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1 June 2009
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\69\ ``Higher-priced mortgage loans'' are consumer-purpose, closed-end loans secured by a consumer's principal dwelling and having an APR that exceeds the average prime offer rates for a comparable transaction published by the Federal Reserve Board by at least 1.5 percentage points for first-lien loans, or 3.5 percentage points for subordinate-lien loans. The term excludes initial construction loans, bridge loans for 12 months or less, reverse mortgages, and home equity lines of credit. See 73 FR at 44603. \70\ The Board promulgated these rules using its authority under TILA Section 129(l)(2). \71\ The final rules provide that creditors are presumed to have adequately considered ability to pay if they have: (1) verified repayment ability based on reliable third-party documents; (2) determined repayment ability using the ``largest scheduled payment'' of principal and interest in the first seven years of the loan (in the case of variable-rate loans, the applicable rate is the fully- indexed rate as of the date of consummation, not the maximum note rate); and (3) assessed the borrower's repayment ability using a ratio of the borrower's total debt obligations to income, and/or a borrower's residual income (income after paying debt obligations). See 73 FR at 44539-551, 44603, 44611-613. \72\ See id. at 44546-548, 44603, 44611-612. \73\ See id. at 44551-557, 44603-604, 44610-611, 44613. \74\ Borrowers may cancel their escrow accounts 12 months after loan consummation. The requirement for a creditor to establish an escrow account for loans secured by site-built homes becomes effective April 1, 2010; for loans secured by manufactured housing, it becomes effective October 1, 2010. See id. at 44557-562, 44604, 44613. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. FTC Mortgage Origination Law Enforcement The FTC's law enforcement program protects consumers in connection with various aspects of their mortgage origination, including those related to mortgage underwriting requirements and loan terms that are restricted or prohibited for HOEPA loans. Some lenders against whom the FTC has taken action \75\ allegedly violated HOEPA by engaging in one or more of the following prohibited acts and practices: extending [[Page 26124]] credit based on the value of consumers' collateral without regard to their repayment ability, charging prepayment penalties, requiring balloon payments, providing negatively amortized loans (causing the loan balance to increase), including provisions to increase the interest rate after default, making direct payments to home improvement contractors, or failing to make required HOEPA disclosures. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \75\ See, e.g., FTC v. Safe Harbour Found. of Fl., Inc., No. 08- 1185 (N.D. Ill. 2008); United States v. Delta Funding Corp., No. 00- 1872 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (brought in conjunction with Department of Justice and Department of Housing and Urban Development); FTC v. NuWest, Inc., No. 00-1197 (W.D. Wash. 2000); FTC v. Capitol Mortgage Corp., No. 2-99-CV580G (D. Utah 1999); FTC v. Cooper, No. CV 99- 07782 WDK (C.D.Cal. 1999); FTC v. CLS Fin. Servs., Inc., No. C99- 1215 Z (W.D. Wash. 1999); FTC v. Granite Mortgage, LLC, No. 99-289 (E.D. Ky. 1999); FTC Interstate Resource Corp., No. 99 Civ. 5988 (S.D. N.Y. 1999); FTC v. LAP Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 3:99 CV-496-H (W.D. Ky. 1999); FTC v. Wasatch Credit Corp., No. 2-99CV579G (D. Utah 1999). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Mortgage Disclosures 1. Overview, Relevant Federal Laws, and FTC Law Enforcement Consumers are faced with numerous factors to take into consideration when comparing the terms of various mortgage loans, such as the duration of the loan, the interest rate, whether that rate is fixed or adjustable, the amount of closing costs, and other characteristics such as prepayment penalties and balloon payments. As consumers shop for a mortgage, it is important that they receive timely and understandable information about the terms and costs of the particular products they are trying to analyze and compare. Moreover, for many alternative mortgage products--where the payment schedule may increase substantially in future years, or prepayment penalties may apply--it is important that consumers receive information about their payments and other important loan terms at a time when they can use that material in selecting their preferred loan and terms. Federal agencies other than the Commission currently have the specific authority to promulgate rules specifying mortgage disclosure requirements. These disclosures are intended to provide consumers with the opportunity to review, understand, and agree to the offered loan terms. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has responsibility for disclosure of settlement costs under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).\76\ The Board also has responsibility for disclosure of certain loan costs under TILA.\77\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \76\ 12 U.S.C. 2603-04. \77\ 15 U.S.C. 1604. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Under RESPA, a lender or broker must provide consumers of ``federally related mortgage loans'' \78\ with a Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Costs (GFE) within three days of receiving a written application and with a HUD-1 Settlement Statement at closing. The GFE currently is not a standardized form, but it must include an itemization of the estimated costs and services the borrower is likely to incur in connection with the settlement. The HUD-1 shows the actual costs of settlement services for the loan. HUD recently amended RESPA's implementing rules to require new standardized GFE and HUD-1 forms. These new rules take effect on January 1, 2010.\79\ The FTC does not have authority to enforce RESPA or its implementing regulations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \78\ This term includes the vast majority of residential purchase money, refinance, and home equity mortgage transactions. See 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. \79\ See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA): Rule to Simplify and Improve the Process of Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce Settlement Costs, 73 FR 68204 (Nov. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 24 CFR parts 203 and 3500). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In general, under TILA and the Board's implementing Regulation Z, creditors currently must provide disclosures within three days of receiving a consumer's written application for a purchase-money mortgage loan. For non-purchase (e.g., refinance) mortgage loans, the creditor must provide the disclosures prior to loan consummation. The FTC has the authority to enforce TILA's mortgage disclosure requirements for non-bank financial companies. Many of the FTC's law enforcement cases regarding mortgage loans allege that companies have failed to provide, or to provide timely, specific TILA disclosures,\80\ including one or more of the following: the amount financed, the finance charge, the APR, the payment schedule, the total of payments, and the fact that the creditor has or will acquire a security interest in the consumer's principal dwelling. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \80\ See, e.g., FTC v. Safe Harbour Found. of Fl., Inc., No. 08- 1185 (N.D. Ill. 2008); United States v. Mercantile Mortgage Co., No. 02-5079 (N.D. Ill. 2002); FTC v. Associates First Capital Corp., No. 1:01-CV-00606 (N.D. Ga. 2001); FTC v. First Alliance Mortgage Co., No. SA CV 00-694 (C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC v. NuWest, Inc., No. 00-1197 (W.D. Wash. 2000); FTC v. Capitol Mortgage Corp., No. 2-99-CV580G (D. Utah 1999); FTC v. Granite Mortgage, LLC, No. 99-289 (E.D. Ky. 1999); FTC v. LAP Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 3:99 CV-496-H (W.D. Ky. 1999); FTC v. Wasatch Credit Corp., No. 2-99CV579G (D. Utah 1999). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In July 2008, the Board issued new rules under Regulation Z that require transaction-specific, earlier mortgage loan disclosures for closed-end loans secured by a consumer's principal dwelling (including non-purchase money mortgages, such as refinancings, but excluding HELOCs).\81\ On the same day, Congress enacted the Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act of 2008 (MDIA), which amended TILA.\82\ The MDIA broadened and added to the Board's new disclosure requirements. The MDIA requirements apply to any closed-end, dwelling-secured loan (including refinancings and loans secured by a dwelling other than the consumer's principal dwelling).\83\ Among other things, they require that disclosures include new language, which varies depending on the type of loan (e.g., fixed- or variable-rate). The TILA disclosures must be given to the consumer no later than three business days after the creditor receives the written application and at least seven business days before closing and before the consumer pays a fee to any person (other than for obtaining the consumer's credit history). In addition, if the originally disclosed APR is incorrect, the creditor must provide a corrected disclosure at least three business days before closing. The consumer can waive this waiting period for a ``bona fide personal financial emergency.'' Nevertheless, final disclosures are still required no later than the time of the waiver. Certain aspects of the MDIA's requirements, including the early disclosure changes, take effect on July 30, 2009; other MDIA requirements for variable-rate transactions become effective contingent on the Board's actions. The Board has issued final rules implementing those aspects of the MDIA that become effective on July 30, 2009 and conforming the Board's July 2008 rules regarding disclosures to the requirements of the MDIA.\84\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \81\ See 73 FR at 44600-601 (to be codified at 12 CFR 226.17, 226.19). The Board promulgated these rules using its authority under TILA Section 105(a). \82\ Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110- 289, 122 Stat. 2654 Sec. Sec. 2501-2503 (July 30, 2008) (enacted in Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008); amended by Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 Sec. 130 (Oct. 3, 2008). \83\ Timeshare plans are subject to some, but not all, of these requirements. See MDIA Sec. 2502 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 1638(b)(2)(E)); see also 11 U.S.C. 101(53D). \84\ See Federal Reserve Board, Press Release, Board Approves Final Rules Revising Disclosure Requirements for Mortgage Loans Under Regulation Z (May 8, 2009), (http://www.federalreserve.gov/ newsevents/press/bcreg/20090508a.htm). For example, the disclosure rules will become effective on July 30, 2009, instead of October 1, 2009. The Board promulgated these rules using its authority under TILA Section 105(a). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. FTC Empirical Testing Regarding Mortgage Disclosures The Commission has a long history of conducting empirical tests of the efficacy of disclosures relating to financial services.\85\ Most recently, in 2007, the FTC's Bureau of Economics published a research report concluding that the current mortgage disclosure requirements do not work and that alternative disclosures should be [[Page 26125]] considered and tested.\86\ The study, based on in-depth interviews with several dozen recent mortgage customers and quantitative testing with over 800 mortgage customers, found that: (1) the current federally required disclosures fail to convey key mortgage costs to many consumers, even for relatively simple, fixed-rate, fully-amortizing loans; (2) better disclosures can significantly improve consumer recognition of mortgage costs; (3) both prime and subprime borrowers failed to understand key loan terms when viewing the current disclosures, and both benefitted from improved disclosures; and (4) improved disclosures provided the greatest benefit for more complex loans, for which both prime and subprime borrowers had the most difficulty understanding loan terms. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \85\ See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics Staff Report, ``The Effect of Mortgage Broker Compensation Disclosures on Consumers and Competition: A Controlled Experiment'' (February 2004); Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics Staff Report, ``Survey of Rent-to-Own Customers'' (April 2000). \86\ See Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics Staff Report, ``Improving Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: An Empirical Assessment of Current and Prototype Disclosure Forms'' (June 2007), available at (http://www2.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/ P025505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf). Following up on this research, in 2008 the FTC's Bureau of Economics convened a conference to evaluate how mortgage disclosures could be improved. See Federal Trade Commission, ``May 15, 2008 Mortgage Disclosure Conference,'' available at (http://www2.ftc.gov/opa/2008/05/mortgage.shtm). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The results of the FTC staff study indicate that consumers in both the prime and subprime markets would benefit substantially from comprehensive reform of mortgage disclosures that would create a single, comprehensive disclosure of all key costs and terms of a loan, presented in language consumers can easily understand and in a form they can easily use, and provided early in the transaction to aid consumers shopping for the best loans. IV. Mortgage Appraisals A. The Role of Appraisals in Mortgage Loans Mortgage lenders and brokers compete with each other to offer loan products to consumers. Regardless of which entity the consumer initially contacts, during the purchase money or refinance mortgage loan shopping process one of the parties seeks an appraisal \87\ to obtain an estimate of the market value of a specific property.\88\ Lenders rely on the appraisal to evaluate the collateral that will secure the loan. Brokers obtain an appraisal to shop a complete loan package (including the appraisal) to multiple lenders. Accurate appraisals therefore are important to the integrity of the mortgage lending process. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \87\ This summary does not address automated valuation models, in which computers generate the estimated property value by performing a data analysis using an automated process. \88\ See 12 CFR 34.42(a), 225.62(a), 323.2(a), 564.2(a), 722.2(a); Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, Definitions, available at (http://commerce.appraisalfoundation.org/ html/USPAP2008/USPAP_folder/uspap_foreword/DEFINITIONS.htm). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Several parties to the loan transaction may have an incentive to influence the appraisal valuation process. Borrowers want an appraisal valuation high enough that they can obtain a loan to purchase the property at the sales price. Mortgage brokers want an appraisal valuation high enough for the transaction to occur because they get paid only if the loan is made, and their commissions usually are based on the loan amount. Individual loan officers also want an appraisal valuation high enough for the transaction to occur, particularly if their compensation is tied to overall loan volume or the amount of the loan. Although lenders may have some interest in obtaining an appraisal valuation high enough so that the loan is made (particularly if they immediately sell the loan),\89\ they also have a very strong interest in the property being accurately valued to ensure that it provides adequate security for the loan (particularly if they hold the loan in their portfolio). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \89\ See, e.g., Prepared Statement of the Appraisal Institute, American Society of Appraisers, American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers, and National Association of Independent Fee Appraisers on H.R. 1728 The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 5-6 (Apr. 23, 2009), available at (http:// www.appraisalinstitute.org/newsadvocacy/downloads/ltrs_tstmny/2009/ AI-ASA-ASFMRA-NAIFATestimonyonMortgageReform042309final.pdf); Joe Eaton, ``The Appraisal Bubble: In Run Up to Real Estate Bust, Lenders Pushed Appraisers to Inflate Values,'' The Center for Public Integrity, Apr. 14, 2009, available at (http:// www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/luap/articles/entry/1264). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Appraisers are paid to value property for their customers, who primarily are lenders or mortgage brokers.\90\ Some lenders and mortgage brokers may use coercion or pressure appraisers to obtain the valuations they want. To satisfy and retain customers, appraisers have some incentive to provide an appraisal at or above the amount sought. In the face of these incentives, industry self-regulatory and government restrictions have been imposed to protect the independence of appraisers and the integrity of the mortgage lending process. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \90\ Appraisers also are paid to value property for appraisal management companies (AMCs). Typically, AMCs are hired by lenders to provide appraisal and, in some cases, other settlement services. AMCs, in turn, typically develop, and purchase appraisals from, a network of independently contracted appraisers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Laws and Standards for Appraisals Typically, the conduct of appraisers is governed through the Appraisal Foundation and its Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) guidelines,\91\ as well as through various state appraiser licensing and certification laws. These laws primarily address the conduct of appraisers and preparation of appraisals, not the entities that order appraisals, such as mortgage lenders and brokers. The federal bank regulatory agencies have issued appraisal guidance that applies to the entities under their jurisdiction,\92\ but there is no equivalent federal guidance for non-bank entities under the FTC's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, including unfair or deceptive appraisal activities, whether by non-bank financial companies that order appraisals, or by appraisers under the FTC's jurisdiction. In addition, the FTC enforces TILA, HOEPA, and Regulation Z, among other laws, with regard to non-bank mortgage lenders and brokers that order appraisals.\93\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \91\ The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989), requires that real estate appraisals used in conjunction with federally-related transactions be performed in accordance with USPAP. \92\ See, e.g., Proposed Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines, 73 FR 69647 (Nov. 19, 2008) (issued jointly by OCC, Board, FDIC, OTS, and NCUA, proposing revisions to Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines issued jointly on Oct. 27, 1994); Independent Appraisal and Evaluation Functions (Oct. 28, 2003) (issued jointly by OCC, Board, FDIC, OTS, and NCUA). \93\ This discussion is not intended as a comprehensive list of all potentially applicable mortgage appraisal laws. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Home Valuation Code of Conduct On March 3, 2008, the New York Attorney General (NYAG) announced settlement agreements with the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).\94\ The settlement agreements and corresponding Home [[Page 26126]] Valuation Code of Conduct (Code) impose various restrictions, prohibitions, and requirements to promote independent appraisals.\95\ The primary provisions of the Code address: (1) general appraiser independence safeguards, such as prohibiting specific parties from influencing the appraisal process;\96\ (2) timing and cost for the borrower to receive a copy of the appraisal; (3) hiring of appraisers, such as prohibiting third parties (e.g., mortgage brokers) from selecting, retaining, or compensating appraisers; (4) prevention of improper influences on appraisers, such as prohibiting lenders from using an appraisal prepared by an employee of the lender (with certain exceptions) or by an entity that is an affiliate of another entity the lender retained to provide other settlement services in the same transaction (with certain exceptions); (5) establishment of the Independent Valuation Protection Institute to take and review complaints about non-compliance with the Code; and (6) other compliance issues, such as required quality control testing, referrals of appraiser misconduct, and certification that appraisals are obtained in compliance with the Code. As of May 1, 2009, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae do not purchase single-family home mortgage loans (except government- insured loans) from lenders that do not adopt the Code. Because Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae purchase a significant number of single-family home mortgage loans in the United States, the Code may have a substantial impact on the conduct of appraisers in the mortgage market. The FTC cannot enforce the settlement agreements or Code provisions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \94\ See New York Attorney General Cuomo Announces Agreement with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO (Mar. 3, 2008), (http:// www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/mar/mar3a_08.html) (last visited May 18, 2009). At the time of the settlement, OFHEO was the agency within HUD with oversight of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. On July 30, 2008, OFHEO staff and other federal agency staff combined to become the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), a new agency that is no longer part of HUD. See About FHFA, (http://www.fhfa.gov/ Default.aspx?Page=4) (last visited May 18, 2009). \95\ The parties to the settlement requested public comment on the original Code that was proposed in March 2008. The FTC staff submitted a comment to Freddie Mac to convey its concerns about aspects of the proposed Code. Letter from FTC Staff to Senior Vice President, Credit Risk Oversight, Freddie Mac (Apr. 30, 2008), available at (http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/05/freddiemac.shtm) (prepared by the staff of the Office of Policy Planning and the Bureau of Economics). On December 23, 2008, the FHFA (see supra note 94) announced that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae would implement a revised Code, which includes modifications reflecting many comments received, including those of the FTC staff. \96\ Specifically, the Code prohibits any employee, director, officer, or agent of the lender, or other party affiliated in any way with the lender from influencing or attempting to influence the development, reporting, result or review of an appraisal through coercion, extortion, collusion, compensation, inducement, intimidation, bribery, or in any other manner, including but not limited to the several examples provided in the Code. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Board's Regulation Z Amendments As discussed above, in July 2008, the Board issued rules under Regulation Z addressing appraisal issues.\97\ In connection with any covered closed-end loan secured by a consumer's principal dwelling, creditors and mortgage brokers, and their affiliates, cannot directly or indirectly coerce, influence, or otherwise encourage an appraiser\98\ to misstate or misrepresent the home's value.\99\ If a creditor knows or has reason to know, at or before loan consummation, of a violation of the above requirement, the creditor must not extend credit based on that appraisal unless the creditor documents that it acted with reasonable diligence to determine that the appraisal does not materially misstate or misrepresent the home's value. The Board's rules take effect on October 1, 2009. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \97\ See 73 FR at 44604 (to be codified at 12 CFR 226.36). The Board promulgated its appraisal rules using its authority under TILA Section 129(l)(2). \98\ Under the Board's rules, an ``appraiser'' refers to a person who engages in the business of providing assessments of the value of dwellings. It includes persons that employ, refer, or manage appraisers, and affiliates of such persons. See 73 FR at 44604. Thus, it includes appraisal management companies. \99\ See id. at 44565-568, 44604, 44614. Note that this language used in the Board's rules is similar in concept to, but not the same as, the appraiser independence safeguard language in the NYAG settlement's Code. See note 96, supra for the Code's language. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- V. Mortgage Servicing A. The Role of Mortgage Loan Servicers Mortgage servicers handle day-to-day duties for those who own mortgage loans. They collect mortgage payments, provide customer service, handle delinquencies (including bankruptcies and foreclosures), and otherwise protect the interests of the loans' owners. The loans' owners may be the original lenders or other investors in the future proceeds of the loans (and can include servicers themselves). The relationship between mortgage servicers and consumers is vulnerable to abuse. Mortgage servicers typically do not have a customer relationship with homeowners; rather, they work for the loans' owners. Moreover, borrowers cannot shop for a loan based on the quality of servicing, and they have virtually no ability to change servicers if they are dissatisfied. Mortgage servicing rights can be transferred frequently, causing consumers confusion about who owns their loan and where to send their payments. In addition, servicers have financial incentives to impose fees on consumers. Servicers are compensated in three main ways. First, they receive a fixed fee for each loan, such as a fee based on the unpaid principal balance of the loan. Second, servicers earn ``float'' income from accrued interest between when consumers pay and when those funds are sent to investors. Third, servicers derive ancillary income from charges imposed on consumers, such as late fees or other delinquency- related fees. Thus, a borrower's default can increase a servicer's revenues. For these reasons, it is important that servicers take appropriate care in acquiring and handling consumers' mortgages, including providing consumers with complete and accurate information about fees and other account information. However, the process of acquiring, securitizing, and transferring large volumes of loans on the secondary market has raised concerns about the integrity of consumers' loan information and the mistakes that can occur due to mishandling or lack of documentation. For example, courts have dismissed foreclosure cases against borrowers because the companies failed to show proof of ownership, and the United States Trustee Program has announced an effort to move against mortgage servicers that file false and inaccurate claims in consumer bankruptcy cases. The FTC is also concerned about the servicing of consumers' loans in bankruptcy. Because of these concerns and because mortgage servicers are the day-to-day contact for many homeowners, the FTC has been active in monitoring the servicing industry for potential abuses. The FTC's experience in this area suggests that there is a need for comprehensive rules with respect to mortgage servicing. B. Federal Mortgage Servicing Laws The FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, including unfair or deceptive mortgage servicing activities. In addition, servicers may be subject to a patchwork of other laws.\100\ In July 2008, the Board issued rules under Regulation Z addressing certain mortgage servicing issues.\101\ These rules apply to all consumer-purpose, closed-end loans secured by a consumer's principal dwelling. They prohibit mortgage servicers from the [[Page 26127]] following abusive servicing practices: (1) failing to credit a consumer's payment as of the date received (except under specified circumstances); (2) imposing a late fee or delinquency charge when the delinquency is due only to the consumer's failure to include in the current payment a late fee or delinquency charge that was imposed on an earlier payment;\102\ and (3) failing to provide an accurate payoff statement to borrowers within a reasonable period of time after it is requested.\103\ The Board's rules take effect on October 1, 2009. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \100\ This discussion is not intended as a comprehensive list of all potentially applicable mortgage servicing laws. Mortgage servicers also may be subject to requirements under other laws the FTC enforces, such as the FDCPA and FCRA. The Commission is not seeking comment on FDCPA or FCRA issues in response to this ANPR. \101\ See 73 FR at 44604 (to be codified at 12 CFR 226.36). The Board promulgated its servicing rules using its authority under TILA Section 129(l)(2). \102\ This practice is commonly referred to as fee ``pyramiding.'' See 73 FR 44568-574, 44614. \103\ See 73 FR 44568-574, 44604, 44613-44614. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition, HUD imposes disclosure and other requirements related to servicing under RESPA and its implementing Regulation X.\104\ The person who makes the mortgage loan must provide consumers with a servicing disclosure statement, which discloses whether the person intends to transfer the servicing of the loan to another entity at any time and also includes complaint resolution information. Both the transferor servicer and the transferee servicer have disclosure obligations to the consumer about the transfer. Servicers have a duty to respond in a timely manner to qualified written consumer inquiries with a written explanation or clarification that includes specified information. RESPA and Regulation X also regulate servicers regarding escrow accounts, such as requiring annual escrow statements and prohibiting fees for the preparation of escrow account statements. The FTC does not have authority to enforce RESPA or its implementing regulations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \104\ See 12 U.S.C. 2605, 2609, 2610; 24 CFR 3500.17, 3500.21. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. FTC Mortgage Servicing Law Enforcement The FTC has challenged deceptive and unfair practices in the servicing of mortgage loans, addressing core issues such as failing to post payments upon receipt, charging unauthorized fees, and engaging in deceptive or abusive debt collection tactics.\105\ For example, in November 2003, the Commission, along with HUD, announced settlements with one of the country's largest third-party subprime loan servicers at that time, its parent company, and its founder and former chief executive officer.\106\ The Commission alleged that the defendants violated several federal laws, including the FTC Act, FDCPA, and FCRA, by: (1) failing to post consumers' payments upon receipt; (2) charging consumers for unnecessary casualty insurance; (3) assessing illegal late fees and other unauthorized fees in connection with alleged defaults; (4) using dishonest or abusive tactics to collect debts; and (5) reporting consumer payment information that the defendants knew to be inaccurate to credit bureaus. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \105\ See, e.g., FTC v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., No. 98- 00237 (D.D.C. 1998) (settled in 2005; FTC alleged that defendant mortgage lender and servicer deceptively induced consumers into taking mortgage loans, included false charges in monthly statements, added charges to loan balances, forced consumers to make monthly payments for the entire loan amount while withholding some loan proceeds, and failed to release liens on homes after loans were paid off). \106\ U.S. v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 03-12219 (D. Mass. 2003). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to requiring the defendants to pay over $40 million to redress consumer injury, the settlements enjoin the defendants from future law violations and impose new restrictions on their business practices. Among other things, the settlements: 1. require the defendants to accept partial payments from most consumers and to apply most consumers' mortgage payments first to interest and principal; 2. prohibit the defendants from forcing consumers to buy insurance when they know the consumer has insurance or fail to take reasonable actions to determine whether the consumer has insurance; 3. enjoin the defendants from charging unauthorized fees, and place limits on specific fees; 4. require the defendants to acknowledge, investigate, and resolve consumer disputes in a timely manner; 5. require the defendants to provide timely billing information, including an itemization of fees charged; 6. prohibit the defendants from taking any action toward foreclosure unless they have reviewed the consumer's loan records to verify that the consumer failed to make three full monthly payments, confirmed that the consumer has not been the subject of any illegal practices, and investigated and resolved any consumer disputes; 7. prohibit the defendants from piling on late fees in certain situations; 8. prohibit the defendants from enforcing certain waiver provisions in forbearance agreements that consumers had to sign to prevent foreclosure; and 9. prohibit the defendants from violating the FDCPA, the FCRA, or the RESPA. The FTC conducted a review of the defendants' compliance with certain aspects of the 2003 settlement.\107\ The FTC and defendants negotiated and agreed to several modifications of the settlement.\108\ HUD also agreed to these changes, which, among other things, include: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \107\ In early 2004, the defendants changed their names to Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. and SPS Holding Corp. \108\ FTC v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (formerly Fairbanks Capital Corp.), Civ. No. 03-12219-DPW (D. Mass. 2007) (modified stipulated final order). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. a five-year prohibition on marketing optional products, which are products or services that are not required by the consumer's loan (such as home warranties); 2. refunds of optional product fees paid by consumers in certain circumstances; 3. revised limitations on charging attorney fees in a foreclosure or bankruptcy to ensure that consumers receive full disclosures, including the actual amount due if consumers receive estimated attorney fees;\109\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \109\ The defendant servicer also agreed to conduct reconciliations after payoff or foreclosure and reimburse consumers who may have paid for services that were not actually performed. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. refunds for consumers who may have paid foreclosure attorney fees for services that were not actually performed since November 2003; 5. a permanent requirement that consumers be provided with monthly mortgage statements containing important information about their loans; and 6. a requirement that the company revise its monthly mortgage statements based on consumer testing performed by a qualified, independent third party. In September 2008, the FTC settled charges that another mortgage servicer and its parent violated Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FDCPA, and the FCRA in servicing mortgage loans.\110\ Among other practices, the complaint alleged that the defendants: (1) misrepresented the amounts consumers owed; (2) assessed and collected unauthorized fees, such as late fees, property inspection fees, and loan modification fees; and (3) misrepresented that they had a reasonable basis to substantiate their representations about consumers' mortgage loan debts. The complaint further alleged the defendants made harassing collection calls; falsely represented the character, amount, or legal status of consumers' debts; and used false representations and deceptive means to collect on mortgage loans. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \110\ See FTC v. EMC Mortgage Corp., No. 4:08-cv-338 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2008); see also Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Bear Stearns and EMC Mortgage to Pay $28 Million to Settle FTC Charges of Unlawful Mortgage Servicing and Debt Collection Practices (Sept. 9, 2008), available at (http://www2.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/ emc.shtm). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In addition to requiring the defendants to pay $28 million to redress consumer injury, the settlement bars the [[Page 26128]] defendants from future law violations and imposes new restrictions and requirements on their business practices. Among other things, the settlement: 1. bars the defendants from misrepresenting amounts due or any other loan terms; 2. requires them to possess and rely upon competent and reliable evidence to support claims made to consumers about their loans; 3. bars them from charging unauthorized fees, and places specific limits on property inspection fees even if they are authorized by the contract; 4. prohibits them from initiating a foreclosure action, or charging any foreclosure fees, unless they have reviewed all available records to verify that the consumer is in material default, confirmed that the defendants have not subjected the consumer to any illegal practices, and investigated and resolved any consumer disputes; and 5. prohibits the defendants from violating the FDCPA, FCRA, or TILA. The settlement further requires defendants to establish and maintain a comprehensive data integrity program to ensure the accuracy and completeness of data and other information that they obtain about consumers' loan accounts, before servicing those accounts. The defendants also are required to obtain periodic assessments over an eight-year period from a qualified, independent, third-party professional, to assure that their data integrity program meets the standards of the order. VI. Request for Comments The Commission is seeking comments on a wide range of topics related to mortgage loans, but it is not soliciting views on the merits of current statutory and regulatory schemes applicable to these topics. The Commission has broad authority over acts and practices related to financial services, but the FTC Act specifically excludes banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions from the agency's jurisdiction. However, non-bank subsidiaries or affiliates of banks are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Likewise, the FTC has jurisdiction over entities that perform services on behalf of banks, but which are not themselves banks. As discussed above, the Commission intends that any rules it issues in this proceeding would apply only to the same types of entities over which the Commission has jurisdiction under the FTC Act. The Commission is seeking comments to determine whether certain acts and practices of non-bank financial companies (such as non-bank mortgage lenders, brokers, appraisers, or servicers) related to mortgage loans are unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act and should be incorporated into a proposed rule. These acts and practices include conduct that the FTC currently could challenge in a law enforcement action as violating Section 5 of the FTC Act. However, the Commission is not otherwise seeking comments on statutes that have been enacted and rules that have been issued. The FTC also specifically is not seeking comments on the Board's new rules. The FTC invites interested persons to submit written comments on any issue of fact, law, or policy that may bear upon these issues. After examining the comments, the Commission will determine whether and how to incorporate them into a possible proposed rule. The Commission encourages commenters to respond to the specific questions asked. However, commenters do not need to respond to all questions. Please provide explanations for your answers and detailed, factual supporting evidence. The Commission is particularly interested in receiving comments on the following questions and issues: A. Mortgage Advertising 1. What types of unfair or deceptive acts and practices, if any, do non-bank financial companies engage in related to advertising and marketing mortgages? For any such act or practice, please answer the following questions: a. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 2. Is there any specific information that non-bank financial companies should be required to disclose to prevent unfairness or deception in advertising and marketing mortgages? Identify any such type of information, and for each, please answer the following questions: a. Why is the failure to disclose the information unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should disclosure be required for all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of mandating its disclosure? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to require non-bank financial companies to disclose this information, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly required to do so? 3. What types of unfair or deceptive acts and practices, if any, do non-bank financial companies engage in regarding Internet financial services related to mortgage loans, including but not limited to acts and practices of mortgage rate aggregators that post rate and points charts? For any such act or practice, please answer the following questions: a. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 4. Should the FTC incorporate into a proposed rule any of the requirements or prohibitions on acts or practices related to mortgage advertising that the Board promulgated under its TILA Section 105(a) authority, thereby allowing the FTC to obtain civil penalties for any violation of TILA, HOEPA, or Regulation Z, consistent with the authority conferred on federal banking regulatory agencies? \111\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \111\ See note 37, supra. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. Do any recent reports, studies, or research provide data relevant to mortgage advertising rulemaking? If so, please provide or identify such reports, studies, or research. B. Mortgage Origination--Underwriting, Loan Terms, and Disclosure Issues 6. What types of unfair or deceptive acts and practices, if any, do non-bank financial companies engage in related to mortgage origination? For any such act or practice, please answer the following questions: a. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, [[Page 26129]] thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 7. Are there features of any non-traditional, or alternative, mortgage loans that are unfair or deceptive? Identify any such feature, and for each, please answer the following questions: a. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the feature, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 8. Is there any specific information that non-bank financial companies should be required to disclose to prevent unfairness or deception related to the origination of mortgage loans? Identify any such type of information, and for each, please answer the following questions: a. Why is the failure to disclose the information unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should disclosure be required for all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of mandating its disclosure? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to require non-bank financial companies to disclose this information, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly required to do so? 9. Should the FTC incorporate into a proposed rule any of the requirements or prohibitions on acts or practices related to mortgage disclosures that the Board promulgated under its TILA Section 105(a) authority, thereby allowing the FTC to obtain civil penalties for any violation of TILA, HOEPA, or Regulation Z, consistent with the authority conferred on federal banking regulatory agencies? \112\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \112\ See id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10. Do any recent reports, studies, or research provide data relevant to mortgage origination rulemaking? If so, please provide or identify such reports, studies, or research. C. Mortgage Appraisals 11. What types of unfair or deceptive acts and practices, if any, do non-bank financial companies engage in related to mortgage appraisals, including but not limited to engaging or selecting appraisers, ordering appraisals, or performing as appraisers? For any such act or practice, please answer the following questions: a. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 12. Is there any specific information that non-bank financial companies should be required to disclose to prevent unfairness or deception related to mortgage appraisals? Identify any such type of information, and for each, please answer the following questions: a. Why is the failure to disclose the information unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should disclosure be required for all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of mandating its disclosure? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to require non-bank financial companies to disclose this information, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly required to do so? 13. Should the FTC incorporate into a proposed rule any of the prohibitions or restrictions on acts or practices related to mortgage appraisals addressed in the NYAG's settlement and Code? Identify any such prohibited or restricted act or practice, and for each, please answer the following questions: a. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 14. Do any recent reports, studies, or research provide data relevant to mortgage appraisal rulemaking? If so, please provide or identify such reports, studies, or research. D. Mortgage Servicing 15. What types of unfair or deceptive acts and practices, if any, do non-bank financial companies engage in related to mortgage servicing? For any such act or practice, please answer the following questions: a. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 16. Should the FTC incorporate into a proposed rule any of the prohibitions or restrictions on acts and practices addressed in its settlement orders with mortgage servicers? \113\ Identify any such prohibited or restricted act or practice, and for each, please answer the following questions: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \113\ See text discussion in Part V.C, supra. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- a. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? b. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? c. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 17. Is there any specific information that non-bank financial companies should be required to disclose, or to disclose in a particular manner (for example, through uniform or model servicing disclosures), to prevent unfairness or deception related to mortgage servicing, such as: a. information about fees the servicer is authorized to charge under the mortgage contract over the life of the loan; or b. information about applicable fees the servicer has charged during a specific monthly statement period. Identify any such type of information, and for each, please answer the following questions: i. Why is the failure to disclose the information, or to disclose it in a particular manner, unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? ii. Should disclosure be required in a particular manner (for example, through uniform or model servicing disclosures)? Should disclosure be required for all loans or only certain [[Page 26130]] types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of mandating its disclosure? iii. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to require non-bank financial companies to make these disclosures, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly required to do so? 18. Should the FTC consider prohibiting or restricting as unfair or deceptive certain acts and practices related to mortgage servicing fees or related charges, such as: a. charging fees not authorized under the mortgage contract; b. charging fees not authorized by state law; c. charging for ``estimated'' attorney fees or other fees for services not rendered; d. charging late fees that are not permitted under the service agreement or that are otherwise improper (other than ``fee pyramiding,'' which is already prohibited under the Board's Regulation Z amendments\114\ ); --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \114\ See note 102, supra. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- e. failing to disclose and itemize adequately fees in billing statements or other relevant communications with borrowers; or f. forcing consumers to buy insurance on their homes when the servicer knows or should know that insurance is already in place? Identify any such act or practice, and for each, please answer the following questions: i. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? ii. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? iii. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 19. Should the FTC consider prohibiting or restricting as unfair or deceptive certain acts and practices related to how mortgage servicers handle payments, amounts owed, or consumer disputes, such as: a. failing to post payments in a timely and proper manner (beyond the new prohibition under the Board's Regulation Z amendments); b. mishandling of partial payments or suspense accounts; c. misrepresentation of amounts owed or other account terms or the status of the account; d. making claims to borrowers about their loan accounts without a reasonable basis (i.e., lack of substantiation); e. failing to have a adequate procedures to ensure accuracy of information used to service loans; or f. failing to maintain and provide adequate customer service to handle disputes? Identify any such act or practice, and for each, please answer the following questions: i. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? ii. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? iii. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 20. Should the FTC consider prohibiting or restricting as unfair or deceptive certain acts and practices related to how mortgage servicers handle loan performance and loss mitigation issues, such as: a. taking foreclosure action without first verifying loan information and investigating any disputes; b. taking foreclosure action without first giving the consumer an opportunity to attend foreclosure counseling or mediation; c. requiring consumers to release all claims (or other requirements, such as requiring binding arbitration agreements) in connection with loan modifications or other workout agreements/ repayment plans; or d. making loan modifications or other workout agreements/repayment plans without regard to the consumer's ability to repay? Identify any such act or practice, and for each, please answer the following questions: i. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? ii. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? iii. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 21. Should the FTC consider prohibiting or restricting as unfair or deceptive certain acts and practices related to servicing of mortgage loans in connection with bankruptcy proceedings, such as: a. failing to disclose fees incurred during a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case and then seeking to collect them from the consumer after discharge/dismissal? b. filing of proofs of claim or other bankruptcy filings without a reasonable basis (i.e., impose a substantiation requirement beyond Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); c. failing to apply properly payments in bankruptcy to pre- petition/post-petition categories of the consumer's debts; or d. charging of specific unnecessary or excessive fees in bankruptcy cases (e.g., duplicative attorneys' fees)? Identify any such act or practice, and for each, please answer the following questions: i. Why is it unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the FTC Act? ii. Should it be prohibited or restricted? If so, how? For all loans or only certain types of loans? What are the costs and benefits of such prohibitions or restrictions? iii. What would be the effect on competition and consumers if the Commission were to prohibit or restrict non-bank financial companies with respect to the act or practice, but banks, thrifts, and federal credit unions were not similarly prohibited or restricted? 22. Do any recent reports, studies, or research provide data relevant to mortgage servicing rulemaking? If so, please provide or identify such reports, studies, or research. By direction of the Commission. Donald S. Clark Secretary [FR Doc. E9-12595 Filed 5-29-09: 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6750-01-S
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