11 May 2010

[Federal Register: May 11, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 90)]
[Proposed Rules]               
[Page 26180-26183]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr11my10-35]                         

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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Chapter I

[PS Docket No. 10-92; FCC 10-62]

 
Effects on Broadband Communications Networks of Damage To or 
Failure of Network Equipment or Severe Overload

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: Consistent with the recommendations of the National Broadband 
Plan, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted 
this Notice of Inquiry to seek comment on the present state of 
survivability in broadband communications networks and to explore 
potential measures to reduce network vulnerability to failures in 
network equipment or severe overload conditions, such as would occur in 
natural disasters, pandemics, and other disasters or events that would 
restrain our ability to communicate. The Commission seeks comment 
broadly on the ability of existing networks to withstand localized or 
distributed physical damage, including whether there is adequate 
network redundancy and the extent of survivability of physical 
enclosures in which network elements are located, and severe overloads.

DATES: Comments are due on or before June 25, 2010 and reply comments 
are due on or before July 26, 2010.

ADDRESSES: Comments and reply comments may be filed using: (1) The 
Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS), (2) the Federal 
Government's eRulemaking Portal, or (3) by filing paper copies.
    Comments and reply comments may be filed electronically using the 
Internet by accessing the ECFS: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs2/ or the 
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
    Parties who choose to file by paper can submit filings by hand or 
messenger delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class 
or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail. All filings must be addressed to 
the Commission's Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Federal 
Communications Commission. All hand-delivered or messenger-delivered 
paper filings for the Commission's Secretary must be delivered to FCC 
Headquarters at 445 12th St., SW., Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. 
All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or 
fasteners. Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the 
building.
    Commercial overnight mail (other than U.S. Postal Service Express 
Mail and Priority Mail) must be sent to 9300 East Hampton Drive, 
Capitol Heights, MD 20743. U.S. Postal Service first-class, Express, 
and Priority mail must be addressed to 445 12th Street, SW., 
Washington, DC 20554. Parties who choose to file by paper must file an 
original and four copies of each filing.
    Parties wishing to file materials with a claim of confidentiality 
should follow the procedures set forth in Sec.  0.459 of the 
Commission's rules. Confidential submissions may not be filed via ECFS 
but rather should be filed with the Secretary's Office following the 
procedures set forth in 47 CFR 0.459. Redacted versions of confidential 
submissions may be filed via ECFS.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Healy, Communications Systems 
Analysis Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau at 202-
418-2448 or Jeffery Goldthorp, Chief, Communications Systems Analysis

[[Page 26181]]

Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau at 202-418-1096.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice 
of Inquiry NOI in PS Docket No. 10-92, FCC 10-62, adopted and released 
on April 21, 2010. The complete text of this document is available for 
inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC 
Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room 
CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. This document may also be purchased from 
the Commission's duplicating contractor Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 
Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, 
telephone (800) 378-3160 or (202) 488-5300, facsimile (202) 488-5563, 
or via e-mail at fcc@bcpiweb.com. It is also available on the 
Commission's Web site at http://www.fcc.gov. To request materials in 
accessible formats for people with disabilities (braille, large print, 
electronic files, audio format), send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or 
call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 
(voice), 202-418-0432 (tty).

Synopsis of the Notice of Inquiry

    The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (hereinafter 
``ARRA'') directed the Commission to prepare a National Broadband Plan 
(``NBP'' or ``Plan'') and report that plan to Congress. In particular, 
ARRA required the Commission to explore ways in which broadband 
infrastructure and services can ``advance consumer welfare * * * public 
safety and homeland security * * * and other national purposes.''
    In response to a number of public notices issued as part of the NBP 
proceeding, the Commission received a wealth of commentary on the 
rapidly increasing importance of wireline and wireless broadband 
communications networks to consumers, businesses, emergency responders, 
and government agencies. A number of these comments focused on the 
importance of broadband survivability. Based on these comments and 
independent research conducted by Commission staff, the NBP laid out 
numerous proposals to ensure that our nation's critical broadband 
infrastructure can serve the current and future needs of our citizens 
in a consistent and reliable fashion.
    Consistent with the recommendations of the NBP, the Commission 
adopted this Notice of Inquiry to enhance its understanding of the 
present state of survivability in broadband communications networks and 
to explore potential measures to reduce network vulnerability to 
failures in network equipment or severe overload conditions, such as 
would occur in natural disasters, pandemics, and other disasters or 
events that would restrain our ability to communicate. The Commission 
seeks comment broadly on the ability of existing networks to withstand 
localized or distributed physical damage, including whether there is 
adequate network redundancy and the extent of survivability of physical 
enclosures in which network elements are located, and severe overloads.
    Reliance on broadband communications networks is increasing across 
all elements of our society and all sectors of our economy. For 
example, IP-based telephony services have penetrated into the consumer 
and enterprise markets at a breakneck pace, in many cases without the 
end-users even knowing that a major technology change has occurred. 
People are no longer tied to a single public-switched telephone network 
(PSTN), but communicate through a wide range of interconnected networks 
(e.g., cable networks, fiber networks, local exchange carriers, 
licensed wireless broadband communications networks and unlicensed 
wireless internet service providers). As Americans increasingly rely on 
broadband communications networks for voice, video, data, and other 
communications services, the reliability and survivability of broadband 
communications networks becomes an even more critical factor in the 
safety, security, and well-being of the American people.
    The FCC realizes that the increasing use of broadband 
communications networks for telecommunications-type services has 
blurred the distinction between the PSTN and IP-based broadband 
communications networks. Consequently, the Commission believes it 
important that it better understand the implications that this 
migration will have on the communications survivability of our voice 
and broadband communications networks.
    Consumers, businesses, and government agencies increasingly rely on 
broadband communications networks to supply voice, video, and data 
service to fixed and mobile sites. For example, comments received in 
the National Broadband Plan proceeding indicate levels of broadband 
adoption ranging from 47% for rural residences to 79% for non-rural 
businesses. The network infrastructure required to support these 
diverse needs is extensive and complicated. In some instances long-term 
collaboration between telecommunications providers and other major 
enterprises has led to the development of robust networks with purpose-
built survivability features. The Commission is concerned, however, 
that these features may not adequately ensure the survivability of all 
types of broadband service throughout the country, including in lesser 
developed or sparsely populated areas.
    Broadband core networks are generally presumed to be quite 
survivable. Survivability is generally weaker in segments of 
communications networks closer to the network edge, however. In light 
of the ever-growing centrality of broadband communications it is 
imperative that we understand the resilience and survivability of our 
national broadband infrastructure. The Commission seeks comment, 
analysis, and information on the present state of broadband network 
survivability to three broad classes of harm: (1) Physical damage 
(whether due to malevolent acts, accidents, or force majeure), (2) 
inadequate redundancy, and (3) severe network overload. The Commission 
also seeks comment as specifically described below.
    Enhancing our understanding of the state of survivability in 
broadband communications networks and exploring potential measures to 
reduce network vulnerabilities furthers the Commission's core purposes 
as set forth in section 1 of the Communications Act: (1) The 
establishment of ``a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire 
and radio communication service with adequate facilities,'' (2) ``the 
national defense,'' and (3) ``promoting safety of life and property 
through the use of wire and radio communication.'' The Commission seeks 
comment on the strongest sources of authority to act in this regard 
should it choose to do so, and asks commenters to address whether 
different sources of authority would be required with regard to 
different types of communications providers.
    For example, the Commission seeks comment on whether it has 
authority under Title II and Title III to adopt specific measures to 
reduce network vulnerabilities should it choose to do so. In addition, 
the Commission seeks comment on whether the Commission could, if 
necessary, exercise ancillary authority to reduce network 
vulnerabilities, should the Commission choose to do so. In particular, 
the Commission seeks comment on the scope of its ancillary authority 
with regard to the matters described in this NOI in light of the recent 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in Comcast Corporation v. FCC.

[[Page 26182]]

    The Commission seeks comment on the survivability features and 
risks presented by the physical architecture of current broadband 
communications networks. What are the major single points of failure in 
broadband architectures (for example, edge router, gateway router, 
transport links, cell sites, and VoIP servers)? What are the impacts of 
failure these points? What measures do communications providers take to 
minimize the presence of single points of failure in broadband 
architectures? Under what conditions might these measures not be 
followed? What operational awareness do broadband service providers 
have on these dependencies? For example is the state of transport link 
diversity generally known and tracked by a broadband service provider? 
Do service providers account vulnerability of assets to specific 
threats? Is the incidence of single points of failure greater or lesser 
for small service providers and/or network operators? What special 
provisions are made to ensure the survivability of network services to 
critical response agencies like public safety answering points (PSAPs)? 
What provisions are made to ensure the survivability of cell sites 
relied on by first responders? Should traffic to critical response 
agencies or for critical services be prioritized? What other aspects of 
physical architecture create vulnerabilities in broadband 
communications networks? Besides single points of failure, are there 
dual failures that could impact a large number of users for an extended 
period of time? What should be the FCC's role in reducing single points 
of failure in broadband communications networks? What should the FCC's 
role be in increasing the level of redundancy in broadband 
communications networks taking into consideration the tradeoffs between 
potential regulatory burdens and the benefits of increased 
survivability?
    In addition to network architecture, the Commission seeks comment 
on the survivability of physical facilities in which network elements 
are located. At the outset, the Commission notes that the Network 
Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) adopted a set of best 
practices for communications physical security. What are the most 
effective and widely deployed NRIC physical security best practices? 
What policies are typically put in place to ensure adherence to 
relevant NRIC physical security best practices? How are decisions made 
about when not to apply NRIC best practices? Is the present level of 
protection adequate, and, if so, by what measure? If not, what else 
should be done and how should this be accomplished? In addition, what 
other structural, mechanical, environmental or electrical standards are 
utilized in the construction of facilities that house broadband network 
elements? What should the FCC's role be in encouraging the 
implementation of security best practices?
    The Commission also seeks comment on the risks posed by network 
facility co-location. For example, does the co-location of network 
hardware in ``carrier hotels'' or ``SuperNodes'' represent a 
significant vulnerability of networks to physical attack or natural 
disaster? How widespread is this practice? What steps have been taken 
to ensure redundancy and diversity of physical network links to and 
from these facilities? Are these redundancies adequate at the metro, 
national, and international scales? Are security standards at these 
facilities adequate and uniformly enforced? What should the FCC's role 
be in the utilization of security standards for co-located network 
hardware? Finally, are the network elements housed in such facilities 
commonly protected by redundant elements in physically separated 
locations and will adequate power be available in an emergency? If not, 
how widespread is the lack of redundancy? What should the FCC's role be 
in increasing the level of redundancy for co-located network elements?
    Redundancy is used in communications networks to improve 
survivability. Redundancy failures occur when a network is unable to 
route traffic over an alternate link when the primary or most desirable 
link is down. In the public-switched telephone network (PSTN), for 
example, switches, routers, and multiplexers often protect against 
service interruption due to one or more physical link failures by 
intelligently re-routing traffic around the failed link although calls 
that are in progress may be lost. Traditional telecommunications 
networks use monitoring and alarms to verify redundancy. Occasionally 
the re-routing fails to occur because the monitoring equipment does not 
recognize the physical link failure or because the re-routing equipment 
fails to execute the re-route. In addition, the cause of the initial 
link failure may also affect the redundant link, resulting in its 
failure. The Commission is concerned that the level of redundancy and 
the effectiveness of that redundancy in routing around failures may be 
inadequate in broadband communications networks. The Commission is also 
concerned that the quality of service (QoS) for the rerouted traffic is 
adequate.
    The Commission therefore seeks comment on the risk of physical link 
failures along with the resulting risk of redundancy failures in 
broadband communications networks. For example, to what extent are core 
and edge network links protected with ``dark'' backup links? Are there 
instances where backup circuit paths occupy the same physical link as a 
primary circuit path? If so, how prevalent is this practice and what 
information, systems, or procedures might help to eliminate it? How 
best can the FCC help to prevent or resolve such problems? To what 
extent is switching and routing capacity in broadband communications 
networks protected by redundant systems or reserve switching capacity? 
Does good business practice dictate some minimum level of reserve 
switching capacity for a given network? If so, how is that capacity 
derived? Are the protection mechanisms themselves in broadband 
communications networks reliable? Are there failure mechanisms that 
will affect both the primary path and the back-up path? Finally, how 
can the FCC enhance the chances that redundancy works in broadband 
communications networks without unduly burdening network operators?
    Large-scale events such as pandemics or bioterror attacks may cause 
dramatic changes in broadband usage patterns as traffic that is 
ordinarily confined within enterprise or academic networks or passed 
between enterprise-grade access networks suddenly shifts onto 
residential-access networks. If residential access networks are 
unprepared or insufficiently resourced for such changes, the resulting 
network congestion could threaten the orderly functioning of our 
economy and prevent citizens from accessing critical public safety 
services such as 911 call centers. What can be learned from recent 
events that, while not catastrophic, resulted in a surge of 
telecommuting (e.g., the recent heavy snowstorms in the Mid-Atlantic 
States)?
    In order to better understand the risks associated with sudden 
shifts of network traffic during pandemics and similar events, the 
Commission seeks comment on the ability of broadband access networks 
(i.e., cable, DSL, fiber-to-the-home, etc.) to maintain effective 
operation during severe network congestion or overload. For example, is 
the capacity of residential access networks sufficient to handle sudden 
surges in use? To what degree? To the extent that network capacity is 
insufficient or networks are

[[Page 26183]]

``oversubscribed,'' what methods and procedures are in place to handle 
these overloads and to rapidly apply network resources to where they 
are needed? What are the limits to these network management techniques? 
For example, is there a need for ways to prioritize broadband traffic 
during emergencies? Are some network segments or geographic areas more 
vulnerable than others? The Commission also seeks detailed data on past 
instances: When outbreaks of influenza have closed schools in a given 
area, what changes were observed in residential access network traffic, 
and how did these changes affect the networks? Should the FCC collect 
data on network usage during such events?
    As our broadband infrastructure continues to grow and mature, the 
Commission is committed to ensuring that it stands ready to support the 
myriad uses dreamed up by American innovators and enterprises. This 
Notice of Inquiry is a critical first step toward understanding 
survivability of our broadband communications networks to all types of 
failures and severe traffic overloads. The Commission looks forward to 
collaborating with consumers, businesses, and network operators to 
improve and secure our broadband infrastructure for the future.
    Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 
4(j), 4(o) and 7(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151, 
154(i)-(j) & (o), and 157(b) (2006), this Notice of Inquiry is adopted.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-11159 Filed 5-10-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P