice telephony
services--the ``triple-play.'' More recently, Verizon and AT&T entered
the market with their own networks and also offer the triple-play.
Competition from these video programming distributors has provoked
incumbent cable operators across the country to upgrade their systems
and thereby offer substantially more video programming channels, as
well as the triple-play. Now, OVDs are introducing new and innovative
business models and services to inject even more competition into the
video programming distribution market.
40. Historically, over-the-air (``OTA'') distribution of broadcast
network content has not served as a significant competitive constraint
on MVPDs because of the limited number of channels offered. In
addition, OTA distribution likely will not expand in the future, as no
new broadcast networks are likely to be licensed for distribution. This
diminishes the possibility that OTA could increase its content package
substantially to compete with MVPDs. Thus, OTA is unlikely to become a
significant video programming distributor. By contrast, OVDs, though
they may offer more limited viewing options than MVPDs currently, are
expanding rapidly and have the potential to provide increased and more
innovative viewing options in the future.
41. Consumers purchasing video programming distribution services
select from among those distributors that can offer such services
directly to their home. The DBS operators, DirecTV and DISH, can reach
almost any customer in the continental United States who has an
unobstructed line of sight to their satellites. OVDs are available to
any consumer with a high-speed Internet service sufficient to receive
video of an acceptable quality. However, wireline cable distributors
such as Comcast and Verizon generally must obtain a franchise from
local, municipal, or state authorities in order to construct and
operate a wireline network in a specific area, and then build lines
only to homes in that area. A consumer cannot purchase video
programming distribution services from a wireline distributor operating
outside its area because that firm does not have the facilities to
reach the consumer's home. Thus, although the set of video programming
distributors able to offer service to individual consumers' residences
generally is the same within each local community, that set differs
from one local community to another and can vary even within a local
community.
42. For ease of analysis, it is useful to aggregate consumers who
face the same competitive choices in video programming distribution by,
for example, aggregating customers in a county or other jurisdiction
served by the same group of distributors. The United States thus
comprises numerous local geographic markets for video programming
distribution, each consisting of a community whose residents face the
same competitive choices. In the vast majority of local markets,
customers can choose from among the local cable incumbent and the two
DBS operators. Approximately 38 percent of consumers can also buy video
services from a telco, and a much smaller percentage live in areas
where overbuilders provide service. OVDs are emerging as another viable
option for consumers who have access to high-speed Internet services.
OVDs rely on other companies' high-speed Internet services to deliver
content to consumers.
43. The geographic markets relevant to this transaction are the
numerous local markets throughout the United States where Comcast is
the incumbent cable operator, covering over 50 million U.S. television
households (about 45 percent nationwide), and where Comcast will be
able to withhold NBCU programming from, or raise the programming costs
to, its rival distributors, both MVPDs and OVDs. Because these
competitors serve areas outside Comcast's cable footprint, other local
markets served by these rival distributors may be affected, with the
competitive effects of the transaction potentially extending to all
Americans.
44. A hypothetical monopolist of video programming distribution in
any of these geographic areas could profitably raise prices by a small
but not insignificant, non-transitory amount. While consumers naturally
look for other options in response to higher prices, the number of
consumers that would likely find these other options to be adequate
substitutes is insufficient to make the higher prices unprofitable for
the hypothetical monopolist. Thus, video programming distribution in
any of these geographic areas is a well-defined antitrust market and is
susceptible to the exercise of market power.
VI. Market Concentration
45. The incumbent cable companies often dominate any particular
market with market shares within their franchise areas well above 50
percent. For example, Comcast has the market shares of 64 percent in
Philadelphia, 62 percent in Chicago, 60 percent in Miami, and 58
percent in San Francisco (based on MVPD subscribers). Combined, the DBS
providers account for approximately 31 percent of total video
programming distribution subscribers nationwide, although their shares
vary and may be lower in any particular local market. AT&T and Verizon
have had great success and achieved penetration (i.e., the percentage
of households to which a provider's service is available that actually
buys its service) as high as 40 percent in the selected communities
they have entered, although they currently have limited expansion
plans. Overbuilders serve only about one percent of U.S. television
households nationwide.
46. Today, OVDs have a de minimis share of the video programming
distribution market in any geographic area. OVD services are available
to any consumer who purchases a broadband connection. However,
established distributors, such as Comcast, view OVDs as a growing
competitive threat and have taken steps to respond to that threat.
OVDs' current market shares, therefore, greatly understate both their
future and current competitive significance in terms of the influence
they are having on traditional video programming distributors'
investment decisions to expand offerings and embrace Internet
distribution themselves.
VII. Anticompetitive Effects
47. Today, Comcast competes with DBS, overbuilder, and telco
competitors by upgrading its existing services (e.g., improving its
network, expanding its
[[Page 5445]]
VOD and HD offerings), and through promotional and other forms of price
discounts. In particular, Comcast strives to provide a service that it
can promote as better than its rivals' services in terms of variety of
programming choices, higher-quality services, and unique features
(e.g., unique programming or ease of use). Consumers benefit from this
competition by receiving better quality services and, in some cases,
lower prices. This competition has also fostered innovation, including
the development of digital transmission, HD and 3D programming, and the
introduction of DVRs and VOD offerings.
48. The proposed JV would allow Comcast to limit competition from
MVPD competitors and from the growing threat of OVDs. The JV would give
Comcast control over NBCU content that is important to its competitors.
Comcast has long recognized that by withholding certain content from
competitors, it can gain additional cable subscribers and limit the
growth of emerging competition. Comcast has refused to license one of
its RSNs, CSN Philadelphia, to DirecTV or DISH. As a result, DirecTV's
and DISH's market shares in Philadelphia are much lower than in other
areas where they have access to RSN programming.
49. Control of NBCU programming will give Comcast an even greater
ability to disadvantage its competitors. Carriage of NBCU programming,
including the NBC broadcast network, is important for video programming
distributors to compete effectively. Out of hundreds of networks, the
NBC broadcast network consistently is ranked among the top four in
consumer interest surveys. It receives high Nielsen ratings, which
distributors and advertisers use as a proxy for a network's value. The
importance of the NBC broadcast network to a distributor is underscored
by the fact that NBCU has recently negotiated significant
retransmission fees with certain distributors that when combined with
its advertising revenues, rival the most valuable cable network
programming. Economic studies show that distributors that lose
important broadcast content for any significant period of time suffer
substantial customer losses to their competitors.
50. NBCU's cable networks also are important to consumers and
therefore to video programming distributors. USA Network has been the
highest-rated cable network the past four years. CNBC is by far the
highest-rated financial news cable network, and Bravo and SyFy are top-
rated cable networks for their particular demographics. NBCU's cable
networks are widely distributed and command high fees.
51. As a result of the JV, Comcast will gain control over the NBC
O&Os in local television markets where Comcast is the dominant video
programming distributor. The JV will give Comcast the ability to raise
the fees for retransmission consent for the NBC O&Os or effectively
deny this programming entirely to certain video programming
distribution competitors. In addition, Comcast may be able to gain the
right to negotiate on behalf of its broadcast network affiliate
stations or the ability to influence the affiliates' negotiations with
its distribution competitors. In either case, these distributors would
be less effective competitors to Comcast. Comcast also will control
NBCU's cable networks and film content, increasing the ability of the
JV to obtain higher fees for that programming. The JV will have less
incentive to distribute NBCU programming to Comcast's video
distribution rivals than a stand-alone NBCU. Faced with weakened
competition, Comcast can charge consumers more and will have less
incentive to innovate.
52. The impact of the JV on emerging competition from the OVDs is
extremely troubling given the nascent stage of OVDs' development and
the potential of these distributors to significantly increase
competition through the introduction of new and innovative features,
packaging, pricing, and delivery methods. NBCU has been one of the
content providers most willing to support OVDs and experiment with
different methods of online distribution. It was a founding partner in
Hulu, the largest OVD today, and prior to the announcement of the
transaction entered into several contracts with OVDs, such as Apple
iTunes, Amazon, and Netflix.
53. Comcast and other MVPDs have significant concerns over emerging
competition by OVDs. To the extent that consumers, now or in the
future, view OVDs as substitutes for traditional video programming
distributors, they will be able to challenge Comcast's dominant
position as a video programming distributor. Comcast has taken several
steps to keep its customers from cord-shaving or cord-cutting in favor
of OVDs. These efforts include launching its own online video portal
(Fancast), improving its VOD library and online interactive interface
(in order to compete with, e.g., Netflix and Amazon), and deploying its
``authenticated'' online, on-demand service. Consumers have benefited
from Comcast's competitive responses and, absent the JV, would benefit
from increased competition from OVDs.
54. Comcast has an incentive to encumber, through its control of
the JV, the development of nascent distribution technologies and the
business models that underlie them by denying OVDs access to NBCU
content or substantially increasing the cost of obtaining such content.
As a result, Comcast will face less competitive pressure to innovate,
and the future evolution of OVDs will likely be muted. Comcast's
incentives and ability to raise the cost of or deny NBCU programming to
its distribution rivals, especially OVDs, will lessen competition in
video programming distribution.
VIII. Absence of Countervailing Factors
A. Entry
55. Entry or expansion of traditional video programming
distributors on a widespread scale or entry of programming networks
comparable to NBCU's will not be timely, likely, or sufficient to
reverse the competitive harm that would likely result from the proposed
JV. OVDs are less likely to develop into significant competitors if
denied access to NBCU content.
B. Efficiencies
56. The proposed JV will not generate verifiable, merger-specific
efficiencies sufficient to reverse the competitive harm of the proposed
JV.
IX. Violations Alleged
Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act by Each Defendant
57. The United States and the Plaintiff States hereby incorporate
paragraphs 1 through 56.
58. Pursuant to a Master Agreement dated December 3, 2009, Comcast,
GE, and NBCU intend to form a joint venture.
59. The effect of the proposed JV and Comcast's acquisition of 51
percent of it would be to lessen competition substantially in
interstate trade and commerce in numerous geographic markets for video
programming distribution, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. 18, and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, 2.
60. This proposed JV threatens loss or damage to the general
welfare and economies of each of the Plaintiff States, and to the
citizens of each of the Plaintiff States. The Plaintiff States and
their citizens will be subject to a continuing and substantial threat
of irreparable injury to the general welfare and economy, and to
competition, in their respective jurisdictions unless the
[[Page 5446]]
Defendants are enjoined from carrying out this transaction, or from
entering into or carrying out any agreement, understanding, or plan by
which Comcast would acquire control over NBCU or any of its assets.
61. The proposed JV will likely have the following effects, among
others:
a. Competition in the development, provision, and sale of video
programming distribution services in each of the relevant geographic
markets will likely be eliminated or substantially lessened;
b. Prices for video programming distribution services will likely
increase to levels above those that would prevail absent the JV; and
c. Innovation and quality of video programming distribution
services will likely decrease to levels below those that would prevail
absent the JV.
X. Requested Relief
62. The United States and the Plaintiff States request that:
a. The proposed JV be adjudged to violate Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18;
b. Comcast, GE, NBCU, and Newco be permanently enjoined from
carrying out the proposed JV and related transactions; carrying out any
other agreement, understanding, or plan by which Comcast would acquire
control over NBCU or any of its assets; or merging;
c. The United States and the Plaintiff States be awarded their
costs of this action;
d. The Plaintiff States be awarded their reasonable attorneys'
fees; and
e. The United States and the Plaintiff States receive such other
and further relief as the case requires and the Court deems just and
proper.
Dated: January 18, 2011
Respectfully submitted,
For Plaintiff United States:
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Christine A. Varney (DC Bar 411654)
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Molly S. Boast
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Gene I. Kimmelman (DC Bar 358534)
Chief Counsel for Competition Policy and Intergovernmental Relations
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia A. Brink
Director of Civil Enforcement
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Joseph J. Matelis (DC Bar 462199)
Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Nancy M. Goodman
Chief
Laury E. Bobbish
Assistant Chief, Telecommunications & Media Enforcement
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
John R. Read (DC Bar 419373)
Chief
David C. Kully (DC Bar 448763)
Assistant Chief, Litigation III
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Yvette F. Tarlov* (DC Bar 442452)
Attorney, Telecommunications & Media Enforcement, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite
7000, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 514-5621, Facsimile:
(202) 514-6381, E-mail: Yvette.Tarlov@usdoj.gov
Matthew J. Bester (DC Bar 465374)
Shobitha Bhat
Hillary B. Burchuk (DC Bar 366755)
Luin P. Fitch
Paul T. Gallagher (DC Bar 439701)
Peter A. Gray
F. Patrick Hallagan
Michael K. Hammaker (DC Bar 233684)
Matthew C. Hammond
Joyce B. Hundley
Robert A. Lepore
Erica S. Mintzer (DC Bar 450997)
H. Joseph Pinto III
Warren A. Rosborough IV (DC Bar 495063)
Natalie Rosenfelt
Blake W. Rushforth
Anthony D. Scicchitano
Jennifer A. Wamsley (DC Bar 486540)
Frederick S. Young (DC Bar 421285)
Attorneys for the United States
* Attorney of Record
For Plaintiff State of California
Kamala D. Harris
Attorney General
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan M. Eisenberg
Deputy Attorney General, California Department of Justice, Office of
the Attorney General, CSB No. 184162, 300 South Spring Street, Suite
1702, Los Angeles, California 90013, Phone: (213) 897-6505,
Facsimile: (213) 620-6005, jonathan.eisenberg@doj.ca.gov
For Plaintiff State of Florida
Pamela Jo Bondi
Attorney General, State of Florida
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Patricia A. Conners
Associate Deputy Attorney General
Eli A. Friedman
Assistant Attorney General
Lizabeth A. Brady
Chief, Multistate Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust Division, PL-01,
The Capitol, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050, Tel: (850) 414-3300, Fax:
(850)488-9134, E-mail: Eli.Friedman@myfloridalegal.com
For Plaintiff State of Missouri
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Koster
Attorney General
Anne E. Schneider
Assistant Attorney General/Antitrust Counsel
Andrew M. Hartnett
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 899 Jefferson City, MO 65109 573/751-7445, F: 573/751-2041,
anne.schneider@ago.mo.gov,
For Plaintiff State of Texas
Greg Abbott
Attorney General of Texas
Daniel T. Hodge
First Assistant Attorney General
Bill Cobb
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
John T. Prud'homme, Jr.
Chief, Antitrust Division, Office of the Attorney General, 300 W.
15th St., 7th floor, Austin, Texas 78701, (512) 936-1697, (512) 320-
0975--facsimile
For Plaintiff State of Washington
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
David M. Kerwin
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Office of the
Attorney General of Washington, 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000,
Seattle, WA 98104-3188, 206/464-7030, davidk3@atg.wa.gov
United States District Court for the District of Columbia
United States of America, State of California, State of Florida,
State of Missouri, State of Texas, and State of Washington,
Plaintiffs, v. Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC
Universal, Inc., Defendants.
Case: 1:11-cv-00106.
Assigned To: Leon, Richard J.
Assign. Date: 1/18/2011.
Description: Antitrust.
Competitive Impact Statement
The United States of America (``United States''), acting under the
direction of the Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to
Section 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA'' or
``Tunney Act''), 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact
Statement relating to the proposed Final Judgment (attached hereto as
Exhibit A) submitted for entry in this civil antitrust proceeding.
I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
On December 3, 2009, Comcast Corporation (``Comcast''), General
Electric Company (``GE''), NBC Universal, Inc. (``NBCU''), and Navy,
LLC (``Newco''), announced plans to form a new Joint Venture (``JV'')
to which Comcast and GE will contribute broadcast and cable network
assets. As a result of the transaction, Comcast--the nation's largest
cable company--will have majority control of a JV holding highly valued
video programming needed by Comcast's video distribution rivals to
compete effectively.
The United States filed a civil antitrust Complaint on January 18,
2011, seeking to enjoin the proposed transaction because its likely
effect
[[Page 5447]]
would be to lessen competition substantially in the market for timely
distribution of professional, full-length video programming to
residential customers (``video programming distribution'') in major
portions of the United States in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The transaction would allow Comcast to disadvantage
its traditional competitors (direct broadcast satellite (``DBS'') and
telephone companies (``telcos'') that provide video services), as well
as competing emerging online video distributors (``OVDs''). This loss
of current and future competition likely would result in lower-quality
services, fewer choices, and higher prices for consumers, as well as
reduced investment and less innovation in this dynamic industry.
On January 18, 2011, the Federal Communications Commission
(``FCC'') adopted a Memorandum Opinion and Order relating to the
foregoing transaction.\1\ The FCC's Order approved the transaction
subject to certain conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Applications of Comcast
Corp., General Electric Co. and NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to
Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees, FCC MB Docket No.
10-56 (adopted Jan. 18, 2011). Under the Communications Act, the FCC
has jurisdiction to determine whether mergers involving the transfer
of a telecommunications license are in the ``public interest,
convenience, and necessity.'' 47 U.S.C. 310(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the proposed Final Judgment filed by the United States
Department of Justice simultaneously with this Competitive Impact
Statement and explained more fully below, Defendants will be required,
among other things, to license the JV's programming to Comcast's
emerging OVD competitors in certain circumstances. When Defendants and
OVDs cannot reach agreement on the terms and conditions of the license,
the aggrieved OVD may apply to the Department for permission to submit
its dispute to commercial arbitration under the proposed Final
Judgment. The FCC Order contains a similar provision. For so long as
commercial arbitration is available for the resolution of such disputes
in a timely manner under the FCC's rules and orders, the Department
will ordinarily defer to the FCC's commercial arbitration process to
resolve such disputes. However, the Department reserves the right, in
its sole discretion, to permit arbitration under the proposed Final
Judgment to advance the Final Judgment's competitive objectives. In
addition, the Department may seek relief from the Court to address
violations of any provisions of the proposed Final Judgment. The
proposed Final Judgment also contains provisions to prevent Defendants
from interfering with an OVD's ability to obtain content or deliver its
services over the Internet.
The proposed Final Judgment will provide a prompt, certain, and
effective remedy for consumers by diminishing Comcast's ability to use
the JV's programming to harm competition. The United States and
Defendants have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be
entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of the proposed Final
Judgment would terminate this action, except that the Court would
retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the provisions of
the proposed Final Judgment, and to punish and remedy violations
thereof.
II. Description of Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation
A. Defendants, the Proposed Transaction, and the Department's
Investigation
1. Comcast
Comcast is a Pennsylvania corporation headquartered in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. It is the largest cable company in the
nation, with approximately 23 million video subscribers. Comcast is
also the largest Internet service provider (``ISP''), with over 16
million subscribers. Comcast also wholly owns national cable
programming networks, including E! Entertainment, G4, Golf, Style, and
Versus, and has partial ownership interests in Current Media, MLB
Network, NHL Network, PBS KIDS Sprout, Retirement Living Television,
and TV One. In addition, Comcast has controlling and partial interests
in regional sports networks (``RSNs'').\2\ Comcast also owns digital
properties such as DailyCandy.com, Fandango.com, and Fancast, its
online video Web site. In 2009, Comcast reported total revenues of $36
billion. Over 94 percent of Comcast's revenues, or $34 billion, were
derived from its cable business, including $19 billion from video
services, $8 billion from high-speed Internet services, and $1.4
billion from local advertising on Comcast's cable systems. In contrast,
Comcast's cable programming networks earned only about $1.5 billion in
revenues from advertising and fees collected from video programming
distributors.
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\2\ Comcast owns Comcast SportsNet (``CSN'') Bay Area, CSN
California, CSN Mid-Atlantic, CSN New England, CSN Northwest, CSN
Philadelphia, CSN Southeast, and CSN Southwest, and holds partial
ownership interests in CSN Chicago, SportsNet New York, and The Mtn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. GE and NBCU
GE is a New York corporation with its principal place of business
in Fairfield, Connecticut. GE is a global infrastructure, finance, and
media company. GE owns 88 percent of NBCU, a Delaware corporation,
headquartered in New York, New York. NBCU is principally involved in
the production, packaging, and marketing of news, sports, and
entertainment programming.
NBCU wholly owns the NBC and Telemundo broadcast networks, as well
as ten local NBC owned and operated television stations (``O&Os''), 16
Telemundo O&Os, and one independent Spanish language television
station. In addition, NBCU wholly owns national cable programming
networks--Bravo, Chiller, CNBC, CNBC World, MSNBC, mun2, Oxygen,
Sleuth, SyFy, and USA Network--and partially owns A&E Television
Networks (including the Biography, History, and Lifetime cable
networks), The Weather Channel, and ShopNBC.
NBCU also owns Universal Pictures, Focus Films, and Universal
Studios, which produce films for theatrical and digital video disk
(``DVD'') release, as well as content for NBCU's and other companies'
broadcast and cable programming networks. NBCU produces approximately
three-quarters of the original primetime programming shown on the NBC
broadcast network and the USA cable network, NBCU's two highest-rated
networks. In addition to its programming assets, NBCU owns several
theme parks and digital assets, such as iVillage.com. In 2009, NBCU had
total revenues of $15.4 billion.
NBCU also is a founding partner and 32 percent owner of Hulu, LLC,
currently one of the most successful OVDs. Hulu is a joint venture
between NBCU, News Corp., The Walt Disney Company, and a private equity
investor. Each of the media partners has representation on the Hulu
Board, possesses management rights, and licenses content for Hulu to
deliver over the Internet.
3. The Proposed Transaction
On December 3, 2009, Comcast, GE, NBCU, and Newco, entered into a
Master Agreement (``Agreement''), whereby Comcast agreed to pay $6.5
billion in cash to GE, and Comcast and GE each agreed to contribute
certain assets to the JV. Specifically, GE agreed to contribute all of
the assets of NBCU, including its interest in Hulu, and the 12 percent
interest in NBCU that GE does not own but has agreed to purchase
[[Page 5448]]
from Vivendi SA. Comcast agreed to contribute all its cable programming
assets, including its national programming networks, its RSNs, and some
digital properties, but not its cable systems or its Internet video
service, Fancast. As a result of the content contributions and cash
payment by Comcast, Comcast will own 51 percent of the JV, and GE will
retain a 49 percent interest. The JV will be managed by a separate
Board of Directors consisting initially of three Comcast-designated
directors and two GE-designated directors. Board decisions will be made
by majority vote.
The Agreement precludes Comcast from transferring its interest in
the JV for a four-year period, and prohibits GE from transferring its
interest for three and one-half years. Thereafter, either party may
sell its respective interest in the JV, subject to Comcast's right to
purchase at fair market value any interest that GE proposes to sell.
Additionally, three and one-half years after closing, GE will have the
right to require the JV to redeem 50 percent of GE's interest and,
after seven years, GE will have the right to require the JV to redeem
all of its remaining interest. If GE elects to exercise its first right
of redemption, Comcast will have the contemporaneous right to purchase
the remainder of GE's ownership interest once a purchase price is
determined. If GE does not exercise its first redemption right, Comcast
will have the right to buy 50 percent of GE's initial ownership
interest five years after closing and all of GE's remaining ownership
interest eight years after closing. It is expected that Comcast
ultimately will own 100 percent of the JV.
4. The Department's Investigation
The Department opened an investigation soon after the JV was
announced and conducted a thorough and comprehensive review of the
video programming distribution industry and the potential implications
of the transaction. The Department interviewed more than 125 companies
and individuals involved in the industry, obtained testimony from
Defendants' officers, required Defendants to provide the Department
with responses to numerous questions, reviewed over one million
business documents from Defendants' officers and employees, obtained
and reviewed tens of thousands of third-party documents, obtained and
extensively analyzed large volumes of industry financial and economic
data, consulted with industry and economic experts, organized product
demonstrations, and conducted independent industry research. The
Department also consulted extensively with the FCC to ensure that the
agencies conducted their reviews in a coordinated and complementary
fashion and created remedies that were both comprehensive and
consistent.
B. The Video Programming Industry
NBCU and Comcast are participants in the video programming
industry, in which content is produced and distributed to viewers
through their television sets or, increasingly, through Internet-
connected devices. Historically, the video programming industry has had
three different levels: content production, content aggregation or
networks, and distribution.
1. Content Production
Television production studios produce television shows and
coordinate how, when, and where their content is licensed in order to
maximize revenues. They usually license to broadcast and cable networks
the right to show a program first (i.e., the first-run rights). Content
producers also license their content for subsequent ``windows'' such as
syndication (e.g., licensing series to broadcast and cable networks
after the first run of the programming), as well as for DVD
distribution, video on demand (``VOD''), and pay per view (``PPV'')
services. For example, the television show House is produced by NBCU,
licensed for its first run on the FOX broadcast network and then rerun
on the USA Network, a cable network owned by NBCU. These content
licenses often include ancillary rights such as the right to offer some
programming on demand.
Historically, first-run licenses were reserved for one of the four
major broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX), followed by
broadcast syndication and, ultimately, cable syndication. Over the past
several years, however, content owners have begun to license their
content for first run on cable networks and distribution over the
Internet on either a catch-up (e.g., next day) or syndicated (e.g.,
next season) basis.
In addition to producing content for television and cable networks,
NBCU produces and distributes first-run movies through Universal
Pictures, Universal Studios, and Focus Films. Typically, producers
distribute movies to theaters before releasing them on DVD, then
license them to VOD/PPV providers, then to premium cable channels
(e.g., Home Box Office (``HBO'')), then to regular cable channels, and
finally to broadcast networks. As with television distribution, studios
have experimented with different windows for film distribution over the
past several years.
2. Programming Networks
Networks aggregate content to provide a 24-hour service that is
attractive to consumers. The most popular networks, by far, are the
four broadcast networks.\3\ However, cable networks have grown in
popularity and number, and at the end of 2009 there were an estimated
600 national, plus another 100 regional, cable programming networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The four largest broadcast networks attract 8 to 12 million
viewers each, whereas the most popular cable networks typically
attract approximately 2 million viewers each. SNL Kagan, Economics
of Basic Cable Networks 43 (2009); The Nielsen Company, Snapshot of
Television Use in the U.S. 2 (Sept. 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/
nielsenwire/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Nielsen-State-of-TV-
09232010.pdf.
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a. Broadcast Networks
Owners of broadcast network programming or broadcasters like NBCU
license their broadcast networks either to third-party television
stations affiliated with that network (``network affiliates''), or to
their owned and operated television stations (``O&Os''). The network
affiliates and O&Os distribute the broadcast network feeds over the air
(``OTA'') to the public and also retransmit them to video programming
distributors, such as cable companies and DBS providers, which in turn
distribute the feeds to their subscribers.
Under the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992 (``1992 Cable Act''), Public Law 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460
(1992), broadcast television stations, whether network affiliates or
O&Os, may elect to obtain ``retransmission consent'' from a programming
distributor, in which case a distributor negotiates with a station for
the right to carry the station's programming for agreed-upon terms.
Alternatively, stations may elect ``must carry'' status and demand
carriage but without compensation. Stations affiliated with the four
major broadcast networks and the networks' O&Os have elected
retransmission consent. Historically, these stations negotiated for
non-monetary compensation (e.g., carriage of new cable channels owned
by the broadcaster) in exchange for retransmission consent. Today, most
broadcast stations seek retransmission consent fees based on the number
of subscribers to the cable, DBS, or telco service distributing their
content.\4\ Less
[[Page 5449]]
popular broadcast networks generally elect must carry status, although
recently they also have begun to negotiate retransmission payments.
Despite these retransmission payments, broadcast stations earn the
majority of their revenues from local advertising sales. The broadcast
networks earn most of their revenues from national advertising sales.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ In the past, NBCU negotiated the retransmission rights only
for its O&Os, but recently it has made efforts to obtain the rights
from its network affiliates to negotiate retransmission consent
agreements on their behalf. NBCU also may seek to renegotiate its
agreements with its affiliates to obtain a share of any
retransmission consent fees the affiliates are able to command.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Cable Networks
Popular cable networks include ESPN, USA, MTV, CNN, and Bravo.
Cable networks typically derive roughly one half of their revenues from
licensing fees paid by video programming distributors and the other
half from advertising fees. Generally, a distributor pays an owner of
cable networks a monthly per-subscriber fee that may vary based upon
the number of subscribers served by the distributor, the programming
packages in which the program is included, the percentage of the
distributor's subscribers receiving the programming, and other factors.
Typically, the popularity or ratings of a network's programming affects
the ability of a content owner to negotiate higher license fees. In
addition to the right to carry the network, a distributor of the cable
network often receives two to three minutes of advertising time per
hour on the network for sale to local businesses (e.g., car dealers). A
distributor also may receive marketing payments or discounts to
encourage wider distribution of the programming. In the case of a
completely new cable network, a programmer may pay a distributor to
carry the network or offer other discounts.
3. Video Programming Distribution
Video programming distributors acquire the rights to transmit
professional (as opposed to user-generated videos such as those
typically seen on YouTube), full-length (as opposed to clips) broadcast
and cable programming networks or individual programs or movies,
aggregate the content, and distribute it to their subscribers or users.
This content includes live programming, sports, and general
entertainment programming from a variety of broadcast and cable
networks and from movie studios, and can be viewed either on demand or
as scheduled in a broadcast or cable network's linear stream. Video
programming distributors offer various packages of content (e.g.,
basic, expanded basic, digital) with different quality levels (e.g.,
standard definition, HD, 3D), and employ different business models
(e.g., ad-supported, subscription).
a. Multichannel Video Programming Distributors
Traditional video programming distributors include incumbent cable
companies, DBS providers, cable overbuilders, also known as broadband
service providers (``BSPs,'' such as RCN), and telcos. These
distributors are referred to as multichannel video programming
distributors (``MVPDs''), and typically offer hundreds of channels of
professional video programming to residential customers for a fee.
b. Online Video Programming Distributors
OVDs are relatively recent entrants into the video programming
distribution market. They deliver a variety of on-demand professional,
full-length video programming over the Internet, whether streamed to
Internet-connected televisions or other devices, or downloaded for
later viewing. Hulu, Netflix, Amazon, and Apple are examples of OVDs,
although the content delivered and business model used varies greatly
among them.
Unlike MVPDs, OVDs do not own distribution facilities and are
dependent upon ISPs for the delivery of their content to viewers.
Therefore, the future growth of OVDs depends, in part, on how quickly
ISPs expand and upgrade their broadband facilities and the preservation
of their incentives to innovate and invest.\5\ The higher the bandwidth
available from the ISP, the greater the speed and the better the
quality of the picture delivered to an OVD's users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See discussion infra Section II.C.2.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISPs' management and pricing of broadband services may also affect
OVDs. In particular, OVDs would be harmed competitively if ISPs that
are also MVPDs (e.g., cable companies, telcos) were to impair or delay
the delivery of video because OVDs pose a threat to those MVPDs'
traditional video programming distribution businesses. Because Comcast
is the country's largest ISP, an inherent conflict exists between
Comcast's provision of broadband services to its customers, who may use
this service to view video programming provided by OVDs, and its desire
to continue to sell them MVPD services.
Growth of OVDs also will depend, in part, on their ability to
acquire programming from content producers. Some cable companies, such
as Comcast and Cablevision Corp., have purchased or launched their own
cable networks. This vertical integration of content and distribution
was one reason for the passage of Section 19 of the 1992 Cable Act, 47
U.S.C. 548. Pursuant to the Act, Congress directed the FCC to
promulgate rules that place restrictions on how cable programmers
affiliated with a cable company deal with unaffiliated distributors.
These ``program access rules'' were designed to prevent vertically
integrated cable companies from refusing to provide popular programming
to their competitors. The rules prohibit both the cable company and a
cable network owned by it from engaging in unfair acts and practices,
including: (1) Entering into exclusive agreements to distribute the
cable network; (2) selling the cable network to the cable company's
competitors on discriminatory terms and conditions; and (3) unduly
influencing the cable network in deciding to whom, and on what terms
and conditions, to sell its programming.\6\ The FCC program access
rules do not apply to online distribution or to retransmission of
broadcast station content.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ 47 CFR 76.1001-76.1002. The prohibition on exclusivity
sunsets in October 2012, unless extended by the FCC pursuant to a
rulemaking. Id. Sec. 76.1002(c)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. The Market for Video Programming Distribution in the United States
The relevant product market affected by this transaction is the
market for timely distribution of professional, full-length video
programming to residential customers (``video programming
distribution''). Professionally produced content is video programming
that is created or produced by media and entertainment companies using
professional equipment, talent, and production crews, and for which
those companies hold or maintain distribution and syndication rights.
Video programming distribution is characterized by the aggregation of
professionally produced content consisting of entire episodes of shows
and movies, rather than short clips. The market for video programming
distribution includes both MVPDs and OVDs.
1. Traditional Video Programming Distribution
Cable companies first began operating in the 1940s and initially
were granted exclusive franchises to serve local communities. Although
they now face competition, the incumbent cable companies continue to
serve a dominant
[[Page 5450]]
share of subscribers in most areas. In the mid-1990s, DirecTV and DISH
Network began to offer competing services using small satellite dishes
installed on consumers' homes. Around the same time, cable overbuilders
began building their own wireline networks in order to compete with the
incumbent cable operator and offer video, high-speed Internet, and
telephony services--the ``triple-play.'' More recently, Verizon and
AT&T entered the market with their own video distribution services,
also offering the triple-play. Competition from these video programming
distributors encouraged incumbent cable operators across the country to
upgrade their systems and offer many more video programming channels,
as well as the triple-play. Further innovations have included digital
video recorders (``DVRs'') that allow consumers to record programming
and view it later, and VOD services that enable viewers to watch
broadcast or cable network programming or movies on demand at the
consumer's convenience for a limited time.
A consumer purchasing video programming distribution services
selects from those distributors offering such services directly to that
consumer's home. The DBS operators--DirecTV and DISH--can reach almost
any consumer who lives in the continental United States and has an
unobstructed line of sight to the DBS operators' satellites. However,
wireline cable distributors, such as Comcast and Verizon, generally
must obtain a franchise from local or state authorities to construct
and operate a wireline network in a specific area, and can build lines
only to the homes in that area. A consumer cannot purchase video
programming distribution services from a wireline distributor operating
outside its area because that firm does not have the facilities to
reach the consumer's home. Consequently, although the set of video
programming distributors able to offer service to individual consumers'
residences generally is the same within each local community, that set
differs from one local community to another and can even vary within a
local community. The markets for video programming distribution
therefore are local.
The geographic markets relevant to this transaction are the
numerous local markets throughout the United States where Comcast is
the incumbent cable operator and where Comcast through the JV will be
able to withhold NBCU programming from, or raise programming costs to,
Comcast's rival distributors. Comcast service areas cover 50 million
U.S. television households or about 45 percent of households
nationwide, with nearly half of those households (23 million)
subscribing to at least one Comcast service. Competitive effects also
may be felt in other areas because Comcast's competitors serve
territories outside its cable footprint. If Comcast can disadvantage
these rivals, for example by raising their costs, competition will be
reduced everywhere these competitors provide service reflecting these
higher costs. Thus, the potential anticompetitive effects of the
transaction could extend to almost all Americans.
The incumbent cable companies often dominate any particular market
and typically hold well over 50 percent market shares within their
franchise areas. For example, Comcast has market shares of 64 percent
in Philadelphia, 62 percent in Chicago, 60 percent in Miami, and 58
percent in San Francisco (based on MVPD subscribers). Combined, the DBS
providers account for approximately 31 percent of video programming
subscribers nationwide, although their shares vary and may be lower in
any particular local market. Although AT&T and Verizon have had great
success and achieved penetration (i.e., the percentage of households to
which a provider's service is available that actually buys its service)
as high as 40 percent in the selected communities they have entered,
they currently have limited expansion plans. Overbuilders serve an even
smaller portion of the United States.
2. Competition From OVDs
OVDs are relatively recent entrants into the video programming
distribution market. Their services are available to any consumer with
high-speed Internet service sufficient to receive video of an
acceptable quality. OVDs have increased substantially the amount of
full-length professional content they distribute online. Viewership of
video content distributed over the Internet has grown enormously and is
expected to continue to grow. The number of adult Internet users who
watch full-length television shows online is expected to increase from
41.1 million in 2008 to 72.2 million in 2011.\7\ The total number of
unique U.S. viewers of video who watch full-length television shows
online grew 21 percent from 2008 to 2009.\8\ OVD revenues also have
increased dramatically. Revenue associated with video content delivered
over the Internet to televisions is expected to grow from $2 billion in
2009 to over $17 billion in 2014.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Reaching Online Video Viewers with Long-Form Content,
eMarketer.com (July 26, 2010), http://www3.emarketer.com/
Article.aspx?R=1007830.
\8\ Id.
\9\ Robert Briel, Faster growth for web-to-TV video, Broadband
TV News (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2010/08/17/
faster-growth-for-web-to-tv-video.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One reason for the dramatic growth of online distribution is the
increased consumer interest in on-demand viewing, especially among
younger viewers who have grown up with the Internet, and are accustomed
to viewing video at a time and on a device of their choosing.\10\ In
response to competition by OVDs, MVPDs increasingly are offering more
on-demand choices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See R. Thomas Umstead, Younger Viewers Watching More TV on
the Web, Multichannel News (Apr. 12, 2010), http://
www.multichannel.com/article/451376-Younger_Viewers_Watching_
More_Television_On_The_Web.php (survey of more than 1,000 people
shows 23 percent under the age of 25 watch most of their television
online).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. OVD Business Models and Participants
Recognizing the enormous potential of OVDs, dozens of companies are
innovating and experimenting with products and services that either
distribute online video programming or facilitate such distribution.
New developments, products, and models are announced on almost a daily
basis by companies seeking to satisfy consumer demand. A number of
companies are committing significant resources to this industry.
OVDs provide content using a variety of different business models.
Some offer content on an ad-supported basis pursuant to which consumers
pay nothing. One firm using this model is Hulu, which aggregates
primarily current-season broadcast content from NBC, FOX, ABC, and
others. Hulu has experienced substantial growth since its launch in
2008, reaching 39 million unique viewers by February 2010.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Press Release, comScore Releases February 2010 U.S. Online
Video Rankings, Hulu Viewer Engagement Up 120 percent vs. Year Ago
to 2.4 Hours of Video per Viewer in February (Apr. 13, 2010), http:/
/www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/4/comScore_
February_2010_U.S._Online_Video_Rankings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Netflix has pursued a different business model. It initially
offered DVDs delivered by mail and then added unlimited streaming of a
limited library of content over the Internet for a monthly subscription
fee. Netflix has expanded its online library and introduced an
Internet-only subscription service. Netflix content primarily consists
of relatively recent movies, older movies, and past-season television
shows. Netflix recently announced a deal with premium cable network
EPIX for access to more movie
[[Page 5451]]
content that it will distribute over the Internet.\12\ Netflix also has
grown substantially in the last several years, from 7.5 million
subscribers at the end of 2007 to 16.9 million in the third quarter of
2010.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Netflix, Inc., Q3 10 Management's commentary and financial
highlights, at 2 (Oct. 20, 2010), available at http://
files.shareholder.com/downloads/NFLX/1118542273x0x411049/157a4bc4-
4cad-4d7b-9496-b59006d73344/
Q310%20Management%27s%20commentary%20and%20%20highlights.pdf.
\13\ Netflix, Inc., Form 10-K at 32 (Feb. 22, 2010); Press
Release, Netflix, Inc. Netflix Announces Q3 2010 Financial Results,
at 1 (Oct 20, 2010), available at http://files.shareholder.com/
downloads/NFLX/1118542273x0x411037/5a757dd5-b423-40d7-bb60-
3418356e582e/3Q10_Earnings_Release.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Apple also is experimenting with different business models for
video programming distribution. For several years it has offered
content on an electronic sell-through (``EST'') basis through its Apple
iTunes Store. Customers pay a per-transaction fee to buy television
shows and movies and download them onto various electronic devices
(e.g., iPod). Apple recently announced a service that allows consumers
to rent television content on a per-transaction basis (e.g., $0.99 per
show) and view it for a limited time. Other major companies are
offering or planning to offer OVD services.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ For example, Google recently launched GoogleTV, a device
that enables viewers simultaneously to search the Internet and their
MVPD service for content, and to switch back and forth on their
televisions between content delivered over the Internet and content
delivered by their MVPD. Press Release, Google, Industry Leaders
Announce Open Platform to Bring Web to TV (May 20, 2010), http://
www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20100520_googletv.html.
Walmart recently acquired VUDU, an OVD service, and is making
content available for EST and rental to VUDU-enabled devices. Press
Release, Walmart Announces Acquisition of Digital Entertainment
Provider, VUDU (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.walmartstores.com/
pressroom/news/9661.aspx. Amazon is reportedly developing an OVD
service that allows Amazon service subscribers to stream television
and movie content over the Internet. Nick Wingfield & Sam Schechner,
No Longer Tiny, Netflix Gets Respect--and Creates Fear, Wall St. J.
(Dec. 6, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704493004576001781352962132.html. Sears and Kmart
recently announced the launch of an online video store, called
Alphaline, which sells and rents movies and television shows. Paul
Bond, Sears, Kmart launch Alphaline online video store,Reuters (Dec.
30, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6BT03C20101230.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. The Impact of OVDs
Some of these OVD products and services undoubtedly will be viewed
by consumers as closer substitutes for MVPD services than others. The
extent to which an OVD service has the potential to become a better
substitute for MVPD service will depend on a number of factors, such as
the OVD's ability to obtain popular content, its ability to protect the
licensed content from piracy, its financial strength, and its technical
capabilities to deliver high-quality content. Moreover, as noted
previously, OVDs' future competitive significance depends, in part, on
robust broadband capacity. Accordingly, the competitive significance of
OVDs is fostered by protecting broadband providers' economic incentives
to upgrade and improve their broadband infrastructure, and obtain fair
returns on that investment.
Today, some consumers regard OVDs as acceptable substitutes for at
least a portion of their traditional video programming distribution
services. These consumers buy smaller content packages from traditional
distributors, decline to take certain premium channels, or purchase
fewer VOD offerings, and instead watch that content online, a practice
known as ``cord-shaving.'' A small but growing number of MVPD customers
are also ``cutting the cable cord'' completely in favor of OVDs. These
customers may rely on an individual OVD or may view video content from
a number of OVDs (e.g., Hulu ad-supported service, Netflix subscription
service, Apple EST service) as a replacement for their MVPD service.
When measured by the number of customers who are cord-shaving or
cord-cutting, OVDs currently have a de minimis share of the video
programming distribution market. Their current market share, however,
greatly understates their potential competitive significance in this
market. Whether viewers buy individual or a combination of OVD
services, OVDs are likely to continue to develop into better
substitutes for MVPD video services. Evolving consumer demand,
improving technology (e.g., higher Internet access speeds, better
compression technologies to improve picture quality, improved digital
rights management to combat piracy), the increased choice of viewing
devices, and advertisers' increasing willingness to place their ads on
the Internet likely will make OVDs stronger competitors to MVPDs for an
increasing number of viewers.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Historically, OTA distribution of broadcast network content
has not served as a significant competitive constraint on MVPDs
because of the limited number of channels offered. In addition, OTA
distribution likely will not expand in the future because no new
broadcast networks are likely to be licensed for distribution. Thus,
OTA is unlikely to become a more significant video programming
distributor. By contrast, OVDs are expanding rapidly and have the
potential to provide increased and more innovative viewing options
in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The development of the video programming distribution market--and
in particular the success of OVDs--may influence any future analysis of
consolidation in this market. Such analysis would follow standard
merger evaluation principles and consider not only the role of OVDs,
but also factors such as the extent to which the merging firms'
offerings are close substitutes and compete directly. In this case,
Defendants' own assessments--as reflected in numerous internal
documents and their executives' testimony--of the importance of OVDs
and their potential to alter dramatically the existing competitive
landscape are particularly important to determining the relevant
product market.
c. Comcast's and Other MVPDs' Reactions to the Growth of OVDs
Comcast and other MVPDs recognize the threat posed to their video
distribution business from the growth of OVDs. Many internal documents
reflect Comcast's assessment that OVDs are growing quickly and pose a
competitive threat to traditional forms of video programming
distribution. In response to this threat, Comcast has taken significant
steps to improve the quality of Fancast, its own Internet video
service. Among other things, Comcast has attempted to obtain
additional--and at times exclusive--content from programmers, and has
made Fancast's user interface easier to navigate. Comcast also has
increased the quality and quantity of the VOD content it offers as an
adjunct to its traditional cable service.
In addition, Comcast has created and implemented an
``authentication'' system that enables its existing cable subscribers
to view some video content over the Internet if the subscriber already
pays for and receives the same content from Comcast through its
traditional cable service. Internal documents expressly acknowledge
that ``authentication'' is Comcast's and other MVPDs' attempt to
counter the perceived threat posed by OVDs.
Comcast's and other MVPDs' reactions to the emergence of OVDs
demonstrate that they view OVDs as a future competitive threat and are
adjusting their investment decisions today in response to that threat.
Because OVDs today affect MVPDs' decisions, they are appropriately
treated as participants in the market. Market definition considers
future substitution patterns, and the investment decisions of MVPDs are
strong evidence of market participants' view of the increased
likelihood of consumer substitution
[[Page 5452]]
between MVPD and OVD services.\16\ This effect on investment is
significant and could be diminished or even lost altogether if Comcast,
through the JV, acquires the ability to delay or deter the development
of OVDs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Cf. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines Sec. 5.2 (Aug. 19, 2010), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html (``However,
recent or ongoing changes in market conditions may indicate that the
current market share of a particular firm either understates or
overstates the firm's future competitive significance. The Agencies
consider reasonably predictable effects or ongoing changes in market
conditions when calculating and interpreting market share data.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. The Anticompetitive Effects of the Proposed Transaction
Antitrust law, including Section 7 of the Clayton Act, protects
consumers from anticompetitive conduct, such as firms' acquisition of
the ability to raise prices above levels that would prevail in a
competitive market. It also ensures that firms do not acquire the
ability to stifle innovation. Vertical mergers are those that occur
between firms at different stages of the chain of production and
distribution. Vertical mergers have the potential to harm competition
by changing the merged firm's ability or incentives to deal with
upstream or downstream rivals. For example, the merger may give the
vertically integrated entity the ability to establish or protect market
power in a downstream market by denying or raising the price of an
input to downstream rivals that a stand-alone upstream firm otherwise
would sell to those downstream firms. The merged firm may find it
profitable to forego the benefits of dealing with its rivals in order
to hobble them as competitors to its own downstream operations.
A merged firm can more readily harm competition when its rivals
offer new products or technologies whose competitive potential is
evolving. Nascent competitors may be relatively easy to quash. For
example, denying an important input, such as a popular television show,
to a nascent competitor with a small customer base is much less costly
in terms of foregone revenues than denying that same show to a more
established rival with a larger customer base. Even if a vertical
merger only delays nascent competition, an increase in the duration of
a firm's market power can result in significant competitive harm. The
application and enforcement of antitrust law is appropriate in such
situations because promoting innovation is one of its important
goals.\17\ The crucial role of innovation has led at least one noted
commentator to argue that restraints on innovation ``very likely
produce a far greater amount of economic harm than classical restraints
on competition,'' and thus deserve special attention.\18\ By quashing
or delaying the progress of rivals that attempt to introduce new
products and technologies, the merged firm could slow the pace of
innovation in the market and thus harm consumers.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property Sec. 1 (Apr.
1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/atr/public/
guidelines/0558.htm (``The antitrust laws promote innovation and
consumer welfare by prohibiting certain actions that may harm
competition with respect to either existing or new ways of serving
consumers.''); see also 19A Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law,
] 1902a (2d ed. 2005) (``Our capitalist economic system places a
very strong value on competition, not only to reduce costs but also
to innovate new products and processes.'').
\18\ Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 Cardozo L.
Rev. 247, 253-54, 260 (2007) (``[N]o one doubts [the] basic
conclusion that innovation and technological progress very likely
contribute much more to economic growth than policy pressures that
drive investment and output toward the competitive level.''); see
also 4B Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law, ] 407a (3d ed.
2007); Willow A. Sheremata, Barriers to innovation: a monopoly,
network externalities, and the speed of innovation, 42 Antitrust
Bull. 937, 938 (1997) (```[I]n the long run it is dynamic
performance that counts.' The speed of innovation is important to
social welfare.'' (quoting F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial
Market Structure & Economic Performance 613 (3d ed. 1990))).
\19\ See Sheremata, supra note 18, at 944 (``When owners of
current technology raise artificial barriers to entry of new
technology, opportunities for innovation decline to the detriment of
consumers.'').
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1. The Importance of Access to NBCU Content
Generally, programmers want to distribute their content in multiple
ways to maximize viewers' exposure to the content and the impact of any
advertising revenues. Likewise, distributors must be able to license a
sufficient quantity and quality of content to create a compelling video
programming service. A distributor also must gain access to a
sufficient variety of content from different sources. This
``aggregation'' of a variety of content is important to a distributor's
ability to succeed.
NBCU content is extremely valuable to video programming
distributors. NBC is one of the original three broadcast networks and
has decades of history and brand name recognition. It carries general
interest content that appeals to a wide variety of viewers. Surveys
routinely rank the NBC network as one of the top four of all broadcast
and cable networks. Similarly, NBCU's USA Network is highly valued and
has been rated the top cable network for four of the past five years.
Many of NBCU's other networks--Bravo, CNBC, MSNBC, SyFy--also are
highly rated and valued by their audiences.
The proposed transaction would give Comcast, through the JV,
control of an important portfolio of current and library content. The
ratings of each NBCU network are based on the popularity of the
particular slate of shows currently on that network and can increase or
decrease significantly from one television season to the next based on
the gain or loss of hit shows. NBCU also has the ability to switch
programming from one network to another, or otherwise make popular
content from one network available to another. Through the JV, Comcast
would gain the ability to impair emerging OVD competition by
withholding or raising the prices of individual NBCU shows, or of
linear feeds of one or more NBCU cable or broadcast networks. It is
reasonable to examine the competitive impact of withholding NBCU
content in the aggregate, rather than analyzing the value of any
individual show or network to a competitor, because an aggregate
withholding strategy would have the greatest impact on Comcast's
downstream rivals.
2. The Proposed Transaction Increases the JV's Incentive and Ability To
Harm Competitors
a. Ability and Incentive To Harm Rival MVPDs
If the proposed transaction is approved, Comcast through the JV
will gain control of NBCU's content, including a substantial amount of
valuable broadcast and cable programming. Competing MVPDs will be
forced to obtain licenses for NBCU content from their rival, Comcast.
Unlike a stand-alone programmer, Comcast's pricing and distribution
decisions will take into account the impact of those decisions on the
competitiveness of rival MVPDs. As a result, Comcast will have a strong
incentive to disadvantage its competitors by denying them access to
valuable programming or raising their licensing fees above what a
stand-alone NBCU would have found it profitable to charge.
A stand-alone programmer typically attempts to maximize the
combined license fee and advertising revenues from its programming by
making its content available in multiple ways. The JV would continue to
value widespread distribution of NBCU content, but it also would likely
consider how access to that content makes Comcast's MVPD rivals better
competitors. This could lead the JV to withhold content
[[Page 5453]]
altogether or, more likely, to insist on higher fees for the NBCU
content from Comcast's MVPD competitors. Whether Comcast's rival MVPDs
refuse to purchase the programming or agree to pay the higher fees,
Comcast would benefit from weakening its MVPD rivals. Likewise, high
licensing fees charged to other MVPDs and OVDs will also induce
customers to switch to (or stay with) Comcast. These higher licensing
fees will be reflected either in higher subscriber fees or, in the case
of MVPDs building alternative cable distribution infrastructures, a
smaller level of investment and, consequently, a smaller coverage area
for the MVPD competing with Comcast. In either case, higher licensing
fees will reduce pricing pressure on Comcast's MVPD business and
increase its ability to raise prices to its subscribers.
By disadvantaging competitors in this manner, Comcast through the
JV will cause some of its rivals' customers to seek an alternative MVPD
provider. Many of these dissatisfied customers likely will become
Comcast subscribers, making it profitable for Comcast and the JV to
increase licensing fees above the stand-alone NBCU levels. Those
increased fees likely will lead to higher prices for subscribers of
other MVPDs and perhaps further migration by those subscribers to
Comcast.
Licensing disputes in which a major broadcast network has pulled a
network signal from an MVPD have resulted in the MVPD's loss of
significant numbers of subscribers to its competitors. Through the
formation of the JV, Comcast gains the rights to negotiate on behalf of
the seven O&Os that operate in areas where it is the dominant cable
company. It also becomes the owner of the NBC network, which may give
it leverage to seek the rights to negotiate on behalf of NBCU's NBC
network affiliate television stations, or at least the ability to
influence affiliate negotiations, for retransmission consent rights in
other areas of the United States. Comcast, through the JV, can withhold
or raise the price of the NBC network to its rivals, thereby causing
customers to shift away from the rival. Other NBCU programming also is
important to consumers, and similar switching behavior could result if
the JV were to withhold it from Comcast's rival MVPDs.
Comcast has engaged in such strategies in the past. For example,
Comcast has withheld its RSN in Philadelphia in order to discriminate
against, and thereby disadvantage, DBS providers against which Comcast
competes in that city. The DBS providers' market shares are lower and
Comcast's subscription fees are higher in Philadelphia than in
comparable markets. This appears to have been a profitable strategy for
Comcast because the overall benefit to its cable business of retaining
subscribers seems to have outweighed the substantial losses associated
with failing to earn licensing fees for the withheld RSN from DBS
companies.
Post-transaction, Comcast's rival MVPDs would realize that, unlike
the stand-alone NBCU, the JV will set higher licensing fees for NBCU
that take into consideration Comcast's business profits. Some MVPDs
might find it unprofitable to carry the programming at the prices the
JV could command. Other MVPDs might agree to the JV's increased prices
for the NBCU content given the likelihood that they would lose a large
number of their subscribers if they did not carry the NBCU content.
Lowering the profitability of Comcast's MVPD rivals also would
weaken the incentives of some existing and future entrants to build out
their systems, especially in areas Comcast currently serves, weakening
the competitive constraints faced by Comcast. This weakened state of
competition would allow Comcast, in turn, to decrease its investments
and innovation to improve its own offerings. Higher subscription fees
for Comcast services or decreased investment in improving their quality
are less likely to induce customer switching to Comcast's MVPD rivals
where those rivals are unable to match its programming or prices. As a
result, Comcast could reinforce and even increase its dominant market
share of video programming distribution in all areas of the country in
which it operates.
b. Incentive and Ability To Harm OVDs
Comcast, through the JV, also could discriminate against competing
OVDs in similar ways, thereby diminishing the competitive threat posed
by individual OVDs and impeding the development of OVDs, generally. The
JV could charge OVDs higher content fees than the stand-alone NBCU
would have charged, or impose different terms for NBCU content than
Comcast negotiates for itself. The JV also could withhold NBCU content
completely, thereby diminishing OVDs' ability to compete for video
programming distribution customers, again to Comcast's benefit. Either
situation could delay significantly the development of OVDs as a
competitive alternative to traditional video programming distribution
services.
Over the last several years, NBCU has been one of the content
providers most willing to experiment with different methods of online
distribution. It was a driving force behind the creation and success of
Hulu, and is now a partner in, and major content contributor to, the
recently launched Hulu Plus, a subscription version of Hulu. Prior to
the JV announcement, NBCU entered into several contracts with OVDs to
distribute its content online through Apple iTunes and Amazon, and on a
subscription basis through Netflix. Allowing the JV to proceed removes
NBCU content from the control of a company that supported the
development of OVDs and places it in the control of a company that
views OVDs as a serious competitive threat.
Finally, Comcast, through the JV, would gain control of NBCU's
governance rights and 32 percent ownership interest in Hulu, a current
and future competitor to Comcast's MVPD services. Hulu has achieved
significant success since its launch in early 2008.
Each of the media partners in Hulu, including NBCU, contributes
content to Hulu and holds three seats on Hulu's Board of Directors.
Significantly, any important or strategic decisions by Hulu require the
unanimous approval of all members of the Board. Comcast's acquisition
of NBCU's interest in Hulu would give it the ability to hamper Hulu's
strategic and competitive development by refusing to agree to major
actions by Hulu, or by blocking Hulu's access to NBCU content.
3. How the Formation of the JV Changes Comcast's Incentives and
Abilities
Post-transaction, the JV would gain increased bargaining leverage
sufficient to negotiate higher prices or withhold NBCU content from
Comcast's MVPD competitors. Comcast's rival distributors would have to
pay the increased prices or not carry the programming. In either case,
the MVPDs likely would be less effective competitors to Comcast, and
Comcast would be able to delay or otherwise substantially impede the
development of OVDs as alternatives to MVPDs.
All of these activities could have a substantial anticompetitive
effect on consumers and the market. Because Comcast would face less
competition from other video programming distributors, it would be less
constrained in its pricing decisions and have a reduced incentive to
innovate. As a result, consumers likely would be forced to pay higher
prices to obtain their video content or receive fewer benefits of
innovation. They also would have fewer choices in the types of content
and providers to which they
[[Page 5454]]
would have access, and there would be lower levels of investment, less
experimentation with new models of delivering content, and less
diversity in the types and range of product offerings.
4. Entry Is Unlikely To Reverse the Anticompetitive Effects of the JV
Over the last decade, Comcast and other traditional video
distributors benefited from an industry with limited competition and
increasing prices,\20\ in part because successful entry into the
traditional video programming distribution business is difficult and
requires an enormous investment to create a distribution infrastructure
such as building out wireline facilities or obtaining spectrum and
launching satellites. Accordingly, additional entry into wireline or
DBS distribution is not likely in the foreseeable future.\21\ Telcos
have been willing to incur some of the enormous costs to modify their
existing telephone infrastructure to distribute video, but only in
certain areas, and they have recently indicated that further expansion
will be limited for the foreseeable future.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See, e.g., Report on Cable Industry Prices, In re
Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 24 F.C.C.R. 259, ] 2 & chart
1 (rel. Jan. 16, 2009), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DA-09-53A1.pdf (data showing price of expanded basic
service increased more than three times the consumer price index
(CPI) between 1995 and 2008).
\21\ Similarly, it is unlikely that an entrant would attempt to
provide a traditional MVPD service with wireless technology,
particularly given the difficulty in acquiring spectrum and the
costs and risks of constructing such a system. See generally U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Ex Parte Submission, In re Economic Issues in
Broadband Competition, A National Broadband Plan for our Future, FCC
GN Docket No. 09-51, at 8-11 (filed Jan. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/_.htm.
\22\ See, e.g., Transcript, Verizon at Credit Suisse Group
Global Media and Communications Conference, at 11 (Mar. 8, 2010),
available at http://investor.verizon.com/news/20100308/_;20100308--
transcript.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OVDs, therefore, represent the most likely prospect for successful
competitive entry into the existing video programming distribution
market. However, they face the difficulty of obtaining access to a
sufficient amount of content to become viable distribution businesses.
In addition, OVDs rely upon the infrastructure of others, including
Comcast, to deliver service to their customers. After the JV is formed,
Comcast will control some of the most significant content needed by
OVDs to successfully position themselves as a replacement for
traditional video distribution providers.
5. Any Efficiencies Arising From the Deal Are Negligible or Not Merger-
Specific
The Department considers expected efficiencies in determining
whether to challenge a vertical merger. The potential anticompetitive
harms from a proposed transaction are balanced against the asserted
efficiencies of the transaction. The evidence does not show substantial
efficiencies from the transaction.
In particular, the JV is unlikely to achieve substantial savings
from the elimination of double marginalization. Double marginalization
occurs when two independent companies at different points in a
product's supply chain each extract a profit margin above marginal
cost. Because each firm in the supply chain treats the other firm's
price (in lieu of its marginal cost) as a cost of producing the final
good, each firm finds it profitable to produce a lower output than the
firms would have produced had they accurately accounted for the social
cost of producing the output. This ultimately results in a lower output
(and a higher price to consumers) than would have occurred if the
product had been produced by a combined firm. Despite a higher price,
the lower output from double marginalization ultimately results in
lower total profits for the entire supply chain.
Vertical mergers often are procompetitive because they enable the
merged firm to properly account for costs when determining output and
setting a final product price. The combined firm no longer treats the
profit of the other firm as part of the cost of production. Because the
combined firm faces lower marginal costs, it may find it profitable to
expand output and reduce the final product price. Lower marginal costs
may result in better service, greater product quality or innovation, or
other improvements.
In certain industries, however, including the one at issue here,
vertical mergers are far less likely to reduce or eliminate double
marginalization. Documents, data, and testimony obtained from
Defendants and third parties demonstrate that much, if not all, of any
potential double marginalization is reduced, if not completely
eliminated, through the course of contract negotiations between
programmers and distributors over quantity and penetration discounts,
tiering requirements, and other explicit and verifiable conditions.
Other efficiencies claimed by Comcast are not specific to this
transaction or not verifiable, or both. It is unlikely that the
efficiencies associated with this transaction would be sufficient to
undo the competitive harm that otherwise would result from the JV.
III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment
The proposed Final Judgment ensures that Comcast, through the JV,
will not impede the development of emerging online video distribution
competition by denying access to the JV's content to such competitors.
The proposed Final Judgment also contains provisions that protect
Comcast's traditional video distribution competitors. The proposed
Final Judgment thereby protects consumers by eliminating the likely
anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction.
A. The Proposed Final Judgment Protects Emerging Online Video
Competition
1. The Proposed Final Judgment Ensures That OVDs Have Access to the
JV's Video Programming
The proposed Final Judgment requires the JV to license its
broadcast, cable, and film content to OVDs on terms comparable to those
in similar licensing arrangements with MVPDs or OVDs. It provides two
options through which an OVD will be able to obtain the JV's content.
Under the first option, set forth in Section IV.A of the proposed
Final Judgment, the JV must license linear feeds of video programming
to any requesting OVD on terms that are economically equivalent to the
terms on which the JV licenses that programming to MVPDs. Subject to
some exceptions, the JV must make available to an OVD any channel or
bundle of channels, and all quality levels and VOD rights, it provides
to any MVPD with more than one million subscribers.
The terms of the JV's license with the OVD need not match precisely
any existing license between the JV and the MVPD, but it must
reasonably approximate, in the aggregate, an existing licensing
agreement. That approximation must account for factors, such as
advertising revenues and any technical and economic limitations of the
OVD seeking a license.
The first option ensures that the JV will not be able to use its
control of content to impede competitive pressure exerted on
traditional forms of video programming distribution from OVDs that
choose to offer linear channels and associated VOD content. The
proposed Final Judgment uses Defendants' own contracts with MVPDs,
including MVPDs that do not compete with
[[Page 5455]]
Comcast, as proxies for the content and terms the JV would be willing
to provide to distributors if it did not have the incentive or ability
to disadvantage them in order to maintain customers in or drive
customers to Comcast's service.
Under the second option, set forth in Section IV.B, the proposed
Final Judgment requires the JV to license to an OVD, broadcast, cable,
or film content comparable in scope and quality to the content the OVD
receives from one of the JV's programming peers. For example, if an OVD
receives each episode of five primetime television series from CBS for
display in a subscription VOD service within 48 hours of the original
airing, the JV must provide the OVD a comparable set of NBC broadcast
television programs, as measured by volume and economic value, for
display during the same subscription VOD window. The requirement
applies to all JV content, even non-NBCU content, in order to ensure
that the JV cannot undermine the purposes of the proposed Final
Judgment by shifting content from one network to another.
While the first option ensures that Comcast, through the JV, will
not disadvantage OVD competitors in relation to MVPDs, the second
option ensures that the programming licensed by the JV to OVDs will
reflect the licensing trends of its peers as the industry evolves.
Because the OVD industry is still developing, the contracts of the JV's
peers also provide an appropriate benchmark for determining the terms
and conditions under which content should be licensed to OVDs. The
programming peers include the owners of the three major non-NBC
broadcast networks (CBS, FOX, and ABC), the largest cable network
groups (including News Corporation, Time Warner, Inc., Viacom, and The
Walt Disney Company), and the six largest production studios (including
News Corporation, Viacom, Sony Corporation of America, Time Warner
Inc., and The Walt Disney Company).
If an OVD and the JV are unable to reach an agreement for carriage
of the JV's programming under either of these options, an OVD may apply
to the Department for permission to submit its dispute to commercial
arbitration in accordance with Section VII of the proposed Final
Judgment. The FCC Order requires the JV to license content on
reasonable terms to OVDs and includes an arbitration mechanism for
resolution of disputes over access to programming. The FCC is the
expert communications industry agency, and the Department worked very
closely with the FCC in designing effective relief in this case. For so
long as commercial arbitration is available for resolution of disputes
in a timely manner under the FCC's rules and orders, the Department
will ordinarily defer to the FCC's commercial arbitration process to
resolve such disputes. OVDs are nascent competitors, however, and
consistent with the Department's competition law enforcement mandate,
the Department reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to permit
arbitration pursuant to Section VII to advance the competitive
objectives of the proposed Final Judgment. Although the Department may
seek enforcement of the Final Judgment through traditional judicial
process, the arbitration process will help ensure that OVDs can obtain
content from the JV at a competitive price, without involving the
Department or the Court in expensive and time-consuming litigation.\23\
To support the proposed Final Judgment's requirement that the JV
license its programming to OVDs and assist the Department's oversight
of this nascent competition, Comcast and NBCU are required, pursuant to
Sections IV.M and IV.N, to maintain copies of agreements the JV has
with any OVD as well as the identities of any OVD that has requested
video programming from the JV.
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\23\ Under Section VI of the proposed Final Judgment, Defendants
are required to license only video programming subject to their
management or control or over which Defendants possess the power or
authority to negotiate content licenses. NBCU has management rights
in The Weather Channel, including the right to negotiate programming
contracts on its behalf. NBCU currently is not exercising these
rights. However, Section V.F provides that if the JV exercises them
or otherwise influences The Weather Channel, this programming will
be covered under the requirements of the proposed Final Judgment.
Similarly, Section V.E exempts The Weather Channel, TV One, FearNet,
the Pittsburgh Cable News Channel, and Hulu from the definitions of
``Defendants'' and other related terms unless the Defendants gain
control over those channels or the ability to negotiate or influence
carriage contracts for those channels.
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2. The Proposed Final Judgment Prevents Comcast, Through the JV, From
Adversely Affecting Hulu
Section IV.D of the proposed Final Judgment requires Defendants to
relinquish their voting and other governance rights in Hulu, and
Section IV.E prohibits them from receiving confidential or
competitively sensitive information concerning Hulu. As noted above,
Hulu is one of the most successful OVDs to date. Comcast has an
incentive to prevent Hulu from becoming an even more attractive avenue
for viewing video programming because Hulu would then exert increased
competitive pressure on Comcast's cable business. If the proposed
transaction were to be consummated without conditions, Defendants would
hold seats on Hulu's Board of Directors and could exercise their voting
and other governance rights to compromise strategic and competitive
initiatives Hulu may wish to pursue. Requiring Defendants to relinquish
their voting and governance rights in Hulu, and barring access to
competitively sensitive information, will prevent Comcast, through the
JV, from interfering with Hulu's competitive and strategic plans.
At the same time, NBCU should not be permitted to abandon its
commitments to provide Hulu video programming under agreements
currently in place and deny Hulu customers the value of the JV's
content. Therefore, Section IV.G of the proposed Final Judgment
requires the JV to continue to supply Hulu with content commensurate
with the supply of content provided to Hulu by its other media owners.
3. The Proposed Final Judgment Prohibits Defendants From Discriminating
Against, Retaliating Against, or Punishing Video Programmers and OVDs
The proposed Final Judgment protects the development of OVDs by
prohibiting Defendants from engaging in certain conduct that would
deter video programmers and OVDs from contracting with each other.
Section V.A of the proposed Final Judgment prohibits Defendants from
discriminating against, retaliating against, or punishing any content
provider for providing programming to any OVD. Section V.A also
prohibits Defendants from discriminating against, retaliating against,
or punishing any OVD for obtaining video programming, for invoking any
provisions of the proposed Final Judgment or any FCC rule or order, or
for furnishing information to the Department concerning Defendants'
compliance with the proposed Final Judgment.
4. The Proposed Final Judgment Prohibits Defendants From Limiting
Distribution to OVDs Through Restrictive Licensing Practices
The proposed Final Judgment further protects the development of
OVDs by preventing Comcast from using its influence either as the
nation's largest MVPD or as the licensor, through the JV, of important
video programming to enter into agreements containing restrictive
contracting terms. Video programming agreements often grant
[[Page 5456]]
licensees preferred or exclusive access to the programming content for
a particular time period. Such exclusivity provisions can be
competitively neutral, but also can have either pro- or anticompetitive
purposes or effects. Sections V.B and V.C of the proposed Final
Judgment set forth broad prohibitions on restrictive contracting
practices, including exclusives, but then delineate a narrowly tailored
set of exceptions to those bans. These provisions ensure that Comcast,
through the JV, cannot use restrictive contract terms to harm the
development of OVDs and, at the same time, preserve the JV's incentives
to produce and exploit quality programming.
The video programming distribution industry frequently uses
exclusive contract terms that can be procompetitive. For instance, as
discussed above, content producers often sequence the release of their
content to various distribution platforms, a practice known as
``windowing.'' These windows of exclusivity enable a content producer
to maximize the revenues it earns on its content by separating
customers based on their willingness to pay and effectively increasing
the price charged to the customers that place a higher value on
receiving content earlier. Exclusivity also encourages the various
distributors, such as cable companies, to promote the content during a
distribution window by assuring the distributor that the content will
not be available through other distribution channels at a lower price.
This ability to price discriminate across types of customers and
increase promotion of the content increases the profitability of
producing quality programming and encourages the production of more
high-quality programming than otherwise would be the case. Exclusivity
also may help a new competitor gain entry to a market by encouraging
users to try a service they would not otherwise consider. For example,
an OVD may desire a limited exclusivity window in order to market its
exclusive access to certain programming provided by its service. This
unique content makes the service more attractive to consumers and gives
them a reason to replace their existing service or try something new.
However, exclusivity restrictions also can serve anticompetitive
ends. As a cable company, Comcast has the incentive to seek exclusivity
provisions that would prevent content producers from licensing their
content to alternative distributors, such as OVDs, for a longer period
than the content producer ordinarily would find economically
reasonable, in order to hinder OVD development. If Comcast could use
exclusivity provisions to prevent the JV's peers from licensing content
to OVDs that otherwise would obtain the rights to offer the
programming, other provisions of the proposed Final Judgment designed
to preserve and foster OVD competition could be effectively nullified.
The proposed Final Judgment strikes a balance by allowing
reasonable and customary exclusivity provisions that enhance
competition while prohibiting those provisions that, without any
offsetting procompetitive benefits, hinder the development of effective
competition from OVDs. Section V.B of the proposed Final Judgment
prohibits the JV from entering into any agreement containing terms that
forbid, limit, or create economic incentives for the licensee to limit
distribution of the JV's video programming through OVDs, unless such
terms are common and reasonable in the industry. Evidence of what is
common and reasonable industry practice includes, among other things,
Defendants' contracting practices prior to the date that the JV was
announced, as well as practices of the JV's video programming peers.
This provision allows the JV to employ those pricing and contractual
strategies used by its peers to maximize the value of the content it
produces, while limiting Comcast's incentives, through the JV, to craft
unusually restrictive contractual terms in the JV's contracts with
third parties, the purpose of which is to limit the access of OVDs to
content produced by the JV. Section V.C of the proposed Final Judgment
prohibits Comcast from entering into or enforcing agreements for
carriage of video programming on its cable systems that forbid, limit,
or create incentives that limit the provision of video programming to
OVDs. Section V.C establishes three narrow exceptions to this broad
prohibition. First, Comcast may obtain a 30-day exclusive from free
online display if Comcast pays for the video programming. Second,
Comcast may enter into an agreement in which the programmer provides
content exclusively to Comcast, and to no other MVPD or OVD, for 14
days or less. Third, Comcast may condition carriage of programming on
its cable system on terms which require it to be treated in material
parity with other similarly situated MVPDs, except to the extent such
terms would be inconsistent with the purpose of the proposed Final
Judgment. These provisions are designed to ensure that Comcast, either
alone or in conjunction with the JV, cannot use existing or new
contracts to dictate the terms of the video programming agreements that
the JV's peers are able to offer OVDs, thereby hindering the
development of OVDs.
5. The Proposed Final Judgment Prohibits Unreasonable Discrimination in
Internet Broadband Access
Section V.G of the proposed Final Judgment requires Comcast to
abide by certain restrictions on the operation and management of its
Internet facilities. Without these restrictions Comcast would have the
ability and the incentive to undermine the effectiveness of the
proposed Final Judgment. Comcast is the dominant high-speed ISP in much
of its footprint and therefore could disadvantage OVDs in ways that
would prevent them from becoming better competitive alternatives to
Comcast's video programming distribution services. OVDs are dependent
upon ISPs' access networks to deliver video content to their
subscribers. Without the protections secured in the proposed Final
Judgment, Comcast would have the ability, for instance, to give
priority to non-OVD traffic on its network, thus adversely affecting
the quality of OVD services that compete with Comcast's own MVPD or OVD
services. Comcast also would be able to favor its own services by not
subjecting them to the network management practices imposed on other
services.
Section V.G.1 of the proposed Final Judgment prohibits Comcast from
unreasonably discriminating in the transmission of lawful traffic over
its Internet access service, with the proviso that reasonable network
management practices do not constitute unreasonable discrimination.
This provision requires Comcast to treat all Internet traffic the same
and, in particular, to ensure that OVD traffic is treated no worse than
any other traffic on Comcast's Internet access service, including
traffic from Comcast and NBCU sites. Similarly, Section V.G.2 prohibits
Comcast from excluding their own services from any caps, tiers,
metering, or other usage-based billing plans, and requires them to
ensure that OVD traffic is counted in the same way as Comcast's
traffic, and that billing plans are not used to disadvantage an OVD in
favor of Comcast. Many high-speed Internet providers are evaluating
usage-based billing plans. These plans may more efficiently apportion
infrastructure costs across users, offer lower-cost service to low-
volume subscribers, or divert high-volume usage to non-peak hours.
However, these plans also have the potential to increase the cost of
high-volume services, such as video distribution, that may compete with
an MVPD's video services. Section V.G.2
[[Page 5457]]
addresses this concern by ensuring that under these plans Comcast must
treat other OVD services just as it treats its own Internet-based video
services.
Specialized Services are offered to consumers over the same last-
mile facilities as Internet access services, but are separate from the
public Internet. The potential benefits of Specialized Services include
the facilitation of services that might not otherwise be technically or
economically feasible on current networks and the development of new
and innovative services, such as services that may compete directly
with Comcast's own MVPD offerings. If Comcast were to offer online
video services through Specialized Services, however, it could
effectively avoid the prohibitions in Sections V.G.1 and V.G.2.
Sections V.G.3 and V.G.4 recognize both the potential benefits and the
risks of Specialized Services and strike a balance to protect the
beneficial development of these services while preventing Comcast from
using them anticompetitively to benefit its own content. Section V.G.3
prohibits Comcast from offering Specialized Services that are comprised
substantially or entirely of the JV's content. Section V.G.4 requires
Comcast to allow any OVD access to a Specialized Service if other OVDs,
including Comcast, are being offered access. Together, these two
provisions ensure that OVDs will have access to any Specialized Service
Comcast may offer that includes comparable services.
Finally, Section V.G.5 ensures that Comcast will maintain its
public Internet access service at a level that typically would allow
any user on the network to download content from the public Internet at
speeds of at least 12 megabits per second in markets where it has
deployed DOCSIS 3.0. The requirement to maintain service at this speed
may be adjusted by the Court upon a showing that other comparable high-
speed Internet access providers offer higher or lower speeds. These
speeds are sufficient to ensure that Comcast's Internet access services
can support the development of OVDs as well as other services that are
potentially competitive with Comcast's own offerings.
In interpreting Section V.G and the terms used therein, the
Department will be informed by the FCC's Report and Order, In re
Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket
No. 90-191 & WC Docket No. 07-52, adopted December 21, 2010.
B. The Proposed Final Judgment Preserves Traditional Video Competition
A number of FCC orders issued in prior mergers established a
commercial arbitration process for resolution of disputes over access
to broadcast network programming and regional sports networks. The FCC
Order approving this transaction requires the JV to license all of its
programming to MVPDs, including its cable networks, and includes an
arbitration mechanism that contains several enhancements to its
existing commercial arbitration process when licensing disputes between
Defendants and other MVPDs arise.\24\ The Department believes that
these enhancements, combined with the FCC's experience in MVPD
arbitration disputes, should protect MVPDs' access to the JV's
programming without need of another commercial arbitration mechanism
for MVPDs under this proposed Final Judgment.
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\24\ For example, the FCC Order allows an MVPD claimant to
demand arbitration of programming on a stand-alone basis in certain
circumstances. It also allows a claimant whose contract with the JV
has expired to continue to carry the JV's programming during the
pendency of the dispute, subject to a true-up. The FCC Order also
contains further modifications to the arbitration process relating
to smaller MVPDs.
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In addition to the protections contained in the FCC Order, the
proposed Final Judgment, in Section V.A, prohibits Defendants from
discriminating against, retaliating against, or punishing any MVPD for
obtaining video programming, for furnishing any information to the
United States about any noncompliance with the proposed Final Judgment,
or for invoking the arbitration provisions of the FCC Order. Section
V.D also prevents Defendants from requiring or encouraging their local
broadcast network affiliates to deny MVPDs the right to carry the local
network signals. To aid the enforcement of this prohibition, pursuant
to Sections IV.J and IV.K, Comcast and NBCU are required to maintain
not only their network affiliate agreements, but also all documents
discussing whether any of their affiliates has withheld or threatened
to withhold retransmission consent from any MVPD.
C. Term of the Proposed Final Judgment
Section XI of the proposed Final Judgment provides that the Final
Judgment will expire seven years from the date of entry unless extended
by the Court. The FCC Order also lasts for seven years. The Department
believes this time period is long enough to ensure that the JV cannot
deny access to Comcast's OVD competitors at a crucial point in their
development but otherwise short enough to account for the rapidly
evolving nature of the video distribution market.
IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any
person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the
antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times
the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable
attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither
impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action.
Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any
subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against Defendants.
V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment
The Department and Defendants have stipulated that the proposed
Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the
provisions of the APPA, provided that the Department has not withdrawn
its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's determination
that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public interest.
The APPA provides a period of at least 60 days preceding the
effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person
may submit to the Department written comments regarding the proposed
Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within 60
days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact Statement in
the Federal Register, or the last date of publication in a newspaper of
the summary of this Competitive Impact Statement, whichever is later.
All comments received during this period will be considered by the
Department, which remains free to withdraw its consent to the proposed
Final Judgment at any time prior to the Court's entry of judgment. The
comments and the response of the Department will be filed with the
Court and published in the Federal Register.
Written comments should be submitted to: Nancy M. Goodman, Chief,
Telecommunications and Media Enforcement Section, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Suite 7000,
Washington, DC 20530.
The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains
[[Page 5458]]
jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court
for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification,
interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.
VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment
The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed
Final Judgment, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against
Defendants' transaction and proceeding to a full trial on the merits.
The United States is satisfied, however, that the relief in the
proposed Final Judgment will preserve competition for the provision of
video programming distribution services in the United States. Thus, the
proposed Final Judgment would protect competition as effectively as
would any remedy available through litigation, but avoids the time,
expense, and uncertainty of a full trial on the merits.
VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for the Proposed Final Judgment
The Clayton Act, as amended by the APPA, requires that proposed
consent judgments in antitrust cases brought by the United States be
subject to a sixty-day comment period, after which the court shall
determine whether entry of the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the
public interest.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1). In making that determination,
the court, in accordance with the statute as amended in 2004, is
required to consider:
(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including
termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and
modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of
alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are
ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the
adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a
determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public
interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the
relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and
individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth
in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if
any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1)(A), (B). In considering these statutory factors, the
court's inquiry is necessarily a limited one as the government is
entitled to ``broad discretion to settle with the defendant within the
reaches of the public interest.'' United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56
F.3d 1448, 1461 (DC Cir. 1995); see also United States v. InBev N.V./
S.A., No. 08-1965 (JR), 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ] 76,736, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009) (noting that the
court's review of a consent judgment is limited and only inquires
``into whether the government's determination that the proposed
remedies will cure the antitrust violations alleged in the complaint
was reasonable, and whether the mechanisms to enforce the final
judgment are clear and manageable.''). See generally United States v.
SBC Comm., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (assessing public
interest standard under the Tunney Act).\25\
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\25\ The 2004 amendments substituted ``shall'' for ``may'' in
directing relevant factors for court to consider and amended the
list of factors to focus on competitive considerations and to
address potentially ambiguous judgment terms. Compare 15 U.S.C.
16(e) (2004), with 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(1) (2006); see also SBC Comm.,
489 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (concluding that the 2004 amendments
``effected minimal changes'' to Tunney Act review).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has held, under the APPA a court considers, among other things,
the relationship between the remedy secured and the specific
allegations set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree
is sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient,
and whether the decree may positively harm third parties. Microsoft, 56
F.3d at 1458-62. With respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by
the decree, a court may not ``engage in an unrestricted evaluation of
what relief would best serve the public.'' United States v. BNS, Inc.,
858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Bechtel
Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d
at 1460-62; United States v. Alcoa, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 2d 37, 40
(D.D.C. 2001); InBev, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *3. Courts have
held that:
[t]he balancing of competing social and political interests affected
by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first
instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's
role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the
government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to
the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a
particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but
whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public
interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the
effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.
Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\26\ In
determining whether a proposed settlement is in the public interest, a
district court ``must accord deference to the government's predictions
about the efficacy of its remedies, and may not require that the
remedies perfectly match the alleged violations.'' SBC Comm., 489 F.
Supp. 2d at 17; see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 (noting the need
for courts to be ``deferential to the government's predictions as to
the effect of the proposed remedies''); United States v. Archer-
Daniels-Midland Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that
the court should grant ``due respect to the government's prediction as
to the effect of proposed remedies, its perception of the market
structure, and its views of the nature of the case'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Cf. BNS, 858 F.2d at 464 (holding that the court's
``ultimate authority under the [APPA] is limited to approving or
disapproving the consent decree''); United States v. Gillette Co.,
406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975) (noting that, in this way, the
court is constrained to ``look at the overall picture not
hypercritically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's
reducing glass''). See generally Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461
(discussing whether ``the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so
inconsonant with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the
`reaches of the public interest' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Courts have greater flexibility in approving proposed consent
decrees than in crafting their own decrees following a finding of
liability in a litigated matter. ``[A] proposed decree must be approved
even if it falls short of the remedy the court would impose on its own,
as long as it falls within the range of acceptability or is `within the
reaches of public interest.''' United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982) (citations omitted) (quoting United
States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975)), aff'd
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see also
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 605 F. Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky.
1985) (approving the consent decree even though the court might have
imposed a greater remedy if the matter had been litigated). To meet
this standard, the Department ``need only provide a factual basis for
concluding that the settlements are reasonably adequate remedies for
the alleged harms.'' SBC Comm., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 17.
Moreover, the court's role under the APPA is limited to reviewing
the remedy in relationship to the violations that the United States has
alleged in its Complaint, and does not authorize the court to
``construct [its] own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree
against that case.'' Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459; see also InBev, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84787, at *20 (``[T]he `public interest' is not to be
measured by comparing the violations alleged in the complaint against
those the court believes could have, or even should have, been
alleged.''). Because the ``court's authority to review the decree
[[Page 5459]]
depends entirely on the government's exercising its prosecutorial
discretion by bringing a case in the first place,'' it follows that
``the court is only authorized to review the decree itself,'' and not
to ``effectively redraft the complaint'' to inquire into other matters
that the United States did not pursue. Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459-60.
As this Court recently confirmed in SBC Communications, courts ``cannot
look beyond the complaint in making the public interest determination
unless the complaint is drafted so narrowly as to make a mockery of
judicial power.'' SBC Comm., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 15. In its 2004
amendments, Congress made clear its intent to preserve the practical
benefits of utilizing consent decrees in antitrust enforcement, adding
the unambiguous instruction that ``[n]othing in this section shall be
construed to require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to
require the court to permit anyone to intervene.'' 15 U.S.C. 16(e)(2).
The language wrote into the statute what Congress intended when it
enacted the Tunney Act in 1974, as Senator Tunney explained: ``[t]he
court is nowhere compelled to go to trial or to engage in extended
proceedings which might have the effect of vitiating the benefits of
prompt and less costly settlement through the consent decree process.''
119 Cong. Rec. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Senator Tunney). Rather, the
procedure for the public interest determination is left to the
discretion of the court, with the recognition that the court's ``scope
of review remains sharply proscribed by precedent and the nature of
Tunney Act proceedings.'' SBC Comm., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 11.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See United States v. Enova Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 10, 17
(D.D.C. 2000) (noting that the ``Tunney Act expressly allows the
court to make its public interest determination on the basis of the
competitive impact statement and response to comments alone'');
United States v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ]
61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (``Absent a showing of corrupt
failure of the government to discharge its duty, the Court, in
making its public interest finding, should * * * carefully consider
the explanations of the government in the competitive impact
statement and its responses to comments in order to determine
whether those explanations are reasonable under the
circumstances.''); S. Rep. No. 93-298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6
(1973) (``Where the public interest can be meaningfully evaluated
simply on the basis of briefs and oral arguments, that is the
approach that should be utilized.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIII. Determinative Documents
Appendix F to the FCC's Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re
Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co. and NBC Universal,
Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licensees,
FCC MB Docket No. 10-56 (adopted Jan. 18, 2011), was the only
determinative document or material within the meaning of the APPA
considered by the Department in formulating the proposed Final
Judgment. The Department will file a notice and link to this document
as soon as it is posted on the FCC's Web site.
Dated: January 18, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
Yvette F. Tarlov (D.C. Bar 442452)
Attorney, Telecommunications & Media Enforcement, Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Suite
7000, Washington, DC 20530, Telephone: (202) 514-5621, Facsimile:
(202) 514-6381, Email: Yvette.Tarlov@usdoj.go.
In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
United States of America, State of California, State of Florida,
State of Missouri, State of Texas, and State of Washington,
Plaintiffs, v.
Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.
[Proposed] Final Judgment
Whereas, Plaintiffs, the United States of America and the States of
California, Florida, Missouri, Texas, and Washington, filed their
Complaint on January 18, 2011, alleging that Defendants propose to
enter into a joint venture that will empower Defendant Comcast
Corporation to block competition from video programming distribution
competitors in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended,
15 U.S.C. 18, and Plaintiffs and Defendants, by their respective
attorneys, have consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without
trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and without this
Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or admission by any
party regarding any issue of fact or law;
And whereas, Defendants agree to be bound by the provisions of this
Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
And whereas, Plaintiffs require Defendants to agree to undertake
certain actions and refrain from certain conduct for the purpose of
remedying the loss of competition alleged in the Complaint;
And whereas, Defendants have represented to the United States that
the actions and conduct restrictions can and will be undertaken and
that Defendants will later raise no claim of hardship or difficulty as
grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the provisions contained
below;
Now therefore, before any testimony is taken, without trial or
adjudication of any issue of fact or law, and upon consent of
Defendants, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed:
I. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and each of
the parties to this action. The Complaint states a claim upon which
relief may be granted against Defendants under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18.
II. Definitions
As used in this Final Judgment:
A. ``AAA'' means the American Arbitration Association.
B. ``Affiliated'' means directly or indirectly controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with a Person.
C. ``Broadcast Network'' means The Walt Disney Company (ABC), CBS
Inc. (CBS), News Corporation (FOX), NBCU (NBC and Telemundo), or any
other Person that provides live or recorded Video Programming for
broadcast over a group of local television stations.
D. ``Broadcast Network Peer'' means (1) CBS Inc. (CBS), News
Corporation (FOX), or The Walt Disney Company (ABC); or (2) any of the
top four Broadcast Networks, measured by the total annual net revenue
earned by the Broadcast Network from the broadcast of live or recorded
Video Programming over a group of local television stations. Defendants
are not Broadcast Network Peers, even if they are one of the top four
Broadcast Networks.
E. ``Business Model'' means the primary method by which Video
Programming is monetized (e.g., ad-supported, subscription without ads,
subscription with ads, electronic sell through, or pay per view/
transactional video on demand).
F. ``Cable Programmer'' means Time Warner, Inc., The Walt Disney
Company, News Corporation, Viacom, Inc., NBCU, or any other Person that
provides Video Programming for distribution through MVPDs. A Person
that provides Video Programming to MVPDs solely as a Broadcast Network
or as a Network Affiliate, O&O, or local television station operating
within its licensed territory is not a Cable Programmer.
G. ``Cable Programmer Peer'' means (1) News Corporation, Time
Warner, Inc., Viacom, Inc., or The Walt Disney Company; or (2) any of
the top five Cable Programmers, measured by the total annual net
revenue earned by the Cable Programmer from its cable networks, as
reported by SNL Kagan (or another source commonly relied upon in the
television industry), excluding revenues earned from regional sports
networks. Defendants are not Cable
[[Page 5460]]
Programmer Peers, even if they are one of the top five Cable
Programmers.
H. ``Comcast'' means Comcast Corporation, a Pennsylvania
corporation with its principal place of business in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, its successors and assigns, and its Subsidiaries (whether
partially or wholly owned), divisions, groups, Partnerships, and Joint
Ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and
employees.
I. ``Defendants'' means Comcast, General Electric, and NBCU, acting
individually or collectively, as appropriate. Where the Final Judgment
imposes an obligation to engage in or refrain from engaging in certain
conduct, that obligation shall apply to each Defendant individually and
to any Joint Venture established by any two or more Defendants.
J. ``Department of Justice'' means the United States Department of
Justice Antitrust Division.
K. ``Experimental Deal'' means an agreement between an OVD and a
Peer for a term of six months or less.
L. ``Film'' means a feature-length motion picture that has been
theatrically released.
M. ``Final Offer'' means a proposed contract identifying the Video
Programming Defendants are to provide to OVDs pursuant to Section IV.A
or IV.B of this Final Judgment and containing the proposed price,
terms, and conditions on which Defendants will provide that Video
Programming.
N. ``General Electric'' means General Electric Company, a New York
corporation with its principal place of business in Fairfield,
Connecticut, its successors and assigns, and its Subsidiaries (whether
partially or wholly owned), divisions, groups, Partnerships, and Joint
Ventures, and their directors, officers, managers, agents, and
employees.
O. ``Hulu'' means Hulu, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company
with its headquarters in Los Angeles, California, its successors and
assigns, and its Subsidiaries (whether partially or wholly owned),
divisions, groups, Partnerships, and Joint Ventures, and their
directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
P. ``Internet Access Service'' means a mass-market retail
communications service by wire or radio that provides the capability to
transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all
Internet endpoints, including any capabilities that are incidental to
and enable the operation of the communications service, but excluding
dial-up Internet access service. Internet Access Service does not
include virtual private network services, content delivery network
services, multichannel video programming services, hosting or data
storage services, or Internet backbone services (if those services are
separate from Internet Access Services).
Q. ``MVPD'' means a multichannel video programming distributor as
that term is defined on the date of entry of this Final Judgment in 47
CFR 76.1200(b).
R. ``NBCU'' means NBC Universal, Inc., a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in New York, New York, its successors
and assigns, and its Subsidiaries (whether partially or wholly owned),
divisions, groups, Partnerships, and Joint Ventures, and their
directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
S. ``Network Affiliate'' means a local television station that
broadcasts some or all of the Video Programming of Defendants'
Broadcast Networks (i.e., NBC or Telemundo). A Network Affiliate is
owned and operated by Persons other than Defendants.
T. ``O&O'' means a local television station owned and operated by
Defendants that broadcasts the Video Programming of one of Defendants'
Broadcast Networks (i.e., NBC or Telemundo).
U. ``OVD'' means any Person that distributes Video Programming in
the United States by means of the Internet or another IP-based
transmission path provided by a Person other than the OVD. This
definition (1) includes an MVPD that offers Video Programming by means
of the Internet or another IP-based transmission path outside its MVPD
footprint as a service separate and independent of an MVPD
subscription; and (2) excludes an MVPD that offers Video Programming by
means of the Internet or another IP-based transmission path to homes
inside its MVPD footprint as a component of an MVPD subscription.
V. ``Peer'' means any Broadcast Network Peer, Cable Programmer
Peer, or Production Studio Peer, its successors, assigns, and any
Person that is managed or controlled by any Broadcast Network Peer,
Cable Programmer Peer, or Production Studio Peer. Defendants are not
Peers.
W. ``Person'' means any natural person, corporation, company,
partnership, joint venture, firm, association, proprietorship, agency,
board, authority, commission, office, or other business or legal
entity, whether private or governmental.
X. ``Plaintiff States'' means the States of California, Florida,
Missouri, Texas, and Washington.
Y. ``Production Studio'' means Time Warner, Inc. (Warner Bros.
Television and Warner Bros. Pictures), News Corporation (20th Century
Fox Television and 20th Century Fox), Viacom, Inc. (Viacom's television
production subsidiaries and Paramount Pictures), Sony Corporation of
America (Sony Pictures Television and Sony Pictures Entertainment), The
Walt Disney Company (Disney-ABC Studios and the Walt Disney Motion
Pictures Group), NBCU (Universal Pictures, Focus Films, and Universal
Studios), and any other Person that produces Video Programming for
distribution through Broadcast Networks or Cable Programmers.
Z. ``Production Studio Peer'' means (1) News Corporation, Viacom,
Inc., Sony Corporation of America, Time Warner, Inc., or The Walt
Disney Company; or (2) any of the top six Production Studios, measured
by the total annual net revenue earned by the Production Studio from
the sale or licensing of Video Programming. Defendants are not
Production Studio Peers, even if they are one of the top six Production
Studios.
AA. ``Qualified OVD'' means any OVD that has an agreement with a
Peer for the license of Video Programming to the OVD (other than an
agreement under which an OVD licenses only short programming segments
or clips from the Peer), where the OVD is not Affiliated with the Peer.
BB. ``Specialized Service'' means any service provided over the
same last-mile facilities used to deliver Internet Access Service other
than (1) Internet Access Services, (2) services regulated either as
telecommunications services under Title II of the Communications Act or
as MVPD services under Title VI of the Communications Act, or (3)
Defendants' existing VoIP telephony service.
CC. ``Subsidiary,'' ``Partnership,'' and ``Joint Venture'' refer to
any Person in which there is partial (25 percent or more) or total
ownership or control between the specified Person and any other Person.
DD. ``Value'' means the economic value of Video Programming based
on, among other factors, the Video Programming's ratings (as measured
by The Nielsen Company or other Person commonly relied upon in the
television industry for television ratings), affiliate fees,
advertising revenues, and the time elapsed since the Video Programming
was first distributed to consumers by a Broadcast Network or Cable
Programmer.
EE. ``Video Programming'' means programming provided by, or
generally considered comparable to programming
[[Page 5461]]
provided by, a Broadcast Network or Cable Programmer, regardless of the
medium or method used for distribution, and includes programming
prescheduled by the programming provider (also known as scheduled
programming or a linear feed); programming offered to viewers on an on-
demand, point-to-point basis (also known as video on demand); pay per
view or transactional video on demand; short programming segments
related to other full-length programming (also known as clips);
programming that includes multiple video sources (also known as feeds,
including camera angles); programming that includes video in different
qualities or formats (including high-definition and 3D); and Films for
which a year or more has elapsed since their theatrical release. For
purposes of this Final Judgment, Video Programming shall not include
programming over which General Electric possesses ownership or control
that is unrelated to its ownership interest in NBCU.
III. Applicability
This Final Judgment applies to Defendants and all other Persons in
active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual
notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.
IV. Required Conduct
Provision of Economically Equivalent Video Programming Terms to OVDs
A. At the request of any OVD, Defendants shall provide, for
distribution to consumers through a linear feed (plus any associated
video-on-demand rights), all Video Programming they provide to any MVPD
in the United States with more than one million subscribers, on terms
that are Economically Equivalent to the terms on which Defendants
provide Video Programming to that MVPD.
For purposes of this Section IV.A:
1. ``Economically Equivalent'' means the price, terms, and
conditions that, in the aggregate, reasonably approximate those on
which Defendants provide Video Programming to an MVPD, and shall take
account of, among other things, any difference in advertising revenues
earned by Defendants through OVD distribution and those earned through
MVPD distribution; any limitation of Defendants' legal rights to
provide Video Programming as a linear feed over the Internet or other
IP-based transmission path; any generally applicable, market-based
requirements regarding minimum subscriber and penetration rates; and
any other evidence concerning differences in revenues earned by
Defendants in connection with the provision of Video Programming to the
OVD rather than to an MVPD.
2. Defendants shall provide to any requesting OVD all Video
Programming subject to Defendants' management or control and all Video
Programming, including Video Programming owned by another Person, over
which Defendants possess the power or authority to negotiate content
licenses.
3. At the request of the OVD, Defendants shall provide any bundle
of channels, and all quality formats (e.g., high definition, 3D) and
video-on-demand rights that Defendants provide to any MVPD in the
United States with more than one million subscribers.
4. Subject to other provisions of this Section IV.A, Defendants
shall not apply to an OVD any terms or conditions contained in
Defendants' agreements with MVPDs that would not be technically or
economically practicable if applied generally to Video Programming
distributed by OVDs (e.g., that the OVD distribute Video Programming
over an MVPD system).
5. In any agreement they enter into with an OVD under this Section
IV.A, Defendants may require that the OVD not distribute Defendants'
Video Programming to consumers (a) if Defendants' Video Programming
constitutes more than 45 percent of the OVD's Video Programming
(measured by hours available to subscribers), and (b) until at least
one Peer has agreed to provide Video Programming to the OVD (including,
if the Defendants agree to provide NBC Video Programming to the OVD, at
least one Broadcast Network Peer).
6. Defendants may condition their provision of Video Programming to
an OVD under this Section IV.A on the OVD's (a) Agreement not to
distribute the Video Programming to consumers through a Web site
promoting or communicating the availability or accessibility of
pornography, gambling, or unlawful activities; (b) reasonable
demonstration of its ability to meet its financial obligations; (c)
demonstration of its ability to satisfy reasonable quality and
technical requirements for the display and secure protection of
Defendants' Video Programming; (d) agreement to limit the distribution
of an O&O's Video Programming linear feed solely to that O&O's
designated market area or ``DMA''; or (e) agreement to limit the
distribution of Defendants' Video Programming to the territory of the
United States.
Provision of Comparable Video Programming to OVDs
B. At the request of any Qualified OVD, Defendants shall provide
Comparable Video Programming to the Qualified OVD on terms that are
Economically Equivalent to the price, terms, and conditions on which
the Qualified OVD receives Video Programming from a Peer.
For purposes of this Section IV.B:
1. ``Economically Equivalent'' means price, terms, and conditions
that, in the aggregate, reasonably approximate those on which the Peer
provides Video Programming to the Qualified OVD, and shall take account
of, among other things, any difference between the Value of the Video
Programming the Qualified OVD seeks from Defendants and the Value of
the Video Programming it receives from a Peer.
2. ``Comparable'' Video Programming means Defendants' Video
Programming that is reasonably similar in kind and amount to the Video
Programming provided by the Peer, considering the volume (i.e., number
of channels or shows) of Video Programming and its Value.
3. The following, among other types of Video Programming, are not
Comparable:
a. First-day Video Programming and Video Programming distributed
after Defendants' first-day distribution of that Video Programming to
consumers;
b. Repeat, prior-season Video Programming and original, first-run
Video Programming;
c. Non-sports Video Programming and sports Video Programming;
d. Broadcast Video Programming and cable Video Programming;
e. Video Programming directed to children and Video Programming not
directed to children;
f. Local news Video Programming and Video Programming that is not
local news;
g. Film and non-Film Video Programming; and
h. Film between one and five years from initial distribution and
Film over five years from initial distribution.
4. In any agreement they enter into with an OVD under this Section
IV.B, Defendants shall not be required to include exclusivity
provisions for Comparable Video Programming even if the Qualified OVD's
Peer agreement includes exclusivity provisions, provided that the
price, terms, and conditions on which Defendants provide Video
Programming to the Qualified OVD shall be adjusted so that, in the
aggregate, they reasonably approximate the price, terms, and
[[Page 5462]]
conditions on which the Peer provides Video Programming to the
Qualified OVD.
5. If a Qualified OVD receives Video Programming from two or more
Peers in any single Peer category (i.e., Broadcast Network Peers, Cable
Programmer Peers, or Production Studio Peers) and pursuant to the same
Business Model, Defendants shall provide, pursuant to this Section
IV.B, Video Programming Comparable to the Video Programming of one Peer
in that category selected by the Qualified OVD. If a Qualified OVD
receives Video Programming from a Peer in two or more Peer categories,
Defendants shall provide Video Programming Comparable to the Peer in
both or all categories. If a Qualified OVD receives Video Programming
from two or more Peers in the same Peer category but pursuant to
different Business Models, Defendants shall provide Video Programming
Comparable to each Peer pursuant to the Business Model specified in
each Peer contract.
6. In responding to a request from a Qualified OVD to which
Defendants have provided Video Programming under this Section IV.B,
Defendants shall not be required to provide additional Video
Programming unless the Qualified OVD enters into a Video Programming
agreement with (a) A Peer in a different Peer category (i.e., Broadcast
Network Peers, Cable Programmer Peers, or Production Studio Peers), (b)
the same Peer under a different Business Model, or (c) the same Peer
for additional Video Programming pursuant to the same Business Model.
7. At the request of an OVD with which Defendants have an agreement
to provide Video Programming that subsequently becomes a Qualified OVD,
Defendants shall provide additional or different Video Programming so
the Video Programming Defendants provide to the Qualified OVD
(including any Video Programming the Defendants have previously agreed
to provide to the OVD) is Comparable to that which the Qualified OVD
receives from the Peer.
8. Defendants may require the Qualified OVD to distribute Video
Programming obtained from Defendants pursuant to the Business Model
under which the Qualified OVD distributes the Peer's Video Programming.
9. The number of Experimental Deals to which Defendants, at the
request of Qualified OVDs, must respond by providing Comparable Video
Programming is limited to the maximum number of Experimental Deals any
single Peer has entered into with OVDs.
10. If a Cable Programmer Peer provides substantially all of its
cable channels to a Qualified OVD for distribution to consumers through
a linear feed, Defendants may meet their obligation under this Section
IV.B to provide Comparable Video Programming by providing to the
Qualified OVD and requiring the Qualified OVD to distribute
substantially all of Defendants' channels.
OVD Rights to Commercial Arbitration
C. If, after negotiations, in which Defendants shall participate in
good faith and with reasonable diligence, Defendants and any OVD fail
to agree on appropriate Economically Equivalent terms on which
Defendants must provide Video Programming under Sections IV.A or IV.B
of this Final Judgment or on Comparable Video Programming under Section
IV.B of this Final Judgment, the OVD may apply to the Department of
Justice (but not to the Plaintiff States) for permission to submit its
dispute with Defendants to commercial arbitration in accordance with
Section VII of this Final Judgment. For so long as commercial
arbitration is available for the resolution of such disputes in a
timely manner under the Federal Communications Commission's rules and
orders, the Department of Justice will ordinarily defer to the Federal
Communications Commission's commercial arbitration process to resolve
such disputes; provided that the Department of Justice reserves the
right, in its sole discretion, to permit arbitration under this Final
Judgment to advance the competitive objectives of this Final Judgment.
Nothing in this Section IV.C shall limit the right of the United States
to apply to this Court, pursuant to Section IX of this Final Judgment,
either before or in place of commercial arbitration under Section VII
of this Final Judgment, for an order enforcing Defendants' compliance
or punishing their noncompliance with their obligations under Sections
IV.A and IV.B of this Final Judgment.
Disposition of Control Over Hulu
D. Within ten days after entry of this Final Judgment, Defendants
shall (1) delegate any voting and other rights they hold pursuant to
their ownership interest in Hulu in a manner that directs and
authorizes Hulu to cast any votes related to such ownership interest in
an amount and manner proportional to the vote of all other votes cast
by other Hulu owners; and (2) relinquish any veto right or other right
to influence, control, or participate in the governance or management
of Hulu; provided that such delegation and relinquishment shall
terminate upon Defendants' complete divestiture of their ownership
interests in Hulu.
E. Defendants shall not read, receive, obtain, or attempt to obtain
any confidential or competitively sensitive information concerning Hulu
or influence, interfere, or attempt to influence or interfere in the
management or operation of Hulu. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
Defendants may request and receive from Hulu regularly prepared,
aggregated financial statements and information reasonably necessary
for Defendants to exercise their rights to purchase advertising
inventory from Hulu and to comply with their obligations under Section
IV.G of this Final Judgment.
F. Defendants shall not obtain or acquire any ownership interest in
Hulu beyond that which it possessed on January 1, 2011. Nothing in this
Section IV.F shall prohibit Defendants from receiving a proportional or
less than proportional distribution of Hulu equity securities in
connection with any future conversion of Hulu into a corporation,
provided that Defendants' economic share in Hulu may not increase in
connection with such distribution.
G. Defendants shall continue to provide Video Programming to Hulu
of a type, quantity, ratings, and quality comparable to that of the
Broadcast Network owner of Hulu providing the greatest quantity of
Video Programming to Hulu. Provided that the other current Broadcast
Network owners of Hulu renew their agreements with Hulu, Defendants
also either shall continue to provide Video Programming to Hulu on
substantially the same terms and conditions as were in place on January
1, 2011, or shall enter into agreements with Hulu on substantially the
same terms and conditions as those of the Broadcast Network owner whose
renewed agreement is the most economically advantageous to Hulu.
Clear Delineation of Rights
H. Any agreement Defendants enter into with any Production Studio
concerning Defendants' distribution of the Production Studio's Video
Programming shall include, unless inconsistent with common and
reasonable industry practice and subject to any agreements not
prohibited by Section V.B of this Final Judgment, either (1) an express
grant by the Production Studio to Defendants of the right to provide
the Video Programming to OVDs, or (2) an express retention of that
right by the Production Studio.
[[Page 5463]]
Document Retention and Disclosures
I. Comcast and NBCU shall furnish to the Department of Justice and
the Plaintiff States quarterly electronic copies of any communications
with any MVPD, OVD, Broadcast Network, Cable Programmer, or Production
Studio containing allegations of Defendants' noncompliance with any
provision of this Final Judgment.
J. Comcast and NBCU shall collect and maintain one copy of each of
the following agreements, currently in effect or established after
entry of this Final Judgment:
1. Each affiliation agreement between Defendants and any Network
Affiliate;
2. Each agreement under which a Network Affiliate authorizes
Defendants to negotiate on its behalf for carriage or retransmission on
MVPDs;
3. Each agreement for the carriage or retransmission of an O&O's or
a Network Affiliate's (to the extent Defendants possess the power or
authority to negotiate on behalf of the Network Affiliate) Video
Programming on an MVPD; and
4. Each syndication agreement under which Defendants provide Video
Programming to an O&O or Network Affiliate for distribution to
consumers.
K. Comcast and NBCU shall collect and maintain each document in
their possession, custody, or control discussing an O&O's or a Network
Affiliate's denial or threat to deny Video Programming to an MVPD or
OVD. Defendants shall notify the Department of Justice and the
Plaintiff States within 30 days of learning that an O&O or a Network
Affiliate has denied or threatened to deny Video Programming to any
MVPD or OVD.
L. Comcast and NBCU shall collect and maintain documents sufficient
to show the compensation each O&O and each Network Affiliate (about
which Comcast or NBCU possesses information) receives from any MVPD or
OVD.
M. Comcast and NBCU shall collect and maintain complete copies of
any final agreement or unsigned but operative agreement (1) under which
Defendants provide Video Programming (other than short programming
segments or clips) to any MVPD or OVD, and (2) for Defendants' carriage
or retransmission on their MVPD of Video Programming from a Network
Affiliate, a local television station, a Broadcast Network, or a Cable
Programmer. For any ongoing negotiations that have not yet produced a
final or operative agreement, Comcast and NBCU shall also collect and
maintain electronic copies of the most recent offer made to Defendants
by an MVPD or OVD seeking Video Programming or by a Network Affiliate,
local television station, Broadcast Network, or Cable Programmer
seeking carriage or retransmission on Defendants' MVPD, and Defendants'
most recent response or offer to any such Persons.
N. Comcast and NBCU shall identify for the Department of Justice
and the Plaintiff States semiannually
1. the name of each Person that in writing has requested or
submitted to Defendants a contractual offer for Video Programming
(other than short programming segments or clips) for distribution to
consumers, the date of such Person's most recent written request or
contractual offer, and the date of Defendants' most recent response or
offer to such Person; and
2. the name of each Person that in writing has requested or
submitted a contractual offer for carriage or retransmission of the
Person's Video Programming on Defendants' MVPD, the date of such
Person's most recent written request or contractual offer, and the date
of Defendants' most recent response or offer to such Person.
O. Comcast and NBCU shall collect and maintain each document sent
to or received from General Electric relating to (1) Defendants'
provision of Video Programming to any MVPD or OVD, (2) any OVD's
distribution of any Person's Video Programming to consumers, (3)
carriage or retransmission of any Person's Video Programming on
Defendants' MVPD, or (4) Defendants' compliance or noncompliance with
the terms of this Final Judgment.
V. Prohibited Conduct
Discrimination and Retaliation
A. Defendants shall not discriminate against, retaliate against, or
punish (1) any Broadcast Network, Cable Programmer, Production Studio,
local television station, or Network Affiliate for providing Video
Programming to any MVPD or OVD, or (2) any MVPD or OVD (i) for
obtaining Video Programming from any Broadcast Network, Cable
Programmer, Production Studio, local television station, or Network
Affiliate, (ii) for invoking any provisions of this Final Judgment,
(iii) for invoking the provisions of any rules or orders concerning
Video Programming adopted by the Federal Communications Commission, or
(iv) for furnishing information to the United States or the Plaintiff
States concerning Defendants' compliance or noncompliance with this
Final Judgment.
Contractual Provisions
B. Defendants shall not enter into any agreement pursuant to which
Defendants provide Video Programming to any Person in which Defendants
forbid, limit, or create economic incentives to limit the distribution
of such Video Programming through OVDs, provided that, nothing in this
Section V.B shall prohibit Defendants from entering into agreements
consistent with common and reasonable industry practice. Evidence
relevant to determining common and reasonable industry practice may
include, among other things, Defendants' contracting practices prior to
December 3, 2009, and the contracting practices of Defendants' Peers.
Notwithstanding any other provision in this Section V.B, in providing
Comparable Video Programming to a Qualified OVD under Section IV.B of
this Final Judgment, Defendants may include exclusivity provisions only
to the extent those provisions are no broader than any exclusivity
provisions in the Qualified OVD's agreement with a Peer.
C. Defendants shall not enter into or enforce any agreement for
Defendants' carriage or retransmission on their MVPD of Video
Programming from a local television station, Network Affiliate,
Broadcast Network, or Cable Programmer under which Defendants forbid,
limit, or create incentives to limit the local television station's,
Network Affiliate's, Broadcast Network's, or Cable Programmer's
provision of its Video Programming to one or more OVDs, provided that,
nothing in this Section V.C shall prohibit Defendants from
1. entering into and enforcing an agreement under which Defendants
discourage or prohibit a local television station, Network Affiliate,
Broadcast Network, or Cable Programmer from making Video Programming
for which Defendants pay available to consumers for free over the
Internet within the first 30 days after Defendants first distribute the
Video Programming to consumers;
2. entering into and enforcing an agreement under which the local
television station, Network Affiliate, Broadcast Network, or Cable
Programmer provides Video Programming exclusively to Defendants, and to
no other MVPD or OVD, for a period of time of not greater than 14 days;
or
3. entering into and enforcing an agreement which requires that
Defendants are treated in material parity with other similarly situated
MVPDs, except to the extent application of other
[[Page 5464]]
MVPDs' terms would be inconsistent with the purpose of this Final
Judgment.
Control or Influence Over Other Persons
D. Except as permitted by Section V.B of this Final Judgment,
Defendants shall not require, encourage, unduly influence, or provide
incentives to any local television station or Network Affiliate to
1. Deny Video Programming to (a) any MVPD that provides Video
Programming to consumers in any zip code in which Comcast also provides
Video Programming to consumers or (b) any OVD; or
2. Provide Video Programming on terms that exceed its Value.
E. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Final Judgment,
including the definitions of ``Defendant,'' ``Comcast,'' ``NBCU,''
``General Electric,'' ``Subsidiary,'' ``Partnership,'' or ``Joint
Venture,'' unless Comcast, NBCU, or General Electric possesses or
acquires control over The Weather Channel, TV One, FearNet, the
Pittsburgh Cable News Channel, or Hulu, or the right or ability to
negotiate for any of those Persons or to influence negotiations for the
provision of any such Person's Video Programming to MVPDs or OVDs, such
Person is not a Defendant subject to the obligations of this Final
Judgment.
F. Defendants shall not exercise any rights under any existing
management or operating agreement with The Weather Channel to
participate in negotiations for the provision of any of The Weather
Channel's Video Programming to any MVPD or OVD, to advise The Weather
Channel concerning any such negotiations, or to approve or obtain any
information (other than aggregated financial reports) about any
agreement between The Weather Channel and any MVPD or OVD. If, in the
future, Defendants acquire the right to negotiate for The Weather
Channel or to exercise any control or influence over The Weather
Channel's negotiation of agreements with MVPDs or OVDs, Defendants
shall provide The Weather Channel Video Programming to OVDs when
required to do so under Sections IV.A or IV.B of this Final Judgment.
Practices Concerning Comcast's Internet Facilities
G. Comcast shall abide by the following restrictions on the
management and operation of its Internet facilities:
1. Comcast, insofar as it is engaged in the provision of Internet
Access Service, shall not unreasonably discriminate in transmitting
lawful network traffic over a consumer's Internet Access Service.
Reasonable network management shall not constitute unreasonable
discrimination. A network management practice is reasonable if it is
appropriate and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management
purpose, taking into account the particular network architecture and
technology of the Internet Access Service.
2. If Comcast offers consumers Internet Access Service under a
package that includes caps, tiers, metering, or other usage-based
pricing, it shall not measure, count, or otherwise treat Defendants'
affiliated network traffic differently from unaffiliated network
traffic. Comcast shall not prioritize Defendants' Video Programming or
other content over other Persons' Video Programming or other content.
3. Comcast shall not offer a Specialized Service that is
substantially or entirely comprised of Defendants' affiliated content.
4. If Comcast offers any Specialized Service that makes content
from one or more third parties available to (or that otherwise enables
the exchange of network traffic between one or more third parties and)
its subscribers, Comcast shall allow any other comparable Person to be
included in a similar Specialized Service on a nondiscriminatory basis.
5. Comcast shall offer Internet Access Service that is sufficiently
provisioned to ensure, in DOCSIS 3.0 or better markets, that an
Internet Access Service subscriber can typically achieve download
speeds of at least 12 megabits per second. The United States or
Defendants may petition this Court, based upon a showing that
comparable Internet Access Service providers (e.g., Persons using
hybrid fiber-coax technology to provide service on a mass-market scale)
have generally increased or decreased the speed of their services after
the entry of this Final Judgment, to modify Comcast's required download
speeds. This Section V.G does not restrict Comcast's ability to impose
byte caps or consumption-based billing, subject to the other provisions
of this Final Judgment.
6. Nothing in this Section V.G
a. Supersedes any obligation or authorization Comcast may have to
address the needs of emergency communications or law enforcement,
public safety, or national security authorities, consistent with or as
permitted by applicable law, or limits Comcast's ability to do so; or
b. Prohibits reasonable efforts by Comcast to address copyright
infringement or other unlawful activity.
VI. Permitted Conduct
Nothing in this Final Judgment prohibits Defendants from refusing
to provide to any MVPD or OVD any Video Programming (1) for which
Defendants do not possess copyright rights; (2) not subject to
Defendants' management or control or over which Defendants do not
possess the power or authority to negotiate content licenses; or (3)
the provision of which would require Defendants' to breach any contract
not prohibited by Sections V.B or V.C of this Final Judgment.
VII. Arbitration
A. Defendants shall negotiate in good faith and with reasonable
diligence to provide Video Programming sought by an OVD pursuant to
Sections IV.A and IV.B of this Final Judgment and, upon demand by an
OVD approved by the Department of Justice pursuant to Section IV.C of
this Final Judgment, shall participate in commercial arbitration in
accordance with the procedures herein.
B. Defendants and an OVD may, by agreement, modify any time periods
specified in this Section VII.
C. Any OVD seeking to invoke commercial arbitration under this
Final Judgment must, pursuant to Section IV.C of this Final Judgment,
apply to the Department of Justice for permission to do so. If the
Department of Justice determines the commercial arbitration should
proceed, the OVD shall furnish a written notice to Defendants and the
Department of Justice expressly (1) waiving all rights to invoke any
dispute resolution process under Federal Communications Commission
orders and rules to resolve a dispute with Defendants concerning the
same Video Programming; and (2) stating that the OVD consents to be
bound by the terms in the Final Offer selected by the arbitrator.
Arbitration under this Final Judgment is not available if a dispute
between an OVD and Defendants concerning the same Video Programming is
the subject of any Federal Communications Commission dispute resolution
process. Defendants shall not (a) commence arbitration of any dispute
under the arbitration procedures contained in this Final Judgment, or
(b) upon receipt of the notice from the OVD that it intends to commence
arbitration under this Final Judgment, commence any Federal
Communications Commission dispute resolution process to resolve the
same dispute with the OVD.
D. Arbitration pursuant to this Final Judgment shall be conducted
in accordance with the AAA's Commercial
[[Page 5465]]
Arbitration Rules and Expedited Procedures, except where inconsistent
with specific procedures prescribed by this Final Judgment. As
described below in Sections VII.P and VII.Q, the arbitrator shall
select the Final Offer of either the OVD or the Defendants and may not
alter, or request or demand alteration of, any terms of those Final
Offers. The decision of the arbitrator shall be binding on the parties,
and Defendants shall abide by the arbitrator's decision.
E. The AAA, in consultation with the United States, shall assemble
a list of potential arbitrators, to be furnished to the OVD and
Defendants as soon as practicable after commencement of the
arbitration. Within five business days after receipt of this list, the
OVD and Defendants each may submit to the AAA the names of up to 20
percent of the persons on the list to be excluded from consideration,
and shall rank the remaining arbitrators in their orders of preference.
The AAA, in consultation with the United States, will appoint as
arbitrator the candidate with the highest ranking who is not excluded
by the OVD or Defendants.
F. Defendants shall continue to provide Video Programming to an OVD
pursuant to the terms of any existing agreement until the arbitration
is completed. If the arbitrator's decision changes the financial terms
on which Defendants must provide Video Programming to the OVD,
Defendants or the OVD, as the case may be, shall compensate the other
based on application of the new financial terms for the period dating
from expiration of the existing agreement (plus appropriate interest).
G. Within five business days of the commencement of an arbitration,
the OVD and the Defendants each shall furnish a writing to the other
and to the Department of Justice committing to maintain the
confidentiality of the arbitration and of any Final Offers and
discovery materials exchanged during the arbitration, and to limit the
use of any Final Offers and discovery materials to the arbitration. The
writing shall expressly state that all records of the arbitration and
any discovery materials may be disclosed to the Department of Justice..
H. Defendants shall not be bound by the provisions of this Section
VII if an OVD commences arbitration under this Final Judgment more than
60 days prior to the expiration of an existing Video Programming
agreement, or less than 30 days after an OVD first requests Defendants
to provide Video Programming under Section IV.A or IV.B of this Final
Judgment.
I. After an OVD receives approval from the Department of Justice,
pursuant to Section IV.C of this Final Judgment, the OVD may commence
arbitration by filing with the AAA and furnishing to Defendants and to
the Department of Justice.
1. An assertion that Defendants must provide Video Programming to
the OVD pursuant to Section IV.A or IV.B of this Final Judgment; and
2. If the Qualified OVD's assertion is based, pursuant to Section
IV.B of this Final Judgment, on Comparable Video Programming provided
by a Peer or Peers, each agreement with any such Peers.
J. Simultaneously with the commencement of arbitration, the OVD
must file with the AAA its Final Offer for the Video Programming it
believes Defendants must provide.
K. Within five business days of the commencement of an arbitration,
Defendants shall file with the AAA and furnish to the Department of
Justice their Final Offer for the Video Programming sought by the OVD.
L. After the AAA has received Final Offers from the OVD and
Defendants, it will immediately furnish a copy of each Final Offer to
the other party.
M. At any time after the commencement of arbitration, the OVD and
Defendants may agree to suspend the arbitration, for periods not to
exceed 14 days in the aggregate, to attempt to resolve their dispute
through negotiation. The OVD and the Defendants shall effectuate such
suspension through a joint writing filed with the AAA and furnished to
the Department of Justice. Either the OVD or the Defendants may
terminate the suspension at any time by filing with the AAA and
furnishing to the Department of Justice a writing calling for the
arbitration to resume.
N. The OVD and the Defendants shall exchange written discovery
requests within five business days of receiving the other party's Final
Offer, and shall exercise reasonable diligence to respond within 14
days. Discovery shall be limited to the following items in the
possession of the parties:
1. Previous agreements between the OVD and the Defendants;
2. Formal offers to renew previous agreements;
3. Current and prior agreements between the Defendants and MVPDs or
other OVDs;
4. Current and prior agreements between the OVD and other Broadcast
Networks, Cable Programmers, or Production Studios;
5. Records of past arbitrations pursuant to this Final Judgment;
6. Documents reflecting Nielsen or other ratings of the Video
Programming at issue or of Comparable Video Programming; and
7. Documents reflecting the number of subscribers to the OVD. There
shall be no discovery or use in the arbitration of documents or
information not in the possession, custody, or control of the OVD or
the Defendants, of draft agreements or other documents concerning
negotiations between the OVD and the Defendants (other than formal
offers to renew previous agreements, pursuant to Section VII.N.2 of
this Final Judgment), or of the costs associated with Defendants'
production of their Video Programming.
O. In reaching his or her decision, the arbitrator may consider
only documents exchanged in discovery between the parties and the
following:
1. Testimony explaining the documents and the parties' Final
Offers;
2. Briefs submitted and arguments made by counsel; and
3. Summary exhibits illustrating the terms of Defendants'
agreements with MVPDs or other OVDs or of the party OVD's agreements
with other Broadcast Networks, Cable Programmers, or Production
Studios.
P. Arbitrations under Section IV.A of this Final Judgment shall
begin within 30 days of the AAA furnishing to the OVD and to the
Defendants, pursuant to Section VII.L of this Final Judgment, each
party's Final Offer. The arbitration hearing shall last no longer than
ten business days, after which the arbitrator shall have five business
days to inform the OVD and the Defendants which Final Offer best
reflects the appropriate Economically Equivalent terms under Section
IV.A of the Final Judgment.
Q. Arbitrations under Section IV.B of this Final Judgment shall be
conducted in two stages, the first of which shall begin within 30 days
of the AAA furnishing to the Qualified OVD and to the Defendants,
pursuant to Section VII.L of this Final Judgment, each party's Final
Offer. The first stage shall last no longer than ten business days,
after which the arbitrator shall have five business days to inform the
Qualified OVD and the Defendants which Final Offer encompasses the
appropriate Comparable Video Programming under Section IV.B of this
Final Judgment. Within five business days of the arbitrator's decision,
the Qualified OVD and the Defendants shall file with the AAA, furnish
to the Department of Justice, and exchange revised Final Offers
containing proposed financial terms for the Comparable Video
Programming selected by the arbitrator. The second stage of the
arbitration shall
[[Page 5466]]
commence within ten days of the exchange of the revised Final Offers
and shall last no longer than ten business days, after which the
arbitrator shall have five business days to inform the Qualified OVD
and the Defendants which Final Offer best reflects the appropriate
Economically Equivalent terms under Section IV.B of this Final
Judgment.
VIII. Compliance Inspection
A. For purposes of determining or securing compliance with this
Final Judgment, or of determining whether the Final Judgment should be
modified or vacated, and subject to any legally recognized privilege,
from time to time duly authorized representatives of the Department of
Justice, including consultants and other persons retained by the
Department of Justice, shall, upon written request of an authorized
representative of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, and on reasonable notice to Defendants, be
permitted
1. Access during the Defendants' office hours to inspect and copy,
or at the option of the United States, to require Defendants to provide
to the United States and the Plaintiff States hard copy or electronic
copies of, all books, ledgers, accounts, records, data, and documents
in the possession, custody, or control of Defendants, relating to any
matters contained in this Final Judgment, including documents
Defendants are required to collect and maintain pursuant to Sections
IV.J, IV.K, IV.L, IV.M, or IV.O of this Final Judgment; and
2. To interview, either informally or on the record, the
Defendants' officers, employees, or agents, who may have their
individual counsel present, regarding such matters. The interviews
shall be subject to the reasonable convenience of the interviewee and
without restraint or interference by Defendants.
B. Upon the written request of an authorized representative of the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
Defendants shall submit written reports or respond to written
interrogatories, under oath if requested, relating to any of the
matters contained in this Final Judgment as may be requested. Written
reports authorized under this paragraph may, at the sole discretion of
the United States (after consultation with the Plaintiff States),
require Defendants to conduct, at their cost, an independent audit or
analysis relating to any of the matters contained in this Final
Judgment.
C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in
this section shall be divulged by the United States to any person other
than an authorized representative of (1) the executive branch of the
United States, (2) the Plaintiff States, or (3) the Federal
Communications Commission, except in the course of legal proceedings to
which the United States is a party (including grand jury proceedings),
or for the purpose of securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or
as otherwise required by law.
D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by a
Defendant to the United States and the Plaintiff States, the Defendant
represents and identifies in writing the material in any such
information or documents to which a claim of protection may be asserted
under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the
Defendant marks each pertinent page of such material, ``Subject to
claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,'' then the United States and the Plaintiff States
shall give the Defendant ten calendar days notice prior to divulging
such material in any civil or administrative proceeding.
IX. Retention of Jurisdiction
This Court retains jurisdiction to enable any party to apply to
this Court at any time for further orders and directions as may be
necessary or appropriate to carry out or construe this Final Judgment,
to modify any of its provisions, to enforce compliance, and to punish
violations of its provisions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Plaintiff States shall have no right to apply to the Court for further
orders or directions with respect to Sections IV.C, IV.D, IV.E, IV.F,
V.G, or VII of this Final Judgment. In particular, the Plaintiff States
shall not be able to apply to this Court to carry out, construe,
modify, enforce, or punish violations of Sections IV.C, IV.D, IV.E,
IV.F, V.G, or VII of this Final Judgment.
X. No Limitation On Government Rights
Nothing in this Final Judgment shall limit the right of the United
States or the Plaintiff States to investigate and bring actions to
prevent or restrain violations of the antitrust laws concerning any
past, present, or future conduct, policy, or practice of the
Defendants.
XI. Expiration of Final Judgment
Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment shall
expire seven years from the date of its entry.
XII. Public Interest Determination
Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest. The parties
have complied with the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16, including making copies available to the
public of this Final Judgment, the Competitive Impact Statement, and
any comments thereon and the United States' responses to comments.
Based upon the record before the Court, which includes the Competitive
Impact Statement and any comments and response to comments filed with
the Court, entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.
Date:------------------------------------------------------------------
Court approval subject to procedures set forth in the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16
/s/--------------------------------------------------------------------
United States District Judge
[FR Doc. 2011-1821 Filed 1-28-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-P