1 September 2010. Wikileakileaks is a typical Gawker pimp job for ST-diseased
ads. Kill it and them.
22 May 2010. Add list of Julian Assange messages 1995-2002 on
Marc.info and other pointers.
21 May 2010
Julian Assange along with John Young and some 1400 others were on the Cypherpunks
mail list (crypto, politics) from late in 1995 to 2002 (and beyond, Young
is among few still on the now very quiet list). Below are Julian's messages
from 1995-98 to 2001-02. Taking them out of the raucous and disputatious
context omits a lot about the Cypherpunks vitality and range of interests,
but they indicate Julian's capabilities, wit, eloquence and disdain for authority
-- the last foretelling Wikileaks. Among the messages is his description
of a program he co-invented, ''Rubberhose deniable
encryption'' (a/k/a Marutukku), mentioned in
an interview today:
http://www.theage.com.au/national/keeper-of-secrets-20100521-w230.html
The 1999-2000 gap may be due to a global trip Julian
announced in October 1998:
Date: 25 Oct 1998 04:48:22 -0000
From: Julian Assange <proff@iq.org>
To: coderpunks@toad.com
Subject: Travel Plans
Sender: owner-cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
I'm about to escape from the perils of a summer in ``the planet's
most livable city'' (Melbourne, Australia) and go treking about the
worlderful world of snow, ice, slush, and imploding communism.
I'll be hop-scotching though the US, Western/Eastern europe, Russia,
Mongolia and China (in that order). If anyone feels like getting
together for beer, vodka, Siberian bear steak, or just a good yarn,
please let me know.
What follows is a (very) approximate itinerary. Home-grown
accommodation, a warm hearth, pulsating ethernet, interesting company
(or a pointer to it) is capable of shifting dates and leagues. I am
backpacking through eastern Europe and Siberia, so no hovel, couch or
spare room is too small (even in the SF bay area), and would be highly
thought of :)
28 Oct 98 San Francisco
05 Nov 98 London
06 Nov 98 Frankfurt/Berlin
09 Nov 98 Poland / Slovenia / eastern-europe-on-a-shoe-string
15 Nov 98 Helsinki
16 Nov 98 St. Petersburg
20 Nov 98 Moscow (trans-siberian express) ->
25 Nov 98 Irtutsk
29 Nov 98 Ulan Bator
03 Dec 98 Beijing
Cheers,
Julian.
|
|
1995
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 24 Dec 1995 04:29:29 +0800
To: perry@piermont.com
Subject: Re: CFS and Linux (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199512231640.LAA07020@jekyll.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <199512231941.GAA00983@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Jim Choate writes:
> >
> > > First of all, this is Matt Blaze's pet project, not a product of
> > > AT&T. It is given away for free and you should be happy to get it at
> > > all -- no one is obligated to give you a gift. Have you mailed him a
> > > Linux machine to do his testing on? Why do you assume he even has one?
> > > As it happens, he doesn't, and probably doesn't want to go through the
> > > hassle of paying for a computer and putting Linux on it.
> > >
> > > Be happy he's given you anything at all.
> >
> > If you are going to do it, do it right the first time.
> >
> > Second, I really doubt Blaze has a problem obtaining access to computing
> > power and a $25 CD should be within his budget.
I am annoyed. Matt Blaze has no obligation to produce CFS for free, let
alone a version for dummies. And boy, are you a dummy. As someone who
has hacked away at CFS for a long time now on several platforms,
including linux, I can state that the issues of porting CFS to linux
were trivial and involved a one line sed on the rpcgen output. The more
recent versions of linux don't even require this. Further, Matt is
hardly the government/corporate lacky that you suggest him to be. Why
don't you read some of his papers before you show your technical and
social ignorance? Get a life.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | has stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 30 Dec 1995 09:59:17 +0800
To: lstewart@prisminc.com (lstewart)
Subject: Re: Housewarming/birthday party
In-Reply-To: <9502157953.AA795307204@prisminc.prisminc.com>
Message-ID: <199512300046.LAA16884@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> The price of condo living: There is no guest parking in the complex,
> and the party must end by 10pm. Please help us get along with our new
^^^^^ ^^^^
> neighbors by respecting the condo rules. Thanks!
>
Thats not a party. Thats an after-school tupperware get-together.
Cheers,
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | has stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 16:44:18 +0800
To: puke@suburbia.net
Subject: (fwd) Benchmarks - revs 1.3.50 & 51
Message-ID: <199512310736.SAA06119@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Path: news.apana.org.au!goliath.apana.org.au!sysx.apana.org.au!sleeper.apana.org.au!greathan.apana.org.au!news-mail-gateway
From: fluido@marktest.pt (Carlo Emilio Prelz)
Newsgroups: apana.lists.os.linux.kernel
Subject: Benchmarks - revs 1.3.50 & 51
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 1995 08:05:17 +0100 (MET)
Organization: Mail-to-News Gateway
Lines: 158
Sender: daemon@greathan.apana.org.au
Approved: usenet@greathan.apana.org.au
Distribution: apana
Message-ID:
NNTP-Posting-Host: greathan.apana.org.au
Hi. Here follow the benchmark comparisons w.r.t. revisions 50 & 51. I
decided to wait before posting rev 50 before because the file read &
write results again bounced up with it, and I spent some (very little)
time trying to see if I could have done anything to cause that. With
no results, as usual. Now I also have results for the "greased
weasel", and I decided to send out my numbers for what they're
worth. Not much has changed with the latest release...
I repeat my query: if anybody has suggestions about these huge jumps in
disk performance, please let me know. I am ALWAYS running the benchmark
test after a reboot. I login as root, start the process in background and
log out, and then generally go to sleep. The machine is NOT online, and
is not doing anything important at night. I have not changed anything in
the kernel config in the latest 3 revisions. I have a plain old ISA
disk controller, and two generally fullish disks, but again, the
situation did not change notably between 1.3.49 and 1.3.50.
And, I now have to admit that I find it faster, for example, to load a
huge C file into emacs, and have it do the syntax coloring. I noticed it
this morning.
No problems in patching & compiling.
--8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<-- From: * Linux pimpinel.fluido.org 1.3.49 #77 Fri Dec 22 21:05:57 MET 1995 i486 * Fri Dec 22 21:41:03 MET 1995 To: * Linux pimpinel.fluido.org 1.3.50 #78 Mon Dec 25 11:18:00 MET 1995 i486 * Mon Dec 25 12:11:11 MET 1995 ******* Results ******* File Write (30 seconds) || 1000.0 -> 9460.0 +846.00%
File Write (10 seconds) || 1200.0 -> 8070.0 +572.50%
File Copy (30 seconds) || 968.0 -> 2636.0 +172.31%
File Copy (10 seconds) || 1024.0 -> 2645.0 +158.30%
Execl Throughput Test || 67.9 -> 85.3 +25.63%
C Compiler Test || 48.7 -> 51.9 +6.57%
Pipe-based Context Switching Test || 9863.0 -> 10493.0 +6.39%
Process Creation Test || 347.7 -> 368.9 +6.10%
Shell scripts (1 concurrent) || 96.4 -> 101.9 +5.71%
Shell scripts (4 concurrent) || 25.5 -> 26.5 +3.92%
Shell scripts (2 concurrent) || 50.8 -> 52.6 +3.54%
System Call Overhead Test || 29945.4 -> 30523.5 +1.93%
Dhrystone 2 using register variables || 49658.9 -> 49910.8 +0.51%
Arithmetic Test (type = int) || 8365.0 -> 8377.5 +0.15%
Arithmetic Test (type = double) || 5063.6 -> 5071.1 +0.15%
Recursion Test--Tower of Hanoi || 726.1 -> 727.1 +0.14%
Arithmetic Test (type = arithoh) || 127103.2 -> 127265.6 +0.13%
Arithmetic Test (type = short) || 7508.8 -> 7515.5 +0.09%
Arithmetic Test (type = register) || 8367.3 -> 8372.8 +0.07%
Arithmetic Test (type = float) || 5066.8 -> 5069.3 +0.05%
Arithmetic Test (type = long) || 8371.8 -> 8372.1 +0.00%
Shell scripts (8 concurrent) || 13.0 -> 13.0 +0.00%
Pipe Throughput Test || 17850.0 -> 17726.9 -0.69%
Dhrystone 2 without register variables || 51001.9 -> 49772.1 -2.41%
File Read (30 seconds) || 4613.0 -> 4404.0 -4.53%
File Read (10 seconds) || 4648.0 -> 4390.0 -5.55%
Dc: sqrt(2) to 99 decimal places || 11886.7 -> 10822.2 -8.96%
--8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<-- From: * Linux pimpinel.fluido.org 1.3.50 #78 Mon Dec 25 11:18:00 MET 1995 i486 * Mon Dec 25 12:11:11 MET 1995 To: * Linux pimpinel.fluido.org 1.3.51 #79 Wed Dec 27 19:16:06 MET 1995 i486 * Wed Dec 27 22:41:23 MET 1995 ******* Results ******* File Read (30 seconds) || 4404.0 -> 4548.0 +3.27%
File Read (10 seconds) || 4390.0 -> 4516.0 +2.87%
Dc: sqrt(2) to 99 decimal places || 10822.2 -> 11034.2 +1.96%
Process Creation Test || 368.9 -> 375.0 +1.65%
File Copy (10 seconds) || 2645.0 -> 2683.0 +1.44%
File Copy (30 seconds) || 2636.0 -> 2669.0 +1.25%
Shell scripts (4 concurrent) || 26.5 -> 26.8 +1.13%
C Compiler Test || 51.9 -> 52.4 +0.96%
Dhrystone 2 without register variables || 49772.1 -> 49808.7 +0.07%
Arithmetic Test (type = long) || 8372.1 -> 8376.6 +0.05%
Arithmetic Test (type = register) || 8372.8 -> 8376.1 +0.04%
Arithmetic Test (type = float) || 5069.3 -> 5069.9 +0.01%
Arithmetic Test (type = short) || 7515.5 -> 7515.7 +0.00%
Shell scripts (8 concurrent) || 13.0 -> 13.0 +0.00%
Arithmetic Test (type = double) || 5071.1 -> 5067.4 -0.07%
Arithmetic Test (type = arithoh) || 127265.6 -> 127172.0 -0.07%
Dhrystone 2 using register variables || 49910.8 -> 49870.6 -0.08%
Arithmetic Test (type = int) || 8377.5 -> 8370.4 -0.08%
Recursion Test--Tower of Hanoi || 727.1 -> 724.3 -0.39%
Shell scripts (2 concurrent) || 52.6 -> 52.3 -0.57%
Shell scripts (1 concurrent) || 101.9 -> 101.2 -0.69%
File Write (30 seconds) || 9460.0 -> 9356.0 -1.10%
Pipe Throughput Test || 17726.9 -> 17227.1 -2.82%
Pipe-based Context Switching Test || 10493.0 -> 10194.8 -2.84%
System Call Overhead Test || 30523.5 -> 29476.8 -3.43%
Execl Throughput Test || 85.3 -> 81.5 -4.45%
File Write (10 seconds) || 8070.0 -> 7680.0 -4.83%
--8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<-- From: * Linux pimpinel.fluido.org 1.2.10 #59 Tue Jun 13 09:46:17 MET DST 1995 i486 * Tue Jun 27 10:18:13 MET DST 1995 To: * Linux pimpinel.fluido.org 1.3.51 #79 Wed Dec 27 19:16:06 MET 1995 i486 * Wed Dec 27 22:41:23 MET 1995 ******* Results ******* Process Creation Test || 119.9 -> 375.0 +212.76%
Pipe-based Context Switching Test || 3446.9 -> 10194.8 +195.77%
Dc: sqrt(2) to 99 decimal places || 5906.2 -> 11034.2 +86.82%
Execl Throughput Test || 51.6 -> 81.5 +57.95%
Shell scripts (8 concurrent) || 10.0 -> 13.0 +30.00%
Shell scripts (1 concurrent) || 78.3 -> 101.2 +29.25%
Shell scripts (4 concurrent) || 21.0 -> 26.8 +27.62%
Shell scripts (2 concurrent) || 41.0 -> 52.3 +27.56%
C Compiler Test || 42.2 -> 52.4 +24.17%
Dhrystone 2 without register variables || 46284.2 -> 49808.7 +7.61%
File Write (30 seconds) || 8911.0 -> 9356.0 +4.99%
Recursion Test--Tower of Hanoi || 709.2 -> 724.3 +2.13%
System Call Overhead Test || 29238.2 -> 29476.8 +0.82%
Arithmetic Test (type = float) || 5055.6 -> 5069.9 +0.28%
Arithmetic Test (type = long) || 8353.5 -> 8376.6 +0.28%
Arithmetic Test (type = register) || 8353.2 -> 8376.1 +0.27%
Arithmetic Test (type = short) || 7496.0 -> 7515.7 +0.26%
Arithmetic Test (type = double) || 5056.8 -> 5067.4 +0.21%
Arithmetic Test (type = int) || 8353.4 -> 8370.4 +0.20%
Arithmetic Test (type = arithoh) || 126914.4 -> 127172.0 +0.20%
Dhrystone 2 using register variables || 49802.4 -> 49870.6 +0.14%
File Write (10 seconds) || 8100.0 -> 7680.0 -5.19%
Pipe Throughput Test || 18512.0 -> 17227.1 -6.94%
--8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<----8<-- Enjoy! Carlo -- * ...Ma appena fuori tutto e' gomma,
* K * Carlo E. Prelz - fluido@marktest.pt tutto e' cicca impiastricciata... * (Marco Zappa-Niente cicca nella scuola) -- +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ |Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | has stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon | +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 17:44:15 +0800
To: lmccarth@cs.umass.edu
Subject: Re: (fwd) Benchmarks - revs 1.3.50 & 51
In-Reply-To: <199512310841.DAA09404@thor.cs.umass.edu>
Message-ID: <199512310846.TAA07013@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
> And the cypherpunk relevance is.......?
>
>[...] linux kernel stats
Absolutely zero. Your's truely pressed the wrong key.
--Proff
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | has stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 95 10:11:43 PST
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Premail web server strangeness
Message-ID: <199512281811.FAA20893@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Suprising amount of information one can gain from an env array, really.
....
SORRY
DISPLAY=callisto:0.0
EDITOR=/usr/sww/bin/emacsclient
HOME=/
HOST=kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu
HOSTTYPE=alpha
LOGNAME=root
LPDEST=lws510
MACHTYPE=alpha
MAIL=/var/spool/mail/raph
MANPATH=/private/raph/man:/usr/kerberos/man:/usr/sww/man:/usr/sww/X11/man:/usr/man:/usr/local/man
MITSCHEME_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr2/fa92/c263/scheme/lib
MPL=CMMD
NNTPSERVER=agate
OSTYPE=osf1
PAGER=/usr/sww/bin/less -r
PATH=/usr/bin:/usr/sww/bin
PGPPATH=/private/raph/.pgp
PRINTER=lws510
PWD=/private/raph
REMOTEHOST=callisto.HIP.Berkeley.EDU
SHELL=/bin/sh
SHLVL=2
TERM=xterm
USER=root
VENDOR=dec
SERVER_SOFTWARE=Raph's li'l server 0.04
HTTP_ACCEPT=application/x-csh
HTTP_FROM=
HTTP_REFERER=http://kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu/cgi-bin/premail-0.42.tar.gz?question1=Yes&question2=Yes
HTTP_USER_AGENT=
QUERY_STRING=question1=Yes&question2=Yes
Sorry, can't serve the document.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | has stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
1996
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 1996 07:49:25 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: FreeBSD user
Message-ID: <199601042215.JAA03077@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
I've just had my 3rd Freebsd kernel. Enough is enough.
--Proff
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: nobody@REPLAY.COM (Anonymous)
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 1996 14:56:51 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Zimmermann case is dropped.
Message-ID: <199601121350.OAA20610@utopia.hacktic.nl>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Julian Assange wrote:
>
>The more important point being missed of course that Phil has and no
>doubt will continue to make certain elements of the U.S government
>quite miserable indeed.
...and I'm sure they'll be watching VERY closely to see how
version 3.0 will be distributed....
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 1996 06:03:40 +0800
To: jya@pipeline.com (John Young)
Subject: Re: Toad Hall
In-Reply-To: <199601112030.PAA04786@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199601120936.UAA02076@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> From: "Takedown: The pursuit and Capture of Kevin Mitnick,
> America's Most Wanted Outlaw -- By the Man Who Did It," by
> Tsutomu Shimura, with John Markoff, Hyperion Press, a
> subsidiary of The Disney Company, 1996, 326 pp. $24.95.
> ISBN 0-7868-6210-6
This makes me ill. Tsutomu, when Mitnick croaks, will you dig up his
grave and rent his hands out as ash trays? Don't worry, I'm sure Markoff
will lend you his shovel and for a percentage even teach you how to use
it.
Knowledge of the final days of American wild west not my strong point,
however I _do_ recall that the man who murdered one of the last
notorious American gun-slinger-outlaws went on not long after to produce
and act in stange show which described just how he Did It.
Some years later he himself was murdered by a disgusted member of the
audience.
The jews have a good statement the benefits of recalling the past.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 13 Jan 1996 01:35:56 +0800
To: jya@pipeline.com (John Young)
Subject: Re: Shimomura on BPF
In-Reply-To: <199601120029.TAA28014@pipe3.nyc.pipeline.com>
Message-ID: <199601121223.XAA04718@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Shimomura on BPF, NSA and Crypto:
>
> One of the tools I modified for my work was a sophisticated
> piece of software called the Berkeley Packet Filter. ...
> Unlike the original BPF, my version was designed to bury
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> itself inside the operating system of a computer and watch
> for certain information as it flowed through the computer
> from the Internet. When a packet from a certain address, or
> for that matter any other desired piece of information
> designated by the user flashed by, BPF would grab it and
> place it in a file where it could be kept for later
> viewing.
This is *exactly* what BPF does, always did and was designed to do. As
for writing the packets to a file, everything but opening and closing
the file are described in the man page. You could code it in 10 lines.
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 14 Jan 1996 02:49:05 +0800
To: hallam@w3.org
Subject: Re: Shimomura on BPF, NSA and Crypto
In-Reply-To: <9601131747.AA11926@zorch.w3.org>
Message-ID: <199601131828.FAA01537@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> >Tsutomu has lots of glib rhetoric about how he just builds tools and
> >they can be used for good or evil. This tool is custom-designed for
> >evil.
>
> Rubbish, it would allow me to do something I urgently need to do - measure the
> performance of the main internet links. This is presently very difficult to do
> since the berkley sockets provide no network performance information to the
> application layer.
[..]
The standard BPF does exactly what you want already. Can you say tcpdump?
I think some research is inorder before you go shooting off your mouth.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 96 04:08:17 PST
To: bal@martigny.ai.mit.edu
Subject: Re: Zimmermann case is dropped.
In-Reply-To: <9601120040.AA03530@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199601121206.XAA04446@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Of course they can; they're the U.S. government. No possible outcome of
> Phil's case would have changed this fact. If the Federal government
> wishes to make your life miserable they can always do so.
The more important point being missed of course that Phil has and no
doubt will continue to make certain elements of the U.S government
quite miserable indeed. Something that I suspect doesn't make Phil too
miserable at all.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 96 19:40:23 PST
To: ecarp@netcom.com
Subject: Re: Attack Simulator
In-Reply-To: <199601190129.UAA22928@dal1820.computek.net>
Message-ID: <199601190337.OAA09829@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
> ISS and SATAN are different tools. There is a non-commercial version of ISS available. ISS didn't
> get as much notice as SATAN - I guess it's because it's author isn't as widely known as Dan Farmer.
> --
Err, no its just because ISS is called ISS. Though if Klaus was into
B&D, bisexuality, gutter philosophy courses, exhibitionism and tight
blank pants perhaps it/he would be better known. Wadda you reckon Klaus?
Could this be the new you :)?
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 1996 09:55:08 +0800
To: EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU (E. ALLEN SMITH)
Subject: Re: Just what the Internet needs right now...
In-Reply-To: <01I0QVJK2WDSA0UTJS@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
Message-ID: <199602030025.LAA25077@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> He said police found diesel fuel, a bag of fertilizer and other items
> -- the basic materials to build a bomb-- at the first boy's house.
Looks like I've just been placed into the ranks of the pyro-terrorist.
Golly, Deisel fuel.
Gosh, Fertilizer.
Ma, other items.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 3 Feb 1996 23:41:15 +0800
To: bugtraq@fc.net
Subject: (fwd) National Security Agency
Message-ID: <199602031526.CAA11269@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Path: news.aus.world.net!suburbia.net!proff
From: proff@suburbia.net (Julian Assange)
Newsgroups: alt.anagrams
Subject: National Security Agency
Date: 3 Feb 1996 10:50:30 GMT
Organization: AUSNet Services pty. ltd.
Lines: 21
Message-ID: <4evelm$b9n@sydney1.world.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: suburbia.net
X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2]
National Anti-Secrecy Guy
Secret Analytic Guy Union
Caution Laying Any Secret
Run anti Social Agency Yet
Uncle gay, Insane Atrocity
Insane, ugly, acne atrocity
Your testical, again Nancy?
Acute yearly sactioning
Yes, gain unclean atrocity.
Nuns age angelic atrocity
National Gay Secrecy Unit
ftp://suburbia.net/pub/electron/gan.tgz
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 1996 00:50:20 +0800
To: anonymous@freezone.remailer
Subject: Re: Report available: "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers"
In-Reply-To: <199602081528.KAA11525@light.lightlink.com>
Message-ID: <199602081611.DAA03946@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> I downloaded this so-called "report". It doesn't even mentions PGP.
> Gotta wonder why the 007 wannabe "experts" and the Big Business (BSA)
> want you to only use 90 bits for your keys and why they've never heard
> of PGP...
>
> Anyone who listens to crypto advice from people who's purpose in life
> is to listen to *YOU* gets what they deserve. I'll stay with PGP which
> has a 2048 bit key.
>
> JustWalT
There is one born every minute.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr. Dimitri Vulis)
Date: Sun, 11 Feb 1996 04:46:52 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: China
In-Reply-To: <199602101429.BAA22868@suburbia.net>
Message-ID: <4PJ4iD13w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Julian Assange writes:
> [...]
> > bottle. Remember that starting this year, satellites of Iridium and other
> > LEO satellite projects will start to go up, spreading bandwidth around
> > the world. How will the Chinese government build a firewall against
> > satellites? Say, for instance orbiting anonymous remailers with pgp? Will
> > happen some day.
>
> Radio *reception* of non goverment approved frequences is illegal in a
> number of countries, China included. Possesion of the equipment needed
> to received these frequencies is also illegal in a number of countries
> (including Australia). Sale of that equipment is illegal in still more
> countries, including the USA.
Governments and organized religions sought to regulate book printing
almost since the time in was invented.
In the last few decades, oppressive governments controlled the possession of
short-wave radio receivers (confiscated by several sides during WWII to prevent
citizens from listening to enemy propaganda); xerocopiers and computer
printers; even typewriters (I read that in today's Iraq every typewriter must
be registered and the government must be supplied with type samples).
It's not difficult to imagine that governments will seek to regulate the
possession of modems again. Some may recall that in the U.S. it used to be
technically illegal to connect a modem to the phone jack without a permission
from AT&T.
---
Dr. Dimitri Vulis
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 10 Feb 1996 18:10:29 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: new zip cracking code
Message-ID: <199602100709.SAA03239@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Does anyone have any pointers to cryptanalysis papers on the Zip
encryption scheme (presented below)? I've seen a few MSDOS executeables
which used some sort of brute force attack, which didn't seem
particularly intelligent or effective for long passwords. If anyone has
some pointers, or source I'd be glad to hear of it. From what I can see
of Schlafly's algorithm a bute force attack could be speed up a great
deal by pre-compution and expansaion of elements of the first 3 or so
rounds at the very least.
Ideas anyone?
Decryption
----------
The encryption used in PKZIP was generously supplied by Roger
Schlafly. PKWARE is grateful to Mr. Schlafly for his expert
help and advice in the field of data encryption.
PKZIP encrypts the compressed data stream. Encrypted files must
be decrypted before they can be extracted.
Each encrypted file has an extra 12 bytes stored at the start of
the data area defining the encryption header for that file. The
encryption header is originally set to random values, and then
itself encrypted, using 3, 32-bit keys. The key values are
initialized using the supplied encryption password. After each byte
is encrypted, the keys are then updated using psuedo-random number
generation techniques in combination with the same CRC-32 algorithm
used in PKZIP and described elsewhere in this document.
The following is the basic steps required to decrypt a file:
1) Initialize the three 32-bit keys with the password.
2) Read and decrypt the 12-byte encryption header, further
initializing the encryption keys.
3) Read and decrypt the compressed data stream using the
encryption keys.
Step 1 - Initializing the encryption keys
-----------------------------------------
Key(0) <- 305419896 Key(1) <- 591751049 Key(2) <- 878082192 loop for i <- 0 to length(password)-1 update_keys(password(i)) end loop Where update_keys() is defined as: update_keys(char): Key(0) <- crc32(key(0),char) Key(1) <- Key(1) + (Key(0) & 000000ffH) Key(1) <- Key(1) * 134775813 + 1 Key(2) <- crc32(key(2),key(1) >> 24)
end update_keys
Where crc32(old_crc,char) is a routine that given a CRC value and a
character, returns an updated CRC value after applying the CRC-32
algorithm described elsewhere in this document.
Step 2 - Decrypting the encryption header
-----------------------------------------
The purpose of this step is to further initialize the encryption
keys, based on random data, to render a plaintext attack on the
data ineffective.
Read the 12-byte encryption header into Buffer, in locations
Buffer(0) thru Buffer(11).
loop for i <- 0 to 11 C <- buffer(i) ^ decrypt_byte() update_keys(C) buffer(i) <- C end loop Where decrypt_byte() is defined as: unsigned char decrypt_byte() local unsigned short temp temp <- Key(2) | 2 decrypt_byte <- (temp * (temp ^ 1)) >> 8
end decrypt_byte
After the header is decrypted, the last two bytes in Buffer
should be the high-order word of the CRC for the file being
decrypted, stored in Intel low-byte/high-byte order. This can
be used to test if the password supplied is correct or not.
Step 3 - Decrypting the compressed data stream
----------------------------------------------
The compressed data stream can be decrypted as follows:
loop until done
read a charcter into C
Temp <- C ^ decrypt_byte() update_keys(temp) output Temp end loop -- +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ |Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon | +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 11 Feb 1996 19:14:59 +0800
To: amehta@doe.ernet.in (Arun Mehta)
Subject: Re: China
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199602101429.BAA22868@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
[...]
> bottle. Remember that starting this year, satellites of Iridium and other
> LEO satellite projects will start to go up, spreading bandwidth around
> the world. How will the Chinese government build a firewall against
> satellites? Say, for instance orbiting anonymous remailers with pgp? Will
> happen some day.
Radio *reception* of non goverment approved frequences is illegal in a
number of countries, China included. Possesion of the equipment needed
to received these frequencies is also illegal in a number of countries
(including Australia). Sale of that equipment is illegal in still more
countries, including the USA.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 11 Feb 1996 20:31:44 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199602111200.XAA00164@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>From proff Sat Feb 10 18:09:57 1996
Subject: new zip cracking code
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Date: Sat, 10 Feb 1996 18:09:57 +1100 (EST)
X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23]
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 3806
Does anyone have any pointers to cryptanalysis papers on the Zip
encryption scheme (presented below)? I've seen a few MSDOS executeables
which used some sort of brute force attack, which didn't seem
particularly intelligent or effective for long passwords. If anyone has
some pointers, or source I'd be glad to hear of it. From what I can see
of Schlafly's algorithm a bute force attack could be speed up a great
deal by pre-compution and expansaion of elements of the first 3 or so
rounds at the very least.
Ideas anyone?
Decryption
----------
The encryption used in PKZIP was generously supplied by Roger
Schlafly. PKWARE is grateful to Mr. Schlafly for his expert
help and advice in the field of data encryption.
PKZIP encrypts the compressed data stream. Encrypted files must
be decrypted before they can be extracted.
Each encrypted file has an extra 12 bytes stored at the start of
the data area defining the encryption header for that file. The
encryption header is originally set to random values, and then
itself encrypted, using 3, 32-bit keys. The key values are
initialized using the supplied encryption password. After each byte
is encrypted, the keys are then updated using psuedo-random number
generation techniques in combination with the same CRC-32 algorithm
used in PKZIP and described elsewhere in this document.
The following is the basic steps required to decrypt a file:
1) Initialize the three 32-bit keys with the password.
2) Read and decrypt the 12-byte encryption header, further
initializing the encryption keys.
3) Read and decrypt the compressed data stream using the
encryption keys.
Step 1 - Initializing the encryption keys
-----------------------------------------
Key(0) <- 305419896 Key(1) <- 591751049 Key(2) <- 878082192 loop for i <- 0 to length(password)-1 update_keys(password(i)) end loop Where update_keys() is defined as: update_keys(char): Key(0) <- crc32(key(0),char) Key(1) <- Key(1) + (Key(0) & 000000ffH) Key(1) <- Key(1) * 134775813 + 1 Key(2) <- crc32(key(2),key(1) >> 24)
end update_keys
Where crc32(old_crc,char) is a routine that given a CRC value and a
character, returns an updated CRC value after applying the CRC-32
algorithm described elsewhere in this document.
Step 2 - Decrypting the encryption header
-----------------------------------------
The purpose of this step is to further initialize the encryption
keys, based on random data, to render a plaintext attack on the
data ineffective.
Read the 12-byte encryption header into Buffer, in locations
Buffer(0) thru Buffer(11).
loop for i <- 0 to 11 C <- buffer(i) ^ decrypt_byte() update_keys(C) buffer(i) <- C end loop Where decrypt_byte() is defined as: unsigned char decrypt_byte() local unsigned short temp temp <- Key(2) | 2 decrypt_byte <- (temp * (temp ^ 1)) >> 8
end decrypt_byte
After the header is decrypted, the last two bytes in Buffer
should be the high-order word of the CRC for the file being
decrypted, stored in Intel low-byte/high-byte order. This can
be used to test if the password supplied is correct or not.
Step 3 - Decrypting the compressed data stream
----------------------------------------------
The compressed data stream can be decrypted as follows:
loop until done
read a charcter into C
Temp <- C ^ decrypt_byte() update_keys(temp) output Temp end loop -- +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ |Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon | +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Date: Thu, 22 Feb 1996 17:47:56 +0800 Subject: No Subject Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
> A Kerberos V4 session key is chosen by calling random() repeatedly.
> THe PRNG is seeded with srandom(time.tv_usec ^ time.tv_sec ^ p ^ n++),
> where p is a static integer set to getpid() ^ gethostid() on the first
> call and n is a static counter.
>
> Is there any entropy here??? Most, if not all, Kerberos servers run one
> time synchronization protocol or another, which reduces the entropy to a
> few bits at most.
>
> DEADBEAT
usec grainlessness typically doesn't approach anything like a usec on most
OS implimentations either.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous
Date: Sat, 10 Feb 1996 18:09:57 +1100 (EST)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: new zip cracking code
Message-ID: <3f81e57e9db66b581941ceff328cf1fb@NO-ID-FOUND.mhonarc.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Does anyone have any pointers to cryptanalysis papers on the Zip
encryption scheme (presented below)? I've seen a few MSDOS executeables
which used some sort of brute force attack, which didn't seem
particularly intelligent or effective for long passwords. If anyone has
some pointers, or source I'd be glad to hear of it. From what I can see
of Schlafly's algorithm a bute force attack could be speed up a great
deal by pre-compution and expansaion of elements of the first 3 or so
rounds at the very least.
Ideas anyone?
Decryption
----------
The encryption used in PKZIP was generously supplied by Roger
Schlafly. PKWARE is grateful to Mr. Schlafly for his expert
help and advice in the field of data encryption.
PKZIP encrypts the compressed data stream. Encrypted files must
be decrypted before they can be extracted.
Each encrypted file has an extra 12 bytes stored at the start of
the data area defining the encryption header for that file. The
encryption header is originally set to random values, and then
itself encrypted, using 3, 32-bit keys. The key values are
initialized using the supplied encryption password. After each byte
is encrypted, the keys are then updated using psuedo-random number
generation techniques in combination with the same CRC-32 algorithm
used in PKZIP and described elsewhere in this document.
The following is the basic steps required to decrypt a file:
1) Initialize the three 32-bit keys with the password.
2) Read and decrypt the 12-byte encryption header, further
initializing the encryption keys.
3) Read and decrypt the compressed data stream using the
encryption keys.
Step 1 - Initializing the encryption keys
-----------------------------------------
Key(0) <- 305419896 Key(1) <- 591751049 Key(2) <- 878082192 loop for i <- 0 to length(password)-1 update_keys(password(i)) end loop Where update_keys() is defined as: update_keys(char): Key(0) <- crc32(key(0),char) Key(1) <- Key(1) + (Key(0) & 000000ffH) Key(1) <- Key(1) * 134775813 + 1 Key(2) <- crc32(key(2),key(1) >> 24)
end update_keys
Where crc32(old_crc,char) is a routine that given a CRC value and a
character, returns an updated CRC value after applying the CRC-32
algorithm described elsewhere in this document.
Step 2 - Decrypting the encryption header
-----------------------------------------
The purpose of this step is to further initialize the encryption
keys, based on random data, to render a plaintext attack on the
data ineffective.
Read the 12-byte encryption header into Buffer, in locations
Buffer(0) thru Buffer(11).
loop for i <- 0 to 11 C <- buffer(i) ^ decrypt_byte() update_keys(C) buffer(i) <- C end loop Where decrypt_byte() is defined as: unsigned char decrypt_byte() local unsigned short temp temp <- Key(2) | 2 decrypt_byte <- (temp * (temp ^ 1)) >> 8
end decrypt_byte
After the header is decrypted, the last two bytes in Buffer
should be the high-order word of the CRC for the file being
decrypted, stored in Intel low-byte/high-byte order. This can
be used to test if the password supplied is correct or not.
Step 3 - Decrypting the compressed data stream
----------------------------------------------
The compressed data stream can be decrypted as follows:
loop until done
read a charcter into C
Temp <- C ^ decrypt_byte() update_keys(temp) output Temp end loop -- +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ |Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon | +----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+ From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003 From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 96 22:07:59 PST
To: an5877@anon.penet.fi
Subject: Re: Kerberos vulnerability
In-Reply-To: <9602210339.AA22431@anon.penet.fi>
Message-ID: <199602220606.RAA04537@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
> A Kerberos V4 session key is chosen by calling random() repeatedly.
> THe PRNG is seeded with srandom(time.tv_usec ^ time.tv_sec ^ p ^ n++),
> where p is a static integer set to getpid() ^ gethostid() on the first
> call and n is a static counter.
>
> Is there any entropy here??? Most, if not all, Kerberos servers run one
> time synchronization protocol or another, which reduces the entropy to a
> few bits at most.
>
> DEADBEAT
usec grainlessness typically doesn't approach anything like a usec on most
OS implimentations either.
--
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
|Julian Assange | "if you think the United States has |
|FAX: +61-3-9819-9066 | stood still, who built the largest |
|EMAIL: proff@suburbia.net | shopping centre in the world?" - Nixon |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Michael Froomkin
Date: Mon, 4 Mar 1996 06:34:44 +0800
To: cypherpunks
Subject: Re: (fwd) USA / Australia - Civil Liberty
In-Reply-To: <199603030753.RAA12050@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
The following concerns a fragment from a message that seems to have been
posted to "aus.legal" and to c'punx. Please feel free to forward to
aus.legal if you have access to that group.
On Sun, 3 Mar 1996, Julian Assange wrote:
>
> Under USC 28, 1603, (B)(3) Ms. Wilson is an alien and the US
> Federal court has no jurisdiction over her.
Highly dubious. The court has full jurisdiction over all non-ambassadors
in its jurisidiction. Whatever passport they may hold. The cited text
relates to the immunity of foreign states and their ambassadors and their
political subdvisions. It is not an exemption for all tourists, foreign
workers or the like.
A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax)
Associate Professor of Law |
U. Miami School of Law | froomkin@law.miami.edu
P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin
Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's not warm here today.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: proff@.suburbia.net (Julian Assange)
Date: Sun, 3 Mar 1996 16:32:17 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) Re: The police came knocking
Message-ID: <199603030743.RAA11722@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Path: news.aus.world.net!news.us.world.net!news.inc.net!trellis.wwnet.com!nntp.coast.net!howland.reston.ans.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!news.mel.aone.net.au!newshost.pcug.org.au!blchupin!blchupin
From: blchupin@pcug.org.au (Basil Chupin)
Newsgroups: tip.general,aus.org.efa,aus.legal
Subject: Re: The police came knocking
Message-ID: <09A420598905@pcug.org.au>
X-Mailer: Osiris v4.1 Registered To Basil Chupin
References: <4gisqm$s4c@wabbit.its.uow.edu.au>
Date: Sun, 25 Feb 96 17:06:59 +1000
Organization: Back To The Future CBIS, Canberra, Australia
Lines: 223
Xref: news.aus.world.net aus.org.efa:1808 aus.legal:2660
In article <4gisqm$s4c@wabbit.its.uow.edu.au>
Phil Herring writes:
> In article <312beb37.18538395@newshost.pcug.org.au> Owen Cook,
> rcook@pcug.org.au writes:
>1. All traffic into and out of Australia passes thru this
>building at St Leonards
>2. Xty millions of dollars were spent by Telecom and ASIO to
>install, secretly, computers in the site.
>3. The purpose of the facility was to monitor all traffic thru
>keyword searches, originator and destination addressees.
>
> Erm, no. It's just a version of the "NSA line eater" myth. Aside
> from
> the fact that there are international links all over the place,
> including satellite uplinks and leased phone lines, the plain
> truth of
> the matter is that the government just doesn't care about the
> Internet
> all that much. Politically it's of little consequence, and law
> enforcement and "intelligence" services have small budgets that
> just
> don't stretch to this kind of conspiracy.
>
> On the other hand, the insecurity of email is legendary.
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
Date : 10 Mar 94 13:11:46
From : Relay
To : All
Subject : Government Eavesdropping In New Zealand
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
* Message originally :
From: Relay
To : All
Date: 10 Mar 94 11:42:35
Area: alt.dcom.telcom
* Forwarded by Tech Support using Sphinx! 2.0
The following article was posted to the Student Journalists
mailing list (STUMEDIA@UABDPO.BITNET) by Malcolm Hutchinson
(malcolmh@waikato.ac.nz).
This is an article that appears as the centre feature in
our first issue for the year. as the token NZ representative
on this list, i thought i would post it to show that the US is
not the only country experiencing problems keeping their
govt in line when it comes to digital privacy & secure comms.
NZ is known around the world for it's anti-nuke stand in the mid-
eighties, yet we allow this sort of thing to continue. the waihopai
spy base feeds information *directly* to the NSA.
it is because of the existance of installations like this that i
encourage
all my digital friends to take control of their own information
and start using strong cryptographic software. PGP is available
from any number of anon FTP sites around the world. get it, use it.
i apologise if posting an article like this is considered wasting
bandwith on this list
y'all stay safe
mal
title: The Biggest Sour Grape in Marlborough
At a predetermined signal the two groups of protesters split apart. The group
I was in went round the fence to the main gates and started pushing them back
and forward making a hell of a racket. The gate was secured in three places.
We broke the top padlock and the steel rod holding the gate in the ground. We
heard a shout from the other group. They were through the fence. Nine people
arrested and many more if we didn't stop our vigorous attack on the main
gates.
This was it, we were there to do something radical, to make our protest well
and truly heard. No-one had breached the huge inner fence of the Waihopai
Spybase for years. It was my first protest at Waihopai but not the last. The
Waihopai protest just South of Blenheim is an annual event organised by the
Anti-Bases Campaign (ABC). Ever since the first survey pegs were planted in
the ground in 1987, New Zealand women (originally) and men have protested
against the existence of the secretive Waihopai Spybase. Yet despite its
colourful history the vast majority of people still don't know it exists.
Held from January 27-29 this year's protest was larger than usual. About 80
people (including an unspecified number of university students) from Dunedin
to Auckland converged on a makeshift campsite nestled beside the Wairau River
to plan what action they would take against the Spybase and all it stands for.
The word "spybase" conjures images of undercover cops, secrecy, high security,
mystery and murder. While this is a bit dramatic there are similarities. The
Waihopai base is run by the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB),
a discrete organisation which only reports to the prime minister. Hidden in a
barren valley deep in the Marlborough outback, the Waihopai base is not
something the GCSB wants New Zealanders to know about. Workers at the base
aren't allowed to talk about what they do and even their spouses don't know
how much they earn. The base has a secret budget and secret objectives.
Secrecy is the aim and so far 'they' have been successful.
That is until 6.00pm Sunday night of the protest when on TV3 thousands of
viewers saw the Waihopai Spybase for the first time. The next day articles
were published in Sunday papers, with further articles in major daily papers
on the Monday. Supportive comments by Nelson MP John Blincoe added to the
debate on a topic usually considered closed. For the first time many New
Zealanders became aware that a government agency was spying on our neighbours
in the South Pacific and giving that information straight to the United
States.
What is a Spybase?
A more official name for the Spybase is Satellite Communications Station. This
sounds very innocent but there's no escaping the fact the base invades the
privacy of thousands of people, businesses governments and other organisations
throughout the South Pacific without their consent. The information gleamed is
not meant for the GCSB or the US, that's why it's called spying.
The base consists of an 18 metre receiving dish covered by a huge white dome,
an operations building and workshop, all protected by a 14ft security fence
backed by another electric fence, security cameras and floodlights. The base
monitors communications transmitted via satellite: private and commercial
telephone, fax, e-mail, telex and telegrams. These messages are scanned for
key words by computer. The information collected is then relayed to the GCSB
headquarters in the Freyberg building in Wellington. Useful information is
then sent to the United States National Security Agency or the larger Spybase
in Geraldton, Australia.
Why protest?
"The Waihopai Spybase uses your money to invade your privacy for other
countries' benefit?" This statement taken from an Anti-Bases Campaign pamphlet
about the base sums up the general reason why people are motivated enough to
protest, and to be arrested.
In the past, politicians like David Lange claimed the Waihopai base will give
New Zealand more independence in intelligence matters and that the information
would be under New Zealand control. However a document obtained from the US
Navy by peace researchers last year has confirmed long held suspicions that
the GCSB passes the intelligence collected at Waihopai to the powerful US
National Security Agency. This evidence completely contradicts the claims made
by New Zealand politicians. What's more, according to British investigative
journalist, Duncan Campbell, the Waihopai Spybase is part of a world wide
network of spybases monitoring satellite communications for the benefit of the
NSA.
What really sticks in the throats of those who know about the Waihopai Spybase
is that despite the fact that the information is given to the US, New Zealand
pays for it. Based on the costs of similar bases in other countries, the
Anti-Bases Campaign estimates that the base cost $20 million to set up and up
to $100 million so far. Protesters ask why should we be paying for this
'service' especially when we weren't even told about it.
The Waihopai Spybase was established without the consent of the New Zealand
people and operates without the permission of the Pacific countries who's
sovereignty it intrudes on. The Spybase is part of a reliance on military
power and cold war politics which reinforces the nuclear powers domination of
the globe. Instead of building relationships with our neighbours based on
trust, cooperation and peace we are furthering the interests of oppressive
military alliances by the world super powers.
Under international law it is in fact illegal to intercept international
communications. The activities of the Waihopai Spybase contravene the
International Tele-Communications Convention to which NZ has agreed. It is
also illegal under NZ law to act on such information.
The question we must ask ourselves is "Do we want New Zealand to participate
in this misuse of technology?" "Do we want to be consulted before we enter
into secret military alliances with the super powers? Would we rather the
money spent on spying was spent on education or health? Protesters at Waihopai
demand a Parliamentary inquiry into the activities of the GCSB, and that the
activities of this organisation be subject to review by the judicial system.
We also demand the closure of the Waihopai Spybase and the redirection of the
money spent on its operations to be put toward a peaceful future. Until this
happens we will continue to protest at Waihopai. I didn't try to be unbiased
in this article. For a start I was actively protesting the base myself. It is
also difficult to get another side to the story when politicians won't talk
about it. The head of the GCSB even refused to answer MP's questions in
Parliament about the Spybase. But secrets never last forever and thanks to the
New Zealand peace movement at least some of the truth is becoming public.
The more people who demand knowledge of the Spybase and accountability for its
operations, the more likely politicians will take notice. Already Nelson MP
John Blincoe (Labour) has come out in support of the Waihopai protest. In the
Christchurch Press Blincoe said international circumstances had changed and it
was time for the "cloud of secrecy" over the base to be lifted.
"The public is entitled to know what is being done from its own soil," said
Blincoe. "At the very least there should be Parliamentary scrutiny of Waihopai
and the other listening station, Tangimoana, near Palmerston North." Yes there
are other spybases, of different sorts, but did you know about them? I find it
unnerving to think people could be listening to my phone conversations, that
foreign spy networks are operating through New Zealand and I am helping
finance something I don't believe in. But then we don't have to like it and
nor do we have to accept it. It is our right to question and protest.
To find out more information about Waihopai and other bases in New Zealand
write to the Anti-Bases Campaign, PO Box 9314, Wellington. [NEW ZEALAND]
Paul Smith wc 1345
*********************************************************
Malcolm Hutchinson internet: malcolmh@waikato.ac.nz
Editor: NEXUS 1994 The Waikato Students' Union
Te Wharae Wananga O Waikato
Hamilton, New Zealand
PGP Public Key available on request
*********************************************************
--
Nigel Allen ae446@freenet.carleton.ca
----------------------------------------------------------
Basil Chupin Internet: blchupin@pcug.org.au
Fidonet: 3.620.269.0 +61-6-285-2353
XLTNet: 370.100.1.0 +61-6-285-2353
----------------------------------------------------------
--
"I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's
admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even
considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So
I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we
can make it. You get me?" - Leo Burlero/PKD
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: proff@.suburbia.net (Julian Assange)
Date: Sun, 3 Mar 1996 16:32:02 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: (fwd) USA / Australia - Civil Liberty
Message-ID: <199603030753.RAA12050@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Path: news.aus.world.net!news.us.world.net!usenet
From: tomk@world.net
Newsgroups: aus.legal
Subject: USA / Australia - Civil Liberty
Date: Sun, 03 Mar 96 01:59:02 PDT
Organization: (none)
Lines: 78
Message-ID: <4hbcu6$jco@news.i.net>
NNTP-Posting-Host: portland04.world.net
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
X-Newsreader: NEWTNews & Chameleon -- TCP/IP for MS Windows from NetManage
1 March, 1996
At 1:50 pm today PST in the Federal Court of the USA
in the State of Oregon, an Australian national
Ms. Amanda Wilson was unfairly incarcerated by Justice
Haggerty of the US Federal Court.
During her incaceration, she was denied legal counsel,
her request to have her embassy contacted was refused
and she was informed by the Sherrif of Oregon, that she had
no rights until she was transferred to a Federal Jail.
This individual was a witness in a civil case and was
neither
named as the plaintiff nor the defendant.
Work that she had performed for the plaintiff under
contract was not being paid for by the Plaintiff and Ms.
Wilson was not inclined to provide the information without
her agreed remuneration.
Justice Haggerty then claimed that Ms. Wilson was an agent
of Koltai Inc and Thomas P. Kotlai and that her work was
not Intellectual Property owned by herself until
remunerated.
Ms. Wilson claimed that she had evidence that she was
acting as an independent agent. Justice Haggertys' response
was that "I'm not interested in your evidence".
Justice Haggerty ordered the Sherriff to detain Ms. Wilson
for Contempt of court.
Ms. Wilson then informed the court that she had done
nothing wrong and that she was an Australian resident.
The sherriff and his assistant then handcuffed and
removed Ms. Wilson to the holding cells on level four of the
Federal Courthouse in Portland.
She requested leave to contact her embassy. This was
refused. She requested the right to counsel, this also was
refused. She then requested that the sherriffs office
contact her parents in Australia to notify them of her
arrest. The sherriff refused this request.
She was then photographed, finger printed and informed that
she would be removed to a jail later that afternoon if she
did not comply with the courts order to divulge the
passwords giving Ausnet Services Pty. Ltd. free access to
her Intelectual Property.
Justice Haggerty then visited Ms. Wilson in the holding
cells to counsel her.
Ms. Wilson requested from Judge Haggerty that she be allowed
to contact her father and/or the Australian Embassy.
Justice Haggerty declined this request.
Ms. Wilson then gave into the pressure applied and gave
the passwords required by Justice Haggerty.
During her three hours and fifteen minutes of incarceration
Ms. Wilson was humiliated with a personal body search.
Threatened with transport to a jail in California.
Informed that she had no rights and was generally verbally
and mentally abused.
Under USC 28, 1603, (B)(3) Ms. Wilson is an alien and the US
Federal court has no jurisdiction over her.
It is the opinion of this individual that the US Federal
Court has exceeded its authority and has failed to recognise
the civil rights of an Australian National.
This file was posted by:
Thomas P. Koltai
Ex Managing Director of Ausnet Services Pty. Ltd.
(http://www/world.net)
Mobile: 1-503-260-3666
--
"I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's
admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even
considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So
I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we
can make it. You get me?" - Leo Burlero/PKD
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 1996 02:03:28 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Legal Aspects of Computer Crime (LACC)
Message-ID: <199603041324.XAA25903@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
_ _____ _____
| | /\ / ____| / ____|
| | / \ | | | |
| | / /\ \ | | | |
| |____ / ____ \ | |____ | |____
|______| /_/ \_\ \_____| \_____|
Legal Aspects of Computer Crime
"echo subscribe lacc|mail lacc-request@suburbia.net"
WHEN YOU HAVE SUBSCRIBED
------------------------
Send in a brief synopsis of who you are and why you are interested
in Computer Crime as your first message to the list (this helps
to stimulate discussion and debate as well as provide a sense
of the LACC community). As a [small] example:
"Hello, My name is Jane Reynor. I am an articled clerk at the
Director of Public Prosecutions. I have been assigned as an
assistant legal researcher to the prosecution of a bank officer
involved in fraudulent EDI transactions. My interest in computer
crime stems not just from the case we are working on, but also
from an otherwise unrelated passion for computer networking that
I suffered under during my period as undergraduate."
REASONS FOR INCEPTION
---------------------
The growing infusion of computers and computing devices into society
created a legislative and common law vacuum in the 1980's. State
prosecutors attempted to apply traditional property protection and
deception laws to new technological crimes. By and large they were
successful in this endeavor. There were however a very few but well
publicized failed cases against computer "hackers" (notably R vs
Gold - UK House of Lords and the E911 case). To the informed, these
cases demonstrated not so much a legislation vacuum, but prosecution
incompetence in choosing which statute to lay charges under and
mis-management by prosecuting cases where the real offence of the
defendant was merely the embarrassment of the powerful.
In an atmosphere of increased government reliance on computer
databases and public fear and hostility towards computerization of
the workplace, legislatures rushed to criminalise certain types of
computer use. Instead of expanding the scope of existing
legislation to more fully encompass the use of computers by
criminals, changing phrases such as "utter or write" to "utter,
write or transmit" (the former being the prosecutions undoing in the
well publicized Gold case) as had been done with the computerization
of copyright law, an entirely new class of criminal conduct was was
introduced. The computer had been seen not just as another tool that
criminals might use in committing a crime but something altogether
foreign and removed from the rest of society and established Law.
The result was a series of naively drafted, overly broad and
under-defined statutes which criminalised nearly all aspects of
computer use under certain conditions.
In the early 1990's a fundamental and evolving shift in computer
usage started to occur. Now, it is rare to see a white collar worker
in the work-place without the possession of a computer. In western
countries such as Australia, over one third of households have
computer systems. The computer is no longer the "altogether foreign
and removed from the rest of society" device it once was. It has
come out of the domain of the technical specialist and into the main
stream.
Even our notoriously slow moving legal profession is adopting it as
an essential tool. But there is another change. A qualitative one
important to our discussion.
When you link hundreds of thousands of computers together and thus
the people that use them together you find something remarkable
occurs. An event that you could never have predicted by merely
summing the discrete components involved. A unique virtual society
forms. Despite being designed with computer networking in mind,
computer crime legislation copes very poorly with non homogeneous
authorization [i.e partial authorization].
Societies are based around a common knowledge of history, beliefs,
and current events. Each member of a society can be pinpointed as
belonging to the society in question by the ideas, beliefs and
knowledge held in common with other societal members. Any new member
to a society learns this knowledge only because it is passed onto
them; directly by other members or indirectly via its media, works of
literature, music and art.
Successful large scale computer networks like the Internet form for
one reason and one reason only; information sharing. When a critical
mass of diversity, interests, user population and information
exchange is reached, a situation develops that mirrors in all
important aspects a vibrant and evolving society. Citizens of the
Internet have a nearly equal sized voice with which to convey their
thoughts to other members and can do so quickly and without unwanted
distortion. This is a remarkably democratic process compared to the
very real _self_ censorship and top heavy direction that is so
manifest in traditional broadcast and publishing industries.
But unlike the physical societies that have here-to been the norm,
the electronic network society is remarkably non-isolationist. It
continues to draw from, mesh and feed its beliefs into the
traditional societies it was populated out of. This coupling process
between computer network and traditional societies will continue
(at least for English speaking countries -- the cultural barriers
imposed by primary language differences are non-trivial) until a
stage is reached where the boundary between the two is blurred and
intangible.
Most citizens will then fall under the rule of appallingly drafted
computer crimes legislation every day of their lives. In the vast
majority of such legislation directed to address computer crime
everything which can be performed on a computer unless "authorized"
is defined as illegal. One might think that an individual could
authorize themselves to do anything they wished with their own
computer [not so, as France and Russia and the USA have demonstrated
with anti-cryptography and other information processing and content
laws] given their ownership of it.
But how does the Law define this "ownership"? Does ownership of the
"chattel" (CPU, memory, disks and other hardware) imply ownership of
the information created on it? What about employees with "partial
authorization" [examine disturbing outcome of Intel employee
R.Swartz vs the State of Oregon 1995]? If the user of the computer
system isn't the chattel owner, but has been given full control over
it does this imply they are authorized for all interaction with the
data stored on it? Is there such thing as implicit authorization?
Can an operating system grant authorization (implicit or otherwise)
as an authorized agent of the owner/operator? If not, is sending
electronic mail to someone who doesn't want their computer system to
receive it "unauthorized insertion of data"?
In a networked topology a typical computer user may use or otherwise
interact with hundreds or even thousands of other peoples computers
in any given day. What is then the analogous "authorization
topology"? In Law it has previously been the case that which was
not expressly forbidden was generally permitted. Currently the
digital equivalent of moving a chair [modification of trivial data]
in someone else's office is illegal and carries with it in most
countries a 5 to 10 year prison term. It is a sad reflection on the
legislature of the day that the computer _medium_ was criminalised
rather than the intent or damage caused to the victim.
It is unlikely that law reform will occur until current political
concern over computer networks such as the Internet is moderated. If
anything the push so far from political drafters has being to once
again introduce brand new medium criminalising legislation rather
than revitalizing the existing codes. This unfortunate "labeled
arrow" approach will continue as long as there exists an ill
informed and technologically ignorant legislature that finds itself
pliant to the whims of sensationalist media and honed to their
dubious targets. Strong ideals do not equal strong policy.
So ill defined and over broad are the terms used in most computer
crime legislation that typically the pressing of a button on a
silicon wrist watch without permission can be construed as
"insertion of data into a computer without authority" an offense
which carries 10 years penalty in countries such as Australia. The
farse inherent is blatant. Surely the process going on within the
wrist watch is utterly irrelevant. Victemless crimes should be
avoided if at all possible. If interfering with the watch caused
damage, even if that damage was to the intellectual property in the
watch then the crime is one of Criminal Damage [or one of the other
broad ranging damage statutes, depending on jurisdiction]. If
changing the internal state of the watch led to fraud or theft, then
the crime should be one of fraud or theft (possibly by deception).
If pressing the button changed, for instance, the time of the watch
and this lead to a death, then the crime should be that of
manslaughter or murder. Actions that do not damage (or other wise
attempt to negatively effect) the life of human beings directly, or
indirectly by damage or loss of property or fundamental societal
ideals (such as the right to privacy, freedom of association, speech
& movement) should not be crimes. Actions that annoy but do not
damage should also not be crimes, and traditionally are not. Crimes
and the criminal process are serious. Annoyances by definition are
not.
In most Commonwealth countries physical trespass [despite the
general view] is not a crime and with good reason. The Criminal law
system wasn't intended to be the citizen's lacky and enforcer of
personal whim, but rather to protect persons from genuine harm and
preserve social order and the sovereign. Someone trespassing on your
lands may annoy you. It may contradict your authorization. But it
[typically] only becomes illegal when you ask the trespasser to
leave and they refuse, or if their trespassing was directly
associated with the commission or attempted commission of an offence.
It is with this lack of appropriate legislation, precedents and
judicial guidance that judiciary, practitioners, prosecutors, law
enforcement personnel, defendants and drafters of future codes &
policy have to struggle to find resolution.
This list has been created in an attempt to mitigate the lack of
tangible resources people involved with computer crime have at their
disposal. It is hoped that by bringing together knowledgeable legal
professionals together with para-legal personnel and informed lay
persons that information and resources relevant to the difficult
task of analyzing, presenting in court, formulating departmental or
company policy or otherwise dealing with computer crime law and
computer crimes may be shared and intelligent discussion and law
reform stimulated.
nb. this list it is also an appropriate forum to discuss computerized
legal, law enforcement and criminology databases, such as Netmap,
Watson, PROMIS, Lexis, APAIS, CRIM-L, et cetera.
GUIDELINES
----------
In order to keep the semantic content high on this list, please consult
the following before posting:
DO POST DON'T POST
------- ----------
Un/reported decisions. Personal insults.
Commentaries on cases. Signatures >4 lines.
Reviews on relevant books. Quoted replies with more than 30%
Relevant journal articles. quoted from the original.
Information about proposed legislation. Short questions, or questions which
Full text of CC legislation. otherwise do not convey useful
Judicially defined terms. information in their own right.
Articles on new arrests or Gossip about the moderator.
cases. Articles about computer (in)security,
Detailed questions. they should be sent to:
Intelligent commentary. "best-of-security@suburbia.net"
Personal experiences with computer "breaking into a computer is the same
crime. as...."
Well thought out analogies. Petitions (if you think they are
Relevant transcripts. exceptionally relevant, send them to
Defense or prosecution strategy. the moderator, who may post them).
Relevant papers, thesis. Chain letters.
Conference announcements and details. Advertising material.
Locations of legal resources. Ethical considerations that are only
Computer forensics information. "opinion".
Trial/court dates, verdicts etc. Content free news reports or
Reviews of legal software. articles.
Pointers to any of the above. Abusive, antagonistic or otherwise,
Cross post relevant information from non information rich or non
other lists or news groups. constructive material.
Relevant affidavits, court documents. Quotes from Dan Quayle.
SUBSCRIBING
-----------
Send mail to:
lacc-request@suburbia.net
with the body of:
subscribe lacc
UN-SUBSCRIBING
-------------
Send mail to:
lacc-request@suburbia.net
with the body of:
unsubscribe lacc
POSTING
-------
To send a message to the list, address it to:
lacc@suburbia.net
REPLYING
--------
If you are replying to a message already on the LACC list using your
mail programs reply facility you will almost certainly have to change
the reply address to lacc@suburbia.net. This is because the LACC mailing
list program is configured to have return replies sent no "nobody" in
order to avoid receiving the replies of "vacation" programs which
automatically send email saying "I've gone to the moon for two weeks to
hunt rare bits".
ARCHIVES
--------
Monthly back issues of lacc since January 96 are available from:
ftp://suburbia.net/pub/mailinglists/lacc
Unfortunately the the 1995 archive was lost in a disk crash. If anyone still
has a copy, then please contact the moderator.
--
"I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's
admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even
considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So
I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we
can make it. You get me?" - Leo Burlero/PKD
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 1996 18:55:50 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Anti-scientology rally Melbourne Saturday the 16th of Match
Message-ID: <199603151011.UAA02671@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
The suburbia.net administrators kindly invite you to attend to the
Church of Scientology Demonstration at:
The Church of Scientology
Corner of Fliners Lane and Russel St,
Melbourne City [Australia]
SATURDAY March the 16th 1996 11am to 1pm
For those completely unfamiliar with the Church of Scientology [CoS]'s
attack upon the Internet and RRR radio station and critical speech
generally, read my below summary and the the appended transcript of one
of our users [David Gerard ] from JJJ radio station.
The Church of Scientology was founded by the late L. Ron Hubbard in the
United States some 30 years ago. To followers, Hubbard is their profit,
and his prolific writings are the sacred word. The Church's hierarchy
and financial viability revolve around Hubburd's verbose scriptures.
Each new level gained by a church follower brings to them, among other
rights and privileges access to a new and previously verboten set of the
works of Ron. But to the Church it brings something else. Revenue. A
very sizeable revenue. Ron's works are a required element in order for
the follower to progress through the many of successive levels the
Church has -- and they cost hundreds or thousands of dollars each. In
fact, by the time a devote of the Church has realized the highest OT
level, the Church has usually had them for over five figures. But
revenue isn't the only reason for keeping the works of Ron occulted
away.
A common technique used by cults to brainwash their followers is gradual
immersion in cult mythology and philosophy. To put it bluntly, it is
often advisable to keep the more wacko beliefs and practices out of your
new recruit's faces until they are sufficiently wacko themselves. Now,
the problem for the Church of Scientology is that on the wacko scale the
higher level works of Ron hover somewhere near the figure 10. To an
outsider it is an immediate farse. But to a follower who has become
psychologically dependent on the Church's philosophy & society and
invested thousands and thousands of dollars in doing so, it is just
another step on the road to mental subservience.
What you have then is a Church based on brainwashing yuppies and other
people with more money than sense. This may not concern you. If Nicole
Kiddman, Kate Cerbrano, John Travolta, Burce Willis, Demi Moor and Tom
Cruise want to spend their fortunes on learning that the earth is in
reality the destroyed prison colony of aliens from out of space then so
be it. However, money brings power and attracts the currupt. Money is
something the Church has a lot of. Not all of the Church's beliefs and
practices are so out of it as to be completely as irrelevant as the
previous example. Some are quite insidious. For instance, L. Ron Hubbard
devised a range of methods that could be used against critics and other
`enemies of the Church'. Among the list was manipulation of the
legal/court system. To the Church the battle isn't won in the court
room. It is won at the very moment the legal process starts unfolding,
creating fear and expense in those the Church opposes. Their worst
critic at the moment is not a person, or an organisation but a medium --
the Internet. The Internet is, by its very nature a censorship free
zone. Censorship, concealment and revelation (for a fee) is the Church's
raison d'etre.
The Church, via its manipulation of the legal system has had computer
systems seized, system operators forced to reveal their users personal
details, university accounts suspended and radio stations, such as RRR
cut their programs. It has sued ex-cult members, newspapers, and many
others for copyright infringements, loss of earnings and trade secret
violation. Trade secret violation? Yes, the Church of Scientology
claims its religious works are trade secrets.
The fight against the Church is far more than the Net vs a bunch of
wackos with too much money. It is about corporate suppression of
the Internet and free speech. It is about intellectual property and
the big and rich versus the small and smart. The precedents the
Church sets today the weapons of corporate tirany tomorrow.
--Julian Assange (please direct replies to fun@suburbia.net)
DAVID GERARD ON 3-CR (855KHZ AM) MELBOURNE, 8:50AM THU 14 MAR 1996
ANNOUNCER: There's currently a war going on on the Internet,
especially in relation to the Church of Scientology. This morning on
the line is David Gerard. Good morning, David.
DAVID: Good morning.
A: First of all, can you tell me what, what the war is that's going
on on the Internet?
D: Well, OK. There's a newsgroup on the Internet called
alt-dot-religion-dot-scientology, ARS. For a few years, this was like
one of the thousands of backwater Internet newsgroups. A newsgroup's
a sort of area with a given name where anyone can put a message on,
read other people's messages, that sort of thing; it's distributed
world-wide, there's no central control over it, so ...
A: So it's sort of like an electronic noticeboard, where you can put
up whatever you feel like.
D: Yep. Free access. And, y'know, most of them are utter garbage and
there's no way anyone's interested in all thousands of them. And it
was like a little backwater religion newsgroup for many years, where
you have a few Church people and a few critics sniping at each other,
y'know, and no-one else was really interested. But then, there was an
ex-Scientologist on there, a guy called Dennis Erlich, who ...
Someone put on a message saying, "is this actually part of secret
Scientology scripture?" It was a particularly wacky thing about 'find
some plants and see If you can communicate with them and see if they
receive your communication.' And he verified, 'yes, that's the real
thing.' In verifying it, he quoted it. So what the Church of
Scientology then did, seeing as they have tended in dealing with
critics to have the subtlety of a Mack truck, what they did was, they
got a judge to write a copyright violation writ. And they went round
and raided his house, and took away his computers, and went through
his house, and took anything they felt like. This is a good way to
piss of thirty million people in one go. And the Internet sort of
rose up as one to strike back at these people. So what happened was,
in their attempts to quash all discussion and quash all criticism,
they earned themselves a whole lot more critics. I mean, I'm not an
ex-Scientologist, I have no interest in them, except that they're
trying to use legal thuggery, corporate financing, to try to quash
all dissent. Thankfully they're doing it very badly. They're losing
cases left, right and centre when they get them into court, and the
publicity has been very damaging for them.
A: So there's obviously more than one legal case going on. How many
people have they prosecuted, or how many people are they in the
process of charging?
D: Well, there was Dennis Erlich in America; Lawrence Wollersheim and
Bob Penny, who are also ex- Scientologists -- they ran a computer
bulletin-board called FACTNet, which contains information on all
forms of cults and restrictive groups like those, and Arnie Lerma,
who was an ex-Scientologist. And after Lerma was raided, someone in
Holland put the thing which he had posted, the Fishman Affidavit,
which contains quotes from the Scientology scriptures, someone in the
Netherlands put it on a Web page -- on a World Wide Web page, the
thing you get through Netscape and so on. And in magazines where you
see the Internet, they usually have a screen shot from Netscape --
and what happened was, they tried raiding the Internet provider in
Holland, and the Dutch people were outraged with this and promptly
there were a hundred different copies of it all over Holland. And
then they tried mounting a case against them, and it just came in,
word came in a few days ago that they lost.
A: So is the Church of Scientology actually using the Internet to
display information, or to put out information about the positive
sides of the Church, or the sort of information that they would use
to draw people in?
D: Yeah, they finally got their own Web server up, but the point is
... And that's fine. The more information the better. The critics
have their information up, and the Church is trying to stop that, but
they're having a lot of trouble, because basically, once
information's out there, you can't put the genie back in the bottle,
you can't squeeze the toothpaste back into the tube. They feel that
if people find out about their secret scriptures, they might think
that they're very silly and laugh at them and not want to be
Scientologists. And also when things like the prices of these things
come out, like when you discover you've paid a hundred and sixty
thousand US dollars to learn that Xenu the galactic dictator took
people to Earth seventy-five million years ago, strapped them to
volcanoes and blew them up, and that you've paid this much money for
that and you're supposed to believe it.
A: Well, you'd want to believe it after paying all that money.
D: Well, actually, that's exactly it. The further people get in, the
more fanatical they seem to be. Experts on cults say that the Church
of Scientology is one of the hardest cults to get people back to the
real world from. And you have that cognitive dissonance between 'this
is a load of rubbish' and 'I've paid hundreds of thousands of dollars
and worked for years for this.'
A: Probably fits into the same philosophy that once you've paid a lot
of money for a car, it's the best car there is. [laughs]
D: Something like that. Yeah. And the issue goes beyond the Church of
Scientology. I mean, they're weird and vicious, and this is
well-documented, and if they care to object to me making that
statement I'll back it up in court if they like ...
A: Is this a fairly typical scenario on the Internet? Are there other
groups who are behaving in this manner, or is it a fairly limited ...
D: Well, at first only the Scientologists tried this, but, um, the
Unification Church, Reverend Moon's lot, have recently been trying
this, there's another small cult called Eckankar which is descended
from a church which is descended from Scientology, have recently been
trying this as well. It's quite amazing. It's not an issue of
Scientology, it's not an issue of Scientology teachings, it's an
issue of the corporate behaviour in the world where they attempt to
silence critics by using legal bigfooting, money ... Can small people
criticise big corporations or big financial interests?
A: I guess in some ways it's very similar to the McDonalds case in
Britain, where they're suing two unemployed people as this huge
corporation.
D: And the same thing is happening: it's backfiring on them.
A: Yeah.
D: 'Cos the thing about the Internet is, you can't stop the
information going out, because if you make something restricted,
suddenly everybody wants it. They've tried suing one person in
Holland, a hundred more sprung up. They've tried getting their
critics pulled off the Internet altogether -- my University Internet
account was locked for two months because of the Church of
Scientology, so I then went out and got a private provider. Their
behaviour is ... it's intolerable in a multicultural society, where
the implicit rule is we all have to get along.
A: I understand that a similar thing has happened to the 'Liars'
Club', a show put together by the Skeptics on 3-RRR.
D: Yep. The Church spent about ... a few years trying to shut down
the 'Liars' Club', 'cos they dared to mention, criticise Scientology.
And they finally got it taken to the Australian Broadcasting
Authority, who ruled that a particular show, where they had an
ex-Scientologist called Cyril Vosper ... that he went on and he
talked about the Church and what he didn't like about it and what was
bad about it. And he knows his stuff, he's been there, he actually
knew L. Ron Hubbard, that sort of thing.
A: Is this L. Ron Hubbard the science fiction author?
D: Yes, the guru of Scientology, the source of everything in
Scientology. Every word he wrote is taken by them as scripture.
A: [laugh] I've read his books and thought they were novels! [laughs]
D: Ha, well, yeah, pretty well ... But anyway, Vosper went on, and
the Tribunal ruled that no word or sentence that Vosper said was
religious vilification, no word or sentence that Adam Joseph,
presenter, said was vilification, no word or sentence that Vanda
Hamilton, the other presenter, said was vilification, but, because
the presenters agreed with the guest, it was therefore vilification.
Now, they didn't ask RRR to pull the show, but RRR pulled the show.
They also didn't give them any due process in pulling the show; if a
show's in danger of being pulled, y'know, you give them the chance to
speak. Stephen Walker just killed it.
A: Actually, you're holding a demonstration, that's right.
D: It's a small thing, where we politely state our case and hand out
leaflets, it's outside the Church, corner Russell Street and Flinders
Lane, on Saturday morning at 11am.
A: So you'll be providing people who turn up with leaflets to hand
out?
D: Yep. We'll have hundreds of leaflets, we'll have a few signs ...
We expect it to be a very polite demonstration. We had one in
September last year, we politely stated our case, the Church people
had a leaflet of their own, that sort of thing. It was ...
A: [laughs] That's all very nice!
D: It's all about ... It's not to do with the local people, I mean,
the individual people are fine. We're talking about management
actions in America. It's a multinational organisation.
A: Anyway, we've got to go. Thanks very much for your time, David.
D: Thank you very much.
A: See you later. That was Dave Gerard talking about the war on the
Internet and the way that the Church of Scientology is ... taking
action against people who publish information which is negative about
the Church. You've been listening to Thursday Breakfast, it's now two
minutes past nine, we've gone over time, and we'll catch you again
next week. It's time for 'Scheherazade'.
--
"I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's
admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even
considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So
I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we
can make it. You get me?" - Leo Bulero/PKD
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 1996 22:15:54 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: BOAF Sat April 6, Melbourne
Message-ID: <199603220751.SAA00159@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
____ _ _ _
/ ___| _ _| |__ _ _ _ __| |__ (_) __ _
\___ \| | | | '_ \| | | | '__| '_ \| |/ _` |
___) | |_| | |_) | |_| | | | |_) | | (_| |
|____/ \__,_|_.__/ \__,_|_| |_.__/|_|\__,_|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Birds of a feather
____ _ _
| _ \ __ _ _ __| |_ _ _| |
| |_) / _` | '__| __| | | | |
| __/ (_| | | | |_| |_| |_|
|_| \__,_|_| \__|\__, (_)
|___/
Saturday April 6, 1996 (easter weekend)
8:30pm till day light
boaf@suburbia.net
Melbourne Australia
(http://www.lonelyplanet.com/dest/aust/melb.htm)
Q: who's invited?
A: you
Q: who will be there?
A: a cross-social strata of individuals, occupations and ages. It will
be an eclectic evening.
Q: no, I mean who will *really* be there?
A: now is not the time for potentially dichotomatic simplifications of
character, but what the heck...
(a) Suburbia users:
From magistrates and politicians to convicted computer hackers.
We have as users private investigators, writers, programmers,
QC's, record producers, musicians, film directors, journalists,
policemen, intelligence agents, chess champions, members of
obscure religious sects, netball umpires, many, many types of
scientists and engineers, security experts, doctors,
accountants, bartenders, choral conductors, comedians, nurses,
DJ's, military police, drivers license testing officers,
farmers, haematologists, herbalists, unionists, lecturers,
librarians, linguists, paramedics, basketball umpires, air force
pilots, singers, surgeons, system operators, linesmen, TV
service men, solicitors, taxi drivers, teachers, unemployed
inventors, veterinarians, actresses, aerobics instructors, art
directors, athletes, chefs, bank clerks, cleaners, prison
officers, dentists, dishwashers, film marketers, housewives,
locksmiths, pensioners, radiologists and waiters (to name a few)
(b) members of the following Suburbia run mailing lists:
Avenue
St. Etienne (a musical group) fans.
BoS (best-of-security digest)
Paranoid system admins, computer hackers,
security professionals and a whole bunch of spooks
Inside-Source (inside-source)
As above, but don't introduce these guys to your sister.
LACC (Legal Aspects of Computer Crime)
Lawyers, security professionals, police, hackers,
certifyably paranoid system admins and political
activists
(c) Memebers of the:
Powerline Action Group
Alternative Technology Association
Center for Comtempory Photography
Ross House Association
Australian Public Access Network Association
Private Inquiry Agents Association
(d) Selected people and organisations that we owe favors to, and who
shall remain anonymous.
(e) Fans of T. Capody, P.K Dick, Stanislaw Lem, Pushkin, Nabakov,
Dostoevesky or Thomas Pynchon.
Venue:
A computationally secure address in North Melbourne,
approximately 10 minutes drive from the city center and 5
minutes walk from the North Melbourne railway station.
There will be around 15 Internet ISDN connected PC's and a
pro-tem dedicated link to Suburbia. Though, we encourage you
to forget all about life as a keyboard interface for the night.
Main course meals will be available for around $10 a head.
Drinks will be served till 1am.
Email boaf@suburbia.net for the ADDRESS and DIRECTIONS on how to
get to it. You will need to include the number of people you
plan bringing and how many of those (including yourself) desire
to digest something other than the fascinating conversation. Do
not request the address unless you definitely plan on coming, or
our calculations and your reputation will go down like a V1.
There is NO door fee, but small donations of dollars
and/or computer/radio/microwave hardware/cables are encouraged
(or you might get a few funny looks) to help cover costs.
Music:
BYO and we will play it provided it is something people can
background if they want to talk. Most techno, hard-rock and
pop will end up as a North Melbourne UFO sighting before it gets
anywhere near the audio equipment. R&B, Jazz fusion, and Syd
Barret (early Pink Floyd) style/derived material will be looked
upon a good deal more favorably, but some of us are open minded.
Dress:
Anything that doesn't get you an indecent exposure charge will
get you in the door. 1930's incognito is just fine.
ps. the undercover colour of the day is purple.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 1996 03:43:53 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ar380-5.aip.html
Message-ID: <199603231914.GAA14103@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
AR 380-5 Appendix H Classified Document and Materiel Storage
Standards and Information
AR 380-5 Section I
Minimum Class A, B, and C Vault Construction Standards
AR 380-5 H-1. Consolidated masonry vault specifications
These specifications are given in table H-1.
===============================================================================
=================
Class Approved storage lev- Thicknesses
el
Floors Walls
Ceiling
A TOP SECRET 8"RC(1) 8"RC 8"RC
B SECRET 4"RC 8"(2) 4"RC
C CONFIDENTIAL 4"C(1) 8"(3) 4"RC
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------
Legend: RC = Reinforced concrete; C = Concrete without reinforcement
Notes:
(1) All concrete used in vault construction will be monolithic cast in
place,
Class A, con-
forming to US Army Corps of Engineers Specification C.E. 204 (minimum
compressive strength of
3000 psi after 28 days of aging). Reinforcing will be by minimum 5/8-inch
diameter steel rein-
forcing bars (rebars) laid a maximum of 6 inches on centers, creating a
cross-hatched steel
curtain, to be sandwiched at half thickness of the concrete, parallel to the
longest surface.
Rebars will be anchored or imbedded in all contiguous walls/surfaces.
(2) Class B vault walls will be constructed of masonry at least 8 inches thick,
such as brick or
concrete block employing adequate bond. Hollow masonry, only of the vertical
cell
(load bearing)
type, can also be used, but if used, each cell will have from ceiling to
floor
1/2-inch diame-
ter or larger rebar inserted, and then be filled with pea gravel and
Portland
cement grout.
Rebars will be anchored in both floor and ceiling to a depth of at least 4
inches. In seismic
areas, 6-inch or thicker RC will be required.
(3) Class C vault walls will be constructed of thick-shell concrete block or
vertical cell clay
tile and be not less than 8 inches thick. In seismic areas, 6-inch or thicker
RC
will be used.
===============================================================================
=================
AR 380-5 H-2. Lightweight alternate Class A vault specifications
Interim lightweight alternate class A and B vault specifications
(for use above ground level only). Where building structural
design factors preclude the use of a standard class A or B vault
design at above ground level locations, a modular vault-ASTM type
I, U.L. class-M approved under ANSI/UL Standard 608, dated 27 June
1983 or later, may be used. Until final testing of this product is
completed, it will not be used in lieu of the conventional
designed vaults, at or below grade. Existing steel lined rooms,
built to previously approved specifications, will continue to be
approved for use, but further construction of steel liners will be
deferred in favor of the above specified ANSI/UL Standard 608
product.
AR 380-5 H-3. Doors for both methods of vault construction
The vault will be equipped with an approved vault door of the type
presently listed on the Federal Supply Schedule. The Class 5 vault
door will be used with reinforced concrete vaults. Where weight of
construction is a factor and a steel-lined vault is used, a Class
6 vault door may be used, if obtainable. Normally, a vault should
have only one entrance. When a vault exceeds 1,000 square feet of
floor space or has more than eight occupants, it should have a
minimum of two exits (one of which will be the entrance) for
safety purposes. When more than one entrance is required, each
must be equipped with the approved door, but only one door will be
used for normal access. The use of a vault door for controlling
movement into and out of a facility is not authorized as this
continued use will create undue wear on the door and will
eventually weaken the locking mechanism and cause malfunctioning.
Therefore, a vestibule should be constructed at the entrance with
an access door to achieve control when the vault door is open.
Where building codes require that the vault entrance meet a
specified fire rating, the vestibule and its access door must be
of the required fire rating. Where permissible, the vault door
optional day gate may be employed as the entrance control in lieu
of the above vestibule. There will be no windows in a vault, and
all ventilator openings or other access routes into the vault will
be properly treated to deny unauthorized access. Sound attenuation
will be fully employed and where inadequate, white noise masking
will be added to prevent classified discussions from being
overheard.
AR 380-5 H-4. Additional security safeguards for vaults
All vaults designated Class A or B will have intrusion and fire
protection. In addition, when a vault is unattended, the areas
contiguous to such vault will be supervised either by frequent
routine guard patrols or electronic means so as to increase the
depth of security and to allow early detection of trespass.
Detection of trespass outside the vault is preferred to detection
of vault penetration, since response to the former should preclude
the latter. Detection systems that indicate attempted penetration
(such as vibration sensors) are acceptable, provided they allow
adequate response time before actual barrier violation.
AR 380-5 H-5. Security assistance
If requested in writing, additional technical advice and guidance
relative to vault security problems, may be obtained from the
Commander, Intelligence Materiel Activity (IMA), ATTN: AMXIM-PS,
Fort Meade, MD 20755.
AR 380-5 Section II
Security Upgrading Via Construction-Buildings, Offices, and
Rooms
AR 380-5 H-6. Approved standards for security upgrading
The following guidance is offered as a norm against which-
a. To evaluate the adequacy of existing structural security
safeguards.
b. To provide security guidance for new construction in areas
which will contain activities and material of foreign intelligence
interest.
AR 380-5 H-7. Hardware
Heavy-duty builder's hardware should be used in construction, and
all screws, nuts, bolts, hasps, clamps, bars, 2-inch-square mesh
of No. 11 wire, 18-gauge expanded metal screen, hinges, pins,
etc., should be securely fastened to preclude surreptitious
removal and ensure visual evidence of tampering. Hardware
accessible from outside the area should be peened, pinned, brazed,
or tack-welded to preclude removal. The term ""2-inch-square mesh
of No. 11 wire,'' which meets the requirements of Federal
Specification RR-F-191d, 17 June 1965, hereinafter shall be
referred to as ""wire mesh.''
AR 380-5 H-8. Interior walls
Construction should be plaster, gypsum wallboard, metal panels,
hardboard, wood, plywood, or other opaque materials offering
similar resistance to, and evidence of, unauthorized entry into
the area. If insert-type panels are used, a method should be
devised to prevent the removal of such panels without leaving
visual evidence of tampering. Area barriers up to a height of 8
feet should be of opaque or translucent construction where visual
access is a factor. If visual access is not a factor, the area
barrier walls may be of wire mesh or other nonopaque material
offering similar resistance to, and evidence of, unauthorized
entry into the area.
AR 380-5 H-9. Windows
Window openings 18 feet or less from an access point (for example,
another window outside the area, roof, ledge, door, and so forth)
should be fitted with 1/2-inch bars (separated by no more than 6
inches), plus crossbars to prevent spreading, or 18-gauge expanded
metal screen, or wire mesh securely fastened on the inside. When
visual access is a factor, the windows should be kept closed and
locked at all times, and also should be made translucent or opaque
by any practical method such as painting or covering the inside of
the glass. During nonduty hours the windows should be closed and
securely fastened to preclude surreptitious removal of classified
material.
AR 380-5 H-10. Doors
Doors should be substantially constructed of wood or metal. When
windows, panels, or similar openings are used in the door, they
should be secured with 18-gauge expanded metal screen or wire mesh
securely fastened on the inside. If visual access is a factor, the
windows should be translucent or opaqued. When doors are used in
pairs, a mullion insert anchored top and bottom should be
installed between the doors.
AR 380-5 H-11. Door louvers or baffle plates
When used, they should be reinforced with 18-gauge expanded metal
screen, or wire mesh fastened inside the area.
AR 380-5 H-12. Door locking devices
a. Entrance doors should be secured with either a GSA-approved
built-in, three-position, dial-type, changeable combination lock;
a GSA-approved combination padlock (per paragraph 5-101) as
amended and as specified in paragraph 5-102d; a key-operated
padlock or locking device with high security cylinder and hasp
(see figure H-1) as described in the same paragraph; or a built-in
1-inch throw, deadbolt lock equipped with the GSA-approved high-
security cylinder; or preferably a combination of these. Other
doors should be firmly secured from the inside with a panic bolt
(actuated by a panic bar), a deadbolt, a rigid wood or metal bar
(fitted to preclude ""springing''), extending across the width of
the door and held in position by solid clamps, preferably on the
door casing, or other means approved by the cognizant OPSEC
Support Unit and Fire Marshal.
b. The new High-Security Padlock approved July 1982 became
available within the supply system late fall 1982. It has the same
Federal Stock Number as the Sargent and Greenleaf (S&G) Model 831B
Padlock, which is being phased out of service.
AR 380-5 H-13. Ceilings
Ceilings should be constructed of plaster, gypsum wallboard
material, panels, hardboard, wood, plywood, ceiling tile, or other
material offering similar resistance to and detection of
unauthorized entry. Wire mesh, 18-gauge expanded metal screen, or
other nonopaque material offering similar resistance to, and
evidence of, unauthorized entry into the area may be used if
visual access to classified material is not a factor. When wall
barriers do not extend to the ceiling, and a false ceiling is
used, this false ceiling should be reinforced with wire mesh or
18-gauge expanded metal screen, alarmed and otherwise secured with
heavy-duty builder's hardware. (This measure also applies when
panels are removable, and entry can be gained into the area
without visible detection.) When wire mesh or expanded metal
screens are used, they must be secured to adjoining walls in a
manner which precludes removal without leaving evidence of
tampering. In those instances where barrier walls of an area
extend to a solid ceiling, there is no need to reinforce a false
ceiling; however, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) should
monitor this otherwise unobserved area.
AR 380-5 H-14. Ceilings (unusual cases)
It is recognized that instances may arise where activities have a
valid justification for not erecting a solid suspended ceiling as
part of the area, especially in high-ceiling hangars. The activity
may contend that the use of a suspended ceiling is impractical
because of production methods, such as the use of overhead cranes
for moving bulky equipment within the area. Cases also exist where
the air conditioning system may be impeded by the construction of
a solid suspended ceiling (such as ADP centers). At times, even
the height of the classified material may make a suspended ceiling
impractical. In such cases, special provisions should be made to
ensure that surreptitious entry cannot be achieved by entering the
area over the top of the barrier walls (for example, employ
approved intrusion detection systems, sensors, and more frequent
guard patrols). Areas of this type should be closely scrutinized
to ensure that the structural safeguards are adequate to preclude
entry via adjacent pipes, catwalks, and ladders, or to preclude
observation, if visual access is a factor.
AR 380-5 H-15. Miscellaneous openings
Where ducts, pipes, registers, sewers, and tunnels are of such
size and shape as to permit unauthorized entry (in excess of 96
square inches, for example), they will be secured by 18-gauge
expanded metal screen, wire mesh, or where more practical steel
bars at least 1/2-inch in diameter with a maximum space of 6
inches between the bars. The steel bars will be securely fastened
at both ends to preclude removal, and will have 1/4-inch thick by
1-1/2-inch wide steel crossbars at 18-inch intervals to prevent
spreading. When wire mesh, expanded metal screen, or steel bars
are used, installation should ensure that classified material
cannot be removed through the openings with the aid of any type of
instrument. Care also will be taken to ensure that a barrier
placed across any waterway (sewer or tunnel) will not cause
clogging or offer obstruction to the free flow of water or sewage.
AR 380-5 H-16. Approved alarm systems
Information and limitation on use of approved intrusion detection
systems, both commercial and DOD J-SIIDS equipment, can be found
in DIA Manual 50-3, chapter III, dated 2 May 1980. Model
designations of items specifically approved for use in protection
of U.S. classified information and material are provided in that
chapter, along with other pertinent information. All detailed
information relative to an alarmed area and the electronic system
protecting its classified defense information or materiel (i.e.,
electrical diagrams indicating wire runs, sensor and control
placements, as well as sensor types and area of coverage, floor
plans, and photographs revealing the position or existence of such
items within the area), will be tightly controlled and marked For
Official Use Only.
Figure H-1. New high-security padlock
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 24 Mar 1996 10:43:55 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: email profit centre
Message-ID: <199603240210.NAA28247@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Who wants to take this site down first?
[http://unix.lgn.com/email.htm]
GET A JUMP ON THE INTERNET TODAY,
BEFORE YOUR COMPETITION DOES!
Can you afford not to???
The Email'ers Profit Center
* Increase market penetration
* Great for Multi-Level marketing
* Virtually no mailing expense
* $$ Save money $$
You will have access to 500,000+ Email addresses
* Make your product or service known to thousands of people.
* Save money. (To mail postcards to 500,000 people would run you over
US$95,000.00).
The Email'ers Profit Center is a mailing list of over 500,000 email
addresses, all gathered within the last six months. It is available on
your choice of CD-ROM or 100meg ZIP disk. They both contain the list
in ASCII and .dbf.
FREE MONTHLY UPDATES VIA TELNET!
THE LIST IS EXPECTED TO DOUBLE WITHIN SIX MONTHS!
The list is $500 for your own unlimited use. You may not resell, rent
or loan the listings to any other person or company.
_________________________________________________________________
For more information contact George.
Phone: (209)276-1707 or E-mail: bubba@lgn.com
--
"I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's
admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even
considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So
I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we
can make it. You get me?" - Leo Bulero/PKD
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 1996 15:48:48 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Reminder. Suburbia BOAF Sat 6 April
Message-ID: <199604032330.JAA12922@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
____ _ _ _
/ ___| _ _| |__ _ _ _ __| |__ (_) __ _
\___ \| | | | '_ \| | | | '__| '_ \| |/ _` |
___) | |_| | |_) | |_| | | | |_) | | (_| |
|____/ \__,_|_.__/ \__,_|_| |_.__/|_|\__,_|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Birds of a feather
____ _ _
| _ \ __ _ _ __| |_ _ _| |
| |_) / _` | '__| __| | | | |
| __/ (_| | | | |_| |_| |_|
|_| \__,_|_| \__|\__, (_)
|___/
Saturday April 6, 1996 (easter weekend)
8:30pm till day light
boaf@suburbia.net
Melbourne Australia
(http://www.lonelyplanet.com/dest/aust/melb.htm)
This is a reminder. There are only three days left to RSVP. If you haven't
received the address yet, then you are not on the list. There is no door fee
(please see the original invite).
Ps. Despite the attention to detail, it will be a very laid back
affair. DO NOT wear a tie. At least, not around your neck, or
someone might attach it to the rafters. Despite the serious
types during the day, we are fully BYO pillow.
---
"I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's
admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even
considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So
I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we
can make it. You get me?" - Leo Bulero/PKD
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 13 Apr 1996 05:13:13 +0800
To: lacc@suburbia.net
Subject: Re: LACC: CDA Court Challenge: Update #6
In-Reply-To: <9604121057.AA26895@all.net>
Message-ID: <199604121503.BAA27341@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> This would ONLY impact packets that carry pornographic material, and all
> other packets would remain unchanged. Naturally, you would not be able
> to have Classified Pornographic material under this scheme, but I think
> that's probably an acceptable tradeoff.
Oh, I don't know. The remote satalite imaging lab in reston has been known
for sometime now to have enough resolution to look down a good clean
cleavege, and certainly their perspective is vertical enough.
> Furthermore, any parent that wanted to allow a child to attach to the
> Internet and wanted pornographic protection would be responsible for
> setting their own filter up to limit these packets. Thus the provider
> of pornographic material and the parent of the child using the net are
> the only two groups affected by this change. The rest of the net can
> continue unhindered. ISPs don't have to identify users. After all, it
> is the parent and the bookstore owner who are responsible for keeping
> children out of the dirty book section, not the bus driver who brings
> the child to the neighborhood or the company that paves the street.
I've thought about this as well. You could also use the IP TOS minimise-cost
bit, which is defunct, doesn't require IP options, is included in every
packet and in most modern unix's and rfc1122 complient TCP/IP protocol
interface stacks can be set at user level with a simple setsockopt() call.
That said, it has a granularity of one.
To my mind, it is value judgement, and a difficult one at that to decide
when information is appropriate or otherwise for a given age group. A
given community may feel the age of maturity is something other than 18, and
physiologically the age of maturity is different for differing racial groups.
It is a strange world where it is permissible to get married at 16 -- and
all that implies, but not permissible to think freely until 18, or 21 in
certain states.
More appropriate would be content flags. Using the security option there is
a resonable number that could be assigned. OPT_R_UPPER_NUDITY,
OPT_R_LOWER_NUDITY, OPT_R_FULL_NUDITY, OPT_R_FEMALE, OPT_R_MALE, OPT_R_BIZARRE,
OPT_R_HOMOSEXUAL, OPT_R_BESTIALITY, OPT_R_DISECTION, OPT_R_INTERCOURSE, OPT_R_VIOLENCE and OPT_R_ADVERTISING come to mind. Unlike TOS however, many IP stacks
have no real support for the security option. The value of re-using it then
for this purpose it dubious. There is no reason another IP option couldn't
be added. Perhaps the spare TOS bit could be used as a catch-all until
a content option is implimented.
Most french wouldn't be concerned about OPT_R_FULL_NUDITY provided
OPT_R_HOMOSEXUAL wasn't set.
--
"I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's
admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even
considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So
I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we
can make it. You get me?" - Leo Bulero/PKD
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Mon, 15 Apr
1996 08:35:32 +0800
To: markm@voicenet.com (Mark M.)
Subject: Re: key bit lengths
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199604142137.HAA05553@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> so a brute force attack might take much less energy several billion years
> hence, since the universe will cooled off more.
Proportionally to the amount of energy available in the universe to conduct
such an attack however. You have to get it from somewhere.
--
"I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's
admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even
considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So
I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we
can make it. You get me?" - Leo Bulero/PKD
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 5 May 1996 21:40:09 +0800
To: stewarts@ix.netcom.com (Bill Stewart)
Subject: Re: A MODEST PROPOSAL (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199605050754.AAA02842@toad.com>
Message-ID: <199605051031.UAA18746@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
> At 08:05 PM 5/4/96 EDT, "E. ALLEN SMITH" wrote:
> > The reason I say majordomo is broken is that it shows up
> > with the address of the original sender, not the address of the list,
> > as the From address. Other mailing list software does not do this.
Majordomo is good for small lists. For anything larger, its lack of heuristics
makes it a real liability. I've converted all my lists over to SmartMail
(with some minor changes to the SmartMail code). If anyone wants a copy let
me know.
--
"I mean, after all; you have to consider we're only made out of dust. That's
admittedly not much to go on and we shouldn't forget that. But even
considering, I mean it's sort of a bad beginning, we're not doing too bad. So
I personally have faith that even in this lousy situation we're faced with we
can make it. You get me?" - Leo Bulero/PKD
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Jean-Francois Avon"
Date: Sun, 12 May 1996 16:58:47 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
Message-ID: <9605120422.AA10235@cti02.citenet.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On 12 May 96 at 13:51, Julian Assange wrote:
> Equipment
> capable of the latter would be extremely complicated and expensive
> to design and produce;
Even too expensive for entities with the power of taxation?
> I suspect there has been no call for it to
> date, given that if you are dealing with a target who understands
> the risks of van-eck they usually have shielding and or a faraday
> cage.
You have a point for big outfits. But for small companies or
cypherpunks on a restricted budget, they also know that there is
most likely *no* shielding of any sort...
Regards
jfa
Why is it that govt employees makes the best spouses? Because after
they come back from work, they are not tired and they already read
the newspapers.
PGP key ID# C58ADD0D at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon
Key Fingerprint: 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891
Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h
Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac-
cepted the above mentionned terms.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 12 May 1996 16:59:29 +0800
To: jf_avon@citenet.net
Subject: Re: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
In-Reply-To: <9605120112.AA02225@cti02.citenet.net>
Message-ID: <199605120351.NAA01349@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Or, to the contrary, is it reasonable to assume that modern Tempest equipment can
> work around theses impediments almost all of the time, therefore
> making any attempts at this futile?
>
> Regards
Make a grey-scale cable by merging the RGB lines (AND the RGB return lines).
Do not use a standard grey scale cable, these are typically intensity on
green, which you do not want.
Connect the cable and start playing with your colour scheme. The effect you
want to achieve is one where all colours have the same intensity. When that
happens your whole screen should be the a uniform grey area. Revert to the
regular cable and save your palette configuration.
I imagine this would be effective against all of the middle range
van-eck monitoring equipment. It will not be effective against equipment
that looks for phase distortion and signatures in an attempt to
discriminate against the three signals. Equipment capable of the latter
would be extremely complicated and expensive to design and produce; I
suspect there has been no call for it to date, given that if you are
dealing with a target who understands the risks of van-eck they usually
have shielding and or a faraday cage.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Mon, 13 May 1996 04:58:00 +0800
To: adam@rosa.com (Adam philipp)
Subject: Re: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
In-Reply-To: <2.2.16.19960512030421.3ae77464@sirius.infonex.com>
Message-ID: <199605121612.CAA04055@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> >display colors that will be visible for the eye, but not for the
> >Tempest equipment?
> I am not an electrical engineer and do not play one in real life. However in
> my on TEMPEST I heard nothing about varying colors to reduce RF radiation
> from a monitor. Just set up a Faraday cage, much simpler.
Varying the colours does not reduce RF radiation. It just obfuscates it
by making the radation given off by the three colour beems and their
cables equal in extant (at least, far more equal). Remember the
Black button on the Black console in the Black ship that lights up Black?
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 18 May 1996 15:22:48 +0800
To: snow@smoke.suba.com (snow)
Subject: Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199605180028.KAA23028@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Come to think of it, would the Mixmaster package run under Xenix?
> I have a 286 laying around collecting dust...
relay@suburbia.net is running a type2 remailer (mixmaster)
Use at will.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 22 May 1996 05:38:59 +0800
To: qut@netcom.com
Subject: Re: CAPITALISTS' SUCK
In-Reply-To: <199605211245.IAA24492@unix.asb.com>
Message-ID: <199605211519.BAA11670@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> On 20 May 96 at 4:07, Dave Harman wrote:
>
> [..]
> > ! >Dave Harman writes:
> > ! >
> > ! > CAPITALISTS' SUCK
> > !
> > ! What witty social commentary.
> >
> > Information wants to be free.
>
> Information doesn't want to be free (or anything else) anymore than
> the stapler on my desk wants to be free.
>
> The day that abstract qualities like "information" or "color" have
> desires would be an interesting day indeed.
Nonsense. Mathematics wants to be rational. Symmetry wants to be
self-similar. Memes want to be free.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Tue, 28 May 1996 22:19:04 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: France's proposed telecoms law
Message-ID: <199605280918.TAA17579@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Paris, May 23, 1996: There is an EC regulation called which applies to
all EC countries.
This restricts the use of cryptography in the context of weapons of
mass destruction, but not for any other purpose. The UK also has an
export licensing requirement which is similar in scope. France, on
the other hand, has much wider restrictions. The EC regulation is
"Dual-Use and Related Goods (Export Control) Regulations" and the UK
is "Export of Goods (Control) Order".
Attached is a message containing the pending French legislation,
followed by some comments. I hope this is helpful to readers on both
sides of the pond.
[Tuesday, 07 May 96 08:30:54 EST, "jean-bernard condat"
writte:]
---------------
Art. 12
Article 28 of the Law No. 90-1170 dated December 29, 1990, on
telecommunications regulation is hereby amended as follows:
I - Section I is hereby amended as follows:
1) The first paragraph shall be completed by the following
phrase: "Secret coding method denotes all materials or programs
conceived or modified for the same purpose."
2) The second and third paragraphs are hereby replaced by the
following provisions:
"To preserve the interests of national defense and the internal
or external security of the State, while permitting the
protection of information and the development of secure
communications and transactions,
1) the use of a secret coding method or service shall be:
a) allowed freely:
- if the secret coding method or service does not allow the
assurance of confidentiality, particularly when it can only be
used to authenticate a communication or ensure the integrity of
the transmitted message;
- or if the method or the service assures confidentiality and
uses only coding conventions managed according to the procedures
and by an organization approved under the conditions defined in
Section II;
b) subject to the authorization of the Prime Minister in other
cases.
2) the supply, importation from countries not belonging to the
European Community, and exportation of secret coding methods as
well as services:
a) shall require the prior authorization of the Prime Minister
when they assure confidentiality; the authorization may require
the supplier to reveal the identity of the purchaser;
b) shall require declaration in other cases."
3) A decree sets the conditions under which the declarations are
signed and the authorizations approved. This decree provides
for:
a) a simplified system of declaration or authorization for
certain types of methods or services or for certain categories of
users;
b) the substitution of the declaration for the authorization, for
transactions concerning secret coding methods or services whose
technical characteristics or conditions of use, while justifying
a certain attention being paid with regard to the aforementioned
interests, do not require the prior authorization of these
transactions;
c) the waiver of all prior formalities for transactions
concerning secret coding methods or services whose technical
characteristics or conditions of use are such that the
transactions are not capable of damaging the interests mentioned
at the beginning of this paragraph.
II - Section II is hereby replaced by the following provisions:
"II - Organizations responsible for managing, on behalf of
others, the coding conventions for secret coding methods or
services that allow the assurance of confidentiality must be
approved in advance by the Prime Minister.
They are obligated to maintain professional confidentiality in
the exercise of their approved activities.
The approval shall specify the methods and services that they may
use or supply.
They shall be responsible to preserve the coding conventions that
they manage. Within the framework of application of the Law No.
91-646 dated July 10, 1991, concerning the confidentiality of
correspondence sent via telecommunications, and within the
framework of investigations made under the rubric of Articles 53
et seq. and 75 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they
must release them to judicial authorities or to qualified
authorities, or implement them according to their request.
They must exercise their activities on domestic soil.
A decree in the Council of State sets the conditions under which
these organizations shall be approved, as well as the guarantees
which the approval shall require; it specifies the procedures and
the technical provisions allowing the enforcement of the
obligations indicated above.
III - a) Without prejudice to the application of the Customs
Code, the fact of supplying, importing from a country not
belonging to the European Community, or exporting, a secret
coding method or service, without having obtained the prior
authorization mentioned in I or in violation of the conditions of
the granted approval, shall be punishable by six months
imprisonment and a fine of FF 200,000.
The fact of managing, on behalf of others, the coding conventions
for secret coding methods or services that allow the assurance of
confidentiality, without having obtained the approval mentioned
in II or in violation of the conditions of this approval, shall
be punishable by two years imprisonment and a fine of FF 300,000.
The fact of supplying, importing from a country not belonging to
the European Community, or exporting, a secret coding method or
service, in order to facilitate the preparation or commission of
a felony or misdemeanor, shall be punishable by three years
imprisonment and a fine of FF 500,000.
The attempt to commit the infractions mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs shall be punishable by the same penalties.
b) The natural persons guilty of the infractions mentioned under
a) shall incur the complementary penalties provided for in
Articles 131-19, 131-21, and 131-27, as well as, either
indefinitely or for a period of five years or longer, the
penalties provided for in Articles 131-33 and 131-34 of the
Criminal Code.
c) Judicial persons may be declared criminally responsible for
the infractions defined in the first paragraph under the
conditions provided for in Article 121-2 of the Criminal Code.
The penalties incurred by judicial persons are:
1) the fine according to the modalities provided for by Article
131-38 of the Criminal Code;
2) the penalties mentioned in the Article L. 131-39 of the same
code. The prohibition mentioned in 2) of this article L. 131-39
concerns activities, during the exercise of which, or on the
occasion of the exercise of which, the infraction was committed."
III - Section III becomes IV.
Its last paragraph is hereby replaced by the following
provisions:
"The fact of refusing to supply information or documents, or of
obstructing the progress of the investigations mentioned in this
section IV, shall be punishable by six months imprisonment and a
fine of FF 200,000."
IV - Section IV becomes V.
After the word "authorizations," the words "and declarations" are
hereby inserted.
V - A section VI is hereby added, formulated as follows:
"VI - The provisions of this article shall not hinder the
application of the Decree dated April 18, 1939, establishing the
regulation of war materials, arms, and munitions, to those secret
coding methods which are specially conceived or modified to allow
or facilitate the use or manufacture of arms."
VI - This article is applicable to overseas territories and to
the territorial commonwealth of Mayotte.
Copyright 1996 Steptoe & Johnson LLP
Steptoe & Johnson LLP grants permission for the contents of this
publication to be reproduced and distributed in full free of
charge, provided that: (i) such reproduction and distribution is
limited to educational and professional non-profit use only (and
not for advertising or other use); (ii) the reproductions or
distributions make no edits or changes in this publication; and
(iii) all reproductions and distributions include the name of the
author(s) and the copyright notice(s) included in the original
publication.
---------------
In trying to analyze the impact of the proposed law, I would note
the following:
Section I:
Paragraph 1 (a), first bullet, seems to explicitly allow digital
signatures, and does not require that the secret keys used for such
purposes be escrowed.
Paragraph 1 (a), second bullet, in combination with Section II,
strongly hints at a requirement for key escrow. Conceivably,
depending on the details of Law No 91-646 dated July 10, 1991
concerning the confidentiality of correspondence sent via
telecommunications, the use of short keys that might expose
information to unauthorized individuals (a la the IBM masked DES
and Lotus Notes solution) might even be prohibited!
Paragraph 1 (b) provides an escape clause for certain favored
activities (and/or organizations?). Presumably international
standards such as Visa/MasterCard's SET, which apply strong
confidentiality to only certain data fields, notably the
cardholders account number, would be permitted under this kind of
an exception. Banking transactions and other sensitive information
may also be excluded from the key escrow requirement, especially if
(since) the Government could subpoena the bank's records directly.
This is further borne out by paragraph 3, (a, b, and c).
Paragraph 1 seems to apply to the use of encryption, as opposed to
the supply, import, or export. However, unless such use is covered
by Law No. 91-646, the proposed amendment does not seem to apply
criminal or civil penalties to such use.
Paragraph 2 is interesting, in that it differentiates between
"supply" and "importing from countries not belonging to the
European community". This may be a techni-cality of the European
Community import/export laws -- perhaps importation from countries
within the European Community no longer has any meaning, since such
customs barriers were supposed to have been removed. I would
interpret "supply" to include the offering for sale, or even
distributing for free, such code, even by a French citizen. This
would therefore appear to apply to the (re-)distribution of PGP
and/or any home-grown French products, as well as any encryption
products originating within the EC. If so, this would seem to be
more even-handed with respect to imports from the US and elsewhere
than might otherwise appear, and may obviate any claim that the law
would violate the World Trade Organization's Most Favored Nation
agreements. The apparent import preference for EC products simply
reflect's France's obligation to allow the free flow of goods
within the EC.
Paragraph 3 seems to provide for some simplified administrative
mechanisms that may be less onerous than a case by case review. IN
US terms, this may be similar to requesting a commodity
jurisdiction from Commerce, rather than having encryption being
construed as following under the ITARs. If so, we should certainly
investigate these options. Subparagraphs b and c may apply to the
use of relatively short keys, or for transactions of limited scope,
e.g., for SET.
Section II defines conditions for establishing and approving escrow
agencies. Given the requirement for "professional
confidentiality", I would not be at all surprised if the civil law
"notaires" didn't jump at the chance to get into this business.
The requirement that they exercise their activities on French soil
is rather obscure. The prior language doesn't explicitly say that
anything about escrow, nor where the escrowed keys must be
maintained -- it only talks about the management of coding
conventions, and the requirement to comply with the requirements of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which presumably requires that they
divulge the keys and/or the text of any confidential messages upon
demand by a proper authority. But a literal reading of the text
would suggest that a standards organization that manages and
preserves the coding conventions would have to carry out their
activities on French soil, while the escrow repository might be
elsewhere.
Section III certainly makes it clear that they are serious about
all this. The natural persons who have committed, or even
attempted to commit acts in violation of the Act are subject to
fines and imprisonment, and I would hazard a guess that the
Articles 131-33 and 131-34 would debar them from participating in
any future importing or exporting.
Corporations (judicial persons) may be held criminally responsible
for any infractions caused by their employees, and I would assume
that Article 131-39 would also lead to a debarment for future
import or export, in exactly the same manner as US export
violations would.
Section VI makes the Act applicable to overseas territories, which
means that some of the more obscure areas and countries would also
be covered, such as French Guiana, etc.
Disclaimer: I am not a French attorney, nor someone who is at all
knowledgeable about EC law. The preceding analysis should not be
construed as any kind of an official position. Go get your own
hired guns if you need advice!
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 12:44:54 +0800
To: andrew_loewenstern@il.us.swissbank.com (Andrew Loewenstern)
Subject: Re: Tempest Info
In-Reply-To: <9605281908.AA00554@ch1d157nwk>
Message-ID: <199605282356.JAA29834@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
> Bill Stewart writes:
> > Also, of course, your electrical power system needs to be
> > shielded and filtered, so only 60Hz gets through, unless you
> > plan to stick to laptops and bring in spare battery packs.
>
> At HoHoCon a few years ago, someone did a tempest demo and mentioned that
> signals could be recovered from water pipes! Fire sprinkler systems were
> specifically mentioned...
Water pipes are often form the earth line. If only 60hz (US) can get through
the power cables then only 60 hz can get into the water pipes (I'll ignore
re-radiating, because water pipes are the least of your problems there).
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Lyal Collins
Date: Wed, 29 May 1996 19:54:22 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: Tempest Info
In-Reply-To: <199605282356.JAA29834@suburbia.net>
Message-ID: <31AD02EB.5BF5@ozemail.com.au>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Julian Assange wrote:
>
> >
> > Bill Stewart writes:
> > > Also, of course, your electrical power system needs to be
> > > shielded and filtered, so only 60Hz gets through, unless you
> > > plan to stick to laptops and bring in spare battery packs.
> >
> > At HoHoCon a few years ago, someone did a tempest demo and mentioned that
> > signals could be recovered from water pipes! Fire sprinkler systems were
> > specifically mentioned...
>
> Water pipes are often form the earth line. If only 60hz (US) can get through
> the power cables then only 60 hz can get into the water pipes (I'll ignore
> re-radiating, because water pipes are the least of your problems there).
As the water pipe can form a signal "drain", monitoring that with respoect to an
artificial refernce "earth" allowsthe signal(s) to be reccovered, unless the waterpipe is of very low
impedance.
lyal
--
All mistakes in this message belong to me - you should not use them!
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim bell
Date: Thu, 30 May 1996 05:37:27 +0800
To: SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 09:27 AM 5/29/96 -0400, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N wrote:
>> Water pipes are often form the earth line. If only 60hz (US) can get through
>> the power cables then only 60 hz can get into the water pipes (I'll ignore
>> re-radiating, because water pipes are the least of your problems there).
>
>The high-frequency harmonics from your computers are probably above the
>cutoff frequency of the water-pipes when considered as circular waveguides.
>The water filling will act as a dielectric, bringing F0 down. So, it
>is conceivable that extremely high frequency radiation (>3 Ghz) could
>propagate well in a water pipe.
No, you misunderstood. The RF wouldn't be transmitted on the inside of the
pipes (how could it get inside, anyway?) but on the outside. Since most
information-containing appliances are well-grounded, there is at least a
strong possibility that a ground connection would carry enough interesting
RF to be useful to tap.
Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N
Date: Thu, 30 May 1996 02:06:20 +0800
To: proff@suburbia.net (Julian Assange)
Subject: Re: Tempest Info
In-Reply-To: <199605282356.JAA29834@suburbia.net>
Message-ID: <96May29.092735edt.10690@cannon.ecf.toronto.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> Water pipes are often form the earth line. If only 60hz (US) can get through
> the power cables then only 60 hz can get into the water pipes (I'll ignore
> re-radiating, because water pipes are the least of your problems there).
The high-frequency harmonics from your computers are probably above the
cutoff frequency of the water-pipes when considered as circular waveguides.
The water filling will act as a dielectric, bringing F0 down. So, it
is conceivable that extremely high frequency radiation (>3 Ghz) could
propagate well in a water pipe.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 1996 16:43:09 +0800
To: warlord@MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Subject: Re: Why PGP isn't so ubiquitous (was NRC Session Hiss)
In-Reply-To: <9606041912.AA01215@bill-the-cat.MIT.EDU>
Message-ID: <199606050320.NAA21843@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> So, would you rather see a document right away, or code released
> sooner? Take your pick and let me know. :)
>
> -derek
I'd rather see more good people working on it.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 1996 16:49:49 +0800
To: hfinney@shell.portal.com (Hal)
Subject: Re: Generation of private key from pass
In-Reply-To: <199606222214.PAA18284@jobe.shell.portal.com>
Message-ID: <199606230457.OAA29221@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Matt mentioned difficulty in finding a public domain dictionary that had
> parts of speech. The reason I am posting is because a few weeks ago
> Grady Ward announced that he was making his "Moby Lexicon" available for
> free, and I seem to recall that this included part of speech information.
> If so, this could be an opportunity for someone else to explore this
> method.
Get the Oxford Learner's dictionary.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Tue, 9 Jul 1996 17:27:02 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: ACLU: NJ Alert! Personal Data Chip in DL! (fwd)
Message-ID: <199607090515.PAA17618@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Forwarded message:
>From notes@igc.org Tue Jul 9 15:12:01 1996
Date: Mon, 08 Jul 1996 19:48:10 -0700 (PDT)
Reply-To: Moderator of conference "justice.polabuse"
From: Bob Witanek
Subject: ACLU: NJ Alert! Personal Data Chip in DL!
To: Recipients of pol-abuse
Message-ID:
X-Gateway: conf2mail@igc.apc.org
Errors-To: owner-pol-abuse@igc.apc.org
Precedence: bulk
Lines: 32
Posted: sspnj@exit109.com
*Computer Chips in Driver Licenses?*
NEWARK, N.J. -- The Associated Press reported today that drivers
may soon be using a new high-tech driver's license to pay tolls and
do banking in New Jersey. The soon to be tested "Smart Card" will
carry a data packed computer chip that will provide authorities
with access to private information including fingerprints and
medical records.
The pilot cards will be limited to standard driver's license
information. By the time the cards are issued to all New Jersey
drivers in July 1997, they would also contain fingerprints and an
"electronic purse" to be used to pay bus and train fares, the AP
said.
Civil libertarians said the new licenses raise privacy concerns.
Ultimately, the AP said, the license will contain arrest records,
medical records, vehicle registration, and could be used as a debit
card to pay for groceries and do banking.
"I think citizens should be extremely scared about loss of
privacy," David Rocah of the New Jersey ACLU told AP. "They could
store tax data. They could store medical data. They could store
driver's records, insurance data, virtually any data in the
government's possession."
The ACLU also warned that the potential for misuse of the
information --government surveillance or telemarketing research -
- could pose potential problems.
----------------------------------------------------------------
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 24 Jul 1996 20:57:56 +0800
To: perry@piermont.com
Subject: Re: Brute Force DES
In-Reply-To: <199607231338.JAA15819@jekyll.piermont.com>
Message-ID: <199607231619.CAA18593@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
>
> "Peter Trei" writes:
> > The fastest general purpose, freely available des implementation I'm
> > aware of is libdes. by Eric Young. With this, I can do a set_key in
> > 15.8 us, and an ecb_encrypt in 95 us/block. That adds up to
> > about 9,000 keytests/sec (this is on a 90 MHz P5, running NT).
>
> I'll point out that like most DES implementations, Eric's tries to
> spend a lot of time in key setup to save time later on in
> encryption/decryption. This tradeoff would probably be very different
> if you didn't plan on trying more than one or two blocks of decryption
> after getting a key.
>
> Perry
90 us is several times longer than 15.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 26 Jul 1996 20:40:12 +0800
To: ttw@spire.com (Tyler Whitaker)
Subject: Re: PREDICTIONS, MUST BE BREAK TIME...
In-Reply-To: <960725173949.d5f@spire.com>
Message-ID: <199607260832.SAA25609@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> The AFIM can 'rebuild' fingerprints to overcome dirt a scar tissue
> problems. It also uses a special lense which reads only 3d images so
> photocopies and a cut off fingers will not work.
>
> Tyler Whitaker
> ttw@spire.com
> Senior Internet Engineer
> Spire Technologies.
It is interesting to note that when your fingers / hands are cut off
they automagically turn into two dimensional objects.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 28 Jul 1996 21:10:49 +0800
To: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Subject: Re: Twenty Beautiful Women
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199607281026.UAA07031@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
> At 20:54 7/27/96, Mike Duvos wrote:
> >ichudov@algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes:
> >
> > > Also, I would appreciate if someone specified what exactly
> > > the goal function is.
> >
> >Me too.
>
> For clarification, the problem is often stated in textbooks similar like this:
>
> You ask someone to write one number each on ten pieces of paper without you
> being able to see the numbers. The person may use any number from 1 to
> 10^99, but may not use a number twice. The person turns over the ten
> papers.
>
> You goal is to determine the paper with the highest number [rules apply as
> described in the original post]
>
> The general solution is to flip over 1/e papers and choose the paper that
> has a higher number on it than any of the 1/e papers turned over at first.
Can someone explain the theory behind this?
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: shamrock@netcom.com (Lucky Green)
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 1996 00:25:19 +0800
To: Julian Assange
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 22:01 7/30/96, Julian Assange wrote:
>In the late 80's Matt Bishop while at NASA, wrote DESZIP, which for a
>while was the seminal work. Matt has pointed me to a US summer 1987
>article which describes some of the DES optimisations, however as I am
>an Australian national, Matt can not legally send me the actual
>implimentation to me due to idiotic ITAR restrictions.
Did you try the Usual Suspects? There are numerous crypto sites in Europe.
If none of them has DESZIP, would someone outside the US please upload
it...
-- Lucky Green PGP encrypted mail preferred.
Defeat the Demopublican Unity Party. Vote no on Clinton/Dole in November.
Vote Harry Browne for President.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 1996 23:22:30 +0800
To: coderpunks@toad.com
Subject: DESZIP
Message-ID: <199607301201.WAA21682@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
I am writing an historical piece on crypt(3) optimisation and password
guessing heuristics. This naturally enough envolves tracking down and
analysing various code/papers that have been seen as significant and/or
infulential in those areas.
In the late 80's Matt Bishop while at NASA, wrote DESZIP, which for a
while was the seminal work. Matt has pointed me to a US summer 1987
article which describes some of the DES optimisations, however as I am
an Australian national, Matt can not legally send me the actual
implimentation to me due to idiotic ITAR restrictions.
If someone not as constrained could address the problem described, I
should be delighted.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 1 Aug 1996 04:44:16 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: DESZIP
Message-ID: <199607311701.DAA23143@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6
mQCNAjEU4rEAAAEEAOZT252f2ULHwUYi19HzJeIg3I/Pp+goO2dbJuuaQETSh0Oi
P0HVro6G5rK7lFccU9dqjOJAZ8Ov2v8wvD+mt/auHBBJB7hDQsLlqJsJQlfXQVKd
4FWSdCiv4j6uMcdYZ95/OB8vIUP8rmW21idQZ9AvU9ZWYf1tx9iJtSs22Ap9AAUR
tARhbm9u
=jUI9
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 7 Aug 1996 19:25:10 +0800
To: root@hellspawn.Berkeley.EDU (Damien Lucifer)
Subject: Re: Fixes to loop.c et al. for DES,IDEA,stego now done
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199608070806.SAA26988@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >
> > This directory contains patches to the Linux kernel to enable encryption and
> > steganography of filesystems. Encryption allows you to have a scrambled
> > partition or file that, with the proper pass phrase, you can mount, just
> > like a normal filesystem. Steganography allows you to hide a filesystem in
> > the low bits of, say, an audio file. You can even combine these two to hide
> > a scrambled filesystem in the low bits of an audio file (see the example,
> > below).
>
>
>
> With the addition of stego, this arrangment seems to be rather similar to
> CFS. So the question on my mind, is can the loop device(s) be
Since when has CFS had any steganography features?
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sandy Sandfort
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 1996 09:35:31 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: STEGO GUNS
In-Reply-To: <199608072128.HAA28140@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SANDY SANDFORT
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C'punks,
On Thu, 8 Aug 1996, Julian Assange wrote:
> Correlation != causation. What are the figures on other crimes?
I'm waiting for the official study itself, but the article did
say that the study showed a shift from violent crimes to property
offenses. If so, that's a trade I'll make any day.
I'll see if I can get a copy of the study when it is released.
S a n d y
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: JonWienk@ix.netcom.com
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 1996 14:12:41 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: STEGO GUNS
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199608080121.SAA20077@dfw-ix9.ix.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On Wed, 7 Aug 1996, Sandy Sandfort wrote:
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> SANDY SANDFORT
> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
>
>C'punks,
>
>On Thu, 8 Aug 1996, Julian Assange wrote:
>
>> Correlation != causation. What are the figures on other crimes?
>
>I'm waiting for the official study itself, but the article did
>say that the study showed a shift from violent crimes to property
>offenses. If so, that's a trade I'll make any day.
>
>I'll see if I can get a copy of the study when it is released.
>
>
> S a n d y
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In 1981, the city of Kennesaw, GA suffered 17 violent crimes and 55 burglaries.
In 1982, Kennesaw passed an ordinance requiring all city residents to own a
firearm, and there was only 1 violent crime and 19 burglaries. In 1983, Kennesaw
experienced 3 violent crimes and 9 burglaries. I think that the cause-effect
relationship is obvious.
Jonathan Wienke
"A conservative is a liberal who got mugged last night."
--Lee Rodgers
Key fingerprint = 30 F9 85 7F D2 75 4B C6 BC 79 87 3D 99 21 50 CB
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: jim bell
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 1996 16:37:15 +0800
To: Julian Assange
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 07:28 AM 8/8/96 +1000, Julian Assange wrote:
>>
>> The nationwide study [from the University of
>> Chicago] found that violent crime fell after
>> states made it legal to carry concealed handguns:
>> * Homicide, down 8.5%.
>> * Rape, down 5%.
>> * Aggravated assault, down 7%.
>> ...
>> The drop isn't primarily caused by people
>> defending themselves with guns, says John Lott,
>> the study's author. Rather, criminals seem to
>> alter their behavior to avoid coming into contact
>> with a person who might have a gun.
>Correlation != causation. What are the figures on other crimes? I
>presume they would have to have gone up, since the criminal element has
>been deprived of it's "revenue" in this manner. Perhaps they simply
>didn't have time for killing, raping and assulting; being too busy
>lugging around their legally concealed handguns and pointing them at
>shop-keepers.
I think this is relevant, albeit in an indirect way, to cypherpunks. We're
all familiar with some of the various ways that government tries to justify
intrusion based on arguments which look superficially plausible. The
nationwide 55 mph speed limit is one, which was first supported based on the
claim that it saved gas, but later the justification changed to saving
lives. Yet recently studies have shown an actual decrease in accidents in
states which raised the speed limit.
The other big correlation (which turns out to be an anti-correlation!) is
the idea that allowing people to carry concealed handguns leads to greater
numbers of deaths. By this study, that claim is shown to be false as well.
The reason this is all relevant is that cryptography is currently under
attack by the US government, under the guise of ITAR, with the implicit
claim that the availability of good crypto will somehow help "terrorists,
drug dealers, child pornographers, and Jim Bell" (oops! sorry about that
one...)
We, on the other hand, recognize that the advent of good cryptography will
protect us far more than it might arguably harm us. All of us on CP
(except, probably, Sternlight) would gladly accept a world where
unrestricted crypto is ubiquitous.
By showing previous examples of how government makes false claims and
misuses (or ignores) statistics to support its actions, we can challenge any
presumptions it makes regarding crypto.
Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 1996 09:28:28 +0800
To: sandfort@crl.com (Sandy Sandfort)
Subject: Re: STEGO GUNS
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199608072128.HAA28140@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> C'punks,
>
> The following is from USA Today of last Friday:
>
> In a comprehensive study that may reshape the
> gun control debate, researchers have found that
> letting people carry concealed guns appears to
> sharply reduce killings, rapes and other violent
> crimes.
>
> The nationwide study [from the University of
> Chicago] found that violent crime fell after
> states made it legal to carry concealed handguns:
> * Homicide, down 8.5%.
> * Rape, down 5%.
> * Aggravated assault, down 7%.
> ...
> The drop isn't primarily caused by people
> defending themselves with guns, says John Lott,
> the study's author. Rather, criminals seem to
> alter their behavior to avoid coming into contact
> with a person who might have a gun.
>
> The official release of the study is scheduled for tomorrow.
> The study took two years and was peer reviewed.
>
>
> S a n d y
Correlation != causation. What are the figures on other crimes? I
presume they would have to have gone up, since the criminal element has
been deprived of it's "revenue" in this manner. Perhaps they simply
didn't have time for killing, raping and assulting; being too busy
lugging around their legally concealed handguns and pointing them at
shop-keepers.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 1996 13:51:15 +0800
To: reagle@rpcp.mit.edu (Joseph M. Reagle Jr.)
Subject: Re: ****CyberWatch Security With Face Recognition 08/07/96
In-Reply-To: <9608081407.AA01011@rpcp.mit.edu>
Message-ID: <199608081731.DAA05628@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
> Some of the information that can be protected includes medical,
> financial, criminal, or military records, officials said. The system
> requires no training, is fast to use, and cannot be fooled by holding
> up a photo of a person.
>
> This technology has been used in other situations, including the
> securing of buildings or special areas, officials said.
>
> TrueFace CyberWatch is compatible with PC client/server standards and
> can be used alone or with other security programs, officials said.
>
> The client runs on Windows 95 and Windows NT operating systems, and
> costs $199. A bundle package, which includes a Connectix camera and
> the software, is priced at $298. Both products will be shipping
> within the next two months, officials said.
Useless system for any high security application. May be good for
low-security applications if you are dealing with people who are too
stupid to use tokens.
The reality is that people do not treat their faces like secret keys
(depending on sex, religous beliefs and how many warts they may have). A
regular photo may not fool the device, however one specifically developed
for the purpose may, or if the device has some sort of depth perception,
a hologram or modeled head - all of which can be obtained from publically
availabe data - your face.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 08:06:58 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: GOP Security (fwd)
Message-ID: <199608102127.HAA15949@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Forwarded message:
>From notes@igc.org Sun Aug 11 07:25:25 1996
Date: Sat, 10 Aug 1996 12:46:19 -0700 (PDT)
Reply-To: Moderator of conference "justice.polabuse"
From: Bob Witanek
Subject: GOP Security
To: Recipients of pol-abuse
Message-ID:
X-Gateway: conf2mail@igc.apc.org
Errors-To: owner-pol-abuse@igc.apc.org
Precedence: bulk
Lines: 201
Posted: Michael Novick
Philadelphia Inquirer: Page One
Sunday, August 4, 1996
Next security test: GOP's convention
Even before the Atlanta bombing, San Diego had battened down for
the Republican s' meeting.
By Carol Morello
INQUIRER STAFF WRITER
SAN DIEGO -- For all the festive bunting and wacky elephants
springing up around town, the Republican National Convention will
open here in a grim atmosphere of no-nonsense security.
With a week left to go, Harbor Street, six lanes sweeping past the
convention center, already has been closed to traffic. Owners of
boats docked in the marina adjoining the center have been notified
that their vessels will be swept and boarded for ``consensual
searches.''
Tall chain-link fences ring the convention center itself. But
metal detectors like the ones the delegates will pass through were
deemed too unwieldy for the parking lot across the street, where
65 protest groups have been assigned carefully choreographed time
slots. Instead, a sign at the entrance will advise that satchels
and backpacks may be searched, and police have leased 200 pieces
of high-tech equipment to detect firearms and explosives.
Police also have gathered floor plans and photographs of every
hotel and party site where delegates will be lodged and feted, all
considered potential targets. They have even pressed the Retired
Senior Citizens Patrol into service, and encouraged abortion
doctors to ``take a vacation.''
Authorities in Chicago, where the Democrats will meet the last
week of August, are taking similar precautions. Metal detectors,
bomb-sniffing dogs and surveillance cameras will be in force, along
with thousands of police. Coast Guard cutters will patrol Lake
Michigan. Chicago police are sealing an eight-block area around the
United Center sports arena, the main convention site, to all
unauthorized cars, trucks and pedestrians. As the 20th century
nears an end, wary, pervasive security is as much a part of the
convention scene as Old Glory and silly hats. San Diego has been
preparing convention security for more than a year. Then a bomber
on the other side of the country suddenly made everyone wonder if
the next big public event could be free of mayhem and terror.
In an emergency meeting called the day after a pipe bomb exploded
at the Olympics in Atlanta, convention security planners assured
Mayor Susan Golding that plans already in place were adequate. They
said they neither made, nor expect to make, any significant
changes. They have devised more than 100 scenarios that could
threaten a peaceful convention, from an earthquake to a building
collapse to a bomb like the one that twisted Atlanta's moment of
glory.
Carl Truscott, head of convention security for the Secret Service,
said he had reached a ``comfort level'' for security within the
cente
itself. His agents are conducting sweeps of the 800 to 1,000
sites around San Diego County where party potentates will appear.
But he said the sweeps began before Atlanta's bombing. ``It
certainly raised our awareness level and concern,'' said Capt. Dave
Bejarano, head of the San Diego Police Department's convention
security planning unit, which is coordinating the deployment of law
enforcement from 18 different agencies. ``But we've made no
significant changes. We'll just be more proactive. We're planning
for the worst-case scenario, and hoping for the best.''
After two failed bids, San Diego fought hard for this moment in
the sun. But even before it's begun the clouds are out.
Television networks and party poo-bahs have groused about the
convention center's puny dimensions. Protesters went to court to
guarantee a demonstration zone where delegates can hear and see
them after the Republicans tried to shuffle them down the street.
With equal amounts of anticipation and trepidation, San Diegans
are prepared to host 50,000 visitors who can charitably be
described as intense -- 8,000 conventioneers, 12,000 media
representatives and tens of thousands of protesters. They know the
GOP gathering will showcase this city of 1.2 million people more
than all previous events held here, from the Super Bowl to the
World Series.
Twice before, San Diego was an also-ran in the convention
sweepstakes. In 1972, the convention that nominated Richard Nixon
to a second term was moved to Miami when a leaked memo by ITT
lobbyist Dita Beard disclosed that the Justice Department dropped
an antitrust lawsuit against the corporation after it donated
$400,00 to the San Diego convention campaign. And in 1992,
Republicans encouraged the city to make a costly bid, only to pick
Houston in George Bush's home state.
With the conventions-that-almost-were behind them, the city that
alternately describes itself as ``America's Finest City'' and the
``City of the 21st Century'' hopes to prove to the country -- and
itself -- that it has more going for it than the weather.
``We believe in a lot of outside feedback,'' said Francine
Phillips, author of America's Finest City -- If We Say It Enough
We'll Believe It. ``We've long felt that if we do it here, it's not
really good enough.
``For years and years, we were second to Los Angeles in size and
second to San Francisco in sophistication. Now San Diego is coming
into its own. It's an opportunity, and a risk. We're going to get
exposure, and we feel vulnerable.''
Jack Ford, son of former President Gerald Ford, is responsible for
setting the stage in the compact bayside convention center, built
in 1989. It was designed to hold 13,000, but it's been reconfigured
to hold 19,600. That still falls well short of 50,000 in Houston's
Astrodome and 40,000 in New Orleans' Superdome, site of the 1988
convention.
Seating is so tight that it has helped the price for nondelegate
tickets soar through the convention center's tentlike roof. In
Houston, anyone who donated $1,000 to the party got two floor
passes. In San Diego, donors have to pony up $100,000 to qualify
for the same two tickets.
The host committee's head of protocol, Bill Black, couldn't even
secure enough seats for the 92 foreign ambassadors and their
spouses he's entrusted with shepherding around the convention and
to social events. Since most are smokers, however, he figures he
can rotate them in and out of seats when they sneak to the terrace
for a smoke. It will look more cramped than recent conventions.
A CBS executive complained the convention will come across on TV
screens like ``a postage stamp with a bunch of ants crawling around
on it.'' Ford, executive director of the host committee, put the
best face on the situation as he walked around the convention floor
recently.
``It's the Camden Yards of conventions centers,'' he said, as
stagehands hammered away on temporary skyboxes. ``It will be more
intimate, not big and sterile like Veterans Stadium.''
As for all the carping about not having a dramatic balloon drop
from the 27-foot ceiling, Ford said jovially: ``There are lots of
other possibilities, not the least of which is having a balloon
rise.''
An array of protesters has lined up to get a rise out of
delegates. To control them, police drew up 55-minute slots spread
over five days, with 15-minute breaks to rotate protest groups.
Groups stood in line for up to 72 hours to have first crack at the
65 spots. Thirteen protest groups identify themselves as Democrats.
At least eight spots were reserved by gay and lesbian groups.
``This is going to be the largest mobilization of lesbians and gays
ever in this country,'' said Brenda Schumacher, a spokesman for a
group called Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Voices '96.
``We've faced an extremely hostile political environment ever since
'92. We want to expose the lies and show an accurate picture of who
we are.'' The Republican National Committee tried to confine all
the protesters to a sit e three blocks from the convention center.
It said the parking lot across the street should be reserved for
handicapped parking.
But the ACLU sued, and a federal judge agreed the Republican
proposal would violate the protesters' right to be seen and heard
by delegates. Police, who estimate 10,000 protesters at a time can
wedge onto the two-acre parking lot, had drawn up the time slots
for protest groups wherever they wound up.
Parking will be at a premium. The Secret Service has banned
underground parking at the convention center. And the Republican
National Committee has reserved every spare parking space in town
for its people.
The host committee raised about $12 million to put on this party,
more than double what any other city contributed before. In return,
it's counting on $160 million to be spread around town during
convention week and good publicity to pull in even more economic
benefits.
Knowing the Republican reputation for big spending, every business
in the vicinity, from Hooters restaurant to the Goodwill Industries
store, is decking itself out with GOP paraphernalia.
The Cuban Cigar Factory laid on extra tobacco rollers in early
January. Limousine companies lined up cars from Arizona and Nevada.
One bar opened its doors just two months ago, unabashedly calling
itself the Grand Old Party, complete with a pink neon elephant in
the window. Even Carol the Painting Elephant at the San Diego Zoo
is getting into the act, readying an exhibit of the brush strokes
created by her swinging trunk.
Still, a few San Diegans profess to be unfazed about all the
hoopla.
``This is not the biggest convention we've ever had,'' said
Stephen Cushman, a Mazda and Jaguar auto dealer who is deputy
chairman of the host committee. ``Alcoholics Anonymous and the
Baptist ministers both held bigger conventions here. We handled
those just fine.''
Posted in pol-abuse@igc.apc.org
To subscribe, send this message: subscribe pol-abuse
To this address: majordomo@igc.apc.org
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 1996 15:55:51 +0800
To: unix_code@geocities.com (Unix_Code)
Subject: Re: Read; NOW
In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960812022931.006d7320@mail.geocities.com>
Message-ID: <199608120432.OAA01745@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
> Hi I'm Unix Code and have a few things to ask...(it may not go with
> Cryptography but go ahead and read)
Sad.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 1996 14:04:42 +0800
To: EALLENSMITH@ocelot.Rutgers.EDU (E. ALLEN SMITH)
Subject: Re: Yet another blame-the-Internet-for-child-porn
In-Reply-To: <01I876WBU7C89JD5RL@mbcl.rutgers.edu>
Message-ID: <199608130140.LAA20673@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> They are, of course, failing to answer the question of why encouraging
> people to consume _computer-generated_ child pornography should be considered
> a justification for legal intervention, not to mention that such an effort
> would also make putting _Lolita_ on the Internet illegal (text could drive
> up demand for it as well, after all), or even political speech such as from
> NAMBLA. (It's political speech just as much as material from neo-Nazis... or
> from the Demopublicans.)
I don't see what the FBI is complaining about. Child pornography traded
on the net makes produces of child pornography incredibly easy to
locate. The child porn peddlers and consumers caught on the network are
usually soft, chewy and coperative, responding well to all manner of
threats and inducements. Further the piracy in child pornography tends
to create a buyers market, drives prices down substantially, reducing
the incentive to produce original material at all.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Rich Graves
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 1996 19:19:08 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: CIA Contra Crack and LA Gangs (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199608200513.PAA23414@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I've heard that story so many times from so many less-than-worthless sources
(primarily the wacky-left "Christic Institute" and KPFK Radio) that I find
it difficult to take it seriously. But I do. The US, Cuban, and
"entrepreneurial" actors in Central America in the 80's were so fucked up
that just about anything is possible.
Although... I thought it was pretty funny that today's story matter-of-
factly identified Calero as a CIA agent. Yeah, and registering Republican
makes me Barbara Bush.
At least he's not quiting Agee.
-rich
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Tue, 20 Aug 1996 15:49:19 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: CIA Contra Crack and LA Gangs (fwd)
Message-ID: <199608200513.PAA23414@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Forwarded message:
>From notes@igc.org Tue Aug 20 15:07:25 1996
Date: Mon, 19 Aug 1996 20:27:27 -0700 (PDT)
Reply-To: Moderator of conference "justice.polabuse"
From: Bob Witanek
Subject: CIA Contra Crack and LA Gangs
To: Recipients of pol-abuse
Message-ID:
X-Gateway: conf2mail@igc.apc.org
Errors-To: owner-pol-abuse@igc.apc.org
Precedence: bulk
Lines: 364
From: Bob Witanek
Posted mnovick@laedu.lalc.k12.ca.us Sun Aug 18 22:23:45 1996
This is an astonishing mainstream media documentation of the role of the
U.S. state in the guns for drugs trade and its social devastation results in
the U.S. Although the piece focuses on U.S. involvement on the guns end in
Central America, this was a clear two-birds with one stone
counter-insurgency strategy at this end, too. Given the continuing effect
of crack (and its hypocritical super-criminalization by the government),
genocide is probably too mild a word for this.
'80s effort to assist guerrillas left legacy of drugs, gangs in black L.A.
By Gary Webb
Mercury News Staff Writer
For the better part of a decade, a Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to
the Crips and Bloods street gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug
profits to a Latin American guerrilla army run by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency, a Mercury News investigation has found.
This drug network opened the first pipeline between Colombia's cocaine cartels
and the black neighborhoods of Los Angeles, a city now known as the ``crack''
capital of the world. The cocaine that flooded in helped spark a crack explosion
in urban America -- and provided the cash and connections needed for L.A.'s
gangs to buy automatic weapons.
It is one of the most bizarre alliances in modern history: the union of a
U.S.-backed army attempting to overthrow a revolutionary socialist government
and the Uzi-toting ``gangstas'' of Compton and South-Central Los Angeles.
The army's financiers -- who met with CIA agents both before and during the time
they were selling the drugs in L.A. -- delivered cut-rate cocaine to the gangs
through a young South-Central crack dealer named Ricky Donnell Ross.
Unaware of his suppliers' military and political connections, ``Freeway Rick"''
-- a dope dealer of mythic proportions in the L.A. drug world -- turned the
cocaine powder into crack and wholesaled it to gangs across the country.
The cash Ross paid for the cocaine, court records show, was then used to buy
weapons and equipment for a guerrilla army named the Fuerza Democratica
Nicaraguense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force) or FDN, the largest of several
anti-communist groups commonly called the Contras.
While the FDN's war is barely a memory today, black America is still dealing
with its poisonous side effects. Urban neighborhoods are grappling with legions
of homeless crack addicts. Thousands of young black men are serving long prison
sentences for selling cocaine -- a drug that was virtually unobtainable in black
neighborhoods before members of the CIA's army brought it into South-Central in
the 1980s at bargain-basement prices.
And the L.A. gangs, which used their enormous cocaine profits to arm themselves
and spread crack across the country, are still thriving, turning entire blocks
of major cities into occasional war zones.
``There is a saying that the ends justify the means,'' former FDN leader and
drug dealer Oscar Danilo Blandon Reyes testified during a recent cocaine
trafficking trial in San Diego. ``And that's what Mr. Bermudez (the CIA agent
who commanded the FDN) told us in Honduras, OK? So we started raising money for
the Contra revolution.''
Recently declassified reports, federal court testimony, undercover tapes, court
records here and abroad and hundreds of hours of interviews over the past 12
months leave no doubt that Blandon was no ordinary drug dealer.
Shortly before Blandon -- who had been the drug ring's Southern California
distributor -- took the stand in San Diego as a witness for the U.S. Department
of Justice, federal prosecutors obtained a court order preventing defense
lawyers from delving into his ties to the CIA.
Blandon, one of the FDN's founders in California, ``will admit that he was a
large-scale dealer in cocaine, and there is no additional benefit to any
defendant to inquire as to the Central Intelligence Agency,'' Assistant U.S.
Attorney L.J. O'Neale argued in his motion shortly before Ross' trial on cocaine
trafficking charges in March.
The most Blandon would say in court about who called the shots when he sold
cocaine for the FDN was that ``we received orders from the -- from other
people.''
The 5,000-man FDN, records show, was created in mid-1981 when the CIA combined
several existing groups of anti-communist exiles into a unified force it hoped
would topple the new socialist government of Nicaragua.
>From 1982 to 1988, the FDN -- run by both American and Nicaraguan CIA
agents --
waged a losing war against Nicaragua's Sandinista government, the
Cuban-supported socialists who'd overthrown U.S.-backed dictator Anastasio
Somoza in 1979.
Blandon, who began working for the FDN's drug operation in late 1981, testified
that the drug ring sold almost a ton of cocaine in the United States that year
-- $54 million worth at prevailing wholesale prices. It was not clear how much
of the money found its way back to the CIA's army, but Blandon testified that
``whatever we were running in L.A., the profit was going for the Contra
revolution.''
At the time of that testimony, Blandon was a full-time informant for the Drug
Enforcement Administration, a job the U.S. Department of Justice got him after
releasing him from prison in 1994.
Though Blandon admitted to crimes that have sent others away for life, the
Justice Department turned him loose on unsupervised probation after only 28
months behind bars and has paid him more than $166,000 since, court records
show.
``He has been extraordinarily helpful,'' federal prosecutor O'Neale told
Blandon's judge in a plea for the trafficker's release in 1994. Though O'Neale
once described Blandon to a grand jury as ``the biggest Nicaraguan cocaine
dealer in the United States,'' the prosecutor would not discuss him with the
Mercury News.
A known dealer since '74
has stayed out of U.S. jails
Blandon's boss in the FDN's cocaine operation, Juan Norwin Meneses Cantarero,
has never spent a day in a U.S. prison, even though the federal government has
been aware of his cocaine dealings since at least 1974, records show.
Meneses -- who ran the drug ring from his homes in the Bay Area -- is listed in
the DEA's computers as a major international drug smuggler and was implicated in
45 separate federal investigations. Yet he and his cocaine-dealing relatives
lived quite openly in the Bay Area for years, buying homes in Pacifica and
Burlingame, along with bars, restaurants, car lots and factories in San
Francisco, Hayward and Oakland.
``I even drove my own cars, registered in my name,'' Meneses said during a
recent interview in Nicaragua.
Meneses' organization was ``the target of unsuccessful investigative attempts
for many years,'' prosecutor O'Neale acknowledged in a 1994 affidavit. But
records and interviews revealed that a number of those probes were stymied not
by the elusive Meneses but by agencies of the U.S. government.
Agents from four organizations -- the DEA, U.S. Customs, the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department and the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement -- have
complained that investigations were hampered by the CIA or unnamed ``national
security'' interests.
1988 investigation
hit a wall of secrecy
One 1988 investigation by a U.S. Senate subcommittee ran into a wall of official
secrecy at the Justice Department.
In that case, congressional records show, Senate investigators were trying to
determine why the U.S. attorney in San Francisco, Joseph Russoniello, had given
$36,000 back to a Nicaraguan cocaine dealer arrested by the FBI.
The money was returned, court records show, after two Contra leaders sent
letters to the court swearing that the drug dealer had been given the cash to
buy weapons for guerrillas. Russoniello said it was cheaper to give the money
back than to disprove that claim.
``The Justice Department flipped out to prevent us from getting access to
people, records -- finding anything out about it,'' recalled Jack Blum, former
chief counsel to the Senate subcommittee that investigated allegations of Contra
cocaine trafficking. ``It was one of the most frustrating exercises that I can
ever recall.''
It wasn't until 1989, a few months after the Contra-Sandinista war ended and
five years after Meneses moved from the Peninsula to a ranch in Costa Rica, that
the U.S. government took action against him -- sort of.
Federal prosecutors in San Francisco charged Meneses with conspiracy to
distribute one kilo of cocaine in 1984, a year in which he was working publicly
with the FDN.
In S.F. photo, Meneses
seen with CIA operative
Meneses' work was so public, in fact, that he posed for a picture in June 1984
in a kitchen of a San Francisco home with the FDN's political boss, Adolfo
Calero, a longtime CIA operative who became the public face of the Contras in
the United States.
According to the indictment, Meneses was in the midst of his alleged cocaine
conspiracy at the time the picture was taken.
But the indictment was quickly locked away in the vaults of the San Francisco
federal courthouse, where it remains today -- inexplicably secret for more than
seven years. Meneses was never arrested.
Reporters found a copy of the secret indictment in Nicaragua, along with a
federal arrest warrant issued Feb. 8, 1989. Records show the no-bail warrant was
never entered into the national law enforcement database called NCIC, which
police use to track down fugitives. The former federal prosecutor who indicted
him, Eric Swenson, declined to be interviewed.
After Nicaraguan police arrested Meneses on cocaine charges in Managua in 1991,
his judge expressed astonishment that the infamous smuggler went unmolested by
American drug agents during his years in the United States.
``How do you explain the fact that Norwin Meneses, implicated since 1974 in the
trafficking of drugs . . . has not been detained in the United States, a country
in which he has lived, entered and departed many times since 1974?'' Judge
Martha Quezada asked during a pretrial hearing.
``Well, that question needs to be asked to the authorities of the United
States,'' replied Roger Mayorga, then chief of Nicaragua's anti-drug agency.
U.S. officials amazed
Meneses remained free
His seeming invulnerability amazed American authorities as well.
A Customs agent who investigated Meneses in 1980 before transferring elsewhere
said he was reassigned to San Francisco seven years later ``and I was sitting in
some meetings and here's Meneses' name again. And I can remember thinking,
`Holy cow, is this guy still around?' ''
Blandon led an equally charmed life. For at least five years he brokered massive
amounts of cocaine to the black gangs of Los Angeles without being arrested.
But his luck changed overnight.
On Oct. 27, 1986, agents from the FBI, the IRS, local police and the Los Angeles
County sheriff fanned out across Southern California and raided more than a
dozen locations connected to Blandon's cocaine operation. Blandon and his wife,
along with numerous Nicaraguan associates, were arrested on drug and weapons
charges.
The search warrant affidavit reveals that local drug agents knew plenty about
Blandon's involvement with cocaine and the CIA's army nearly 10 years ago.
``Danilo Blandon is in charge of a sophisticated cocaine smuggling and
distribution organization operating in Southern California,'' L.A. County
sheriff's Sgt. Tom Gordon said in the 1986 affidavit. ``The monies gained from
the sales of cocaine are transported to Florida and laundered through Orlando
Murillo, who is a high-ranking officer of a chain of banks in Florida named
Government Securities Corporation. From this bank the monies are filtered to the
Contra rebels to buy arms in the war in Nicaragua.''
Corporate records show that Murillo -- a Nicaraguan banker and relative of
Blandon's wife -- was a vice-president of Government Securities Corporation in
Coral Gables, a large brokerage firm that collapsed in 1987 amid allegations of
fraud. Murillo did not respond to an interview request.
Despite their intimate knowledge of Blandon's operations, the police raids were
a spectacular failure. Every location had been cleaned of anything remotely
incriminating. No one was ever prosecuted.
Ron Spear, a spokesman for Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block, said
Blandon somehow knew that he was under police surveillance. Others thought so,
too.
``The cops always believed that investigation had been compromised by the CIA,''
Los Angeles federal public defender Barbara O'Connor said in a recent
interview. O'Connor knew of the raids because she later defended the raids'
leader, Sgt. Gordon, against federal charges of police corruption. Gordon,
convicted of tax evasion, declined to be interviewed.
Lawyer suggests aid
was at root of problem
FBI records show that soon after the raids, Blandon's defense attorney, Bradley
Brunon, called the sheriff's department to suggest that his client's troubles
stemmed from a most unlikely source: a recent congressional vote authorizing
$100 million in military aid to the CIA's Contra army.
According to a December 1986 FBI Teletype, Brunon told the officers that the
``CIA winked at this sort of thing. . . . (Brunon) indicated that now that U.S.
Congress had voted funds for the Nicaraguan Contra movement, U.S. government now
appears to be turning against organizations like this.''
That FBI report, part of the files of former Iran-Contra Special Prosecutor
Lawrence Walsh, was made public only last year, when it was released by the
National Archives at the Mercury News' request.
Blandon has also implied that his cocaine sales were, for a time, CIA-approved.
He told a San Francisco federal grand jury in 1994 that once the FDN began
receiving American taxpayer dollars, the CIA no longer needed his kind of help.
``When Mr. Reagan get in the power, we start receiving a lot of money,'' Blandon
testified. ``And the people that was in charge, it was the CIA, so they didn't
want to raise any (drug) money because they have, they had the money that they
wanted.''
``From the government?'' asked Assistant U.S. Attorney David Hall.
``Yes, for the Contra revolution,'' Blandon said. ``So we started -- you know,
the ambitious person -- we started doing business by ourselves.''
Asked about that, prosecutor Hall said, ``I don't know what to tell you. The CIA
won't tell me anything.''
None of the government agencies known to have been involved with Meneses and
Blandon over the years would provide the Mercury News with any information about
them.
A Freedom of Information Act request filed with the CIA was denied on national
security grounds. FOIA requests filed with the DEA were denied on privacy
grounds. Requests filed months ago with the FBI, the State Department and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service have produced nothing so far.
None of the DEA officials known to have worked with the two men would talk to a
reporter. Questions submitted to the DEA's public affairs office in Washington
were never answered, despite repeated requests.
Blandon's lawyer, Brunon, said in an interview that his client never told him
directly that he was selling cocaine for the CIA, but the prominent Los Angeles
defense attorney drew his own conclusions from the ``atmosphere of CIA and
clandestine activities'' that surrounded Blandon and his Nicaraguan friends.
``Was he involved with the CIA? Probably. Was he involved with drugs? Most
definitely,'' Brunon said. ``Were those two things involved with each other?
They've never said that, obviously. They've never admitted that. But I don't
know where these guys get these big aircraft . . .''
That very topic arose during the sensational 1992 cocaine trafficking trial of
Meneses after Meneses was arrested in Nicaragua in connection with a staggering
750-kilo shipment of cocaine. His chief accuser was his friend Enrique Miranda,
a relative and former Nicaraguan military intelligence officer who had been
Meneses' emissary to the cocaine cartel of Bogota, Colombia. Miranda pleaded
guilty to drug charges and agreed to cooperate in exchange for a seven-year
sentence.
In a long, handwritten statement he read to Meneses' jury, Miranda revealed the
deepest secrets of the Meneses drug ring, earning his old boss a 30-year prison
sentence in the process.
``He (Norwin) and his brother Luis Enrique had financed the Contra revolution
with the benefits of the cocaine they sold,'' Miranda wrote. ``This operation,
as Norwin told me, was executed with the collaboration of high-ranking
Salvadoran military personnel. They met with officials of the Salvadoran air
force, who flew (planes) to Colombia and then left for the U.S., bound for an
Air Force base in Texas, as he told me.''
Meneses -- who has close personal and business ties to a Salvadoran air force
commander and former CIA agent named Marcos Aguado -- declined to discuss
Miranda's statements during an interview at a prison outside Managua in January.
He is scheduled to be paroled this summer, after nearly five years in custody.
U.S. General Accounting Office records confirm that El Salvador's air force was
supplying the CIA's Nicaraguan guerrillas with aircraft and flight support
services throughout the mid-1980s.
Miranda did not name the Air Force base in Texas where the FDN's cocaine was
purportedly flown. The same day the Mercury News requested official permission
to interview Miranda, he disappeared.
While out on a routine weekend furlough, Miranda failed to return to the
Nicaraguan jail where he'd been living since 1992. Though his jailers, who
described him as a model prisoner, claimed Miranda had escaped, they didn't call
the police until a Mercury News correspondent showed up and discovered he was
gone.
He has not been seen in nearly a year.
Additional reporting for this series in Nicaragua and Costa Rica was done by
Managua journalist Georg Hodel. Research assistance at the Nicaraguan Supreme
Court in Managua was done by journalist Leonore Delgado.
This material is copyrighted and may not be republished without permission of
the originating newspaper or wire service. NewsHound is a service of the San
Jose Mercury News. For more information call 1-888-344-6863.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 1996 12:08:11 +0800
To: alanh@infi.net (Alan Horowitz)
Subject: Re: CIA Contra Crack and LA Gangs (fwd)
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199608210005.KAA12548@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
> I wish they'd get back in the business, but add an overt poison to the
> product.
>
> Clean out the shit from the cities. Long live Darwinism.
Darwinism is working as well as it ever was. You may not like it, but
shit is being selected for.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan Horowitz
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 1996 09:05:15 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: CIA Contra Crack and LA Gangs (fwd)
In-Reply-To: <199608210005.KAA12548@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On Wed, 21 Aug 1996, Julian Assange wrote:
> Darwinism is working as well as it ever was. You may not like it, but
> shit is being selected for.
Well that sounds.... internally consistent. Oh my God. I'm a dinosaur.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 1996 00:47:56 +0800
To: patrickbc@juno.com (patrick b cummings)
Subject: Re: hackerlist
In-Reply-To: <19960831.074413.9510.2.patrickbc@juno.com>
Message-ID: <199609011450.AAA22573@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> I am planning to make a list of hackers and would appreciatte it if you
> would e-mail me with the following information.
> handle
> e-mail
> city,state
> url
> whether or not you would like to recieve the list when finished
> thanks for your help
> P. Cummings
> Patrickbc@juno.com
Are you on this list of morons?
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Damaged Justice
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 1996 01:05:42 +0800
To: proff@suburbia.net (Julian Assange)
Subject: Re: Los Angeles Times article on Helsingius and anon.penet.fi
In-Reply-To: <199609021023.UAA09571@suburbia.net>
Message-ID: <199609021354.JAA13057@yakko.cs.wmich.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Examining in detail Dyson's interests it appears she maintains a
> sizeable and long-standing interest in Eastern European technology
> companies. She is also clearly very far to the right of the political
> spectrum (rampant capitalist would be putting it mildly). She also speaks
> Russian.
And all these would certainly be excellent reasons to denounce her as an
enemy of liberty, now wouldn't they.
[CIA snip]
> "Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
> may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
> than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
> sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
> torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
> the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
So what's wrong with her being an Evil Capitalist(tm) again?
--
http://yakko.cs.wmich.edu/~frogfarm ...for the best in unapproved information
"We think people like seeing somebody in a uniform on the porch." -US Postal
spokeswoman, quoted in AP, 1/27/96. I don't know about you, but most people I
know who saw someone in uniform on their porch would pull out the shotgun...
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: edyson@edventure.com (Esther Dyson)
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 1996 02:39:37 +0800
To: Julian Assange
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At least you don't accuse me of being a Communist. For the record, I am not
a tool of the CIA nor have they pressured me, but there's no reason for you
to believe me.
Esther Dyson
At 08:23 PM 9/2/96 +1000, Julian Assange wrote:
SNIP ---
>
>Examining in detail Dyson's interests it appears she maintains a
>sizeable and long-standing interest in Eastern European technology
>companies. She is also clearly very far to the right of the political
>spectrum (rampant capitalist would be putting it mildly). She also speaks
>Russian. I'm not saying she has been working for the CIA for the past
>decade, but I would be very surprised if the CIA has not exerted quite
>significant pressure (which they are easily able to do given the
>location of many of Dyson's assets) in order to bring her into their
>folds during that time period.
>
>--
>"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
> may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
> than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
> sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
> torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
> the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
>+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
>|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
>|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
>|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
>+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
>
Esther Dyson Always make new mistakes!
EDventure Holdings
1 (212) 924-8800
1 (212) 924-0240 fax
104 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10011 USA
www.edventure.com
High-Tech Forum in Lisbon, October 27-29, 1996
PC Forum in Tucson, Arizona, March 23-26, 1997
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Chuck Thompson
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 1996 12:27:52 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: The Esther Dyson Flap
Message-ID: <1.5.4.32.19960903005919.0068fc70@mail.nova-net.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I don't quite understand the position taken by Mr. Assange and Mr. Unicorn
regarding recent statements attributed to Ms. Dyson. I would appreciate
some additional insight.
It appears as though they are both critical of statements (taken out of
context according to Dyson) because of her position with the EFF. It
appears that they both believe that she has no right to her opinion if it is
contradictory to the policy of the EFF.
If such an EFF policy exists, and if Dyson is of a different opinion, the
fact that she holds office in an organization with which she is not in total
agreement should not count against her. In fact, it is to her credit that
she has the courage to speak her mind, considering that hers is an elected
position. She has something to lose by speaking her mind publicly. Mr.
Unicorn remains anonymous, thereby mitigating repercussions which might
otherwise accrue to him as a result of the expression of his opinion.
I agree with Mr. Unicorn that the EFF should state its position
unequivocally. I do not agree that officers or staff of EFF should not be
allowed to disagree with that position, if in fact they do. In the case of
Ms. Dyson, how can we know whether she agrees or disagrees with a
non-existant policy? She has, evidently, spoken her mind. Isn't that what
freedom of speech allows? Imagine, if you will, where we would be right now
if all elected representatives were censured for disagreeing with stated
government policy. That ability is what makes this country great - and,
what you both seem to be saying you stand for. Is your position solid only
if everyone agrees with you and you them? Whatever happened to "defending
to the death your right to say it"?
Pouncing on someone, without knowing all the facts, who is vulnerable
because of their position smacks of dirty politics - it is distasteful. Why
not ask for the facts from the source? Then state your opinions or make
your threats about not contributing financially.
In keeping with the message, you have the right to take a cheap shot. I'd
just like some insight into your thinking.
Regards,
Chuck Thompson
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: tcmay@got.net (Timothy C. May)
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 1996 14:56:18 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: The Esther Dyson Flap
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 12:59 AM 9/3/96, Chuck Thompson wrote:
>I don't quite understand the position taken by Mr. Assange and Mr. Unicorn
>regarding recent statements attributed to Ms. Dyson. I would appreciate
>some additional insight.
>
>It appears as though they are both critical of statements (taken out of
>context according to Dyson) because of her position with the EFF. It
>appears that they both believe that she has no right to her opinion if it is
>contradictory to the policy of the EFF.
Certainly no one is suggesting she should have her right of free speech
taken away from her, as a citizen.
Rather, these are precarious times for the future of the Net, with actions
in many countries, including the U.S. to restrict the Net in various ways.
Esther Dyson is in an influential postition, not just because of her new
role as Chairman of the EFF. Anytime a person of her influence is seen to
be supporting limitations on what private citizens can communicate to
others or to the public at large, this is cause for worry.
(As both John Gilmore and Stanton McCandlish have noted, anonymity has a
long history in the United States. From the Federalist Papers, to anonymous
leafletting (upheld by the Supreme Court), to anonymous letters to the
editor, to the basic architecture of the Postal System and the phone
system, anonymity has been with us for a long time.
Esther Dyson says that anonymity on the Net can do more damage than
anonymity in other forums, and thus may need to be regulated and restricted
in various ways. I disagree, as "the Net of a Million Lies" (to use Vinge's
term) has grown up with anonymity, and few people take the anonymous (or
not) rants and charges made in the millions per day with the same degree of
certainty they take print comments. Put another way, there is no clear and
present danger.
And the Net makes for effective counterspeech. As free speech advocates
note, the proper remedy for bad speech is more speech. (The links between
"free speech" and "anonymity" are fairly obvious, and curtailing one
curtails the other. "Congress shall make no law restricting speech" says
nothing about anonymous speech being subject to regulation.)
Further, the computerized nature of Net speech makes other remedies
available as well. For example, reputation-ratings services. And digital
signatures (to preclude forged comments).
Speech on the Net closely resembles idiots, scholars, dweebs, and
scoundrels ranting in public parks. Sometimes they accuse the mayor of
adultery, sometimes they rant about UFOs, sometimes they merely utter
obscenities. All are potentially dangerous, potentially ignorable,
potentially humorous. And yet in none of these cases is there a demand that
identification be produced, that one's papers be in order, that a "free
speech license" be produced upon demand by the authorities.
(Some might say that the physical personna of the speaker means that a
means of last resort--apprehending the person--exists to track down a
speaker of illegal thoughts, and that this is the kind of last resort that
is currently lacking for Net speech. Perhaps. But this very same lack is
evidenced with anonymous pamphlets, with anonymous pieces written for
newsletters (where even an editor may not know the author), and with phone
calls, say, to radio call-in programs. Clearly someone calling "The Howard
Stern Show" and making a preposterous, or even illegal, claim is reaching
many more people than is some anonymous message to a Usenet newsgroup.
Again, where is the clear and present danger with anonymous Net speech that
would justify (putatively) greater restrictions on Net speech than other
speech channels have?)
>Pouncing on someone, without knowing all the facts, who is vulnerable
>because of their position smacks of dirty politics - it is distasteful. Why
>not ask for the facts from the source? Then state your opinions or make
>your threats about not contributing financially.
Well, many of us did not pounce. Speaking for myself, I strongly suspected
that the newspaper article had summarized a more-nuanced point and had
effectively taken just a convenient sound bite.
(Also, I'd heard Dyson speak on anonymity issues before, and knew her to
have some doubts about full-blown crypto anarchy.)
Now that she has somewhat clarified what it was she actually said, more
issues have been raised.
I believe she does not understand the problems implicit in trying to
provide "accountability" for online speech. What if, for example, I offer
to forward things I receive to various online forums? Am I then violating a
law by "anonymizing" a message? Am I supposed to check identities? (How?)
Are remailers to be declared illegal? If not, all other "accountability"
laws go out the window.
This is the "knife edge," or "fork in the road," I've long talked about. If
anonymity is outlawed, it will take draconian measures to enforce
it--citizen-unit ID cards, officially issued encryption keys, escrow,
monitoring of communications, massive penalties to deter illegal use of
encryption, and other police state measures.
On the other hand, if enough degrees of freedom are left untouched, the
result is a growing, expanding crypto anarchy. Government will find itself
powerless to control commerce (handled via encrypted channels), will find
it doesn't know the True Names of various Net entities, and will end up
being chased into an enclave of things it _can_ control.
My strong hunch is that no stable solutions lie between these two extremes.
This is one of those "decision points" for modern society, with attractors
pulling the solution to one side or another.
We know which side we stand on. It's possible that Esther Dyson is finding
herself on the other side, alongside Dorothy Denning, Louis Freeh, Donn
Parker, and the other advocates of "responsible freedom."
(Anytime you hear someone speaking of "responsible freedom," look out.)
I don't call her our enemy. Perhaps she just hasn't thought things through
as deeply as many of us have.
Given that I think EFF has pretty much lost any role it may have once had,
for a variety of reasons we're probably all tired of hearing about, I'm not
too worried about what the EFF says or does on this issue. I'm more
worried, to be honest, that a person as influential _for other reasons_ as
Esther Dyson is talking about responsible freedom and the need to limit
certain forms of speech.
--Tim May
We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed.
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
tcmay@got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Mon, 2 Sep 1996 21:23:51 +0800
To: unicorn@schloss.li (Black Unicorn)
Subject: Re: Los Angeles Times article on Helsingius and anon.penet.fi
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199609021023.UAA09571@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> On Sun, 1 Sep 1996, Esther Dyson wrote:
>
> > Now, speaking personally: I believe there are trade-offs -- which is what I
> > told the LA Times. I assume I was quoted accurately (although the word
> > "enforce" is awkward), but out of context. Anonymity can be dangerous --
> > as can traceability, especially in/by repressive regimes. Therefore I would
> > favor allowing anonymity -- with some form of traceability only under terms
> > considerably stronger than what are generally required for a wiretap.
> > Anyone who seriously needs anonymity because of a repressive government is
> > likely to use a foreign (outside whatever jurisdiction he fears) server, so
> > that this is not a matter of "local" laws. The tracer would have to pass
> > through what I hope would be tighter hoops than we have now.
> >
> > Please note that this is not the same as the right to *private*
> > conversations and the use of encryption; this is the issue of being
> > accountable for what you publish in public.
>
> I've left the attributation list open because I think my view a majority
> one.
>
> The inclinations I had to be involved with or financially support EFF are,
> after reading this, entirely quashed.
>
> What is or is not your personal or EFF's official position is meaningless.
> It is clear that the personal beliefs of those involved in EFF are
> those of compromise, present day politics, and a general lack of moral
> fiber.
>
> The political assumptions and the degree of technical invasion that would
> make the above scheme possible are either hopelessly naive, or insidiously
> invasive.
>
> --
> I hate lightning - finger for public key - Vote Monarchist
> unicorn@schloss.li
I agree with you whole-heartedly. I am stunned by the EFF's position on
this matter and they no longer have my support. Here are some more
of Dyson's statements on this subject.
[http://bin-1.gnn.com/gnn/feat/dyson/index.html]
[...]
The EFF began very much as a civil rights "don't tread on me" kind of
organization, and in a sense one of our major jobs was helping to
educate law enforcement and the government. I wouldn't say that job
is done, but now we also need to educate a broader population. If our
motto was civil rights in cyberspace, it's now civil rights and
responsibilities, because as more people come on to the Internet,
they have to understand their responsibilities as well as their
rights. If people don't do that, someone is going to try to come and
regulate them. We are trying to create a civil society rather than a
legal society in cyberspace.
[...]
We are strongly in favor of privacy, although there's some kind of
balance required because of the need for a free press. Anonymity is a
tougher one, and we actually don't have a formal position on that.
The need for anonymity I agree with, but there are issues with
accountability that mean it shouldn't be absolute.
Examining in detail Dyson's interests it appears she maintains a
sizeable and long-standing interest in Eastern European technology
companies. She is also clearly very far to the right of the political
spectrum (rampant capitalist would be putting it mildly). She also speaks
Russian. I'm not saying she has been working for the CIA for the past
decade, but I would be very surprised if the CIA has not exerted quite
significant pressure (which they are easily able to do given the
location of many of Dyson's assets) in order to bring her into their
folds during that time period.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 1996 02:13:22 +0800
To: jonl@well.com (Jon Lebkowsky)
Subject: Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
In-Reply-To: <2.2.32.19960903115249.006e7bfc@mail.well.com>
Message-ID: <199609031324.XAA30461@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> At 07:40 PM 9/2/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote:
> >> what *constructive*
> >> alternative to EFF do you propose? if you have none, please shut up.
> >
> >I think any organization that would apply political pressure rather than
> >bow to it would be an alternative. I think an organization in touch
> >enough with its own policy to prevent its staff and board from making
> >embarassing big brother type proposals to curtail the ability of any of us
> >to post without attributation would be an alternative. I think an
> >organization without the internal conflict and strife that has clearly
> >marred EFF in past and made it a laughable attempt at cohesive political
> >persuasion would be an alternative. I think an organization that had
> >official policies on the core issues which it proposes to influence would
> >be an alternative.
> >
> >In short, an organization that had even one of the needed elements of
> >legislative influence. (Cohesive, directed, persistent, and
> >uncompromising).
Certain members of the EFF board seem to be politically naive. The
rational, intelligent lobbyist will always see both sides of the
argument. Presenting both sides of the argument to the world at large
is another matter altogether. You should only present both sides of the
argument to the inner policy tactics personnel only in order to formulate
policy and create defences for the weaknesses in your position. To the
outside world only ever sees a united front. This is basic politics.
The EFF is most certainly not the only speaker on the floor where this
issue is concerned. There are some very powerful government interests
who oppose anonymity in any form. For the EFF, who is viewed as normally
opposing government regulation, to have it's spokes-person start
shooting off her mouth and the EFF's previous position down publically
before they even go into battle is political suicide.
The claim of `I was just presenting my personal opinion on the matter'
doesn't hold water. Dyson represents a political lobby group and has no
"personal opinion" when talking publically about issues that concern the
organisation she has been elected to represent. In the interview
material I have seen Dyson talks about the EFF in the same context as
the anonymity issue, and the reader understandably gains the impression
that she is speaking on the behalf of the EFF, and I'm sure at the
time Dyson and the interviewer thought she was too.
Compromise is part of the legislative process, but it is something you
do behind closed doors when the battle is concluded and each faction
is counting the dead and starting to divide up territory. If you
start the battle in a compromised position, expect to loose everything.
Dyson, given her age and experience should be well aware of this, which
is why I find her remarks unusual.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 8 Sep 1996 18:02:35 +0800
To: strombrg@hydra.acs.uci.edu (Dan Stromberg)
Subject: Re: LACC: Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
In-Reply-To: <32303FDA.493B@hydra.acs.uci.edu>
Message-ID: <199609080749.RAA01948@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Julian Assange wrote:
> > Certain members of the EFF board seem to be politically naive. The
> > rational, intelligent lobbyist will always see both sides of the
> > argument. Presenting both sides of the argument to the world at large
> > is another matter altogether. You should only present both sides of the
> > argument to the inner policy tactics personnel only in order to formulate
> > policy and create defences for the weaknesses in your position. To the
> > outside world only ever sees a united front. This is basic politics.
>
> This is certainly the way most people in political roles handle things,
> and it is certainly an effective way of handling simple-minded people.
>
> However, it is one thing I find very difficult to respect.
Respect or not, if your team is small and the field is large, and
everyone else is playing gridiron, then don't expect to prove anything
but your stupidity by playing cricket.
> How many of the world's stupid policies have been enacted, because
> someone decided to present only one side of an issue, realized it was
> "the wrong side", and felt they couldn't later change their mind for the
> better - because they presented the issue as overly black-and-white
> initially?
I agree, however you are confusing large parties, so dominant as to form
government and policy at whim with those that represent a particular
cause or interest group. The EFF falls into the latter category. Its
goals are relatively narrow, its membership tiny. Such a small group,
fighting under-resourced battle against powerful, conservative interests
does not need, and should not espouse the arguments of those who seek to
destroy it. When Canoing up a waterful, one does not need to paddle
backwards 50% of the time in order to be "fair".
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Dan Stromberg
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 1996 09:26:52 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: LACC: Re: What is the EFF doing exactly?
In-Reply-To: <199609080749.RAA01948@suburbia.net>
Message-ID: <323459C7.5492@hydra.acs.uci.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I sent this to you privately, because I did not want a public war.
You've chosen to bring it to the list anyway.
What you've written below appears to be quite nonsequitur, but I suppose
one can guess the upshot.
Many governments are quite braindead, when it comes to crypto, yes.
I will reiterate: many governments are also quite braindead, when it
comes to demonstrating reasonably accurate "metaknowledge", when it
comes to having a clue about just how certain something really is.
I obviously applaud your efforts to free crypto.
I obviously deplore your efforts to fight crypto in the manner of the
ugliest of politicians, and find it quite hypocritical that you've
sugges
ed that in so doing, you are -avoiding- arguments of those who
seek to destroy you. I believe it is quite clear, you're arguing
against yourself: your methods are very much those of the ones who "seek
to destroy you.", and to the extent that this is true, I'd say they
-have- destroyed you.
Note that I have seen/noticed no example of this from you - only that
you have -stated- that things should be phrased in a quite B&W manner
for political advantage.
Were you seeking to make things messier, when you brought this to the
list without asking first?
Julian Assange wrote:
> > How many of the world's stupid policies have been enacted, because
> > someone decided to present only one side of an issue, realized it was
> > "the wrong side", and felt they couldn't later change their mind for the
> > better - because they presented the issue as overly black-and-white
> > initially?
>
> I agree, however you are confusing large parties, so dominant as to form
> government and policy at whim with those that represent a particular
> cause or interest group. The EFF falls into the latter category. Its
> goals are relatively narrow, its membership tiny. Such a small group,
> fighting under-resourced battle against powerful, conservative interests
> does not need, and should not espouse the arguments of those who seek to
> destroy it. When Canoing up a waterful, one does not need to paddle
> backwards 50% of the time in order to be "fair".
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 1996 20:26:04 +0800
To: fconley@astro.ocis.temple.edu (fconley)
Subject: Re: LACC: Bernie S. attacked in prison
In-Reply-To: <199609101648.MAA06069@astro.ocis.temple.edu>
Message-ID: <199609110936.TAA15567@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> >Of course. Surprising or shocking? Not in the least.
> >
> > Nico Garcia
> > raoul@tiac.net
>
> Every day that I wake up, I'm amazed at how far this country has
> devolved. When rational people sit quietly and accept the abuses of the
> police and other authorities, it is a sign that society has truly turned
> belly-up.
I was shocked.
I've had some dealings with the SS. Their behavior in court, painting Ed
as a "terrorist" was to be expected, NOT condoned. What happened to Ed in
prison is shocking. If Ed was a killer of little children, then I could
understand. He wasn't. At his worst Ed's crime was no more than petty
white collar fraud. Ed would not have been imprisoned in Australia.
I've reviewed many US computer crime / toll fraud cases, including
sentencing decisions. I found myself very unimpressed with US sentencing
guidelines, which are extremely rigid and compartmentalised, leaving
a sentencing judge with almost no disgression or ability to impose
a sentence that fits the crime as a whole or the defendant as a whole.
Whether Nico or anyone else found the violence against Cummings
"shocking" or "to be expected" or not, is of no import. No one is
surprised to hear that a pretty girl walking alone through central park
in the middle of the night has been brutally raped. This makes the
crime, and its effects on the victim no less hideous. Those that abuse
their power and inflict grave violence on others must be held
accountable and their crimes deplored and punished in the strongest
manner. Failure to do so merely creates an environment where such
behavior becomes predominant. This is not acceptable.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Y Do U Care
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 1996 00:00:54 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: hackerlist
In-Reply-To: <199609011450.AAA22573@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On Mon, 2 Sep 1996, Julian Assange wrote:
> > I am planning to make a list of hackers and would appreciatte it if you
> > would e-mail me with the following information.
> > handle
> > e-mail
> > city,state
> > url
> > whether or not you would like to recieve the list when finished
> > thanks for your help
> > P. Cummings
> > Patrickbc@juno.com
>
> Are you on this list of morons?
I can hardly wait for the big rush of everyone sending in their
names on this one.. haha buddy... I wouldnt wait up.
-HevnScenT
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 1996 12:56:50 +0800
To: saione@primenet.com
Subject: Re: talker
In-Reply-To: <199609120013.RAA23678@primenet.com>
Message-ID: <199609120227.MAA03680@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Mailbomb me, go ahead punk, make my day, if you dare to even think
> about doing so I will kick your ass, I will hurt you in ways you
> cannot imagine, I have carried out vindictive personal vendettas
> before and will do so again if necessary.
>
> Go on, I dare you, I double dare you motherfucker.
>
> Yours with the greatest respect:
>
> Paul Bradley MbM
Yawn. Says more about you than him kiddo.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Declan McCullagh
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 14:53:12 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: Risk v. Charity (was: RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant
In-Reply-To: <199609171531.BAA22478@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Clearly, we must have only professional political views here.
-Declan
On Wed, 18 Sep 1996, Julian Assange wrote:
> > And what am I paying for...to protect the status quo. I believe that
> > there is more than enough help for ppl available. They just need to
> > get off their butts and work.
>
> Do we really need your amatuer political views?
>
> --
> "Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
> may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
> than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
> sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
> torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
> the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
> +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
> |Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
> |proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
> |proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
> +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
>
// declan@eff.org // I do not represent the EFF // declan@well.com //
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 02:53:08 +0800
To: craigw@dg.ce.com.au
Subject: Re: Risk v. Charity (was: RE: Workers Paradise. /Political rant
In-Reply-To: <199609170703.RAA21552@mac.ce.com.au>
Message-ID: <199609171531.BAA22478@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> And what am I paying for...to protect the status quo. I believe that
> there is more than enough help for ppl available. They just need to
> get off their butts and work.
Do we really need your amatuer political views?
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Douglas B. Renner"
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 1996 11:07:28 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: Morality, Responsibility, Technology.
In-Reply-To: <199609191327.XAA00418@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>> The term "defect" is therefore entirely out of line. We have no business
>> placing judgements from our own limited material value sets onto
>> something which has the definite potential of affecting all future
>> generations of Humanity. It's none of our business.
>
>The problem however, is that artificial selection maybe the only way to
>select beneficial attributes at all. What is presently being selected
>for in western societies is all the factors that lead to a lack of
>practice or belief in birth control. I'll let the reader think for a
>moment on just what those are. Perhaps we can also somehow test for and
>abolish the "Catholic" gene?
You offer the humorous example of Catholicism. But this is really a
deceptively clear example of exactly what I was saying: that we aren't even
close to having any kind of objective faculties which would be required
to competently make these kinds of decisions. Catholicism: is it Nature
or is it Nurture? This example would effectively equivalent to just one
ideology gaining "leverage" over another, and using the technology of
genetics to gain this leverage. I'll finish this up below.
I don't want to miss your real counterpoint behind the example. What I hear
you really saying is that you can open your eyes, and look around at the
processes of natural selection in action, and you can see all kinds of
social forces at work, many of which would appear, given our value set, to
be functioning to the disadvantage of the species. But again, this
proves even more brutally how deeply our lack of objectivity runs when we
try to evaluate such matters.
We tend to value traits such as industriousness, and yet we see some social
welfare programs which effectively reward the absence of this quality.
This example, as well as your own example, are issues which we can't
even reach a consensus on socially. And since *we* can't even deal with
such things socially, how could we ever presume to claim the moral
competence to address them genetically?
For example, our western society is less than 9,000 years old. As
participants we assume our western society is "good." But a traditional
Australian Aborigine, coming from a 35,000 to 60,000 year old society,
might have a completely different perspective. He might view our
European lifestyle as one very big mistake, and a recent one at that.
Maybe, just maybe, we have culturally taken a very large step away
from what our inherent natures really are. If this were true you might
expect to see a larger amount of latent grey matter evolved into all of
our skulls than any of us really use. But then, this *is* the case.
So as we are, nobody really knows what the effect of widespread crypto
will be, any more than we could have predicted the impact of cars or
transistors or nuclear fission. The future is literally in your hands.
Douglas B. Renner
dougr@usa.globelle.com
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 1996 01:25:51 +0800
To: dougr@skypoint-gw.globelle.com (Douglas B. Renner)
Subject: Re: Morality, Responsibility, Technology.
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199609191327.XAA00418@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> The term "defect" is therefore entirely out of line. We have no business
> placing judgements from our own limited material value sets onto
> something which has the definite potential of affecting all future
> generations of Humanity. It's none of our business.
The problem however, is that artificial selection maybe the only way to
select beneficial attributes at all. What is presently being selected
for in western societies is all the factors that lead to a lack of
practice or belief in birth control. I'll let the reader think for a
moment on just what those are. Perhaps we can also somehow test for and
abolish the "Catholic" gene?
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 1996 16:53:11 +0800
To: rkluge@nunic.nu.edu
Subject: Re: LACC: Re: Australia now has information police
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <199609220643.QAA13076@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
>
>
> Hello:
>
> I have one short, short question regarding this item. I really
> hope that you know the anwswer and have the time to answer it.
>
> 1- International document: any idea who else had signed it?
[re COCOM trade agreements]
All COCOM countries most likely. That said Australia does not seem to be
actively enforcing this relic of the cold war. However around 8 years
ago, I recall that the NSA found out about a telephone encrypting device
developed here in Australia, and preassured the Australian government to
forbid export of the device, under COCOM provisions until it was
weakened. At the moment it is politically untenable to enforce COCOM
export provisions over cryptographic software in this country. The COCOM
treaty is seen, quite rightly, as a U.S barrow which COCOM countries had
to sign in order to avoid U.S trade sanctions and tarrifs, but not
something that needs to be enforced for smaller concerns (arms shipments
are bigger concerns).
COCOM is being replaced with new controls, according to the PARI DAILY.
(anyone have better details?)
PARI DAILY
FRIDAY, APRIL 5, 1996
BULGARIA IGNORED AT POST-COCOM TALKS
Bulgaria did not take part in the first plenary session of
the member-countries of the Wassenaar Arrangement, also
known as the New Forum, Foreign Ministry spokesman
Mr.Pantelei Karasimeonov told a briefing yesterday. Of all
the 28 participants in the session, it was only USA that
opposed Bulgaria's participation in the arrangement, a
control regime which is to succeed the Cold War's COCOM
export controls of technology and equipment usable for
military purposes, too, it was revealed at the briefing.
Bulgaria has stated many times, and at different levels, its
willingness to join the new control regime, the Foreign
Ministry spokesman emphasised. In a statement, disseminated
by BTA, Bulgarian News Agency, Foreign Ministry pointed out
that obviously some of the participants in the Wassenaar
Arrangement talks are still under the rather depressing
impressions of the suitable conditions created in the
country for wide-ranging scot-free ruin and lack of
ownership, which apply also to the military-industrial
complex and foreign trade in spesial-purpose production. Mr.
Karasimeonov said that these impressions have sprung from
the period of radical economic and political reforms in the
country; he voiced his hopes that the founder-states of the
Wassenaar Arrangement would soon change these views of
theirs and would put their trust in Bulgaria's export
control abilities.
Trade Ministry officials said that bilateral talks are due
to be held between Bulgaria and each of the New Forum
member-countries, which are expected to result in Bulgaria's
joining the arrangement. An expert group is to visit USA
from April 29 till May 3 aiming to acquaint American high
officials with the measures Bulgaria has taken to control
trade in spesial-purpose production, Mr.Vladimir Velichkov,
head of Internationally Controlled Trade Department at Trade
Ministry, said in a recent interview for the PARI Daily. By
June an expert group of the Wassenaar Arrangement is due to
visit Bulgaria to lead discussions about our participation
in the New Forum.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 22 Sep 1996 16:35:06 +0800
To: jimbell@pacifier.com (jim bell)
Subject: Re: Bernstein hearing: The Press Release
In-Reply-To: <199609220525.WAA21842@mail.pacifier.com>
Message-ID: <199609220647.QAA13187@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> >There may be certain circumstances under which speech can be directly harmful.
> >Military operations and missle launch codes are things that should be kept
> >secret. Information about high-powered weapons should be too. If the
> Japanese
> >had been able to get information about how to build A-bombs during WWII, major
> >cities in the U.S. probably would have been completely wiped out. I don't
> like
> >the idea that the government has the power to decide what's harmful and what
> >isn't, but there are beneficial uses of the provision.
>
> The few examples that exist, as you've selected them above, seem to be
> almost entirely based on military secrets in time of war. It is not clear
> whether a non-security clearance civilian is restricted in any way, nor
> should he be.
You must remember there is a distinction to information in-confidence,
and information generated independntly. It is only the breech of confidence
that should be penalised, not the information itself.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: s1113645@tesla.cc.uottawa.ca
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 1996 05:48:51 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: LACC: Re: Australia now has information police
In-Reply-To: <199609220643.QAA13076@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On Sun, 22 Sep 1996, Julian Assange wrote:
> [re COCOM trade agreements]
>
> All COCOM countries most likely. That said Australia does not seem to be
Didn't the COCOM treaty expire?
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 1996 09:48:13 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: LACC: Re: Australia now has information police
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <4DuRuD1w165w@bwalk.dm.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
s1113645@tesla.cc.uottawa.ca writes:
>
>
> On Sun, 22 Sep 1996, Julian Assange wrote:
>
> > [re COCOM trade agreements]
> >
> > All COCOM countries most likely. That said Australia does not seem to be
>
> Didn't the COCOM treaty expire?
No; rather the COCOM members had a meeting and voted to dissolve it.
It happened some time around 1992 or 93, I think.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: dlv@bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM)
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 1996 06:41:03 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Looking for Qualified Individual/Firm to Contract for Cryptanalysis
In-Reply-To: <199609281833.EAA04360@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Julian Assange writes:
> > I am looking for one or more people (or firms) who are qualified to perform
> > world class cryptanalysis work. Please send mail to me at joswald1@msn.com
> > call in the U.S. at +1 408.479.7874
> >
> > Jack Oswald
> >
>
> Find your father's little black book under the couch?
Well, I dialed the number out of curisotity (it's in San Diego). The answering
machine says "This is Jack Oswald with R.P.K." Sounds gay.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Randall Terpstra
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 1996 06:29:09 +0800
To: cypherpunks-errors
Subject: RE: Looking for Qualified Individual/Firm to Contract forCrypt analysis
Message-ID: <324FF9DB@mnbp.network.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Nice try bimbo--- 408 is San Jose!!
RWT
----------
From: cypherpunks-errors[SMTP:cypherpunks-errors@toad.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 28, 1996 3:58 PM
To: cypherpunks
Subject: Re: Looking for Qualified Individual/Firm to Contract
forCryptanalysis
Julian Assange writes:
> > I am looking for one or more people (or firms) who are qualified to
perform
> > world class cryptanalysis work. Please send mail to me at
joswald1@msn.com
> > call in the U.S. at +1 408.479.7874
> >
> > Jack Oswald
> >
>
> Find your father's little black book under the couch?
Well, I dialed the number out of curisotity (it's in San Diego). The
answering
machine says "This is Jack Oswald with R.P.K." Sounds gay.
---
Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM
Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013,
14.4Kbps
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 5 Oct 1996 16:02:09 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: anagrams
Message-ID: <199610050242.MAA07877@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
Fast(est?) anagram generator:
ftp://suburbia.net/pub/proff/original/gan/an-0.93.tar.gz
(unix source and dos executable)
Some Anagrams Found Using an-0.92
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Free Software Foundation - I'd fan out tons of freeware!
National Security Agency - Lusty yearning at cocaine.
President Dole - Led despite Ron.
Central Intelligence Agency - Langley: Inelegant, eccentric.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 5 Oct 1996 18:10:29 +0800
To: iang@cs.berkeley.edu (Ian Goldberg)
Subject: Re: encrypting pppd?
In-Reply-To: <534nh8$c4p@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu>
Message-ID: <199610050806.SAA20884@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> pppd doesn't necessarily run over a modem; you can "tunnel" it over another
> IP connection.
>
> I have in fact done this very thing. Use ssh to (encrypted) log in to
> the ppp server, and start pppd at each end. It's been a while; I think I
> had to tweak something to make it work over a pty instead of a serial port.
>
> - Ian
You need to use my ssh tunneling patch:
ftp://suburbia.net/pub/mailinglists/best-of-security/179
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Duncan Frissell
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 1996 22:59:33 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: Government Denial of Service Attacks
Message-ID: <3.0b19.32.19961009061541.00d23c48@panix.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 09:33 AM 10/9/96 +1000, Julian Assange wrote:
>I will not coment on the correctness of the U.S government's funding
>allocations, however the above statement is clearly designed to be
>deceptive. Given the GDP of the U.S as a whole during fiscal 1996 was
>greater than that of any other country at any other time, including the
>U.S in previous years (the U.S like most other countries has postive
>growth), of course the absolute value of taxes collected will be larger.
I make the point only because this very important fact never occurs to
anyone. Our rulers like to say that they can't make do with a cent less of
the vast sums they collect from us and, in fact, all of them say that they
will need more.
Just pointing out that with all they have, they can probably stand to cut
back a little. The Fortune 500 did.
DCF
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 1996 14:57:08 +0800
To: frissell@panix.com (Duncan Frissell)
Subject: Re: Government Denial of Service Attacks
In-Reply-To: <3.0b19.32.19961008154059.00a26358@panix.com>
Message-ID: <199610082333.JAA27903@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> "During Fiscal 1996, the Government of the United States collected more
> taxes from the American people than any government had ever collected
> before in the history of mankind. During Fiscal 1997, the Government of
> the United States plans to collect more taxes from the American people than
> any government has ever collected before in the history of mankind. And
> still it's not enough."
>
I will not coment on the correctness of the U.S government's funding
allocations, however the above statement is clearly designed to be
deceptive. Given the GDP of the U.S as a whole during fiscal 1996 was
greater than that of any other country at any other time, including the
U.S in previous years (the U.S like most other countries has postive
growth), of course the absolute value of taxes collected will be larger.
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 1996 06:40:17 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: LACC: Japan imposing crypto export restrictions!
In-Reply-To: <199610160435.GAA00926@basement.replay.com>
Message-ID: <199610161339.XAA14264@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> Another Cypherpunks exclusive!
>
> Bowing to US pressure, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has quietly made changes to Japanese crypto export regulations.
>
> In the past, export of crypto products from Japan was unregulated. The exporter had to file a pro-forma export declaration with MITI. The new regulations, imposed in recent weeks without public announcement, require the exporter to state the ultimate recipient of the crypto product. MITI then conducts a lengthy approval process that can take many weeks.
>
> It is widely assumed that the US used the thread of trade sanctions to bring about this 180 degree turn in the attitude of the Japanese government.
How is it "widely assumed" when we have "Cypherpunks exclusive" ...
"quietly made changes" ... and "without public annoucement"?
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | 0619737CCC143F6DEA73E27378933690 |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Declan McCullagh
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 17:13:23 -0700 (PDT)
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: New On WWW.Infowar.Com Vol I #3
In-Reply-To: <199610241857.EAA03695@suburbia.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Yes. Perhaps it's time to review this book -- and associated advertising
techniques.
-Declan
On Fri, 25 Oct 1996, Julian Assange wrote:
> > WINN Schwartau's second book on IW, "Information Warfare - Cyberterrorism:
> > Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age" is a *must* have,
> > inclusive update on the subject. You will want this book in your library
> > of Information Warfare AND INFORMATION SECURITY genre.
> >
>
> Jesus WINN do WE have TO go THOUGH this BLOODY CAPS thing WITH every
> AGRANDISING product ANNOUCEMENT INTERpact RELEASES?
>
> --
> "Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
> may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
> than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
> sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
> torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
> the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
> +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
> |Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
> |proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
> |proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | C7F81C2AA32D7D4E4D360A2ED2098E0D |
> +---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
>
// declan@eff.org // I do not represent the EFF // declan@well.com //
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 1996 11:58:50 -0700 (PDT)
To: betty@infowar.com (Betty G. O'Hearn)
Subject: Re: New On WWW.Infowar.Com Vol I #3
In-Reply-To: <1.5.4.32.19961024153400.00715da4@mail.infowar.com>
Message-ID: <199610241857.EAA03695@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text
> WINN Schwartau's second book on IW, "Information Warfare - Cyberterrorism:
> Protecting Your Personal Security In the Electronic Age" is a *must* have,
> inclusive update on the subject. You will want this book in your library
> of Information Warfare AND INFORMATION SECURITY genre.
>
Jesus WINN do WE have TO go THOUGH this BLOODY CAPS thing WITH every
AGRANDISING product ANNOUCEMENT INTERpact RELEASES?
--
"Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber barons
than under omnipotent moral busybodies, The robber baron's cruelty may
sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who
torment us for own good will torment us without end, for they do so with
the approval of their own conscience." - C.S. Lewis, _God in the Dock_
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
|Julian Assange RSO | PO Box 2031 BARKER | Secret Analytic Guy Union |
|proff@suburbia.net | VIC 3122 AUSTRALIA | finger for PGP key hash ID = |
|proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | FAX +61-3-98199066 | C7F81C2AA32D7D4E4D360A2ED2098E0D |
+---------------------+--------------------+----------------------------------+
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 1996 08:48:14 -0800 (PST)
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject: No Subject
Message-ID: <199612051647.DAA09954@suburbia.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
>From smtpd Fri Dec 6 03:03:59 1996
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Date: Thu, 5 Dec 1996 15:43:33 +0000 (GMT)
From: Local GlobalPublishing
To: foreignc@lglobal.com
Subject: ForeignCorrespondent REVENGE OF HER MAJESTY'S SPOOKS
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
Precedence: bulk
Reply-To: emargolis@lglobal.com
Sender: proff
Foreign Correspondent
Inside Track On World News
By International Syndicated Columnist & Broadcaster
Eric Margolis
,,ggddY"""Ybbgg,,
,agd888b,_ "Y8, ___`""Ybga,
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,dP" ]888888888P' "Y `888Yb,
,dP" ,88888888P" db, "8P""Yb,
,8" ,888888888b, d8888a "8,
,8' d88888888888,88P"' a, `8,
,8' 88888888888888PP" "" `8,
d' I88888888888P" `b
8 `8"88P""Y8P' 8
8 Y 8[ _ " 8
8 "Y8d8b "Y a 8
8 `""8d, __ 8
Y, `"8bd888b, ,P
`8, ,d8888888baaa ,8'
`8, 888888888888' ,8'
`8a "8888888888I a8'
`Yba `Y8888888P' adP'
"Yba `888888P' adY"
`"Yba, d8888P" ,adP"'
`"Y8baa, ,d888P,ad8P"'
``""YYba8888P""''
REVENGE OF HER MAJESTY'S SPOOKS
by
Eric Margolis 5 Dec 1996
Comrade-in-Chief Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev banged his fist onto
a solid oak table, knocking over bottles of Armenian
mineral water and vodka, and bellowed at the ashen-faced
chiefs of the Soviet aircraft industry: `The Motherland's
honor is a stake. Beat the Concorde! Or you will all be
designing coal mines cars in Siberia!'
Such is the story I'm told by someone who was there. I'm
recalling these events now because a group of US aircraft
companies and NASA have partnered with Russia's Tupelov
aircraft firm to take the old TU-144 supersonic transports
out of mothballs and fly 32 test flights. My advice to the
eager US aviation people is: watch the tests from the
ground. Here's why:
In the late 1950's and early 1960's, the Soviets were
boasting they would shortly overtake America's capitalist
technology. Soviet propaganda dismissed France as a nation
of foppish boulevardiers, and Britain as a degenerate,
toothless old lion.
The `degenerate' British and French stunned and mortified
Moscow by announcing development of a supersonic jet
transport, made with European technology. The outcome of
this project was the exquisite, technologically superb
Concorde, which continues today to fly passengers at twice
the speed of sound.
The Kremlin ordered a crash program to develop a Soviet
supersonic transport, or SST, no matter the cost. The famous
Tupelov design bureau was selected to develop the plane, by
`storming,' if necessary, 24-hours a day, until completion.
Unfortunatly, Tupelov designers couldn't develop a workable
design in the short time given them by the Kremlin.
So KGB was ordered to steal the blueprints of the Concorde.
A score of KGB agents were dispatched to England and France
in a highly complex and expensive mission designed to
infiltrate plants where the Concorde was being built. Such
military-industrial spying is often used by nations trying
to save time, money, or both. Agents of Israel's Mossad,
for example, managed to steal the complete blueprints of the
French Mirage III fighter after Paris refused to supply them
to Israel.
Now comes the fun part- as told to me by the late,
distinguished RAF commander, Air Marshall Menaul. British
counter-intelligence, MI5, according to Menaul, learned of
the Soviet penetration and identified many of the agents
whose haste, and deviation from KGB standard operating
procedures, made them sloppy.
The wicked British got their top aviation engineers to
doctor a set of Concorde plans - so that the aircraft's
center of gravity was too far aft, making it dangerously
unstable, particularly at low speeds. The bogus drawings
were left where they could be purloined by the KGB. A few
days later, the tainted plans were in Moscow.
On Dec 31, 1968, the TU-144 - instantly dubbed `Conkordski'-
made its maiden flight - a few days before the Concorde's
inaugural flight. Chairman Brezhnev was ecstatic.
In 1973, the Soviets triumphantly sent their TU-144 to the
Paris Air Show. There,. before the world's eyes, the
`Conkordski' went out of control and crashed. The horrified
Soviets became the butt of international ridicule. Another
TU-144 crashed outside Moscow in 1978. From 'pride of Soviet
aviation,' the poor TU-144 soon was called, `the supersonic
coffin.'
A few were put into Moscow-Tashkent service, first flying
terrified passengers, then just mail. The `Conkordski' were
taken out of service in 1978 after the second spectacular
accident. I'm sure many toasts were drunken that night in
London at MI5 headquarters.
The new TU-144 flights are being conducted with the
Americans to develop a future, 300-passenger SST. Tupelov
has refurbished some of the aircraft, but I'm uncertain if
the basic design flaw introduced by Her Majesty's spooks has
been corrected. Probably not, leaving the Conkordski
lethally wobbly.
Such is the revenge of British intelligence, served up cold
and lethal - as the best revenge always is.
copyright eric margolis 1996
*****************************************************************
*****************************************************************
---------------------------------------------------------------
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WWW: www.bigeye.com/foreignc.htm
For Syndication Information please contact:
Email: emargolis@lglobal.com
FAX: (416) 960-4803
Smail:
Eric Margolis
c/o Editorial Department
The Toronto Sun
333 King St. East
Toronto Ontario Canada
M5A 3X5
---------------------------------------------------------------
1997
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 25 Jan 1997 02:10:58 -0800 (PST)
To: meditation@gnu.ai.mit.edu
Subject: language drift
Message-ID: <199701251010.CAA23802@toad.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
One of my projects involves tracking language drift; i.e the relative
change in word frequency on the internet as time goes by. This is
useful for predicting concept movement, and the anglisization
rates of non-English language countries.
Now, one day while browsing the frequencies from the 10 billion
word corpus, what do I see?
God 2,177,242
America 2,178,046
designed 2,181,106
five 2,189,194
December 2,190,028
;)
-Julian Assange
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Alan
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 1997 01:15:40 +0800
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
Subject: Cryptographic Mythology (fwd)
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I found this on the firewalls mailing list. It needed to find its way
here...
alano@teleport.com | "That will make it hot for them" - Guy Grand
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 4 Jun 1997 02:03:43 +1000 (EST)
From: proff@suburbia.net
To: firewalls@greatcircle.com
Subject: Cryptographic Mythology
Here is something to amuse, delight and horrify - the tail of:
_One Man's Search for a Cryptographic Mythology_.
I recently wrote a VNODE (4.4bsd) based encrypted file-system. Now
the day dawned when I decided it was high time to discard my rather
egocentric working name _Proffs_ (i.e Proff File System) and cast
about for a decent, respectable name. My first thought on this
matter was:
CERBERUS, n. The watch-dog of Hades, whose duty it was to guard
the entrance -- against whom or what does not
clearly appear; everybody, sooner or later, had to go there,
and nobody wanted to carry off the entrance. Cerberus is known
to have had three heads, and some of the poets have credited
him with as many as a hundred.
Only, what was the relation between KERBEROS and CERBERUS? Pups
from the same litter, or was the relationship a little more
incestuous? I had to find out. There was no way - n o w a y - I'd be
having my encrypted file system playing second fiddle to that evil
authentication beast.
KERBEROS; also spelled Cerberus. n. The watch dog of
Hades, whose duty it was to guard the entrance--against
whom or what does not clearly appear; . . . it is known
to have had three heads. . .
Mythology couldn't get any more incestuous than that.
450,000 bytes of Greek polytheism later, and I'm wondering if the
Gods of Olympus really had any high-paid guards to speak of except
the multi-headed mongrel from Hades. I'm feeling down. I'm cursing
the Ancients. I'm disrespectfully humming tunes `All and All it's
Just Another Greek in the Wall', and `Athena be my Lover' when I
discover:
JANUS: in Roman mythology, custodian of the universe, god of
beginnings. The guardian of gates and doors, he held
sacred the first hour of the day, first day of the month, and
first month of the year (which bears his name). He is represented
with two bearded faces set back to back.
Custodian of the universe. Guardian of gates and doors. Cooool.
Janus. January. I like it. Only while I'm liking it, I'm thinking
that I've heard the word Janus a lot before. I'm thinking it isn't
just me who has looked up from the middle of a Greek mythology
text, whilst in the throes of a name hunt with the words "Cooool"
on their tongue. No: the Gods just don't smile on me that way.
AltaVista confirms the truth of Heaven's bad attitude towards me.
17,423 references. _The Janus Mutual Trade Fund_, _The Janus
Project_, _Janus ADA95_, a dozen ISPs from Canada (what is it WITH
these Canadians?), _Janus' cool word list_ (turns out to be not so
cool), _The Janus Ensemble_, _Hotel Janus_, _Janus Theatre_,
_janus.com_, _janusfunds.com_, _Janus_ an Australian Police drama
series and of course, the sixth moon of Saturn - _Janus_. Janus is
out-of-the-picture. I'm not sure whether to feel smug or grim about
the rest of the world's lack of originality.
Guards. Guardians. The Greeks didn't have many with bite and I'm
loosing patience with the whole culture. Euphrosyne, Aglaia, and
Thalia do not grace me. What I need is something that evokes
passion within my cryptographic domain. And when you come down to
it, that means something which produces copious amounts of gore
and blood, at will, from those who would dare to pass its demesne
of protection.
The Erinyes, or Furies, were three goddesses who punished by
their secret stings the crimes of those who escaped or defied
public justice. The heads of the Furies were wreathed with
serpents, and their whole appearance was terrific and appalling.
Their names were Alecto, Tisiphone, and Megaera. They were
also called Eumenides.
Aye. Plenty of gore there. But somewhat lacking in cryptographic
analogy. Fantastic material for the group that doesn't meet at
number 41 every Saturday night though. They will appreciate what
the Erinyes were trying to achieve.
Somewhat heartened, my mind turns to the Erinyes' dress sense. "..heads
of the Furies were wreathed with serpents, and their whole appearance
was terrific and appalling". Terrific. Serpents.
Terrific \Ter*rif"ic\, a. [L. terrificus; fr. terrere: to frighten
+ facere: to make. See Terror, and Fact.] Causing
terror; adapted to excite great fear or dread; terrible; as, a
terrific form; a terrific sight.
Is it a symptom of society in decay that this word has come to mean:
Excellent \Ex"cel*lent\, a. [F. excellent, L. excellens, -entis,
p. pr. of excellere. See Excel.] 1. Excelling;
surpassing others in some good quality or the sum of qualities;
of great worth; eminent, in a good sense; superior, as an
excellent man, artist, citizen, husband, discourse, book, song,
etc.; excellent breeding, principles, aims, action.
Or as Milton would say:
To love . . . What I see excellent in good or fair.
On the other hand, David Hume (1711-1776):
The more exquisite any good is, of which a small specimen is
afforded us, the sharper is the evil, allied to it; and few
exceptions are found to this uniform law of nature. The most
sprightly wit borders on madness; the highest effusions of joy
produce the deepest melancholy; the most ravishing pleasures
are attended with the most cruel lassitude and disgust; the most
flattering hopes make way for the severest disappointments. And,
in general, no course of life has such safety (for happiness is
not to be dreamed of) as the temperate and moderate, which
maintains, as far as possible, a mediocrity, and a kind of
insensibility, in every thing.
Perhaps it is the sign of a brain in decay, rather than a society
that I dwell on it so, because Terrific hair serpents of course
lead unfailing into the arms of the Medusa. A guardian of fearsome
looks, but dubious motivations according to authorities like Clash
of the Titans (1981). A moot point, perhaps as Princeton's
history department no longer wants to talk to me. I'm cast adrift,
to rely on my Plasticine childhood memories and the mythological
swamp of the web.
NAME: Medusa
FAVORITE PASTIME: Turning men to stone
PLACE OF ORIGIN: Los Alamos Secret CIA Lab
SPECIAL GIFTS: Petrified Aggregate Projectist
FAVORITE MOVIE: Mighty Morphin' Power Rangers
GOALS IN LIFE: To be a nice person
FAVORITE BOOK: Madonna's biography
PET PEEVE: Bad hair days
Jesus. I've been sucked into comic book hell. Princeton, take me
back. I won't curse at the ancient Greek's sexual proclivities
anymore. I'm sure chaste marriages were very daunting to those yet
to have them. I was only joking. Lighten up will you?
But, alas, the history faculty however was still nursing its
wounds, and was not ready to forgive me. I'd have to find an
authoritative source somewhere else. Perhaps I could filter out the
comic book hell contaminants and come up with respected history Ivy,
even if it wasn't Princeton Ivy.
To decapitate - to castrate. The terror of the Medusa is thus
a terror of castration that is linked to the sight of something.
The hair upon the Medusa's head is frequently represented in
works of art in the form of snakes, and these once again are
derived from the castration complex. It is a remarkable fact
that however frightening they may be in themselves, they
nevertheless serve as a mitigation of the horror, for they
replace the penis, the absence of which is the cause of the
horror. This is a confirmation of the technical rule according
to which a multiplication of penis symbols signifies castration.
Sigmund Freud
The Medusa's Head
You had to hand it to Sigmund. He was nothing if not authoritative,
and after reading his inspiring words on the terrific serpent haired
woman, it became clear to me that _Proffs_ and the Gorgon had somewhat
unresolved metaphorical incompatibilities. I didn't want my software
giving anyone a castration complex.
I decided to put aside the denizens of Olympus from contest verbatim.
I'd read Fraud on Perversions a few years before and knew Medusa
was just a portent of what was to come. What I needed was another
polytheist culture entirely. Latin didn't help me. Nearly all the
Roman Gods had been vilely plagiarised from the Greeks, Latin names
or not. Freud knew this as well as I did. The Norse gods were of
little assistance to me. The only one worth paying school to was
Loki, the Norse god of mischief. Loki was a very cool fellow, which
was why his name has been appropriated as a moniker by virtually
every Bjorn, Sven, and Bob hacker to come out of Scandinavia in
the last 10 years. No, Loki was not for me.
The problem craved for a polytheist mythology outside the realm of
my, and more importantly Sigmund Freud's, Western European upbringing.
The answer to my question was by definition locked within a body of
history I didn't know an onion skin about. In order for the pilgrim
to reach the master he must first place his foot on the path, no
matter how gradual the slope up the mountain of enlightenment. Zen
Buddhism is good like that. Fabricating parables up as you go along
that is.
Zen master Gutei raised his finger whenever he was asked a
question about Zen. A young novice began to imitate
him in this way. When Gutei was told about the novice's imitation,
he sent for him and asked him if it were true. The novice admitted
it was so. Gutei asked him if he understood. In reply the novice
held up his index finger. Gutei promptly cut it off. The novice
ran from the room, howling in pain. As he reached the threshold,
Gutei called, "Boy!". When the novice returned, Gutei raised
his index finger. At that instant the novice was enlightened.
But wait. This Koan isn't fabricated. At least, not by me. And
unlike most Zen Koan's I think you will agree that it pleasantly
satisfies Schopenhauer's "life, without pain, has no meaning".
However, semantically I'm seeing a very unhealthy correlation to
forgetting one's encryption key and losing one's finger.
My mind is drawn to the memory of the real-life nightmare of laying
in the easy-chair of a Swanston St. hypnotherapist suite, gazing
intently into a bright, but distant red light, while chanting the
mantra "I am not cynical about hypnotherapy. I am not cynical about
hypnotherapy. I am not cynical about an Indian doctor with a 5th
floor office decorated coup'd'Edelstien. I'm not cynical about a
man who claims that his foremost clientele are rich middle aged women
who have put their jewellery somewhere "safe" and consequently
are unable to recall the location. I'm not cynical about a
hypnotist who extols the virtues of having a M.D. so his patients
can claim 2/3rds of the cost of these jewellery retrieval sessions
under Medicare. I'm not cynical that these middle aged women are
infact suffering from some form of Mesmer complex. And by all the
powers in Heaven, I have no pessimism about recalling my god-damned
pass-phrase!".
I never did remember the pass-phrase and you will notice Gutei
keeps very quiet about what he does with the novice's finger. In
this particular case, given the value of the data, I would have
traded placed with Gutei's novice, before you can say "Boy! Was I
enlightened".
I put my chin on my knee, and stare at the grain of my beige
plastic monitor case. Unless I could jump into another reality
it was the end of the line for _Proffs_ and _One Man's Search
for a Cryptographic Mythology_. Boy! Was I bummed.
One of the great sins of us programmers is procedural thinking.
And it was exactly this sort of folly I was engaging in. There were
around 6 billion other realities going about their business. I
grant you that 2 billion of these were no doubt indulging in the
confusion and diffusion of an avalanche of pseudo-random mental
images and sequences we associate with dreams, and probably another
2 billion busy expanding their minds with the powerful products of
hash or decaying into a compressive state of increasing entropy
and beer rounds. This still left a select 2 billion souls with
which to weave my work. If I approached them directly rather than
by analysing the information trails they left behind, I'd stand a
good chance of getting my feet onto the path of cryptographic
mythological enlightenment.
I have a Swedish friend who calls himself Elk on odd days and
Godflesh on even days. Don't ask why. As far as I know he's not
bisexual. Elk listened to my quest for cryptographic myth. He
had pondered, and uncovered a diamond in the rough. MARUTUKKU.
The third name is MARUTUKKU, Master of the arts of protection,
chained the Mad God at the Battle. Sealed the Ancient Ones in
their Caves, behind the Gates.
F a r o u t. Master of the arts of protection. Chained the Mad
God. Sealed the Ancient Ones in their Caves, behind the Gates.
Even the very word MARUTUKKU looks like it has been run through a
product cipher.
But I wasn't about to trust the work of a self-admitted Swedish
Sumeria freak who was obviously suffering from a bi-polar moniker
disorder. Was it mere coincidence that MARUTUKKU was an anagram
for KUKU MART and KUKU TRAM? I didn't want MARUTUKKU to end up as
another cog in the annals of Freudian analogy. What I
needed was the sort of Authoritative History that only Princeton's
history faculty could provide. The tablets of the Enuma Elish:
The Akkadian Creation Epic
Based on the translation of E. A. Speiser, with the additions
by A. K. Grayson, Ancient Near-Eastern Texts Relating to the
Old Testament, third edition, edited by James Pritchard (Princeton,
1969), pp. 60-72; 501-503, with minor modifications.
This work, the ancient Mesopotamian creation epic consisting of
seven tablets, tells of the struggle between cosmic order and
chaos. It is named after its opening words. It was recited on
the fourth day of the ancient Babylonian New Year's festival.
The text probably dates from the Old Babylonian period, i.e.,
the early part of the second millennium B.C.E.
[...]
The third name is MARUTUKKU Master of the arts of protection,
chained the Mad God at the Battle. Sealed the Ancient Ones in
their Caves, behind the Gates.
[...]
MARUTUKKU truly is the refuge of his land, city, and people.
Unto him shall the people give praise forever.
All praise the MARUTUKKU! My search had born a ripe and tasty
fruit indeed. The quest for a cryptographic mythology was
complete. Or was it? The words of Hume kept coming back to me
and I had a nagging feeling that there was some substance in
them.
If MARUTUKKU was my exquisite cryptographic good, of wit, effusive
joy, ravishing pleasure and flattering hope; then where was the
counter point? The
figure to its ground - the sharper evil, the
madness, the melancholy, the most cruel lassitudes and disgusts
and the severest disappointments. Was Hume right? Because if he
was, there was only one organisation this string of hellish adjectives
could represent. The cryptographic devil with its 500,000 sq feet
of office space in Maryland. But surely there could be no reference
to such an organisation in the 4,000 year old Babylonian tablets.
The idea was preposterous. Wasn't it?
TABLET VII OF THE ENUMA ELISH:
ESIZKUR shall sit aloft in the house of prayer;
May the gods bring their presents before him, that from
him they may receive their assignments; none can without
him create artful works. Four black-headed ones are
among his creatures; aside from him no god knows the
answer as to their days.
It's a cold and wintry night, here in Melbourne. Despite this, the
gusts of wind and rain seem to be unusually chilling. What had I,
in my search for a cryptographic mythology, stumbled onto?
I look hard at the seven letters E-S-I-Z-K-U-R. A frown turns to
a smile and then a dead pan stare. I write down:
IRK ZEUS
--
Prof. Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood and don't assign them tasks
proff@iq.org |and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 17 Oct 1997 20:56:52 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Marutukku - cryptographic filing system
Message-ID: <19971017123313.25514.qmail@iq.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Marutukku (my cryptographic file system/block device) is due for first
beta sometime next week. Before release, I'd like some (strong!)
criticism of the sub key generation / chaining techniques I'm
using. But first, for those who haven't a frigging clue what Marutukku
is, here is a hastily drawn non-cryptographic (more about that later)
features list:
o OS independent (excepting two files pertaining only to the
kernel drivers)
o Currently implemented as a 4.4bsd (Free/Net/OpenBSD)
loadable kernel module, and client (I have someone working
on the Linux port, but no promises).
o The BSD implementation turns a file (even an NFS mounted
file) into a device, on which any number of file systems
types can be created in the regular manner (or even a swap
partition ;)
o Endian independent - Marutukku extents (the ciphertext
regions) can be mailed around like .tar files
o various backup/recovery/whole extent encryption/decrypt
functions built into the client
Marutukku supports a variety of ciphers, and the cipher used for the
lattice (which is used to generate sub-keys for each file-system
block) generation is independent from the cipher used for block
functions. At the moment it only makes sense to talk of the lattice
generator in terms of a stream cipher or a block cipher/hash algorithm
in OFB. My design principles along the way have attempted as far as
possible to cover as yet unknown vulnerabilities in the under-laying
ciphers used with good management of IV's, salts, sub-keys, chaining
etc. Some of these steps may pose no additional security in relation
to certain attacks (i.e secret vs public IV's) on particular ciphers
but most come at little cost compared to the encryption itself.
Primary key/salt generation walk though:
A pass-phrase of size (l) is requested from the
user. max_keysize (256) public random key saltation bytes are
generated and [saved]. (l) of these bytes then salt the key
(XOR) (we don't use more than (l) to avoid any potential
issues with key-correlation attacks as the salt is public).
max_keysize cryptographically random bytes are produced to
form the "master key".
The salted pass-phrase is used to encrypt the master key,
which is [saved].
The (unencrypted) master key is used to key a stream cipher
(in this case that's rc4 or rc16) which is used for further
key generation.
Bytes [0] and [1] of the key stream output are saved for later
use in creating a pass-phrase checksum (more about that later).
Bytes [2] and [3] of the key stream are saved for later use in
encrypting the number of stream-cipher key-generator
iterations.
The stream cipher is then set to stir its internal state for
(t) seconds (a user supplied value). The number of iterations
(i) is counted, the two LSBytes's from which are encrypted
with [2] and [3] and [saved]. The reason we don't encrypt the
MSB's is that they are are likely to be known-plain-text (all
0 bits to the left) which can be used for key-scanning checks.
This has the annoying effect of reducing the uncertainty in
the iteration count to 2^16, but I can't fathom a way around
it without exposing bits of the stream output.
Stream bytes [3+i] and [3+i+1] are XOR-ed with bytes [0] and
[1] to provide a 16 bit key checksum and [saved]. The distance
here serves to obfuscate any predictability in the key-stream
generator and force the attacker though all (i) iterations to
test each key (or if they are attacking directly on the
internal state of the stream cipher at (i) to generate guesses
at [0] as well).
A public random key-salt for the two primary lattice keys are
generated and [saved].
n * 2 (n=32 for a 4G file-system-block maru extent) public
random sub-key lattice IV's are generated and [saved].
The public master block IV array salt is randomly generated
and [saved].
Instance/Lattice generation:
The saved maru saltation/IV header (above) is loaded, and the the
pass-phrase is salted as before. The master key is decrypted
and the key stream cipher is initialised, half the checksum is
generated, the number of iterations decrypted, the generator
stired, the other half of the checksum is generated and the
checksum verified.
The two primary lattice salts are encrypted with the key
stream stream and form the primary lattice keys for the
lattice fs-block sub-key generating block cipher.
The n*2 lattice sub-key IV's are encrypted with the stream and
form the lattice sub key array.
The master block IV salt array is encrypted with the stream
and forms the master block IV array.
This ends the primary initialisation stage.
Block key generation:
The problem here is to turn a block number into a unique
"sub-key" for each fs-block in such a way that frustrates
possible key (or other) correlation attacks. i.e discovering
the key for one block should not help the cryptanalyst in
discovering the key for any other block. It is simple to
generate a sub-key key-stream with a stream cipher or a block
cipher operating in OFB, but storing such a construct is
untenable and it is not efficient to generate on the fly (for
instance, the first fs-block accessed might be the last in the
maru extent, which would correlate to the last sub-key
generated by the key-stream). The solution designed and
employed is a binary tree based key generation approach, that
can generate a cryptographically-unique block key in
log2(max_blocks) steps. The author has thought of various
variations on this scheme (e.g with two different
cryptographic hashes, one moving left, one moving right), but
see below for the variant used in Marutukku.
It is simpler to visualise the sub-key generator tree "turned
inside out" as a 2d lattice, two columns across and n rows
down (this is also how it is implemented in Marutukku). i.e
______________________
|LEFT | RIGHT|
|----------+----------|
|L-SUBKEY 0|L-SUBKEY 1|
|----------+----------|
|L-SUBKEY 1|L-SUBKEY 2|
|----------+----------|
| .... | .... |
|----------+----------|
|L-SUBKEY n|L-SUBKEY n|
|__________|__________|
The journey from fs-block number to fs-block-key starts with
the msb of the block number and the top of the lattice (we use
the msb rather than the lsb for caching reasons. Using the lsb
naively seems more secure but uncacheable, yet on closer
examination, neither of theses claims are true (however the
Marutukku lattice sub-key cache *performance* using lsb is
poor due to the inverted clustering)). As each bit slides off
the left of the block number, key material is picked up from
the left or right of the lattice according to whether the bit
is on or off. Each lattice sub-key chosen is encrypted with
the next (CBC wise, but lattice sub-key size, rather than
cipher block size) at the top of the lattice and twines it's
way down to the end, collecting key-material as it goes. The
result is a unique compressed (i.e its the CBC chaining
performing the compression) "necklace" of key material which
forms the appropriate fs-block key.
FS block encryption:
Each plain text block in the fs-block is XOR-ed with the
corresponding entry in the master block IV array and then CBC
encrypted. In effect, each cipher block has two IV's. The
first block, which lacks any cipher text from previous blocks
to chain with, uses the block number XOR-ed with its master
block IV entry.
The rational behind this is that we have the benefits of CBC's
error-recovering abilities without it's major drawback (and it
is certainly not alone here among major block cipher
modes) - that is, find the key for (cipher) block 0 and the
attacker can successfully decrypt every other block that (CBC
wise) follows it.
Comments?
--
Prof. Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood and don't assign them tasks
proff@iq.org |and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 1997 09:19:33 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: cryptographic anecdotes
Message-ID: <19971027010829.851.qmail@iq.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I'm involved in producing a segment on cryptograpic issues for Radio
National (ABC) to be aired latter this week. I have no problems with
the technical issues but could use some (reliable) "colour" i.e small
quirky or unusual anecdotes that will draw in and hold the larger
order of listeners who don't otherwise have any cryptography/
cryptographic-policy background.
e.g o RSA export-a-crypto-system .sig
o algorithm tatoos (couldn't find any confirmation of
this :()
o if cryptography is arms, then US constitution
right to bear arms
o programming languages embody freedom of speech
(patel)
o (otoh) machine-understandable languages are not protected
speech: as soon as a computer can understand Ulysses
it's no-longer protected. (I'm not sure about Ulysses
but Oracle and the computational linguistics groups
at Edinburgh and MIT have code to perform summaries
of the King James bible).
Cheers,
Julian.
--
Prof. Julian Assange |"Don't worry about people stealing your ideas. If your
| Ideas are any good, you'll have to ram them down
proff@iq.org | people's throats."
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | -- Howard Aiken
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Martin Pool
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 1997 16:00:48 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: cryptographic anecdotes -- GPS and
In-Reply-To: <19971027010829.851.qmail@iq.org>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On 27 Oct 1997, Julian Assange wrote:
> I'm involved in producing a segment on cryptograpic issues for Radio
> National (ABC) to be aired latter this week. I have no problems with
> the technical issues but could use some (reliable) "colour" i.e small
> quirky or unusual anecdotes that will draw in and hold the larger
> order of listeners who don't otherwise have any cryptography/
> cryptographic-policy background.
Do you know the timeslot yet?
"Java Network Services" (I forget the exact title) from Prentice Hall has
a case study about interfacing Java to GPS hardware. The introduction to
the chapter provides some very interesting information about GPS which,
like crypto, is a "dual use technology". It's not exactly the same, of
course -- GPS is about people getting information that the state would
like to keep secret, not vice versa -- but it's still interesting.
("Location escrow" is a nice phrase.)
If the book is correct, then the system was originally designed to
introduce errors into the part of the time signal decypherable by civilian
users that would produce positional uncertainty of about 100m. The
complete signal, available (in theory) only to US or US-sponsored forces,
allowed positions to be calculated to within an accuracy of about 1m.
However, hackers being what they are ;-), somebody realized that since the
same errors were observed by all receivers, one could compensate for them
to some extent.
Specifically, one has a base station somewhere whose location you know
very accurately by other means. This station continuously subtracts it's
known position from the position calculated by it's civilian GPS hardware,
and broadcasts the difference over the pager network or some other public
medium. (The math is not quite that simple, I imagine, but conceptually
that's what you do.) Combining this information with the satellite signals
allows civilian GPS hardware to improve it's accuracy by an order of
magnitude to about 10m of uncertainty, which could make all the difference
in, say, a search-and-rescue situation. This technique is called,
obviously enough, "differential GPS".
Even more interesting is that the DOT is apparently negotiating with the
DOD to make full GPS publicly available, presumably because it would sell
more cars. (Just what the world needs...) Quite possibly there will be
export restrictions, of course. The similarities to commerce vs TLA
concerns in encryption are obvious. I don't know the outcome of the
negotiations, but I got the impression it was more likely than not.
The book was not immensely technical, so some (or all) details may be
wrong.
Assuming you're talking about Australian RN, then comparisons to the
recent gun buy-back scheme might be interesting, on the topic of
balance-of-power between the people and the state. (Hmm, wish I could
post "Blue Murder", a documovie about NSW police corruption in the 80s to
the list.)
--
Martin Pool
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Anonymous
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 1997 06:15:36 +0800
To: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject: Re: cryptographic anecdotes
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Julian Assange wrote:
>I'm involved in producing a segment on cryptograpic issues for Radio
>National (ABC) to be aired latter this week. I have no problems with
>the technical issues but could use some (reliable) "colour" i.e small
>quirky or unusual anecdotes that will draw in and hold the larger
>order of listeners who don't otherwise have any cryptography/
>cryptographic-policy background.
>
> e.g o RSA export-a-crypto-system .sig
> o algorithm tatoos (couldn't find any confirmation of
> this :()
http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ has a picture and name of the person
with the RSA tattoo.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Bill Stewart
Date: Wed, 29 Oct 1997 15:10:00 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Message-ID: <3.0.3.32.19971028203232.00691d48@popd.ix.netcom.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 01:08 AM 10/27/1997 -0000, Julian Assange wrote:
>I'm involved in producing a segment on cryptograpic issues for Radio
>National (ABC) to be aired latter this week. I have no problems with
>the technical issues but could use some (reliable) "colour" i.e small
Cool.
My usual rant on cryptography and privacy goes like this:
[If you're talking to non-Americans, fill in your local
versions of Bureaucratic TaxID numbers...]
- How may of you like to fill out forms with your Social Security Number?
It's so convenient, having one little number that ties in everything,
from your taxes to your bank accounts to your credit reports to your
cellphone to your credit cards to all the jobs you've worked to
the $25 lunch you had yesterday and the books you bought at Borders
to the people you live with to the gasoline your roommate Bob bought
for your car Friday night? Me neither.
Computers are really good at tying information together -
take one thing you know, and they can connect it to other things they know -
and they're getting so ridiculously cheap that the only reason they
_don't_ tie two things together is that nobody's figured out how to
make money off of that combination yet. We know that after Bob bought gas,
he had a couple of drinks at a bar where many of the other patrons
use the same credit cards at gay bookstores, but we just haven't decided yet
whether to send _you_ some discount coupons for the same bookstores,
or to suggest that your girlfriend Alice get an AIDS test before we'll
give her medical insurance at her new job. After all, we're already testing her
cholesterol level because of all the pork you've been buying at Safeway.
So what can we do about it? Computers keep getting cheaper
and faster every year, and that won't stop. Laws don't help much.
Some European governments try data privacy laws, but they're mainly an
excuse to inspect _your_ computer for illicit data -
the same governments already require you to join the National Health Care
and carry a National ID card in many of them, and pay income tax,
and there's that nice new EC driver's license instead of the old
one from each country. The US makes some noise about that,
but it's the same government that's making you give your SSN and
thumbprint to get a driver's license and registering all kids with the IRS.
If you can't stop people from combining information, the alternative
is don't give it to them - use cash, but more importantly build computer
systems that let businesses solve their business problems without
universal identifiers. Use employee ID numbers on forms instead of SSNs
(and in a global business environment, it's pretty dumb to do otherwise.)
Use cryptographic techniques, like digital cash, to let people buy things
on the web without sending your credit card numbers. There's some cool
work by David Chaum on creating credentials, like driver's licenses that
keep track of your tickets but don't use ID numbers, and voter registration
that indicates your voting district and status but aren't tied to the census
that says three of your neighbors are black with Haitian parents.
You can give everybody a stack of taxpayer-ids, whether
on paper or on a smartcard, any bank or employer that needs to collect
taxes on you has a number to use, but only the IRS can tie them together,
because nobody else needs to. 9-digit SSNs are running out soon anyway;
we could change to something secure for the next time.
Chaum's digicash system was designed for automated road tolls, so you can
drive through the tollbooth without slowing down, and the toll system takes
the money off your smartcard, without telling Big Brother where _you_ were.
Here in California, we can send a monthly bill to the address on your license,
but there are European countries that are still remember having German or
Russian soldiers running them and want an infrastructure they can't abuse.
We're more worried about the automatic traffic fines, when your car didn't take
enough minutes to get from Exit 4 to Exit 17 Friday night. You know,
the exit by that bar Bob went to. Next door to the synagogue bookstore.
There's an alternative to crypto - it's "give up privacy".
Go the David Brin route, and make sure that if the police have
video cameras everywhere pointed at you, you and your neighbors
have video cameras everywhere pointed at them. Ask Rodney King
if that matters - or ask the next cop who wants to beat up the next driver.
Cameras keep getting cheaper and smaller, and networks to tie them
together and computers to interpret the pictures are getting faster.
And the police do have cameras - last year, when San Francisco was planning
to close the Central Freeway for repairs, they video taped all the cars
for a few days, looked up the license plate numbers, and mailed the drivers
postcards asking them to take a different road when construction started.
It worked real well, especially because they didn't need 100% coverage.
They used cheap labor to read the license plates off the video tapes,
but computers can do it in real time if you need to do it often,
and they can match the SSN on your car registration with the SSN
on your tax forms from work, so they _could_ send you a nice postcard
suggesting the best router to get to _your_ office. And a coupon for
the Starbucks drivethrough on the way. So Have A _Nice_ Day!
>o programming languages embody freedom of speech
One of my favorite programming languages is Algol.
It's designed for describing mathematical problems very precisely
for humans, and it was the standard language used by the
"Communications of the ACM" journal for many years.
[ACM=Association for Computing Machinery].
It's not designed for telling computers what to do,
though there is computer software that will read Algol
and do it. But if an American math teacher writes a couple
lines of mathematics in Algol and emails them to a non-American student,
he'd better be a registered international arms dealer,
or he can be busted....
Thanks!
Bill
Bill Stewart, stewarts@ix.netcom.com
Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 15 Nov 1997 21:11:34 +0800
To: Anonymous
Subject: Re: Gieger dies in poverty...not!
In-Reply-To: <4d6eb9fde26d7cea2f4cb06471340fad@anon.efga.org>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Anonymous writes:
> Why? Because those being hatefully intolerant have the 'right'
> beliefs as to what the Bible says.
> (Am I a racist if I don't also include an example from the Koran?)
No, just an illiterate.
--
Prof. Julian Assange |"Don't worry about people stealing your ideas. If your
| Ideas are any good, you'll have to ram them down
proff@iq.org | people's throats." -- Stolen quote from Howard Aiken
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | http://underground.org/book
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1997 14:00:46 +0800
To: coderpunks@toad.com
Subject: Rubber-hose proof (cryptographically deniable) file-systems.
Message-ID: <19971206054919.5142.qmail@iq.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Here's a copy of some correspondence in relation to my implementation
of a `rubber hose proof' (cryptographically deniable) file system
(actually implimented as a block device on which you can mount any
file system). I'm happy with the cryptographic strength of the system
(but feel free to comment anyway). That said, I'm not convinced that
my avoidance of media (i.e disk surface) analysis attacks (which could
potentially show the pre-sense or otherwise of cryptographic file
systems other than the "duress" ones) is entirely effective. I'd like
some comment from gauss-ridden declassification guru's here :)
[...]
Here's how I'm implementing `aspects' in Rubberhose/marutukku;
`aspect' is the term I'm using to refer to the
cryptographically-deniable (i.e rubber-hose-proofed) "portion", of a
maru extent i.e it's a different _aspect_ (view) of the same
underlying physical block extent.
I decided that random split lengths don't add to the security of the
scheme - only 2x from my calculations - which isn't enough to warrant
the increase in memory use and complexity involved. The extent is
simply divided up into n splits (say 1024 or one every 256k, whichever
is smaller). Each aspect has an encrypted 32bit block remap list
(which is simply a linear array because of the fixed split size). A
split avoidance bit-map is created from these per-aspect remap lists
on instantiation of the aspects. An individual aspect looks like so
(when saved):
typedef struct
{
m_u32 keySum; /* key checksum */
u_char masterKey[MAX_KEY];
u_char latticeCipherType, blockCipherType;
u_char pad[MAX_BLOCK - (4 + MAX_KEY + 1 + 1) % MAX_BLOCK]; /* block align */
} maruCycle;
typedef struct
{
maruCycle cycle;
u_char keySalt[MAX_PASSPHRASE];
maruLatticeKey latticeKeySalt[2];
u_char blockIV[MAX_FS_BLOCK_SIZE];
u_char latticeSalt[2*MAX_LATTICE_DEPTH*MAX_BLOCK_KEY]; /* must be 64 aligned */
m_u32 remap[MAX_SPLITS];
m_u32 iterations;
maruCipher keyCipherType;
} maruHeaderAspect;
There are an array of (8 by default) of these constructs in a maruHeader.
The smap accessor macros are simple:
#define SMAP_SET(p, n) (((p))[(n)/(sizeof(maruSmap)*8)] |= (1 << ((n) % (sizeof(maruSmap)*8)))) #define SMAP_CLR(p, n) (((p))[(n)/(sizeof(maruSmap)*8)] &= ~ (1 << ((n) % (sizeof(maruSmap)*8)))) #define SMAP_ISSET(p, n) (((p))[(n)/(sizeof(maruSmap)*8)] & (1 << ((n) % (sizeof(maruSmap)*8)))) By default, each unused maruHeaderAspect struct contains random noise (except for keyCipherType, which defaults to being the same for all aspects) and is of course indistinguishable from a valid maruAspect without the associated key. Instantiation example: Say you have three valid aspects, a1, a2 and a3. Arbitrarily, you have chosen a1 to be the simple duress aspect (i.e ``you expect us to believe you have solitary letter of donation to the Polit Bureau Ball in your entire encrypted file system?! Do you know what this is Nikov? . THIS is the finest cryptanalytic device known to
man. THIS is a RUBBERHOSE! *thwap* *thwunk* *boink*. Now... what's the
*real* key Nikov... or should we call you... Nikolay Bukharin?''), a2 to
be the limited disclosure aspect ("Dear diary. Nikita, Ivan, Boris and
came over today and smoked a *shit load* of hash. Not wanting to
offend, I had a toke, but like that capitalist dog
^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H illustious leader of the freeworld, was
careful not to inhale.") and a3 has your ice-9 formula nicely tucked
away.
You decide one fine morning that you want to add an ATP pre-cursor as
a catalyst to your ice-9 recipe of destruction (ostensibly, you plan
to generate this stuff from cultures of genetically modified mouse
liver cell mitochondria), and provide the a1, a2 and a3 pass-phrases.
a1, a2 and a3 are decrypted. the aspect remap is parsed and used to
create the physical block "avoidance" map (checking for conflicts
along the way).
Joyous about the frozen seas to come, you copy the ATP pre-cursor
catalyst into a3 and the file system tries to write a new block - e.g
b28 - to a3. b28 is translated through the a3 remap table to b-1
(unallocated). A random block remap number is generated e.g b595 and
tested against the avoidance smap. If free, it is marked and chosen to
be the new a3 mapping, otherwise the algorithm simply does a circular
hunt for the next free entry in the avoidance smap.
Naturally, reading only requires the key of the aspect you are
interested in (divulging). Writing to one aspect without the keys to
the other aspects will randomly trash them as new splits are assigned.
Timer remaps, reads and re-writes:
This would be the simple end of it, were it not but for magnetic
domain leakage/disk surface wear analysis attacks. Theoretically, this
sort of attack could used to demonstrate access patterns by the drive
head in regions outside those used by the duress aspect blocks. What
we want to do here is to make sure the non-data carrying
magnetic/other properties of the disk substrate are as close to a
Jackson Pollock painting as is possible. i.e totally random :) Three
methods are used:
1) every few seconds, we read a random number of blocks within
a split in a random location and write it back to that same
location with a m-1/m (e.g 9/10) (recursive) chance of an
additional write.
2) every-time there is a conventional write, there is a m-1/m
chance of a full remap of the split concerned.
3) every n seconds a random full split remap.
(maybe not needed given the statistical properties of the
above - I need to think about this a lot more. its not simple)
All aspects are defined to take up 100% of the marutukku extent from
the file-system perspective - this is essential to our deniability
scheme. This works fine with most file-systems - e.g UFS, because they
only write to a small fraction of their addressable blocks when
formatted - i.a few super-blocks and inode, rather than zeroing every
block, and so split usage for a given aspect reflects population of
the file system that pertains to it.
Cheers,
Julian.
--
Prof. Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood and don't assign them tasks
proff@iq.org |and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
X-Authentication-Warning: blacklodge.c2.net: majordom set sender to owner-cryptography@c2.org using -f
To: David Honig <honig@otc.net>
Cc: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>, coderpunks@toad.com,
cryptography@c2.net
Subject: Re: Speaking of rubber hoses [was Re: Storage encryption tools]
References: <"James A. Donald"'s message of "Tue, 9 Dec 1997 22:39:40 -0800 (PST)"> <199712100639.WAA07097@proxy4.ba.best.com> <3.0.5.32.19971210105432.007e5360@otc.net>
From: Julian Assange <proff@iq.org>
Date: 11 Dec 1997 11:41:25 +1100
In-Reply-To: David Honig's message of "Wed, 10 Dec 1997 10:54:32 -0800"
Message-ID: <wx90ts1zka.fsf@profane.iq.org>
Lines: 44
X-Mailer: Gnus v5.5/XEmacs 20.3 - "Vatican City"
Sender: owner-cryptography@c2.net
David Honig <honig@otc.net> writes:
> At 12:12 AM 12/11/97 +1100, Julian Assange wrote:
> >
> >Speaking of rubber hose cryptography, here is a copy of some recent
> >correspondence concerning that subject:
> >
> >
> >I have designed a `cryptographically deniable' (other wise known as
> >rubber-hose-proof - a `rubber hose' being the beating weapon of choice
> >for pass-phrase extraction) file system. the file system has 0-n keys,
> >each of which divulges different data. This is essence of the
> >deniability scheme, whereby one can divulge the "duress" key which
> >will only decrypt pre-meditated "duress" information, i.e love letters
> >pertaining to some illicit, but otherwise harmless liason, as opposed
> >to Russian SS30 launch codes. The file-system has the following
> >property:
> >
>
> I've got a sketch of a similar plan in
> http://rattler.otc.net/Crypto/MyDocs/Decoy.doc
>
> If you compress cargo & decoy you may not have to explain the still-hidden
> cargo-message.
This is the problem with simple byte-interleaving - even when compressed, once
you have the decoy key, you can uncompress the decoy and show there's
`something more'.
What's "nice" about my scheme (and it really only works for encrypted file
systems), is that it's not computationally (or physically if I have my
anti-stm statistical attack method done right) feasible to show that there
is any "cargo" at all - what you are seeing as gaps between the duress
data, is exactly what you would see if the duress file-system wasn't full
(yet). i.e it's not possible given a set of duress keys to show that
the "empty" blocks are anything but empty blocks - i.e copy material into
the duress file-system and they will be assigned, and over-written as one
would expect if you only had the duress key.
--
Prof. Julian Assange |"Don't worry about people stealing your ideas. If your
| Ideas are any good, you'll have to ram them down
proff@iq.org | people's throats." -- Stolen quote from Howard Aiken
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu | http://underground.org/book
X-Authentication-Warning: blacklodge.c2.net: majordom set sender to owner-cryptography@c2.org using -f
Date: 12 Dec 1997 05:26:20 -0000
Message-ID: <19971212052620.593.qmail@iq.org>
From: Julian Assange <proff@iq.org>
To: coderpunks@toad.com, cryptography@c2.net
Subject: chaotic vs random functions
Sender: owner-cryptography@c2.net
I'm looking for a chaotic (seeded) iterative function, that has
the following property:
Presume that the output of our function f is normalised into
the ranges +/- 1. It is not predictable over i iterations
of the function (and i is large, say a few billion) whether
the average of outputs to that point is close to zero. i.e
there is no faster way to determine the average of outputs of
f over period i iterations without conducting all i
iterations. It's reasonable for the average output of f to
"tend to the average" as i grows large, but I'd like
"long periods" of unpredictably non-random behavior.
Cheers,
Julian.
--
Prof. Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood and don't assign them tasks
proff@iq.org |and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sun, 28 Dec 1997 16:25:10 +0800
To: Information Security
Subject: Re: cypherpunks missing from Usenet
In-Reply-To: <199712280157.UAA17694@panix2.panix.com>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Information Security writes:
> The Clive Feather person is emphatic only real child porn
> is being deleted and reported to the police; he clarified
> that the 1800 items listed for Sep 1997 are *total* for
> the existence of IWF.
>
> So, it's probably going to take me several weeks to
> verify his claim.
>
> I back off from my claim (based on his dialog) that
> they are canceling mere nudity, for now.
> ---guy
Who-fucking-ray.
Less talk, more code.
--
Prof. Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood and don't assign them tasks
proff@iq.org |and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
1998
Date: Fri, 2 Jan 1998 03:23:23 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 2:52 AM -0800 1/1/98, Julian Assange wrote:
>Anyone noticed this before?
>
>------- Start of forwarded message -------
>Date: 1 Jan 1998 09:54:51 -0000
>Message-ID: <19980101095451.25998.qmail@suburbia.net>
>From: proff@suburbia.net
>To: proff@suburbia.net
>Subject:home.html
>
>
>
> Scoop the Grim Reaper!
>
> Who will live?
>
> Who will die?
Yeah, a few people pointed this out when Bell's "Assassination Politics"
stuff began hitting the CP list, circa fall of 1995.
--Tim May
The Feds have shown their hand: they want a ban on domestic cryptography
---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:----
Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money,
ComSec 3DES: 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero
W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets,
Higher Power: 2^2,976,221 | black markets, collapse of governments.
"National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Kent Crispin
Date: Fri, 2 Jan 1998 07:21:29 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Jim Bell... lives... on... in... Hollywood!
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <19980101150542.36875@songbird.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On Thu, Jan 01, 1998 at 09:52:20PM +1100, Julian Assange wrote:
>
> Anyone noticed this before?
No. But there are two obvious differences between this and the Bell
plan: 1) it's not anon; 2) you are explicitly barred from winning if
you contribute in any way to the death.
[...]
> You will not receive credit for a death if you somehow contribute to
> that person's demise. If there's any dispute over the exact date of a
> celebrity's demise, information listed on the death certificate will
> prevail.
>
> Dewey's Death Pool is open to residents of the 50 United States and
> the District of Columbia who are 18 years or older. For complete
> rules, see the Official Rules.
So you have to provide proof of age to claim...
[...]
--
Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited",
kent@songbird.com the thief he kindly spoke...
PGP fingerprint: B1 8B 72 ED 55 21 5E 44 61 F4 58 0F 72 10 65 55
http://songbird.com/kent/pgp_key.html
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 1 Jan 1998 19:08:37 +0800
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Jim Bell... lives... on... in... Hollywood!
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Anyone noticed this before?
------- Start of forwarded message -------
Date: 1 Jan 1998 09:54:51 -0000
Message-ID: <19980101095451.25998.qmail@suburbia.net>
From: proff@suburbia.net
To: proff@suburbia.net
Subject:home.html
Scoop the Grim Reaper!
Who will live?
Who will die?
And who will win the grand prize in Dewey's Death Pool -- an
all-expense paid, two-day Hollywood Death Tour for two. Or one of four
quarterly prizes -- a fabulous celebrity death library.
It's fun, it's easy -- and all you have to do to win is correctly
forecast more celebrity deaths for the calendar year 1998 than any
other entrant.
Here's how it works: Between now and December 31, 1997, fill out an
entry form, listing your picks in descending likelihood of death. For
instance, if you believe Celebrity X is a cinch to die within the
year, list him or her in the No. 1 slot, followed by your second most
likely choice in the No. 2 slot, etc. For tie-breaking reasons, a
correct pick in the top slot is worth 10 points, a correct pick in the
second is worth 9 points, and so forth. (Please list an alternative
name in the event that one of your choices dies before the game
begins. The alternative will be substituted in the empty slot and you
will not receive credit for the original name.)
At the end of the year, the contestant with the most correct picks
wins. If there's a tie, the winner will be the person with the highest
point total. In the event of a point-tie, the contestant with the
youngest decedent will win. Judges' decisions are final.
In addition, quarterly prizes (an assortment of guide books, maps,
videos and other celebrity death memoribilia) will be awarded for the
most correct picks within the four three-month intervals ending 11:59
EST on March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31, 1998. In the
event of ties, tie-breaker rules described above apply. Standings will
be updated on the site regularly.
To qualify as a correct "hit," a death must be noted in one or more of
the following publications: New York Times, Los Angeles Times, U.S.A.
Today, Time, Newsweek or People.
Paid obituaries do not count; the death notice MUST appear in the
context of a news story, roundup item or editorial obituary. If
someone's death is not mentioned in one of the above publications, you
will not receive credit.
You will not receive credit for a death if you somehow contribute to
that person's demise. If there's any dispute over the exact date of a
celebrity's demise, information listed on the death certificate will
prevail.
Dewey's Death Pool is open to residents of the 50 United States and
the District of Columbia who are 18 years or older. For complete
rules, see the Official Rules.
[INLINE]
home | entry | rules
_________________________________________________________________
Back to Webb Page Confidential
------- End of forwarded message -------
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Sergey Goldgaber
Date: Thu, 8 Jan 1998 11:57:04 +0800
To: Kent Crispin
Subject: Re: Jim Bell... lives... on... in... Hollywood!
In-Reply-To: <19980101150542.36875@songbird.com>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
On Thu, 1 Jan 1998, Kent Crispin wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 01, 1998 at 09:52:20PM +1100, Julian Assange wrote:
> >
> > Anyone noticed this before?
>
> No. But there are two obvious differences between this and the Bell
> plan: 1) it's not anon; 2) you are explicitly barred from winning if
> you contribute in any way to the death.
1 - Anonymity is technically feasable.
2 - This requirement is a legal necessity. Otherwise, the organization
may be seen as advocating murder.
Obviously, if the "Death Pool" was fully anonymous, there would be
no way to tell if the winner had contributed in any way to the death.
Thus, I think we may be well on our way to Assasination Politics.
- Sergey Goldgaber
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: David Honig
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 1998 02:38:30 +0800
To: Sergey Goldgaber
Subject: Re: Jim Bell... lives... on... in... Hollywood!
In-Reply-To: <19980101150542.36875@songbird.com>
Message-ID: <3.0.5.32.19980108092108.007c3b30@206.40.207.40>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
At 10:48 PM 1/7/98 -0800, Sergey Goldgaber wrote:
>On Thu, 1 Jan 1998, Kent Crispin wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jan 01, 1998 at 09:52:20PM +1100, Julian Assange wrote:
>> >
>> > Anyone noticed this before?
>>
>> No. But there are two obvious differences between this and the Bell
>> plan: 1) it's not anon; 2) you are explicitly barred from winning if
>> you contribute in any way to the death.
>
>1 - Anonymity is technically feasable.
>
>2 - This requirement is a legal necessity. Otherwise, the organization
> may be seen as advocating murder.
>
>Obviously, if the "Death Pool" was fully anonymous, there would be
>no way to tell if the winner had contributed in any way to the death.
>
>Thus, I think we may be well on our way to Assasination Politics.
>
> - Sergey Goldgaber
I agree, but "contribute to death" needs to be operationalized. Here's a
proposal:
If a homicide suspect is arrested within N months, they will be isolated
from the net
and the owner of the winning ID will have to perform a challenge-response.
Since
the suspect couldn't have replied, they are different; if a pair
collaborated, well,
when a hit man is caught, his payoff matrix will usually make him turn in
the client.
The N-months might be a weakness since there is no expiration time on
homicide.
But in cases where cause of death is known and it can be proved that the
incarcerated is not the winner, it looks good. E.g., a bet that "more than
two BATF agents will be blown up in 97" would be safely payable now that those
fellows with the short haircuts have been convicted.
------------------------------------------------------------
David Honig Orbit Technology
honig@otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu
"How do you know you are not being deceived?"
---A Compendium of Analytic TradeCraft Notes,
Directorate of Intelligence, CIA
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 1998 08:07:24 +0800
To: "James A. Donald"
Subject: Re: Crypto Kong penetration.
In-Reply-To: <199801142049.MAA02259@proxy4.ba.best.com>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
"James A. Donald" writes:
> -- 2
> Since release there have been a very large number of hits on
> the Kong documents, and mere 102 downloads of the program,
> and 74 downloads of the source code.
>
> The large number of source code downloads indicates that I am
> only reaching the crypto techie audience, that for the most
> part is already able to use PGP, not the non tech audience
> that Crypto Kong was designed for.
>
My first recomendation would be to change the name. Quickly.
Cheers,
Julian.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Tue, 24 Feb 1998 12:20:41 -0800 (PST)
To: "William H. Geiger III"
Subject: Re: Fight ECHELON while the topic is hot!
In-Reply-To: <199802241648.LAA15368@users.invweb.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
"William H. Geiger III" writes:
> No not at all I just don't have any pie-in-the-sky daydreams that it will
> mean squat! I have better things to do with my time than dealing with a
Please, please go do better things.
Cheers,
Julian.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 1998 22:59:10 -0800 (PST)
To: mgraffam@mhv.net
Subject: Deniable Cryptography [was winnowing, chaffing etc]
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
mgraffam@mhv.net writes:
> I figure the best we can do is to hide the contents of S with crypto and
> hide its existence through other means. Traditional stego works well
> for this latter goal, but it does not give us a way to cough up something
> meaningful in place of S, which could be very handy.
>
> In short, certainly the existence of S needs to be hidden, and it would be
> best to do hide it in plain sight as it were, in a big junk pile with
> everything else on the drive.
>
> Indexing this huge mess of data to allow for a practical system to work
> with is certainly a challenge, and in all likelyhood impossible given the
> parameters of the system.
>
Marutukku (my rubber-hose proof filing system) addresses most of these
technical issues, but I'd like to just comment on the best strategy
game-theory wise, of the person wielding the rubber-hose.
In Marutukku the number of encrypted extents (deniable "virtual"
partitions) defaults to 16 (although is theoretically unlimited). As
soon as you get over about 4 pass-phrases, the excuse "I can't recall"
or "there's nothing else there" starts to sounding highly plauseable.
Ordinarily best strategy for the rubber-hose wielder is to keep on
beating keys out of (let us say, Alice) indefinitely till there are no
keys left. However, and importantly, in Marutukku, *Alice* can never
prove that she has handed over the last key. As Alice hands over more
and more keys, her attackers can make observations like "the keys
Alice has divulged correspond to 85% of the bits". However at no point
can her attackers prove that the remaining 15% isn't simply
unallocated space, and at no point can Alice, even if she wants to,
divulge keys to 100% of the bits, in order to get the un-divulged
portion down to 0%. An obvious point to make here is that
fraction-of-total-data divulged is essentially meaningless, and both
parties know it - the launch code extent may only take up .01% of the
total bit-space.
What I find interesting, is how this constraint on Alice's behaviour
actually protects her from revealing her own keys, because each party,
at the outset can make the following observations:
Rubber-hose-squad: We will never be able to show that Alice has
revealed the last of her keys. Further, even if
Alice has co-operated fully and has revealed all of
her keys, she will not be able to prove it.
Therefor, we must assume that at every stage that
Alice has kept secret information from us, and
continue to beat her, even though she may have
revealed the last of her keys. But the whole time
we will feel uneasy about this because Alice may
have co-operated fully. Alice will have realised this
though, and so presumably it's going to be very hard
to get keys out of her at all.
Alice: (Having realised the above) I can never prove that I
have revealed the last of my keys. In the end I'm
bound for continued beating, even if I can buy
brief respites by coughing up keys from time to
time. Therefor, it would be foolish to divulge my
most sensitive keys, because (a) I'll be that much
closer to the stage where I have nothing left to
divulge at all (it's interesting to note that this
seemingly illogical, yet entirely valid argument of
Alice's can protect the most sensitive of Alice's
keys the "whole way though", like a form
mathematical induction), and (b) the taste of truly
secret information will only serve to make my
aggressors come to the view that there is even
higher quality information yet to come, re-doubling
their beating efforts to get at it, even if I have
revealed all. Therefor, my best strategy would be
to (a) reveal no keys at all or (b) depending on
the nature of the aggressors, and the psychology of
the situation, very slowly reveal my "duress" and
other low-sensitivity keys.
Alice certainly isn't in for a very nice time of it (although she
she's far more likely to protect her data).
On the individual level, you would have to question whether you might
want to be able to prove that, yes, infact you really have surrendered
the last remaining key, at the cost of a far greater likelihood that
you will. It really depends on the nature of your opponents. Are they
intelligent enough understand the deniable spect of the cryptosystem
and come up with the above strategy? Determined to the extent they
are will to invest the time and effort in wresting the last key out of
you? Ruthless - do they say "Please", hand you a Court Order, or is it
more of a Room 101 affair?
But there's more to the story.
Organisations and groups may have quite different goals in terms of
key retention vs torture relief to the individuals that comprise them,
even if their views are otherwise co-aligned. I'm not talking about
some mega-complex multinational 8 level hierarchy. A simple democratic
union of two or more people will exhibit this behaviour.
When a member of a group, who uses conventional cryptography to
protect group secrets is rubber-hosed, they have two choices (1)
defecting (by divulging keys) in order to save themselves, at the cost
of selling the other individuals in the group down the river or (2)
staying loyal, protecting the group and in the process subjugating
themselves continued torture.
With Marutukku-style deniable cryptography, the benefits to the
individual derived from choosing tactic (1) are largely
eliminated. Individuals that are "otherwise loyal" to the group, will
realise this and choose tactic (2).
Presumably most people in the group do not want to be forced to give
up their ability to choose defection. On the other hand, no one in the
group wants anyone (other than themselves) in the group to be given
the option of defecting against the group (and thus
themselves). Provided no individual is certain* they are to be
rubber-hosed, every individual will support the adoption of a
group-wide Marutukku-style cryptographically deniable crypto-system.
* Actually a complicated threshold.
Cheers,
Julian
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: mgraffam@mhv.net
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 1998 15:05:15 -0800 (PST)
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: Deniable Cryptography [was winnowing, chaffing etc]
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
On 28 Mar 1998, Julian Assange wrote:
> Rubber-hose-squad: We will never be able to show that Alice has
> revealed the last of her keys. Further, even if
> Alice has co-operated fully and has revealed all of
> her keys, she will not be able to prove it.
> Therefor, we must assume that at every stage that
> Alice has kept secret information from us, and
> continue to beat her, even though she may have
> revealed the last of her keys. But the whole time
> we will feel uneasy about this because Alice may
> have co-operated fully.
I've never really fully understood this assumption. It seems to me
that any person or group that would beat a person isn't going to
care much if Alice cooperated or not.
All things considered, a group with enough power to grab Alice and
beat her probably has ways to escape punishment from the law, or
doesn't care about the law in the first place.
In this case, I figure that their best option is to beat Alice everyday
forever or until she dies. Whichever comes first.
The longer they beat her, the better chance there is that she broke
down and gave them her most important secrets. Even if she can't prove
it.. so what? The rubber-hose group isn't exactly the boy scouts. They
beat her the next day too, this time a little harder.
Alice may hold up, she may not.. I don't really see the cryptosystem
helping here. You can't win a game when the other player doesn't use
your rules. You have to use the same set of rules. We know that
the rubber-hose wielding guys aren't going to play by Alice's rules.
So, the only way for Alice to win is to do the impossible (because this
is reality, not TV) and that is to grab the rubber hose and beat them
with it.
I don't think that any crypto can defend this sort of attack, because
it has nothing to do with crypto. Consider even a one-time pad. Alice
could calculate the needed pads that would turn her ciphertext into
other meaningful plaintext messages. So they beat her. She gives them
a pad.. and they beat her again. It won't end. They can never know
if they got the "right" pad. But it doesn't really matter, does it?
In my opinion deniable encryption is only valuable against a more or
less civil entity.
Now, what might be useful is some sort of biometric info that is part
of the key material. Heart rate, brain wave patterns, maybe biochemical
information. As Alice gets beat the fluctuations in her body could make
it impossible for her to reveal the information. A sensitive enough
system might even stand up against stuff like intimidation and
nervousness.. a polygraph test can supposedly detect this.
If such a system were implemented, then this could render rubber-hose
cryptanalysis useless, or at least much harder to put into effect.
Michael J. Graffam (mgraffam@mhv.net)
http://www.mhv.net/~mgraffam -- Philosophy, Religion, Computers, Crypto, etc
Let your life be a counter-friction to stop the machine.
Henry David Thoreau "Civil Disobedience"
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From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 28 Mar 1998 08:42:53 -0800 (PST)
To: "Marcus J. Ranum"
Subject: NRA support for crypto [was Rivest's Wheat & Chaff - A crypto alternative]
In-Reply-To: <3.0.3.32.19980323132339.006a03e4@mail.clark.net>
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
"Marcus J. Ranum" writes:
> >Since when have you been a cryptographer, Marcus?
>
> Ever since I independently re-invented ROT-12 at the age of 12. :)
I guess that was a bit mean. I'm just not sure one is really a
cryptographer till one is spending the majority of their time doing it
and earning a living (or a lot of respect) due to the quality of the
work produced. i.e dabbling in cryptography != I've made significant
contributions to the state of the art (I know you have made useful
contributions to other parts of the security world). We .... is often
used as a psychological ploy, to convince people the argument that
follows is their own. Given that I strongly disagreed with the
substance of your message, perhaps I took a dislike to the We
.... business a little too eagerly.
> >> Has anyone considered approaching the NRA for support for
> >> cryptography?? If it is a munition, isn't our right to use it
> >> domestically protected under the second amendment, just like
> >> our right to keep and bear arms?
> >
> >Guns are made for killing people. Terrorists use guns. Terrorists
> >kill people. Cryptography is guns. Terrorists use cryptography.
> >Cryptography kills people. What a fantastic public relations ploy.
> >The genius of it.
>
> D'uh, that's what FBI is saying already!
So your suggesting putting your weight behind a tactical metaphor of
the FBI? Effectively letting them control the landscape of the debate,
by implanting into the public's minds that guns equal cryptography.
Ok.
You now have a situation where all strong cryptography is out-lawed
(err, when was the last time you purchased a A42 tank cannon?)
domestically, everything requires export permits (wadda ya mean I can't
post my 10 gauge to Zurich without a license?!) and weak cryptography
is exposed to a whole host of restrictions, including key size
limitation (small arms only), speed limitations (it's dangerous to be
able to encrypt too many messages quickly and automatically), usage
registration (1 32 bit 8 round IDEA cipher and 2 40 bit barrel-loaded
RC4's in farmer Jones' bedroom), cooling off periods (can't let people
encrypt on a 'whim), exclusion of un-desirables (you want a crypto
license and you haven't been in the state 3 months/had a psychiatric
illness/were convicted of an offence/are under the age of 21/listen to
NPR?!), necessity (I need that there 56 bit 8 rounder for rabbit
'crypting; I had to encrypt, officer, in a suburban environment - it was
self defence against hardened criminal hackers!).
> Cryptography is a tool for liberty! Cryptography was used to
> save lives in the war! It's been used throughout history by
> freedom loving men and women to fight oppression! It's as
> American as apple pie!
Breaking cryptography saved lives in the war, this is extensively
documented over hundreds of clearly defined cases [see Kahn's epic
work]. How many lives both-sides using cryptography saved is
intangible. I suspect the completely unreal situation of all-sides
having open communications would have saved a truly huge number of
lives.
> >> I will give up one time pad when you pry it from my cold dead
> >> left hand. My rifle will be in my right hand.
> >
> >Tell me this is fabricated Macrus.
>
> I wrote that. What's your beef? Having a bad hair day or
> something?
I honnestly believed you had been done over by D. Vulis there
for a moment.
Cheers,
Julian.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Jeremiah Blatz
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 1998 09:43:58 -0800 (PST)
To: coderpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: Deniable Cryptography [was winnowing, chaffing etc]
In-Reply-To:
Message-ID: <0p7xTq200YUg0CkXw0@andrew.cmu.edu>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
mgraffam@mhv.net writes:
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>
> On 28 Mar 1998, Julian Assange wrote:
> > Rubber-hose-squad: We will never be able to show that Alice has
> > revealed the last of her keys. Further, even if
> > Alice has co-operated fully and has revealed all of
> > her keys, she will not be able to prove it.
> > Therefor, we must assume that at every stage that
> > Alice has kept secret information from us, and
> > continue to beat her, even though she may have
> > revealed the last of her keys. But the whole time
> > we will feel uneasy about this because Alice may
> > have co-operated fully.
>
> I've never really fully understood this assumption. It seems to me
> that any person or group that would beat a person isn't going to
> care much if Alice cooperated or not.
>
> All things considered, a group with enough power to grab Alice and
> beat her probably has ways to escape punishment from the law, or
> doesn't care about the law in the first place.
>
> In this case, I figure that their best option is to beat Alice everyday
> forever or until she dies. Whichever comes first.
"Rubber hose" cryptanalysis needn't involve actual beatings in secret
underground cells. Simple example: Cops raid your house, rough you up
a little bit (not much) and toss your ass in a cell with "real '
criminals. 12 hours later they take you into a room and play good
cop/bad cop with you. Maybe you're not sure you could stand up to
this, and might panic and reveal more than you have to (remember, you
haven't been charged with a crime yet). However, if you do hold out,
the chances that you'll be let go, and get your stuff back in a few
years, are pretty high. In this case, being able to spill a key that
revelas harmless stuff is good, since the police are unlekely to hold
you for a long time.
"Dissapearing" is the regressive case, and there's not a whole lot you
can do in regressive cases. If someone really wants to defect, they
will.
Jer
"standing on top of the world/ never knew how you never could/ never knew
why you never could live/ innocent life that everyone did" -Wormhole
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ulf@fitug.de (Ulf =?iso-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=)
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 1998 12:56:13 -0700 (PDT)
To: cypherpunks@toad.com
Subject: Re: GSM Security Study
Message-ID: <199804211916.VAA18518@public.uni-hamburg.de>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> To assess this spin we offer extracts of a 1998 GSM System
> Security Study:
>
> http://jya.com/gsm061088.htm (44K + 3 images)
Looks like that is the 'two brown envelopes' doc from which Ross Anderson
reconstructed the A5 algorithm as reprinted in Applied Cryptography.
Racal Research writes that there were French, Swedish and British
proposals. Ross indicated that the French one was chosen as A5, while
Julian Assange says that two different "A5" algorithms are in use.
What happened to the Swedish and the UK proposal?
Do you also have Appendix A and Section 8 of the A5 analysis?
They write that COMP128 was proposed 'by the German administration'.
Does anyone know which role the BSI (then called ZfCh) played in the
design of this algorithm?
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Sat, 20 Jun 1998 11:40:35 -0700 (PDT)
To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
Subject: AUcrypto mailinglist
Message-ID: <19980620184014.22630.qmail@iq.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
With things starting to heat up here in Australia (DoD/DSD has
recently taken to making some exceptionally nasty noises about
prosecuting Eric Young, Tim Hudson and the rest of the Australian
CryptoMozilla team). I'd like to remind everyone who's interested in
aussie/nz crypto issues of the aucrypto mailing list.
_ _ _ ____ ______ ______ _____ ___
/ \ | | | |/ ___| _ \ \ / / _ \_ _/ _ \
/ _ \| | | | | | |_) \ V /| |_) || || | | |
/ ___ \ |_| | |___| _
<| | | __/ | || |_| | /_/ \_\___/ \____|_| \_\|_| |_| |_| \___/ Australasian & Pacific Cryptography mail the word "subscribe" to aucrypto-request@suburbia.net or mail the word "subscribe" to aucrypto-d-request@suburbia.net (AUCRYPTO weekly digest) WHEN YOU HAVE SUBSCRIBED ------------------------ Send in a brief synopsis of who you are and why you are interested in AUCRYPTO as your first message to the list (this helps to stimulate discussion and debate as well as provide a sense of the AUCRYPTO community). As a [small] example: "Hello AUCRYPTO! My name is Sara Harding. I'm a technical services
officer working at the AFP (Australian Federal Police), specialising
in cryptogrpahic issues." SUBSCRIBING ----------- Send mail to: aucrypto-request@suburbia.net or aucrypto-d-request@suburbia.net (AUCRYPTO digest) with the subject or body of: subscribe UN-SUBSCRIBING ------------- Send mail to: aucrypto-request@suburbia.net or aucrypto-d-request@suburbia.net (AUCRYPTO digest) with the subject or body of: unsubscribe aucrypto POSTING ------- To send a message to the list, address it to: aucrypto@suburbia.net Messages under 700 bytes in size will not be accepted. Send your one-liners to nobody@nowhere.org. REPLYING -------- If you are replying to a message already on the AUCRYPTO list using your mail programs reply facility you may have to change the reply address to aucrypto@suburbia.net. This is because the AUCRYPTO mailing list program is configured to have return replies sent the author in order to avoid receiving the replies of misconfigured "vacation" programs which automatically send email saying "I've gone to the
moon for two weeks to hunt rare bits". ARCHIVES -------- Monthly back issues of aucrypto since January 96 are available from: ftp://suburbia.net/pub/mailinglists/aucrypto You can also instruct the mailing list processor to automatically scan and retrive messages from the archive. It understands the following commands: get filename ... ls directory ... egrep case_insensitive_regular_expression filename ... maxfiles nnn version Aliases for 'get': send, sendme, getme, gimme, retrieve, mail Aliases for 'ls': dir, directory, list, show Aliases for 'egrep': search, grep, fgrep, find Lines starting with a '#' are ignored. Multiple commands per mail are allowed. Setting maxfiles to zero will remove the limit (to protect you against yourself no more than maxfiles files will be returned per request). Egrep supports most common flags. Examples: ls vomume96 (for aucrypto digest) ls latest (the latest directory containes the archived messages) get latest/12 egrep some.word latest/* TECHNICAL --------- The list processor software is based on the excellent Procmail/Smartlist by Stephen R. van den Berg with
some minor extensions by Julian Assange .
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: "Trei, Peter"
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 1998 06:42:55 -0700 (PDT)
To: "'cypherpunks@toad.com>
Subject: Eric Young: Zimmerman redux?
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
Date: 20 Jun 1998 18:40:14 -0000
From: Julian Assange
To: ukcrypto@maillist.ox.ac.uk
With things starting to heat up here in Australia (DoD/DSD has
recently taken to making some exceptionally nasty noises about
prosecuting Eric Young, Tim Hudson and the rest of the Australian
CryptoMozilla team). I'd like to remind everyone who's interested in
aussie/nz crypto issues of the aucrypto mailing list.
Australasian & Pacific Cryptography
mail the word "subscribe" to aucrypto-request@suburbia.net
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Julian Assange
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1998 05:10:42 +0800
To: cypherpunks@Algebra.COM
Subject: cypherpunks archive
Message-ID: <19980910100541.10897.qmail@iq.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
I'm looking for a/the cypherpunks archive, particularly one that
covers 92-present. infinity.nus.sg doesn't seem to work anymore.
Cheers,
Julian.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: ulf@fitug.de (Ulf =?iso-8859-1?Q?M=F6ller?=)
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 1998 10:38:51 +0800
To: proff@iq.org (Julian Assange)
Subject: Re: cypherpunks archive
In-Reply-To: <19980910100541.10897.qmail@iq.org>
Message-ID: <199809101539.RAA59090@public.uni-hamburg.de>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> I'm looking for a/the cypherpunks archive, particularly one that
> covers 92-present. infinity.nus.sg doesn't seem to work anymore.
I don't there is a complete archive on the web at the moment.
http://calvo.teleco.ulpgc.es/listas/cypherpunks@infonex.com
has an archive for 1997 and 1998.
From cypherpunks@MHonArc.venona Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Ryan Lackey
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 1998 09:04:17 +0800
To: Julian Assange
Subject: Re: cypherpunks archive
Message-ID:
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
(Looks like I left at about the right time...)
I'm definitely planning to bring the archive back now that it seems
worthwhile, but I'm highly tempted to move it outside the US. I'm
giving somone a few more days trying to fix it, and if that fails,
I'll restore the drive physically. (the problem is that my agent in
the US is being slow, and I'm a bit low on cash after moving hastily...)
Anyone have 1gb of disk space on a machine, optionally with root access,
on a machine with unmetered network access outside the US on which I
could put the archive?
I can put the archive here in AI, but I'll have to charge per megabyte,
as my t1 is metered-use :( It would end up being something on the order of
$0.50/MB for total traffic, and unfortunately there are no good payment
systems for that kind of thing right now.
--
Ryan Lackey
rdl@mit.edu
http://sof.mit.edu/rdl/
X-Loop: minder.net
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From: Julian Assange <proff@iq.org>
To: coderpunks@toad.com
Subject: Travel Plans
Sender: owner-cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Precedence: first-class
Reply-To: Julian Assange <proff@iq.org>
X-List: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
X-Loop: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
I'm about to escape from the perils of a summer in ``the planet's
most livable city'' (Melbourne, Australia) and go treking about the
worlderful world of snow, ice, slush, and imploding communism.
I'll be hop-scotching though the US, Western/Eastern europe, Russia,
Mongolia and China (in that order). If anyone feels like getting
together for beer, vodka, Siberian bear steak, or just a good yarn,
please let me know.
What follows is a (very) approximate itinerary. Home-grown
accommodation, a warm hearth, pulsating ethernet, interesting company
(or a pointer to it) is capable of shifting dates and leagues. I am
backpacking through eastern Europe and Siberia, so no hovel, couch or
spare room is too small (even in the SF bay area), and would be highly
thought of :)
28 Oct 98 San Francisco
05 Nov 98 London
06 Nov 98 Frankfurt/Berlin
09 Nov 98 Poland / Slovenia / eastern-europe-on-a-shoe-string
15 Nov 98 Helsinki
16 Nov 98 St. Petersburg
20 Nov 98 Moscow (trans-siberian express) ->
25 Nov 98 Irtutsk
29 Nov 98 Ulan Bator
03 Dec 98 Beijing
Cheers,
Julian.
--
Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood and don't assign them tasks
proff@iq.org |and work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
<-- brought down by a flakey hd controller or drive ------------------------------------------------- >
2001
To: Ray Dillinger <bear@sonic.net>
Cc: cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Subject: Re: Paternity issues
References: <Pine.LNX.4.21.0103151326260.12426-100000@bolt.sonic.net>
Cc: proff@iq.org
From: Julian Assange <proff@iq.org>
Date: 16 Mar 2001 09:35:42 +1100
In-Reply-To: Ray Dillinger's message of "Thu, 15 Mar 2001 13:28:47 -0800 (PST)"
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Ray Dillinger <bear@sonic.net> writes:
> at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/ctf706.htm:
> ... In about a
> third of the welfare cases and 10% of other
> cases, lab directors say that the father named by
> the mother turns out not to be the biological
> parent....
What's more amusing is the number of cases where fraternal twins show
differing paternity.
--
Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood or assign them tasks and
proff@iq.org |work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
Subject: Re: Safeweb Hotmail Question
In-Reply-To: <200110131411.KAA29044@smtp10.atl.mindspring.net>
To: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Date: Sun, 14 Oct 2001 02:55:04 +1000 (EST)
Cc: cypherpunks@lne.com
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From: proff@iq.org (Julian Assange)
> The source last wrote that "multiple" Safeweb protection
> was used to cloak the messages. Is there a way to chain
> Hotmail to Safeweb, or some other way to "multiple"
> Safeway protection as preamble to Hotmail?
This is probably referring to simply looping back through safeweb
again, feeding output to input. Provided the source is unconcerned
with the RIAA paling up with the CIA and the notoriously dollar
happy American Chinese dissident community for mutally benefitting
shenanigans this isn't a bad idea.
Julian.
--
Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood or assign them tasks and
proff@iq.org |work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
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Subject: Re: mirror volunteers needed
In-Reply-To: <3BCBC379.F917222B@acmenet.net>
To: Steve Furlong <sfurlong@acmenet.net>
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 19:56:20 +1000 (EST)
Cc: cypherpunks@lne.com
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From: proff@iq.org (Julian Assange)
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> Julian Assange wrote:
>
> > If you are brave and have a unix account/machine with approximately
> > 2Gig of disk free, we need you.
>
> More details, please. Mainly the kind of material to be hosted. Holding
> 2GB of kiddie porn (horseman alert!) might be objectionable on moral
> grounds as well as legal grounds.
Documents and images. No kiddie porn, but there are still three
other horsemen to choose from. Absolutely legal for now, bar
retrospective legislation, but that won't stop the horse trainers
from pretending otherwise. Constitutionally protected in the US,
but that doesn't mean you won't cop flak from ISP higher-up and
other organisations regardless of where you live.
If you'd be happy to mirror cryptome.org, then you'd probably be
happy to mirror this material.
> What kind of traffic is expected, in terms of connections per hours and
> bytes per hour?
Depends on interest. We can use dns tricks to shape traffic to
reflect your resources.
> Why does it need to be a *NIX machine? Ease of remote access, security,
> active content, or the requirements of the mirroring software?
The anonymous push nature of the mirroring software. We can support
non-unix pull mirrors too, provided there are enough push mirrors
to feed from. The software could be ported to other operating
systems without too much difficulty, but that's another project.
> The mirror would presumably need a fixed IP address. Are there any other
> requirements?
An ability to create mail-aliases, gpg, perl5, and a good sense of humour :)
Cheers,
Julian.
--
Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood or assign them tasks and
proff@iq.org |work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
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Subject: Re: Stu Baker on CALEA and the Net
In-Reply-To: <5.1.0.14.2.20011018144500.036871c0@bivens.parrhesia.com>
To: Greg Broiles <gbroiles@well.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2001 10:12:37 +1000 (EST)
Cc: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>, mikecabot@fastcircle.com,
cypherpunks@lne.com
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From: proff@iq.org (Julian Assange)
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> He's a gun-for-hire, not a doctrinaire blinders-on true believer for either
> the surveillance enthusiasts or privacy freaks.
Oh, come off it.
Stu is a well known NSA zealot. The only reason there's a bridge
between Kapor and Baker is due to the cavernous ravine that lays
between them. Kapor is now apparently half-way across, following
Stu's silently bekoning finger, fearfully running from the sounds
of angels wings; fooled into believing that they lie behind and
not ahead of him.
--
Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood or assign them tasks and
proff@iq.org |work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
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Subject: Re: Retribution not enough
In-Reply-To: <5.0.2.1.0.20011021215710.01fe91d0@mail.well.com>
To: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2001 16:58:47 +1000 (EST)
Cc: cypherpunks@lne.com
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From: proff@iq.org (Julian Assange)
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> I'm actually surprised to see Steve launch into a critique of laissez-faire
> capitalism here on cypherpunks, of all places. One can admit that
> globalization has ill effects (mostly, bricks through windows of Starbucks
> thrown by bored, upper-middle-class, college-age protesters), certainly.
> But when responding to claims that factory workers in poorer countries are
> only being paid $2/hour or whatnot, it makes sense to ask: Is this worse
> than their other alternatives, like mud huts in villages?
>
> To argue against people voluntarily entering into market-based transactions
> with each other is so a-economical and contrary to cypherpunk philosophies*
> -- wlel, I just don't think it's worth taking the time to go any further in
> a response.
Declan, Declan.
Put away your straw man. There are alternative's other than huts
and two dollars an hour (which is high, btw). Nobel ecconomic
laureates have been telling us for years to be careful about
idealised market models and to start looking at players not as mere
as capital and labour but as information processing nodes.
This years Nobel for Economics won by George A. Akerlof, A. Michael
Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz "for their analysis of markets with
assymetric information" is typical.
You don't need a Nobel to realise that the relationship between a
large employer and employee is brutally assymetric. One entity
knows far more about the rules of the negotiation than the other.
There's you as a prospective employee and then there's the local
workplace monopoly with hundreds of industrial relations lawyers,
psychologists, and other assorted strategists who'll hand you a
document thick with legalese and tell you where to sign. Without
a legal team, you'll never understand it or the political connections
backing it up. And even if you do there's a million other mugs to
choose from who won't.
To counter this sort of assymetry. Employees naturally start trying
to collectivise to increase their information processing and
bargaining power. That's right. UNIONS Declan. Those devious entities
that first world companies and governments have had a hand in
suppressing all over the third world by curtailing freedom of
association, speech and other basic political rights we take for
granted.
--
Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood or assign them tasks and
proff@iq.org |work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
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Subject: Tim May
In-Reply-To: <FLEJLELCPOOCNFGDGKKGAEEDCFAA.blancw@cnw.com>
To: Blanc <blancw@cnw.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Oct 2001 01:40:24 +1000 (EST)
Cc: cypherpunks@lne.com
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From: proff@iq.org (Julian Assange)
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> >From Tim, Killer Cypherpunk, in a couple of posts about a half-hour apart:
>
> Free people are free to fire those who form communal organizations.
> Anyone who disagrees with this point has earned killing.
>
> .and.
>
> Fucking creep. Where's that sniper rifle, Bob?
> -----------------
> Someone told me that, deep down, Tim is really a sensitive kinda guy.
> <giggle>
>
> ..
> Blanc
Any man who keeps a cat is either sensitive. Or gay. Or both. Tim
keeps two.
Date: 2000/10/23
ba.mountain-folk
I have two cats. Raised from kittenhood. They are delightful...no
scratching, no tearing up of furniture, a joy to be around. Both are
males, both were fixed (neutered) at the usual age.
[..]]
Have you considered having him be mainly an outdoor cat? Just a
little bit of food and medical care, and maybe a warm place to
sleep, should be enough. Many people with "outdoor cats" let them
in at night and put them out in the morning. This minimizes the
"tearing up while owners are out" effect.
--
Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood or assign them tasks and
proff@iq.org |work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
Subject: Re: WSJ on Safety Before Liberty
In-Reply-To: <200110231639.MAA03877@barry.mail.mindspring.net>
To: John Young <jya@pipeline.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2001 05:34:37 +1000 (EST)
Cc: cypherpunks@lne.com
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From: proff@iq.org (Julian Assange)
> Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, among others. But claims that
> after the crises passed civil liberties were restored "stronger
> than ever." So fear not what is in the offing.
Post-war US liberties were usually restored after apalling abuses by the
mendacious followed by intensive lobbing by civil rights activists.
It'd be nice to cut the former phase short. Although, perhaps the
better tactic is to let them run-amok. It certainly worked for
the Netherlands.
--
Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood or assign them tasks and
proff@iq.org |work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
2002
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Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2002 15:54:53 +1100
From: Julian Assange <proff@suburbia.net>
To: cypherpunks@minder.net
Cc: cypherpunks@lne.com
Subject: Re: design considerations for distributed storage networks
Message-ID: <20020323155453.A22940@suburbia.net>
References: <20020322184403.A1424898@exeter.ac.uk>
<20020322215505.17865.qmail@web13205.mail.yahoo.com>
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> Sharing copyrighted material in order to get the same is the only working
> example that I can see. If someone can point to reason why large number of
> people would give a fuck about fighting censorship, enhancing privacy and
> anonymity, I'd like to be enlightened. With working real-world examples.
> Unemployed cypherpunks do not count.
It is not necessary for the entire population to adopt a technology; merely
a user-base of sufficient size to forfill the technical & social requirements
of the project leaders. Visions of world domination are for
propaganda, not for actualisation. The 95% of the population which
comprise the flock have never been my target, and neither should
they be yours; it's the 2.5% percent at either end of the normal that
I find in my sights, one to be cherished and the other to be destroyed.
--
Julian Assange |If you want to build a ship, don't drum up people
|together to collect wood or assign them tasks and
proff@iq.org |work, but rather teach them to long for the endless
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu |immensity of the sea. -- Antoine de Saint Exupery
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Delivered-To: meditation@eterna.com.au
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2002 00:34:41 +1000 (EST)
From: Julian Assange <proff@iq.org>
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To: nettime-l@bbs.thing.net
Cc: proff-cc@iq.org, <dolist@altnews.com.au>,
<fibreculture-request@lists.myspinach.org>, <cypherpunks@cyberpass.net>,
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Subject: Remarks made by Australian Defence Minister in Malaysia
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---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Tue, 4 Jun 2002 12:08:01 +1000
From: Julian Assange <julian-policy@iq.org>
To: Senator X <senator.X@aph.gov.au>
Cc: proff-cc@iq.org
Subject: Remarks made by Australian Defence Minister in Malaysia
Dear Senator X,
I have been urgently contacted by Elizabeth Wong, Secretary-General
National Human Rights Society (HAKAM) of Malaysia, in relation to
some extremely damaging statements made by Sen. Robert Hill
in Malaysia. Hill's comments are being internationally reported
via Agence France Presse (AFP), so it is likely the story will
break in the national press tomorrow or Thursday. I include an
excerpt of the material sent to me by the Secretary General. I ask
that you raise the matters therein with the Minister and your party
colleagues.
Sincerely,
Julian Assange
President,
Australian Institute for Collaborative Research
PO BOX 2031 Hawthorn 3122
Victoria Australia
Dear Sir,
Please find attached, a letter by Mr. Tian Chua, a civil
rights activist, Vice-President of the National Justice
Party and political prisoner in Malaysia in response to
remarks made by the Australian Defence Minister, Senator
Robert Hill, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
I have also attached below, a Malaysian news report of
Senator Hill's most inappropriate remarks in regards to
detention without trial in Malaysia and Australia.
Inappropriate, because here in Malaysia, human rights
advocates and the Malaysian Bar Council have been campaigning
for years to repeal the draconian Internal Security Act
(ISA). We fear that the Australian government's tacit
approval for such an act will have repercussions both in
Malaysia and in Australia.
You can find more information about the ISA and our national
campaign to repeal the Act in Malaysia at www.suaram.org/isa
and www.hakam.org
We hope you will be able to raise our concerns in the
Australian media, Parliament and Senate.
Your sincerely,
Elizabeth Wong Secretary-General National Human Rights
Society (HAKAM), Malaysia
----------------------------------------------------
Australia supports M'sia's preventive law to combat terrorism
4:41pm Thu May 30th, 2002 Agence France Presse (AFP)
Australian Defence Minister Robert Hill today voiced support for Malaysia's
use of a tough security law to detain without trial dozens of suspected
local militants.
"Extraordinary responses" were needed to deal with "those that are not
prepared to accept the norms of reasonable behaviour," Hill told reporters
after meeting his Malaysian counterpart Najib Razak.
"In effectively combating terrorism, sometimes you've got to err on the side
of the protection of your community, even if it is at some cost to civil
liberties," he said.
"I've argued that you may take preemptive measures and administrative
actions that don't curb civil liberties, but should endeavour to ensure that
you don't go further than is necessary," he said.
"The decison where that line should be drawn is a decison we all have to
make."
Malaysia has detained 62 suspected militants allegedly linked to the
al-Qaeda network blamed for the Sept 11 attacks in the United States under
the Internal Security Act (ISA) allowing detention without trial.
But critics have accused the government of using the ISA to squash dissent
as some of the 62 were members of the opposition Islamic party.
Hill said Australia was also drawing up new laws to give new powers to its
key intelligence agency to counter terrorism, including detaining suspects
for two days without legal representation.
On Malaysia's ISA which allows a person to be detained indefinitely without
trial, he said it was not in his place to "dictate to Malaysia what is an
appropriate period of time for holding somebody."
Hill said Australia pledged to "work very closely" with Malaysia in the
anti-terrorism war during talks with Najib.
"We are both equally committed to achieve a world that is less threatened by
terrorist activity. We agreed on how improving intelligence exchange between
us, learning from each other's experiences can strengthen the hand of each
of us," he said.
He said Southeast Asian countries could strengthen their position against
terrorists by increasing the exchange of intelligence.
Hill said the threat of terrorism "may seem more threatening now because we
are in the know of the greater risks involved but on the other hand, it is
less threatening because action is being taken against it."
Unlikely to join US
Asked if Australia would join US troops to be deployed in the southern
Philippines to train and assist Filipinos forces pursuing the Abu Sayyaf
Muslim rebels, Hill said it was unlikely.
"I can't envision a situation at this moment when that is likely to occur
but obviously it would only be on invitation ... and under the umbrella of
the US as the leader of the coalition force against terrorism.
Hill, who arrived here late Wednesday for a three-day trip, leaves Friday
for Singapore to attend an international security conference.
[demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type APPLICATION/MSWORD which had a NAME of An Open Letter to the People of Australia.doc]
http://marc.info/?a=90366091900010&r=1&w=2
Viewing messages posted by 'Julian Assange <proff () suburbia ! net>'
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1. 2002-05-01 [1] Re: Cypherpunks Europe cypherpun
2. 2002-04-27 [1] Re: disk encryption modes (Re: RE: Two ideas for rand cypherpun
3. 2002-04-27 [1] Block key generation algorithms cypherpun
4. 2002-04-24 [1] Re: Choate a Spammer or a Victim? cypherpun
5. 2002-04-12 [1] Re: Re: Among the Bourgeoisophobes cypherpun
6. 2002-03-26 [1] Re: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise cypherpun
7. 2002-03-23 [1] time-delayed release of information cypherpun
8. 2002-03-23 [1] Re: design considerations for distributed storage net cypherpun
9. 1999-09-13 [1] dynamically growing ffs netbsd-te
10. 1997-09-27 [1] Re: BoS: CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-97.08 bugtraq
11. 1997-07-19 [1] Re: KSR[T] Advisory #2: ld.so bugtraq
12. 1997-07-08 [1] Vulnerability in websendmail (fwd) bugtraq
13. 1997-06-13 [18] (No Subject) freebsd-h
14. 1997-04-14 [1] [ANNOUNCE]: ipfilter for FreeBSD2.2.x + FreeBSD3.0-cu bugtraq
15. 1997-01-30 [1] Re: modifing libc to discover gets()/sprintf() calls bugtraq
16. 1997-01-22 [1] BoS: (fwd) Computer Security Evaluation FAQ, Version best-of-s
17. 1997-01-17 [1] Re: Smashing the stack on a DEC Alpha bugtraq
18. 1996-12-06 [1] Re: mount_mfs freebsd-h
19. 1996-12-03 [1] Re: Does anybody need it ? freebsd-h
20. 1996-12-03 [1] Re: TCP/IP bandwidth bragging freebsd-h
21. 1996-12-02 [2] cyclades PCI driver doesn't detect carrier drop freebsd-h
22. 1996-12-02 [1] Re: Logging ttys off freebsd-h
23. 1996-12-02 [1] multiple swap paritions freebsd-h
24. 1996-12-02 [2] Re: text, menu/dialog/windowing, library, ideas? freebsd-h
25. 1996-12-01 [1] Re: modifications to ftpd to support restricted users freebsd-h
26. 1996-11-27 [1] Re: A simple way to crash your system. freebsd-h
27. 1996-11-23 [1] Re: Who needs Perl? We do! freebsd-h
28. 1996-11-21 [1] WordPerfect 7.0? - use LyX instead freebsd-h
29. 1996-11-21 [1] BoS: IMPORTANT: you have been u-n-s-u-b-s-c-r-i-b-e-d best-of-s
30. 1996-11-20 [1] Re: Serious BIND resolver problem. (fwd) freebsd-h
31. 1996-11-18 [1] Re: 1600x1200 Modelines freebsd-h
32. 1996-11-17 [1] Re: New sendmail bug... freebsd-h
33. 1996-11-17 [1] BoS: HPUX mstm/cstm buffer overflow [sod] best-of-s
34. 1996-11-17 [1] Re: Domain Registration firewalls
35. 1996-11-16 [1] Re: earlier "holographic shell" in 2.2-ALPHA install freebsd-h
36. 1996-11-15 [1] BoS: IP-spoof.1 best-of-s
37. 1996-11-14 [1] status of ports freebsd-h
38. 1996-11-13 [2] Re: Programming technique for non-forking servers? freebsd-h
39. 1996-11-12 [1] predictor-clues [was ufs too slow?] freebsd-h
40. 1996-11-11 [1] Re: PPP/LCP sensing getty freebsd-h
41. 1996-11-11 [5] virtual hosting with inetd freebsd-h
42. 1996-11-10 [1] Re: gdb anomalies freebsd-h
43. 1996-11-10 [1] Re: MMAP: how to use... freebsd-h
44. 1996-11-08 [1] Re: patches for nice text modes (170x48x16 etc) (sysc freebsd-h
45. 1996-11-07 [2] limiting bandwidth on a port via forwarding freebsd-h
46. 1996-11-07 [2] Re: SUP on sup.freebsd.org freebsd-h
47. 1996-11-07 [1] Re: still no response freebsd-h
48. 1996-11-05 [1] Re: src/games/piano freebsd-h
49. 1996-11-05 [1] Re: XFree86 3.2 now available. freebsd-h
50. 1996-11-04 [1] scsi dat drive under freebsd freebsd-h
51. 1996-11-01 [1] grub freebsd-h
52. 1996-10-31 [1] Re: FreeBSD and IP tunneling freebsd-h
53. 1996-10-30 [1] Re: /var/mail (was: re: Help, permission problems...) freebsd-h
54. 1996-10-28 [2] Re: comments on this change please. freebsd-h
55. 1996-10-28 [1] Re: test DEVFS! freebsd-h
56. 1996-10-27 [1] Re: NNTP proxy (sub-title: socks???) firewalls
57. 1996-10-23 [1] VSTa graphics and Linux GGI (was Re: put pixel on scr freebsd-h
58. 1996-10-22 [1] Re: libc string routines don't check for NULL pointer freebsd-h
59. 1996-10-21 [1] BoS: dfa.htm best-of-s
60. 1996-10-21 [1] Re: Read-only root partition. [SYSLOG] freebsd-h
61. 1996-10-19 [1] BoS: schlowdishk best-of-s
62. 1996-10-18 [1] Re: SLIP speed freebsd-h
63. 1996-10-18 [2] high resolution text modes freebsd-h
64. 1996-10-13 [1] BoS: SOD remote exploit bugtraq
65. 1996-10-02 [1] Re: contrib/src freebsd-h
66. 1996-09-27 [2] SVGATextMode under FBSD freebsd-h
67. 1996-09-27 [1] Re: Please remove this lines from XFree configuration freebsd-h
68. 1996-09-26 [1] bzip vs gzip freebsd-h
69. 1996-09-26 [1] Re: BLOAT in minimal programs freebsd-h
70. 1996-09-24 [1] Re: cvsup - the next generation multi purpose netw. d freebsd-h
71. 1996-09-23 [1] make world problem with current freebsd-h
72. 1996-09-22 [1] Grand Unified Unix freebsd-h
73. 1996-09-19 [1] Re: Could use a favor freebsd-h
74. 1996-09-17 [1] Re: Internet policy firewalls
75. 1996-09-14 [1] attribute/inode caching freebsd-h
76. 1996-09-14 [2] Re: BUG in /bin/bash bugtraq
77. 1996-09-13 [1] Re: SYN floods - possible solution? (fwd) freebsd-h
78. 1996-09-11 [1] Re: BSD/OS does not work. ipfilter
79. 1996-09-05 [1] BoS: NetKit-B-0.08 - collection of network utilities best-of-s
80. 1996-09-05 [1] DIPC (Distributed IPC) freebsd-h
81. 1996-09-01 [1] BoS: More on UnixWare 2.x vulnerability best-of-s
82. 1996-09-01 [1] BoS: More on the UnixWare problem best-of-s
83. 1996-09-01 [1] BoS: Vulnerability in the Xt library best-of-s
84. 1996-08-28 [1] Re: An insane journey (was Re: JDK 1.02) freebsd-h
85. 1996-08-27 [1] Re: Script to setup PPP? freebsd-h
86. 1996-08-27 [1] source address routing controls and packet priorities freebsd-h
87. 1996-08-26 [1] BoS: Re: [Fwd: BoS: Gaping Security Hole] best-of-s
88. 1996-08-23 [1] Re: Am I wrong or is this just stupid?r freebsd-h
89. 1996-08-22 [2] Re: libresolv+ bug bugtraq
90. 1996-08-14 [2] Re: ipfw vs ipfilter? freebsd-h
91. 1996-08-14 [1] BoS: Wide spread resolv+ bugs best-of-s
92. 1996-08-12 [2] mmap #2 freebsd-h
93. 1996-08-10 [1] mmap freebsd-h
94. 1996-08-09 [1] Re: /etc/shells (was Re: procmail) bugtraq
95. 1996-08-09 [1] call for papers firewalls
96. 1996-08-03 [1] per-line profiling freebsd-h
97. 1996-08-01 [1] Authorisation forwarding secure-sh
98. 1996-07-31 [1] BoS: WITAT'96 best-of-s
99. 1996-07-31 [1] Re: Manpages 9 freebsd-h
100. 1996-07-31 [1] Re: X.25 revisited freebsd-h
101. 1996-07-30 [1] DESZIP firewalls
102. 1996-07-30 [2] NOTE: ppp/slip tunneling over ssh firewalls
103. 1996-07-29 [1] BoS: NOTE: ppp/slip tunneling over ssh best-of-s
104. 1996-07-28 [1] Re: PPro Question freebsd-h
105. 1996-07-25 [2] anoncvs freebsd-h
106. 1996-07-07 [1] Re: filemalloc etc. for shared memory between process freebsd-h
107. 1996-07-04 [1] Re: What is the best way to setup a driver freebsd-h
108. 1996-07-01 [3] rsync freebsd-h
109. 1996-07-01 [2] BoS: http:--www.omna.com-msiis- bugtraq
110. 1996-07-01 [1] Re: portmapper dangers bugtraq
111. 1996-06-27 [1] Re: no subject (file transmission) freebsd-h
112. 1996-06-26 [1] Re: A response from CSI firewalls
113. 1996-06-25 [1] BoS: CIFS draft best-of-s
114. 1996-06-25 [1] Re: I need help on this one - please help me track th freebsd-h
115. 1996-06-25 [1] Re: Pilot Network Services firewalls
116. 1996-06-14 [1] Re: ISC dhcp, AF_UNSPEC & bpf bugs freebsd-h
117. 1996-06-12 [1] BoS: NSA is monitoring key internet routers - Puzzle best-of-s
118. 1996-06-05 [1] BoS: keylength.txt best-of-s
119. 1996-06-02 [1] NNTPCACHE-0.87.9 (fast nntp cache/proxy) firewalls
120. 1996-05-30 [2] Re: Re[2]: Encryption Technology firewalls
121. 1996-05-30 [2] Re: Indentation styles freebsd-h
122. 1996-05-28 [1] memcpy/strcpy optimisation freebsd-h
123. 1996-05-28 [1] BoS: Security problem in ESRI's ArcDoc 7.0.4 best-of-s
124. 1996-05-28 [1] BoS: Jim Christy GAO witness document best-of-s
125. 1996-05-26 [1] BoS: amodload.tar.gz - dynamic SunOS modules best-of-s
126. 1996-05-19 [1] BoS: Practical Unix Security Volume #2 best-of-s
127. 1996-05-18 [1] BoS: rfc1948.txt best-of-s
128. 1996-05-12 [1] BoS: Re: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings best-of-s
129. 1996-05-05 [2] BoS: BOS Changes [read] best-of-s
130. 1996-05-04 [1] BoS: Java Security Weaknesses best-of-s
131. 1996-05-04 [1] BoS: Monkey - the skey cracker best-of-s
132. 1996-05-04 [1] BoS: Information Warfare best-of-s
133. 1996-04-20 [1] BoS: Final Call for Papers - Colloquium on Personal I best-of-s
134. 1996-04-20 [1] BoS: LACC: UK Government to Introduce Key Escrow best-of-s
135. 1996-04-17 [1] BoS: 9606.html best-of-s
136. 1996-04-16 [1] BoS: OS/2 Warp TCP/IP misfeature best-of-s
137. 1996-04-15 [1] BoS: Impending moderation of b-o-s best-of-s
138. 1996-04-12 [1] BoS: pgp brute force cracker released best-of-s
139. 1996-04-12 [1] Re: FAX Servers Security firewalls
140. 1996-04-10 [1] BoS: http:--www.osf.org-~loverso-javascript- best-of-s
141. 1996-04-04 [1] Reminder. Suburbia BOAF Sat 6 April firewalls
142. 1996-04-03 [1] BoS: Suburbia Party Reminder best-of-s
143. 1996-03-24 [1] Re: Redundant Internet Connections firewalls
144. 1996-03-24 [1] Re: Sick Puppy firewalls
145. 1996-03-23 [1] Re: watchdog firewalls
146. 1996-03-22 [1] BOAF Sat April 6, Melbourne firewalls
147. 1996-03-21 [1] BoS: Suburbia BOAF SATURDAY April 6th 8:30pm best-of-s
148. 1996-03-14 [1] BoS: noise levels best-of-s
149. 1996-03-12 [1] BoS: Three security holes in oracle RDBMS best-of-s
150. 1996-03-12 [1] BoS: Netscape2.0 sends mail to the world without auth best-of-s
151. 1996-03-09 [1] BoS: New Security Paradigms '96 -- Final Call for Pap best-of-s
152. 1996-03-05 [1] BoS: Java security bug (applets can load native metho best-of-s
153. 1996-03-04 [1] BoS: Legal Aspects of Computer Crime [LACC] best-of-s
154. 1996-02-25 [1] BoS: internic-gen-1.txt best-of-s
155. 1996-02-21 [1] Re: BoS: ident-scan best-of-s
156. 1996-02-08 [1] BoS: Best-of-Security Charter. READ and UNDERSTAND best-of-s
157. 1996-02-08 [1] Re: BoS: FW: FV Demonstrates Fatal Flaw in Softwa best-of-s
158. 1996-02-07 [1] Re: BoS: First Virtual PR not appropriate best-of-s
159. 1996-01-10 [1] BoS: B-O-S hub site disconnected (IMPORTANT) best-of-s
160. 1996-01-05 [1] BoS: NZ conference best-of-s
161. 1996-01-03 [1] Re: Compression is useful - but for security, not firewalls
162. 1995-12-31 [1] Re: Firewalls-Digest V4 #726 firewalls
163. 1995-12-30 [1] Re: Dawg wants rootkit for Christmas firewalls
164. 1995-12-28 [2] BoS: From cold war to cell wars best-of-s
165. 1995-12-28 [1] BoS: Restore font (linux) exploit best-of-s
166. 1995-11-28 [1] BoS: (fwd) Reflection 4 encryption best-of-s
167. 1995-11-27 [2] Re: BoS: Re: Another weakness in challenges best-of-s
168. 1995-11-27 [1] strobe v1.03 released bugtraq
169. 1995-11-27 [2] BoS: strobe v1.03 released best-of-s
170. 1995-11-26 [1] Re: Internet Firewall Vulnerabilities Part 2 of 4 firewalls
171. 1995-11-25 [1] BoS: HP/UX NFS file handle generation best-of-s
172. 1995-11-24 [1] BoS: Firewalls.html best-of-s
173. 1995-11-23 [1] Re: Secret key versus obscurity firewalls
174. 1995-11-22 [1] BoS: rand-test.c best-of-s
175. 1995-11-20 [1] BoS: (fwd) Re: **$10,000 Internet Security Challenge* best-of-s
176. 1995-11-13 [1] BoS: Cracking the MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 authorization pr best-of-s
177. 1995-11-03 [1] sub problems freebsd-h
178. 1995-11-02 [2] Re: Tightening up SunOS 5.4 (was Re: Hardened OS) bugtraq
179. 1995-11-02 [1] BoS: Re: Tightening up SunOS 5.4 (was Re: Hardened OS best-of-s
180. 1995-11-01 [1] BoS: Windows NT C2|!C2 best-of-s
181. 1995-10-29 [1] BoS: (fwd) Crypto '96 Call for Papers best-of-s
182. 1995-10-23 [1] BoS: microsoft maligns samba best-of-s
183. 1995-10-19 [1] BoS: e-shimmy best-of-s
184. 1995-10-12 [2] BoS: ncsa .htaccess best-of-s
185. 1995-10-01 [1] BoS: netscape/X remote control exploit best-of-s
186. 1995-09-29 [1] Re: livingston.. bugtraq
187. 1995-09-29 [1] BoS: IEEE symposium on security and privacy, call for best-of-s
188. 1995-09-26 [2] BoS: linux tty surfing best-of-s
189. 1995-09-17 [2] BoS: diffie-helman in 93 lines best-of-s
190. 1995-09-17 [1] BoS: diffie-helman in 10 lines best-of-s
191. 1995-09-16 [1] BoS: (fwd) PGP 2.62ui has been released best-of-s
192. 1995-09-16 [1] BoS: NIST crypto documents best-of-s
193. 1995-09-13 [1] LACC bugtraq
194. 1995-09-13 [1] BoS: Legal Aspects of Computer Crime best-of-s
195. 1995-09-13 [1] BoS: Legal Aspects of Computer Crime (LACC) best-of-s
196. 1995-09-12 [1] Re: BOS: Early Review of the movie "Hackers" -Reply best-of-s
197. 1995-09-11 [1] wank worm firewalls
198. 1995-09-11 [1] BOS: gs hole + patch best-of-s
199. 1995-09-08 [1] Re: Firewall-1 concerns firewalls
200. 1995-09-01 [2] Re: syslog overruns and TIS smap firewalls
201. 1995-08-31 [2] Hannah best-of-s
202. 1995-08-30 [1] Re: -rw-rw-rw- 1 root 8025 Aug 24 04:10 /tmp/.lsof_de best-of-s
203. 1995-08-29 [1] patch to latest 8lgm exploit posted best-of-s
204. 1995-08-29 [1] Re: Bug of RISC !! firewalls
205. 1995-08-28 [1] joining freebsd-h
206. 1995-08-26 [1] Beta version of ipfirewall v2.0d available best-of-s
207. 1995-08-26 [1] PGPfone for Macintosh beta out. best-of-s
208. 1995-08-25 [2] Australian Cryptographic Policy best-of-s
209. 1995-08-24 [1] Re: IP Spoofing best-of-s
210. 1995-08-23 [2] Ghostscript problem best-of-s
211. 1995-08-23 [1] Re: Looking for intrusion detection - Tripwire isn't best-of-s
212. 1995-08-23 [2] Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) Archives (fwd) best-of-s
213. 1995-08-23 [1] IP firewalling bugs best-of-s
214. 1995-08-23 [1] linux yppasswd bug best-of-s
215. 1995-08-23 [1] New release of klaxon (fwd) best-of-s
216. 1995-08-21 [2] FBI Files: Clipper Must be Mandatory (fwd) best-of-s
217. 1995-08-20 [2] citibank penetration best-of-s
218. 1995-08-20 [1] CSP (fwd) best-of-s
219. 1995-08-14 [3] RiscOS rsh exploit best-of-s
220. 1995-08-13 [1] Orlowski.html best-of-s
221. 1995-08-12 [1] Re: TCP Header Flags best-of-s
222. 1995-08-12 [1] samba security best-of-s
223. 1995-08-11 [2] Re: SunOS vs Solaris 2 vs Intel/BSD for firewalls best-of-s
224. 1995-08-11 [1] Cinncinnati ECPA complaint 3/3 best-of-s
225. 1995-08-11 [1] Cinncinnati ECPA complaint pt. 2/3 best-of-s
226. 1995-08-11 [3] Cinncinnati ECPA complaint 1/3 best-of-s
227. 1995-08-08 [1] Re: Sparc2 as a 3-way packet filter? firewalls
228. 1995-08-08 [1] Re: Encripted ftp connections firewalls
229. 1995-08-07 [1] Re: computer crime (fwd) best-of-s
230. 1995-08-05 [1] (fwd) Australia next to ban PGP best-of-s
231. 1995-08-04 [1] SECURITY ALERT: Dangerous hole in vacation v1.0. best-of-s
232. 1995-08-03 [1] Sign bits in IP fragmentation best-of-s
233. 1995-08-02 [1] best-of-security firewalls
234. 1995-08-02 [1] Duplicates best-of-s
235. 1995-08-02 [1] Linux Security FAQ Update#5: Cipher-3.0/deslogin-1.3 best-of-s
236. 1995-08-02 [1] CFS 1.3.0 now available best-of-s
237. 1995-08-02 [1] Secure Computing invites an attack best-of-s
238. 1995-08-01 [1] test best-of-s
239. 1995-07-30 [5] CERT Summary CS-95:01 best-of-s
More by Google search on:
proff@suburbia.net
proff@iq.org
proff@suburbia.apana.org.au
proff@gnu.ai.mit.edu
proff@four.net
strobe@suburbia.apana.org.au
http://iq.org/~proff/
And more by Julian Assange:
Free download of Underground- Tales of hacking, madness and obsession
on the electronic frontier, by Suelette Dreyfus with research by Julian
Assange:
http://www.suburbia.com.au/~suzieq/download.php3
The Idiot Savants' Guide to Rubberhose
http://iq.org/~proff/marutukku.org/current/src/doc/maruguide/t1.html
Strobe (c) 1995 Julian Assange
http://stuff.mit.edu/afs/athena/contrib/potluck/src/strobe/Makefile
STROBE v1.01 Super Optimised TCP port surveyor, Julian Assange 9 Mar 1995
http://dataguard.no/bugtraq/1995_1/0623.html
http://diswww.mit.edu/menelaus/bt/1201
STROBE v1.06, Julian Assange, et al, 1997
ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/scanners/strobe/
Best Of Security, Julian Assange
http://www.cultural.com/web/security/mailing.lists/bos.html
Legal Aspects of Computer Crime, Julian Assange
http://www.cultural.com/web/security/mailing.lists/lacc.html
Interesting mention of a "LEAKS" project, not further identified, in this
1996 message:
http://marc.info/?l=freebsd-hackers&m=94346859627556&w=2
List: freebsd-hackers
Subject: IMPORTANT: pointy-head alert!
From: Julian Assange <proff () net>
Date: 1996-11-26 8:49:56
[Excerpt]
A few pointy-heads up in Canberra have been considering your
moderator's continued existence. Consequentially I've been called
on to justify labour and resources spent on all projects under my
control, particularly those that can't easily be quantified such
as IQ, BOS, LACC, IS, LEAKS and the various bits of security and
other software you may have seen floating around the net with
my name on it over the past few years.