The Truth Behind The Israeli Secret Services
By Ghaith El Lawzi

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“Y'all gotta start thinking on a different level- like the CIA does.  We're through the looking glass.  Here white is black and black is white.”      Jim Garrison  (Oliver Stone’s JFK)

1.      Introduction.

2.      The role and function of the agencies (Shin Bet, Mossad, AMAN, Lakam).

3.      The Secret Services Vs. The Arab World

4.      The role in Lebanon prior to 82 invasion.

5.      The Role of the three Israeli Intelligence agencies in the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre 

6.      The truth exposed. 

            Introduction:

            Perception is paramount to reality in the Middle East. Most of the known, and some of the written, history is based on myths and half truths. All parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the inter-Arab conflicts, have engaged in spreading lies and dis-information, and unfortunately most of these stick to the minds of the public. The party that has most benefited from and made use of this fact has been, and still is, Israel. It has been the main and most pervasive purveyor of lies for many reasons, but the main one has been its strong influence, and sometimes its actual control, of most main media in the west. Many Arabs do not trust their own government controlled media, and often turn to foreign sources, like the BBC World service and CNN, to get their information. Israel has been extremely active since its inception and mostly since the 1967 war in spreading the lies about its own prowess vis-à-vis the Arabs. One of the most effective media campaigns has been the one to portray the Israeli secret service, especially the Mossad, as a heroic group of dedicated and patriotic men who are in direct war with the Arab hordes and international terrorists. Most of the now-famous operations, like the Adolf Eichman abduction in 1960, have been translated into best-selling books and box-office hits at the cinema (Black and Morris, 501). 

The truth behind the Mossad and other Israeli secret services is far more insidious and unethical and it is a catalogue of crime, of murder, internationally illegal acts, intra-organizational conflict, and inept handling of sensitive operations. We will see evidence of this, particularly the role of these services in the 1982 Invasion and in particular with the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre, as well as the eventual Intelligence failure in Lebanon. Then we will work on explaining the functions of the different organizations, showing that not only can we expose them, but that it’s possible to counter them successfully.

The Role and Function of the Agencies

            Although the Mossad has almost exclusively been the focus of the world media, Israel actually has three main security services (Mossad, Shin Bet, and AMAN), as well as one minor service (LAKAM), and one agency (AL), whose existence is unconfirmed but highly plausible. The three agencies grew out of the pre-1948 security organs that were attached to the main Zionist organizations like the HAGANAH. Many recruits to the post-1948 security services, were also recruited from the intelligence organs attached to the other terrorist groups such as the Irgun and the Stern. The latter group contained very competent operatives who made the transition from being terrorists to being intelligence operatives (Raviv and Melman, 228)). They were highly effective against the British Mandate forces, as they would be later with their Arab foes. Secret work, mainly deception and murder, was part and parcel of the general Zionist ideology, and it was a necessity according to Ben-Gurion, for the service of the “Star of David” flag. Unlike the CIA, which was established after the Communist menace became dangerous, the Zionist leaders created the Israeli security agencies to pre-empt any acts of the Arab foes. The Israeli security agencies were diabolically ingenious until the Lebanese fiasco which began in 1982 and lasted until 2000. The intelligence failure in Lebanon, despite it being the most intricate and confident of all covert operations, ended in disaster for Israel, including the involvement in the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre. This is the reason why we will focus on this particular event after explaining who these agencies truly are.    

1-                 Mossad: (Hebrew: HaMossad LeModi’in U’Letfkidm Meyuhadim. English: Institute for Intelligence and Special Duties). Established in March, 1950. Dedicated to the gathering of intelligence outside of Israel, preparing the target area for covert special operations, running agents, monitoring the activities of the enemy embassies and offices of enemy organizations, surveillance of anti-Semitism (individuals or organizations), and spreading dis-information about the enemy in the media. http://fas.org/irp/world/israel/mossad/index.html (Mentioned 78 times in Kahan)  

2-                 AMAN: (Hebrew: Agaf Modi’in. English: IDF Intelligence Branch) Established in December 1953. Dedicated to the gathering of specifically military data, monitoring enemy communication, analysis of satellite imagery, and running covert special units and operations. http://fas.org/irp/world/israel/AMAN/index.html (Mentioned 104 times in Kahan)   

3-                 Shin Bet, or Shabak: (Hebrew: Sherut Habitachim Haklali. English: General Security Services). Established in June 1948. Dedicated to the internal security of the Israel and all occupied territories, recruiting informers and agents among the enemy populations, interrogation coupled with psychological and physical pressure on suspects i.e. torture, and the occasional extra-judicial execution. http://fas.org/irp/world/israel/shin_bet/index.html (Mentioned 8 times in Kahan)

4-                 LAKAM: (Hebrew: Lishka le Kishrei Mada. English: Scientific Affairs Liaison Bureau). Established in 1957. A covert unit of the Israeli Defense Ministry. Initially dedicated to the collection of info leading to the building of the Atom bomb, obtaining blueprints for advanced military hardware, and running overseas covert scientific operations in friendly countries. Officially disbanded in 1986. http://fas.org/irp/world/israel/lekem/index.html 

5-                 AI: (Hebrew for Above). This is a highly secretive autonomous division of the Mossad. They work under deep cover in the USA, without knowledge or approval of the US government, and some times against its interests. They mainly spy on Arab and other embassies, but sometimes they run operations against the US government, like the Jonathan Pollard scandal in late 1985.*           

The Secret Services Vs. The Arab World

Until the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Israeli Security Services were involved in hostile covert activities against the neighboring Arab states as well as others who were of the leftist persuasion (Nasserist, Baathist, Communist, and Socialist). As for the Arab regimes that were of Western persuasion, such as Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, the Israelis relied on their American and French connections to obtain intelligence and maintain indirect political contacts. The majority of operations were successful due to the atmosphere of hostility and mistrust due to the Arab Cold war between leftist and conservative regimes. Nevertheless, the main targets were the neighboring states of Egypt and Syria.

The Mossad in particular succeeded in placing deep cover Israeli agents, or spies in layman terms, who managed to obtain highly classified and sensitive political and military intelligence. The most infamous of these agents were Wolfgang Lotz in Egypt and Eli Cohen in Syria. Both spies who were active in the 1960’s, provided invaluable information that was vital in Israel’s victory in 1967 (Raviv and Melman, 143). Another highly successful operation was the defection of an Iraqi air force pilot with his MIG-21 in August 1966, which again was vital for Israel’s “pre-emptive” strike a year later (Black and Morris, 208). The MIG-21 was the most lethal of the Soviet fighters at that time and its secrets were unknown to the US, and NATO until Israel gave them the blueprints. This coup, along with some secrets obtained from the Soviet Bloc, raised the myth of the Israeli Secret Services in the West. 

Nevertheless, the 1967 victory was the peak of Israeli achievements. After 1967, the whole picture in the region changed and a new threat was born. That threat was called “Terrorism”, and this threat became and still is the bane of the Zionist military-intelligence machine. The Israelis had always dealt with cross-border infiltrations from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan since 1948. The difference after 1967 was that the cross border attacks were not sponsored by the Arab regimes but by independent groups, mostly under the umbrella of the PLO. Prior to 1967, it was the Syrian and Egyptian borders that were the most threatening, but after 1967 the attacks came from Jordan and Lebanon. After the PLO was evacuated from Jordan in 1970, Lebanon became the obsession of the Zionist decision-makers. So much that when Egypt and Syria launched their brilliant and successful offensive in October 6 1973, the IDF’s AMAN and the Mossad were caught with their pants down in what was known as the Mehdal, the Hebrew word for blunder (Black and Morris, 290). Nevertheless, the “Terrorism Complex” still obsessed the Israeli decision-makers. They retaliated against targets both in the Middle East and in the West, and in particular against Lebanon.* When Menachem Begin, a wanted terrorist himself, got to power in 1977, Israel decided to find a solution to the “Palestinian Terrorist” problem once and for all. In his cabinet he had a former soldier who thought he had the solution. That man was called Ariel Sharon.        

The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

Lebanon has always been a target of attention for the Israeli secret services since the 1948 War, although since it was not an adversary like Egypt or Syria, it didn’t get much attention. All that changed after the 1967 War, and intensified after the PLO moved from Jordan to Lebanon in 1970. From this point on, Lebanon was the focus of the Israeli secret services (AMAN, Shin Bet, and the Mossad), who reallocated some of the intelligence assets it had previously reserved to Egypt after the peace talks began between Sadat and Begin in the late 1970’s. 

Once the Lebanese Civil War began, and a clear power vacuum appeared in South Lebanon, where only the PLO had any nominal authority. Throughout the mostly Shiite and Christian villages of South Lebanon, however, residents were disenchanted with the PLO rule. As a matter of fact, Major Saad Haddad was sent to the area to re-establish the Beirut government authority in the area. When the 1975 breakdown of law and order occurred in Central Lebanon occurred, none of the 3 intelligence agencies had any real assets to activate in Lebanon (Black and Morris, 364). In terms of the very factional and brutal nature of the Lebanese Civil War, it presented them with numerous tempting opportunities equaled by the numerous dangerous risks. Unlike the previous situations, the Israeli Intelligence Services were presented with an unprecedented situation for which they had no prepared strategies.

As a result, none of the 3 intelligence agencies had any real plans to deal with Lebanon.* Nevertheless, in 1975, the possibilities seemed endless and infinitely more benign. In that relatively more relaxed atmosphere, the Israeli government of PM Rabin initiated the ‘Good Fence” policy, in which then residents of (preferably Christian) villages were given access to jobs and medical care in the Galilee. (O’balance, 65) Using tactics that they perfected in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Intelligence agencies, and specifically the Shin Bet, manipulated this seemingly benevolent policy as a backdoor to Lebanon and a fertile recruitment ground to recruit informers and agents (Black and Morris, 399). As 1978 approached, though, the Mossad was focused on the Phalange connection, and intelligence in the South was primarily run by the Shin Bet and AMAN, who began to have regular meetings in Northern Command to run the Lebanese operations (Black and Morris, 367).          

The operations in Lebanon were of two tiers; One, were the operations that were dedicated to obtaining information on the Palestinian organizations that were based in Lebanon. This information was used for the assassination operations in the pre-1978 period. An example of such operations occurred on the 9th of April 1973, when 30 Israeli commandos landed at El-Ramleh El-Beidah in Beirut, led by Ehud Barak, and conducted a three pronged attack killing an unspecified number of Palestinian Fedayeen, including 3 major DFLP leaders, and demolishing a PLO military facility (Katz, 50). Intelligence was used even more ruthlessly in the Invasions of 1978 and 1982. The operations were mainly focused on locating the leaders and commanders of the various Palestinian organizations, the counting and locating of hardware, and to recruit or coerce people into acting as agents or informers. The latter task was vital in the relatively easy task of occupying of the refugee camps in the South. Many Palestinian witnesses we met in the South have all emphasized the role of the informers in the detection, arrest, and maybe even the execution or disappearance of prisoners. The Shin Bet, or the General Security Service as it is officially known, which is responsible for the security of the state of Israel [48 Lands] and all occupied territories, worked feverishly between 1978-1982 to use the occupied Southern areas as a nest of agents and informers to be used against the Palestinian organizations that were based in the refugee camps in the South (Randal, 219). In a little publicized incident in South Lebanon, the Israeli security forces oversaw a massacre by the FLA in the village of Khiam in March 1978 after the IDF completed its occupation of South Lebanon (Fisk, 137). This coincided with the preparations for the (Peace For Galilee) Invasion by the AMAN, the intelligence arm of the IDF who were using information from the Shin Bet’s informants, as well as reconnaissance flights by the IAF, to locate the targets for the Invasion.                 

The second tier was the initiation of contacts with Lebanese parties of all sects, although they found the Christians more responsive, although mostly reluctant, trying to find a fifth column within the cauldron of the civil war that began in 1975. From an early stage, the three main services differed in their (Lebanon Strategy). The AMAN, and later the Shin Bet, favored a concentration on the South to clearly focus on the security of Israel’s northern borders. It was these two parties that worked together on the establishment of Saad Haddad’s renegade unit as a pro-Israeli proxy militia in the South in 1978. 

The Mossad were more concentrated on recruiting “allies” in the ranks of the Maronite militias, especially the Phalangists and their leader Bashir Jemayel, who were on the brink of defeat in the first year of the Lebanese Civil War. Even after the Syrians intervened to rescue the Christians, the Mossad maintained their contacts with the Maronite militia leaders. The initiation of contact with the Israelis was not done by the Phalange, however, but by Camille Chamoun’s son, Danny. On September 1975 in Paris, and via a Mossad Station in Paris, Danny Chamoun, son of former president and leader of the Tigers Militia approached the Israeli Government for assistance (Black+ Morris, 365). Qualitatively, the Chamoun militia was better in terms of leadership morale and desire for an alliance with Israel. Quantitatively, The Phalangists had the advantage of numbers. Eventually, Bashir used his numerical superiority to exterminate his rivals in the pro-Syrian Franjieh militia. On the 13th of May 1978 in Ehden (Southeast of Tripoli), Phalangist militia men, under orders from Bashir Jemayel and commanded by Samir Geagea, kill Tony Franjieh, who was the son of the former president and the leader of the pro-Syrian Maronite faction, Sulieman Franjieh. The Phalangists killed Tony, his wife and his daughter as well as nearly 30 of his loyalists. (O’Ballance, 79) Not satisfied with slaying his Maronite rivals, Bashir went on to slay his allies. On the 7th of July 1980 in Safra Resort near Jounieh, Phalangist militiamen launched a wide-scale attack against Chamoun’s Tigers. The battle ended with nearly 80 deaths on both sides, including many innocent bystanders. Danny Chamoun, the deposed leader of the Tigers, would later claim and insist that Bashir Jemayel was encouraged to carry out this putsch by Israeli C-o-S Eitan (Schiff and Ya’ari, 29). By the beginning of 1982, Bashir had become the commander of the now united Maronite militias, under the name of the Lebanese Forces (LF), who were armed and trained by Israel. This sheer brutality and cold-bloodedness endeared Bashir to the Israeli government, the IDF and the 3 agencies. In fact after Sharon became defense minister after August 1981, he and Bashir became good friends.

Underneath the whole amicability, there was a diversion in what was to become of the Palestinians in Lebanon in the eyes of the LF and the IDF. The LF held the banner of expelling the Palestinians from Lebanon, but in reality the LF would have settled for the expulsion of the Palestinians from Central Lebanon, especially Beirut. The IDF also wanted the PLO gone and the Palestinian refugees moved to Jordan but it also would have settled for the removal of the Palestinian presence from South Lebanon. In the end, the arrogance and brutality of the two strongmen, Sharon and Bashir, would guide them to a radical and final solution to the Palestinian problem in Lebanon: Genocide.

In Central Lebanon, the LF had only one real adversary, the PLO, who happened to be the sworn enemy of Israel, standing in the way of Maronite controlled Lebanon. Syria was another enemy but Bashir was not going to confront it on his own. So encouraged by the Mossad station chief in Jounieh, Bashir wanted to provoke the Syrian Army into an attack on the Maronites. During the election campaign, and after his victory, PM Begin made many grandiose statements about preventing the “genocide of the Christians” in Lebanon. (Morris, 504-505) The Israeli Government needed a pretext to intervene in Lebanon and prompted Bashir to provide them with one. The Ehden Massacre of one of Syria’s primary allies in Lebanon was such a provocation but the Syrians refused to fall in the trap. Bashir knew that he needed a stronger incident to get the Syrians to attack the LF positions to provide a pretext for the IDF to attack. Thus on the 1st of April in 1981, LF units attack and occupy Zahle, the strategic town on the Beirut-Damascus Highway in the Bekaa Valley, provoking a massive response from the Syrian Army. (Schiff +Ya’ari, 32)

On the 28th of April in 1981, the Israeli Cabinet met to discuss the Zahle Crisis. PM Begin and C-o-S Eitan called for IAF strikes against Syrian targets in and around Zahle. The majority of the cabinet and the Mossad Director, Yitzhak Hofi opposed the idea. The loudest opposition came from Saguy, AMAN Commander, who openly accused Eitan of encouraging Bashir to incite the Zahle Crisis to give the IDF justification to intervene. Both Hofi and Saguy suspected that Eitan was encouraging Bashir to pick a fight with the Syrians in order to drag Israel into the Lebanese conflict (Schiff +Ya’ari, 33). They were right. C-o-S Eitan, in collusion with PM Begin, left the meeting to order the shooting down by of two Syrian helicopters, and claimed when he returned to the meeting that the IAF has shot down “two assault gunships”. The truth was that the IAF had shot down 2 unarmed troop carriers. Saguy predicted that Syrian President Assad will take measures that can only threaten the IAF’s air supremacy over Lebanese Skies. (Schiff +Ya’ari, 33-34) Sure enough the next day the Syrians introduced 4 (SAM-6) batteries to the Bekaa. On the 30th of April in 1981, PM Begin and C-o-S Eitan ordered an IAF attack against the Syrian SAM’s, but poor weather prevented the attack. US mediation eventually defused the situation, but in favor of Syria, which kept its SAM’s in Lebanon and defeated the LF in Zahle. (Morris, 506) This failure was followed by another attempt at provoking the Syrians. On the 14th of December 1981, PM Begin announced the annexation of the Golan Heights, Syrian territory that has been occupied since 1967. Syria sensibly refused to respond to this blatant provocation. (To Win or to Die, 265)

By the beginning of 1982, the 3 Agencies were hard at work planning the Invasion of Lebanon, and the plans included 3 main elements: destruction of the PLO infrastructure, the expulsion of the Syrian forces, and the promotion of LF dominance of Lebanon. On the second week of January 1982, DM Sharon led a large entourage on tour of Central Lebanon, including Beirut. He met with Bashir Jemayel, who expressed support for the invasion but refused to meet any of Sharon’s demands. These included an IDF landing in Jounieh and joint IDF-LF operations in West Beirut against PLO positions, including the refugee camps. Sharon told Bashir, “We’ll get to Beirut. Don’t you worry”. He also met with the Maronite elders, Pierre Jemayel and Camille Chamoun. Sharon returned from the visit more determined to invade Lebanon, according to AMAN Commander Saguy.(Black and Morris, 372-373) Sharon’s visit was followed by visits by C-o-S Eitan and other IDF and intelligence officials, all of which included attempts at persuading the LF to participate in the Invasion, especially in “mopping up” operations against Palestinian targets. The visit that sealed the fate of Lebanon was on April 1982, when Northern Command OC Amir Drori led a team of high-ranking IDF and IAF officers on an intelligence gathering mission. The LF Commander Fady Ephraim and later Bashir Jemayel met with them. Once again the LF repeated their insistence of refusing any joint operations or an IDF landing in Jounieh. Despite this clear disparity between what the LF leadership was saying and what Sharon expected them to do, the IDF was still poised to invade. At the end of April, Northern Command OC, Drori reported that the IDF had “the most thoroughly planned war in its history”. This now included built positions for the artillery, launch platform for tanks, complete aerial mapping of the areas to be occupied with US-provided satellite images of Syrian positions in Lebanon and Syria, and the activation of the informer networks in Southern Lebanon (Schiff +Ya’ari, 54).* 

  With the necessary military information AMAN was ready, and so was the Shin Bet who had lists of Palestinian activists and a web of informers in all camps. The Mossad had handed the issue of diplomacy with the LF to Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, laden with the illusion of friendship and alliance with their Maronite allies. The Israelis had prepared well, but they were not quite ready to occupy the politically complex country. They went ahead anyway on June 1982.      

Although at its heart, (Peace of Galilee) was Ariel Sharon’s plan, but all the power brokers in the Israeli military and security structures were equally if reticently, committed to the Invasion. This fact needs to be emphasized; DM Ariel Sharon with PM Menachem Begin’s blessing and Rafael Eitan complicity, was in complete control of what, at the end of April 1982, Northern Command Operations Commander, Amir Drori reported to be the IDF’s “most thoroughly planned war in its history” (Schiff +Ya’ari, 54). The heads of the 3 Intelligence Agencies, especially the AMAN’s Yehoshua Saguy, were all reluctant about the extent of “Peace For Galilee”. Sharon made it clear to all 3 heads that he was going to take the IDF and them to Beirut. This reluctance to accept the Zionist-LF alliance was also apparent on the Lebanese side. Pierre Jemayel, the Godfather of the Phalangist Party and Bashir’s father, was willing to let Israel do the dirty work in Lebanon, but he was adamant in refusing an open alliance with Israel. On the Second week of January 1982 in Jounieh, Pierre Jemayel told a shocked Sharon during his first clandestine visit to Lebanon, “We are part of the Arab World. We are not traitors. We are not like Saad Haddad.”(Black and Morris, 373)  

The AMAN and the Mossad, along with the Labor Opposition, would later claim that they disagreed with DM Sharon, but typically never specifying what they disagreed with him about. Our research shows, however, that the AMAN and Mossad, along most Israeli politicians supported the plans to “eradicate the PLO in Lebanon” (Schiff +Ya’ari, 66). The eradication of the PLO and its terrorist infrastructure explicitly meant the destruction of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The two points of contention, the relationship with the LF and the war with Syria, had nothing to do with the PLO and the Palestinians. Not once was the morality or military effectiveness of the saturation bombing campaign and the mass arrests of all males, as clearly defined in both versions, Little and Big Pines, debated in any of the cabinet or military meetings before and during the Invasion.     

In both books, Israel’s Lebanon War and Israel’s Secret Wars, we find plenty of evidence that there was internal dissent against the (Peace for Galilee). Especially in the ranks of the IDF, many Israelis were predicting that the Invasion would end up in disaster since it was not clearly defined what the military and political objectives were. Ariel Sharon was mainly responsible for this confusion, but he was also responsible for getting the IDF and the security agencies to join in despite the dissent. The conduct of the IDF and the three intelligence agencies during the operation leading to the occupation of West Beirut on the 15th of September, showed a diligence and commitment that never wavered. The trail of death and destruction they left behind certainly showed that despite the dissenting voices of some IDF troops, like Dov Yermia and Avi Grabowsky, the majority of the IDF troops acted with the brutality and cruelty that is their trademark.* Equally, the intelligence agencies also acted without mercy, especially in their handling of the refugee camps in the South.

The role of Israeli Intelligence in the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre

The words (cover-up) and Intelligence agencies go hand in hand. There have been several scandals and cover ups in the history of the Israeli secret services, like the Lavon Affair in 1954 and the Bus 300 Affair in 1984. No scandal or misdeed, however, can compare with the enormity and criminal dimension of the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre, and the cover-up that followed. Nothing signifies the cover-up of the Israeli role in the Massacre like the mysterious Appendix (B) of the Kahan Report, where many believe the real role of the IDF and the 3 Secret Agencies is clarified. Nevertheless, there is enough evidence from the testimonies of survivors, journalistic reports, and political analysts to show the direct involvement of the AMAN and Shin Bet in the actual massacre, as well as the complicity of the Mossad. In fact, we can safely conclude what we already know to be true; the Israeli government, its military and its intelligence agencies are directly responsible for the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre.

The 3 agencies were involved in the period prior to the massacre but on different levels and in different places. As has been mentioned above, the Mossad was involved closely with the LF in central Lebanon. They had a liaison office in Jounieh since the late-70’s and had coordinated many of the military and political moves between the LF and the Israeli government (Raviv and Melman, 265). Senior Mossad officers attended most of the meetings prior and during the Invasion. They also conducted many operations within Beirut and participated in the horrifying bombardment of Beirut, by sending coordinates to the IAF that pinpointed the leaders of the PLO and their allies. Worse still, was their sending in of car bombs into West Beirut. In relation to the S&S Massacre, the Mossad directors were aware of the joint LF-IDF plans to remove the Palestinian refugee camp and the transfer of their populations out of Beirut and maybe Lebanon altogether. Although the Mossad Director, Yitzhak Hofi, was skeptical of the validity of the alliance with the LF, the Mossad field officers were extremely friendly with the LF personnel on the ground (Raviv and Melman, 268). Furthermore, they were over-confident about the positive outcome of the Invasion. Sources have told of the Mossad officers joyfully shooting their guns in the air in the streets of Asharfiya with the LF men when Bashir was elected as Lebanon’s president (Schiff +Ya’ari, 233). Equally, this explains why the Mossad were in a state of shock and near-despair when Bashir Jemayel was killed. Israeli journalist Ehud Ya’ari tells of a senior Mossad officer, Nahik Navot, hysterically digging in the rubble of the LF office in Ashrafiya looking for Bashir Jemayel (The Lebanese War, episode 9).*

On the other hand, The AMAN and the Shin Bet were working on another level. The former was specifically working on promoting Haddad’s militia and extended their zone of control. The AMAN even worked against any extension of the LF control to the South, and all attempts by the LF to gain power in Sidon during the summer of 1982 were thwarted by the IDF (Schiff +Ya’ari, 238-239). The Shin Bet played a quieter if not less malignant role. As with all occupied Arab territories, the Shin Bet was in South Lebanon after 1978, and followed in the steps of the IDF as they advanced towards Beirut in 1982. By the nature of their security role, the Shin Bet does not get involved in fighting. There is no information of the Shin Bet were involved in the Siege of Beirut, but Robert Fisk does confirm their presence in the Cite Sportif on the 18th and 19th of September conducting interrogations with suspected “terrorists” (Fisk, 366). There are also extensive records of the Shin Bet in the oppression of the South until the final IDF withdrawal to the security zone in 1985. Though mentioned 8 times in the Kahan Report, it would seem that they only attended the meetings before and during the massacre. They are, however, guilty after the fact since they were at the Cite Sportif during the Massacre, and the informers that were identifying people inside the Cite Sportif were, as is their Modus Operandi showed in the South during the summer, recruited and run by the Shin Bet. Therefore, and despite being implicitly cleared by the Kahan Report, the Shin Bet is no less guilty of the crime of genocide in Sabra and Shatilla than the AMAN that was implicated in the same report. 

So why was the AMAN alone implicated in the crime, and its commander Yehoshua Saguy dismissed? Other than being a scapegoat, it would seem obvious that the AMAN was involved in the planning and maybe the carrying out of the Massacre. It has to be clear that Saguy was opposed to the alliance with the LF, and had objected heavily even before Sharon became defense minister to any alliance with the LF. Like the Mossad who got too close to the LF, Saguy and the AMAN had got too close to the FLA. Saguy insisted that any future plans for an Israeli-allied Lebanon that would not only forgive Haddad for his treason, but to also to reward him. Reports of the meetings, including the seminal meeting between PM Begin and Bashir in Nahariya in September 1st, show that the Israeli government and the IDF were adamant in giving Haddad a significant role in the new Lebanese government (Randal, 10). He was further rewarded after the Massacre when he was re-instated into the Lebanese Army in late 1984 right before his death, and his militia led by another traitor Antoine Lahd was maintained until May 25th  2000. He was rewarded but for what? In all likelihood, and as many witnesses and reporters have stated, his forces participated in the Massacre under orders from the AMAN. Therefore the Command responsibility falls on Saguy for any atrocities committed in the South, or in Sabra and Shatilla. Nevertheless, the exact details or “the smoking gun” are not available, and are probably clear in the mysterious Appendix B. The simple fact is that the AMAN was the most directly responsible Israeli Intelligence agency for the Massacre, although all 3 agencies were equally guilty of the crime of genocide since all 3 were involved in the planning and execution of the Invasion of Lebanon, whose main uncontested aim was “the eradication of the PLO infrastructure”, which meant the destruction of the Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Lebanon and the forceful transfer of its residents out of the country. DM Sharon himself wanted them moved to Jordan where a “substitute homeland” would be established for them after the Hashemite monarchy was toppled (Schiff and Ya’ari, 43). Saguy knew of this and is not on record as objecting to this goal.

In short, all 3 agencies are guilty in the crime of Sabra and Shatilla, if on different levels. Their guilt is a foregone conclusion once the IDF occupied West Beirut on the 15th of September, but the role of the AMAN is far more insidious. The hypothesis is that the after the Bashir-Begin meeting, Saguy’s point of view prevailed. Sharon, Begin, and the IDF commanders, Yaron and Saguy had realized that Bashir will not keep his any of his promises, that there will not be a Lebanon controlled by the LF and allied with Israel, nor will the LF or Lebanese Army expel the Palestinian population out of Lebanon. Therefore, and as the Zionist pattern shows, the Israeli leadership wanted to keep Lebanon divided, to punish the LF for their betrayal, and to cause a mass flight of the Palestinians. The true and tried method would be a Massacre that would first discredit the LF and prevent them from unifying Lebanon under their control, plus causing a panic in the ranks of the now undefended camps that would drive the Palestinians out. The only problem was making it as ugly as possible but at the same time keeping it quiet.

The Truth Exposed

            For 19 years, the Israelis have managed to convince the world of one of the biggest lies of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that lie was embodied in the Kahan Report about the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre. The basic line was that the Phalangists, crazed by the killing of their leader, thirsty for revenge, attack the camps and slaughter their inhabitants. The IDF and the 3 intelligence agencies, while guilty in trusting the Phalangists to behave during the “mopping up” operation, were not guilty of perpetrating the massacre itself. Furthermore, the Israelis went about trying to convince the world that the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre was a historical anomaly, and that it was more of an error in judgment on the part of the Begin government. To add insult to injury, the Kahan Report did hold certain government officials and IDF officers responsible, and it did recommend their dismissal, but the focus was on DM Sharon and AMAN Commander Saguy. With the February 1983 issuance of the Kahan Report, Israel declared that its conscience was clean. Nothing could be further from the truth.

            Ever since, many people have swallowed the Kahan Lie and accepted it as the truth. So what is the truth? The decision to wipe out the Palestinian presence in Lebanon was taken many years preceding the actual Massacre, and was taken at the highest levels of the Israeli military and security hierarchy. In conjunction with the Zionist plans and ambitions for the Middle East, the Israelis were intent on not only destroying the Palestinian organizations, but removing the whole Palestinian population out of Lebanon, by transfer and/or murder. That in essence is genocide. In 1977, when the Likud got to power in Israel, there were enough genocidal minds coalescing and plotting. By early 1982, the plans were ready for the final solution of the Palestinian problem; the eradication of the PLO and the destruction of the refugee camps in Lebanon, the transfer of the Palestinian refugees to Jordan and the establishment of the substitute homeland, and finally the annexation of “Judea and Samaria”, as the Israelis call the Occupied West Bank. Unlike the rhetoric of the period, the alliance with the LF was secondary and thus can be sacrificed. As for Syria, the Israelis were probably considering defeating it in Lebanon, then contain it and complete its defeat at a latter stage once Lebanon was secured. The AMAN and the Shin Bet, as well as the Mossad to a lesser degree, agreed on all these points which constituted the “Grand design” that (Begin Five) adopted.*

            The Sabra and Shatilla Massacre was not an anomaly but rather an inevitable conclusion to the Peace For Galilee Invasion. It happened because the Zionist decision makers, strategists, and commanders among whom members of the 3 agencies figured prominently, wanted to happen. To say that the Phalangists or Haddad were responsible is to give these proxies too much credit. They were mere fronts for the IDF and the 3 security agencies. Who was Saad Haddad or Elie Hobeika without Israeli training and direction? How can the AMAN, the Mossad, or the Shin Bet claim ignorance about the Massacre while they claim to be the best Intelligence agencies in the world? How can we accept that the Kahan Report was nothing more than cover-up? And lastly, who other than the AMAN could have planned the brutal mopping up of the Camps, whether those in the South or in Beirut?

            The Sabra and Shatilla Massacre was planned within the Invasion plan, and it appears under the name of Operation Spark, or Operation Iron Brain. Its finer details were worked out between the 1st of September when the alliance with Bashir collapsed, and the 12th of the same month when Sharon met with Bashir. The LF was perceived as unreliable and that the mopping up of the camps was to proceed with or without them. The AMAN could rely on the FLA to get the job done, and it would assist them with IDF special forces, or Sayerets as they are called in Hebrew. It is quite clear that the Sayerets were in the camps as the former fighters in the camp have told us, but we have not been able to identify which unit it was exactly. But the presence of the Sayerets indicates clearly that the Massacre was what is called in intelligence lingo a Black Operation, which is a secret operation that is carried out by the intelligence agents and special forces upon a decision taken by the Chief Executive and a few of his ministers. Israeli Secret Services and the Sayerets have  carried out many Black Operations, including the Qibya Massacre of 1953, the attack on the Beirut International Airport in 1968, and the assassination of Abu Jihad in Tunis in 1988. During the 1982 Invasion, and according to IDF historian Samuel Katz, the Sayerets were deeply involved in the military operations, who are like all special forces in the world are made up of hard and brutal killers who volunteer for the job and know exactly what it entails.* In short, Israel’s Secret Services’ role in the Sabra and Shatilla Massacre is not only undeniable, but is far more involved than what the Kahan Commission stated. One day when Appendix B finally comes to light, this theory will be proven, although it is clear that there is enough evidence to back it up. As an epilogue, Israel’s secret services, probably the Mossad, assassinated Elie Hobeika in Beirut in 2002 in what is obviously an attempt to conceal the truth about the Massacre. If anyone doubted the involvement of the Israeli intelligence, this should silence the naysayers.   

Sources

1-     Benny Morris. Righteous Victims. Vintage Press; New York, 2001.

2-     Dan Raviv and Danny Melman. Every Spy a Prince. Houghton Miflin; Boston, 1990.

3-     Edgar O’Ballance. Civil War in Lebanon: 1975-1992. Macmillan Press; London, 1998.

4-     Ian Black and Benny Morris. Israel’s Secret Wars. Futura Publications; London, 1991.

5-     Jonathan C. Randal. Going All The Way: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers, and the War in Lebanon. Viking Press; New York, 1983. 

6-     Michael Jansen. The Battle of Beirut. Zed Press; London, 1982.

7-     Robert Fisk. Pity the Nation. Simon and Schuster; New York, 1990.

8-     Samuel M. Katz. Israeli Elite Units since 1948. Osprey Publishing; London, 1988.

9-     Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari. Israel’s Lebanon War. Simon & Schuster; New York, 1984.

 

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* The only source of information on this unit is available in former Mossad agent, Victor Ostrovsky’s (By Way Of Deception). Judging by the general reluctance in accepting all the info in Ostrovsky’s book by many intelligence analysts, we should be skeptical in affirming AI’s existence.

*For more details on Israel’s aggression against Lebanon see http://www.futuretvnetwork.com/justice/israel_in_lebanon.html 

* Today, there had been no change in this confusion in the ranks of Israel’ s intelligence agencies, where there is still no Lebanon policy, except perhaps “Stay out”. (See Ha’aretz article Fighting Blind (http://www.moqawama.org/page2/f_iaggrr.htm) for more on the confusion and discord plaguing the IDF, AMAN, Mossad, and Shin Bet in the face of the Lebanese resistance. 

  Saguy is on record badgering the DM after the meeting with Pierre Jemayel about the lack of wisdom in the alliance with the LF. Saguy believed, according to the minutes of the meeting, that the LF will let Israel carry the load by itself. Most high ranking military officials in the IDF shared Saguy’s low opinion of the LF. 

* Even at this juncture, Sharon’s declared political objectives to the Americans and his own cabinet, and those known to and supported by Begin, Eitan, Shamir, and Arens were very different. Drori has his reservation. Saguy and Mossad Director Hofi are the only voices of dissent. It is worth noting that the duplicity, the collusion and dissent were all about a specific point; a wide war with Syria and/or the alliance with the LF, or Phalangists as they were known in Israel. Not one voice within the civilian, security and military circles spoke once against the “Eradication of the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon.”  

* Dov Yermia, a reservist wrote a seminal book (My War Diary), which is a clear condemnation of the IDF’s brutality and inhumanity during the 1982 Invasion. Another soldier, Lieutenant Grabowsky, a deputy commander of a tank company near the Sabra and Shatilla camps, who testified before the Kahan Commission, was another well known dissenters.   

* See our website to read Navot’s testimony to the Kahan Commission http://www.futuretvnetwork.com/justice/cab_8.html  

* The Begin Five were five individuals in the Israeli government who pursued the goals of this Zionist Grand Design and they were: Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, and Israeli Ambassador to the US Moshe Arens.   

* The Sayerets are like all special forces in the world are made up of hard and brutal killers who volunteer for the job and know exactly what it entails. Such units work in total secrecy and are not trained to take prisoners or hold positions. They carry out what the Americans call “search and destroy” missions.