18 December 2009. Could be legitimate information but the list of recipients suggests a sting.

Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2009 16:57:28 -1000
Subject: Cryptome: Latency in Wiretap Order Fulfillment
From: "Lee @ Royal Gardens" <lee@royalgardens.us>
To: cryptome <cryptome@earthlink.net>, tscm-l2006 <TSCM-L2006@googlegroups.com>, 
	"Painter, Christopher M." <Christopher_M._Painter@nsc.eop.gov>, christopher.painter@ic.fbi.gov, 
	christopher.painter@usdoj.gov, info <info@in-q-tel.org>

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Cryptome:

There appears to be a prioritization and fulfillment latency in the
access to wiretap authorities by minor jurisdiction (organized crime
courts) compared to the various federal and related.

Of note, there was close to a 3 day latency between activating a new
Verizon account (mifi wireless device) before the organized crime
entities misusing small police jurisdictions were able to re-route and
intercept/jam communications on the wire.

Contrarily, the DHS Fincen/USSS taps were activated immediately,
likely before the account was assigned, as the credit check required
provided an account trace which also GENERATED A CUSTOM NUMBER
assigned to the account reinforcing their tampering/molestation
activity.

Also, there appears to be a very strong intercept prioritization
problem, namely when multiple full wire intercepts may be registered
(this human would automatically fall in early counter-terrorism watch,
FBI-Esp and DIA, USSS Treas, etc automatic) but also highly targeted
by organized crime fronts and various corporate parties including
misled banks exploiting very small jurisdictions to gain court orders,
as well as foreign-asset and foreign-interest flags registered to UN,
NATO, and federal which activate automatically.

These interjections, especially between endpoint and large information
sources (including the google products and WhiteHouse.GOV's captchas),
appear to be highly COMPETITIVE, meaning there are very fast context
derived throttles between flag authorities which all appear to be
MANAGED through the same master interface but are very much related to
the targeted and explicit injecting/providing or denial of certain
types of information. There will be jammed denial responses from a
google search with obvious false injected content but then immediately
later (same page) there will be jammed highly accurate data with very
overt flags to which parties supposedly preferred the content getting
through rather than prevented entirely. This replacement of content
happens both in wire intercept as well as from the content management
subsystems in the search provider. Simultaneous requests from a new
and unknown device gain common legitimate responses. There is
indication the wire is fully compromised at various main points but
there is also MAC and account/transaction-tracked triggers that
perform in locations of the communication's propagation that are more
likely in the controlled mainstream information sources.

When complaints are filed with I3c, Tips.FBI.Gov, DHS/USSS,
INFO@IN-Q-TEL.ORG, etc., each independently triggers specific topics
and content targets to be molested DIFFERENTLY than when their timers
pass a few minutes/hours later (FBI has a 2 hour immediate override
and then approx 3 days of monitor, usss/dhs trigger for a few minutes
to trace and identify the endpoint electronic device) which then open
up the opportunity for LOWER RANKED EXPLOITS to compete for the single
wire, inducing explicit throttle between contexts as each
jamming/interjection system gains authority for a time period.

Obviously, there is also indication of remote tracing and polling of
wire activity by unconventional weapons, typically related to Secret
Service or Military observation but technologies accessible to anyone,
and occasionally indications such as electrical or electrostatic
spikes resulting from multiple probes against the target electronics
simultaneously or more visibly the polling tracer which locks on to
the field of the CRT monitor and very actively traces VISUAL
ILLUMINATION when topics such as the word-confirm "reCaptcha" (google,
wikipedia, *.gov) are monitored off the screen by electric field.
(this is apparently a visual-likeness requirement rather than simply
listening the VGA signals?) On frequent occasions these signal
observation methods have been identified to be disrupting eachother
regarding specific targets during activation or loss of wire intercept
by the competing parties. FCC Part 15 as always.

These topics are quite interesting, horribly troubling and problematic
as all communications are jammed, but provide useful insight into the
mechanisms used by various levels of intercept, jamming,
disinfo/propaganda, and general wiretap processes on paper and in
real-world implementation.

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