[Redistributed with permission]

From: KALLISTE@delphi.com (J. Orlin Grabbe)
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 1995 02:52:41 -0500 (EST)
Subject: The End of Ordinary Money

****************************************************
* The End of Ordinary Money is copyrighted 1995 by *
* J. Orlin Grabbe, 1280 Terminal Way #3, Reno, NV  *
* 89502.                                           *
****************************************************


THE END OF ORDINARY MONEY

by  J. Orlin Grabbe

=09Late one night while sharing a=20
pharmacological product with a spook I met in the=20
northeastern part of the United States, I mentioned I=20
was studying cryptology. =20

=09"Cryptology is the *future*," he responded=20
emphatically.  "It's what's going to protect us from=20
Big Brother." =20

=09Since he worked for the National Security=20
Agency (NSA), the thought did occur to me that=20
many would have taken the position that he and his=20
colleagues *were* Big Brother.  But I had learned=20
years ago not to demonize people on the basis of an=20
accidental profession.  After all, if an ex-CIA=20
employee like Kerry Thornley could become a=20
staunch libertarian, the creator of Zenarchy and=20
implied co-author of  the Erisian holy book=20
Principia Discordia [1], then there was hope for all=20
of us.  I additionally believed that one of our best=20
defenses against the national security state was the=20
perennial proclivity of clandestine organizations to=20
piss off their own employees [2].

=09At any rate, the spook spoke the truth:=20
cryptology represents the future of privacy, and=20
more.  By implication cryptology also represents the=20
future of money, and the future of banking and=20
finance. (By "money" I mean the medium of=20
exchange, the institutional mechanisms for making=20
transactions, whether by cash, check, debit card or=20
other electronic transfer.)  Given the choice between=20
intersecting with a monetary system that leaves a=20
detailed electronic trail of all one's financial=20
activities, and a parallel system that ensures=20
anonymity and privacy, people will opt for the=20
latter.  Moreover, they will *demand* the latter,=20
because the current monetary system is being turned=20
into the principal instrument of surveillance and=20
control by tyrannical elements in Western=20
governments.  =20

=09These elements all want to know where your=20
money comes from, and when and how you spend=20
it.  After all, you might be a terrorist, drug dealer,=20
or spy.  And if you try to hide your transactions, you=20
are by definition a money launderer and perhaps a=20
child pornographer. =20

=09Say what? To understand this quaint=20
accusatorial juxtaposition, one only has to grasp a=20
few simple facts:  Money is digital information. =20
The way to hide digital information is through=20
cryptography. The government doesn't want you=20
using cryptography, because they want to know=20
where your money is so they can get some of it. =20
And they don't like you using drugs, unless the=20
government is the dealer [3], or viewing child=20
pornography, unless the government supplies it=20
because it is setting you up for blackmail or a smear=20
campaign [4].

=09Okay, I'll admit it.  I like privacy (I often=20
send mail inside sealed envelopes, and sometimes=20
close the door when I go to the bathroom), take=20
drugs (nothing like a cup of expresso in the=20
morning), and don't like to pay taxes (but doesn't=20
H&R Block make a living off this same popular=20
sentiment?). I don't know much about child=20
pornography, but a friend of a friend is said to have=20
a distant cousin who swears he keeps several=20
hundred gigabytes of encrypted pictures of naked=20
children stored in NSA computers at Ft. Mead. ("No=20
one breaks in there," the cousin supposedly brags.)=20
[5]

=09This is serious stuff.  Consider the following=20
items as pieces of an overall mosaic, whose ultimate=20
meaning will become even more obscure as we=20
proceed.

=09* Cryptography software is classified as=20
munitions, and its export is restricted by the State=20
Department. The International Traffic in Arms=20
Regulations (ITAR) defines "encryption software"=20
to include not only computer programs designed to=20
protect the privacy of information, but all of the=20
technical data about those programs.  ITAR=20
restrictions continue to be enforced, even though the=20
Justice Department originally found them=20
unconstitutional [6].  Mail a copy of your new=20
encryption program to a friend in Italy, and--
presto!--you are subject to prosecution as an=20
international arms dealer. (It is not, however, illegal=20
to export your program to outer space, or to deliver=20
it to your friend by rocket, since a "launch vehicle=20
or payload shall not, by the launching of such=20
vehicle, be considered export for the purposes of=20
this subchapter" (120.10).)

=09* Steward Baker, Chief Counsel for NSA,=20
points out how the spread of cryptology plays into=20
the hands of pedophiles:  "Take for example the=20
campaign to distribute PGP ('Pretty Good Privacy')=20
encryption on the Internet. Some argue that=20
widespread availability of this encryption will help=20
Latvian freedom fighters today and American=20
freedom fighters tomorrow. Well, not quite. Rather,=20
one of the earliest users of PGP was a high-tech=20
pedophile in Santa Clara, California. He used PGP=20
to encrypt files that, police suspect, include a diary=20
of his contacts with susceptible young boys using=20
computer bulletin boards all over the country. 'What=20
really bothers me,' says Detective Brian Kennedy of=20
the Sacramento, California, Sheriff's Department, 'is=20
that there could be kids out there who need help=20
badly, but thanks to this encryption, we'll never=20
reach them' " [7] .

=09Which does lead to a few questions.  Since=20
the NSA is the largest user of encryption software in=20
the world, does that mean NSA is rife with=20
pedophiles?  Are police *suspicions* to be taken as=20
convincing evidence?  And what if this alleged=20
pedophile had never kept notes in the first place? =20
But never mind. What really bothers me is that there=20
could be kids out there who need help badly, but=20
thanks to sloppy records, extended ignorance, and=20
appeals to national security, we'll never reach them.=20

=09The NSA Chief Counsel also noted, as he=20
had in previous speeches, ". . . it's the proponents of=20
widespread unbreakable encryption who want to=20
create a brave new world, one in which all of us--
crooks included--have a guarantee that the=20
government can't tap our phones." Which caused=20
one observer, Bruce Sterling, to remark, "As a=20
professional science fiction writer I remember being=20
immediately struck by the deep conviction that there=20
was plenty of Brave New World to go around" [8].=20

=09* Georgetown University cryptologist=20
Dorthy Denning reminds us that "Because =20
encryption can make communications immune from=20
lawful interception, it threatens a key law=20
enforcement tool. The proliferation of high quality,=20
portable, easy-to-use, and affordable encryption=20
could be harmful to society if law enforcement does=20
not have the means to decrypt lawfully intercepted=20
communications. Although encryption of stored=20
files is also of concern, 99% of the issue is=20
telephone communications (voice, fax, and data)"=20
[9]. =20
=09
=09The reason for this is all those people on the=20
phone dealing drugs.  "Almost two thirds of all=20
court orders for electronic surveillance are used to=20
fight the war on drugs, and electronic surveillance=20
has been critical in identifying and then dismantling=20
major drug trafficking organizations.  In an=20
operation code named 'PIZZA CONNECTION,' an=20
FBI international investigation into the importation=20
and distribution of $1.6 billion worth of heroin by=20
the Sicilian Mafia and La Cosa Nostra resulted in=20
the indictment of 57 high-level drug traffickers in=20
the U.S. and 5 in Italy . . ..  The FBI estimates that=20
the war on drugs and its continuing legacy of=20
violent street crime would be substantially, if not=20
totally, lost if law enforcement were to lose its=20
capability for electronic surveillance" [10].

=09In fact, that's supposed to settle the issue=20
right there:  "We need such-and-such to fight the=20
war on drugs.  Case closed."  This argument is used=20
ad nauseam in document after document.  Nowhere=20
is the issue raised:  Oh yeah?  So why are we=20
fighting a war on drugs?  Such questions are ruled=20
out, because we're dealing with *needs* here, and=20
needs spew forth their own logic and evolve their=20
own morals.

=09* One of governments' biggest needs is to=20
get all that drug money for themselves, the part they=20
don't already have.  The U.S. State Department=20
proposes a sort of international spree of =20
government theft: "We must effect greater asset=20
seizures, not just of bank accounts, but also=20
corporate assets and even corporate entities . . . We=20
must be ready to impose appropriate sanctions=20
against banking institutions, as well as bankers . . .=20
The FATF [Financial Task Force] countries, the 12=20
EU [European Union] nations, the EFTA countries,=20
and the majority of the 95 states party to the 1988=20
UN Convention are adopting (if not yet fully=20
implementing) legislation that will ultimately=20
improve individual and collective capabilities." [11]  =20

=09Everyone is suspect.  You say you want to=20
buy some Portuguese escudos?  We better keep our=20
eye on you--you're a potential money launderer. =20
According to the State Department, "Entry in the=20
European monetary system has made the escudo,=20
which became fully convertible in 1993, more=20
attractive to potential money launderers" [12].=20
Hmm. Hey, fellows. With that mentality, you=20
should send some investigators from Foggy Bottom=20
up to 19th Street. You'll find an entire building, an=20
outfit called the International Monetary Fund, which=20
was originally set up to work for currency=20
convertibility.  No telling what wicked *potential*=20
money laundering havens they're working on next.   =20

=09* The Financial Crimes Enforcement=20
Network (FinCEN) located in Vienna, Virginia, was=20
set up in April 1990 to track money laundering, and=20
given computerized access to data from pretty much=20
everyone--FBI, DEA, Secret Service, Customs=20
Service, Postal Service, CIA, NSA, Defense=20
Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, the=20
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and=20
Research, and, yes, the IRS (despite denials).=20
FinCEN has a $2.4 million contract with Los=20
Alamos National Laboratory to develop artificial=20
intelligence programs to look for unexplained=20
money flows [13].  FinCEN also proposed a=20
"Deposit Tracking System" (DTS) that would also=20
track deposits to, or withdrawals from, U.S. banks=20
accounts in real time.

=09* Now, if you were a drug dealer (or maybe=20
just an average Joe), how would you react to all this=20
unwanted attention?  Try to keep a low profile,=20
maybe?  Perhaps opt out of the usual banking=20
channels? "During the past two years, analysts saw=20
an increasing use of non-bank financial institutions,=20
especially exchange houses, check cashing services,=20
credit unions, and instruments like postal money=20
orders, cashiers checks, and certificates of deposit=20
(particularly in 'bearer' form), with transactions=20
occurring in an ever longer list of countries and=20
territories" [12].

=09This process whereby money flows through=20
non-traditional banking channels is termed=20
*disintermediation*.  Disintermediation happens=20
whenever a government manipulates banking=20
services in such a way to make them less attractive. =20
For example, if bank deposits have an interest rate=20
ceiling of  3 percent, you may elect to pull your=20
money out of bank deposits, and purchase Treasury=20
bills which  have no ceiling.  In the same way, if the=20
government is looking around in your bank account,=20
perhaps with the idea of seizing it, or seizing you,=20
you may elect not to have a bank account, or at least=20
not one the government knows about.  Or you may=20
elect to use non-traditional financial channels which=20
are less likely to be observed.   The ultimate end of=20
the process is completely anonymous banking=20
through encrypted digital cash.      =20

=09The State Department also notes will alarm=20
that "[drug] traffickers were employing professional=20
money managers." Which does lead one to reflect,=20
whatever is the world coming to?  The next thing=20
you know,  drug dealers will be shopping at the=20
local grocery store and sending their children to=20
better schools.  They'll be mowing their lawns and=20
sprucing up the neighborhood. How could we live=20
in such a society?

=09* All this talk of computers has gotten the=20
IRS hot and bothered also. Not in a negative way,=20
mind you.  The IRS has become obsessed with the=20
noble goal to save us time by just sending us a bill: =20
"In an effort to catch more tax cheats, the Internal=20
Revenue Service plans to vastly expand the secret=20
computer database of information it keeps on=20
virtually all Americans. . . .'Ultimately, the IRS may=20
obtain enough information to prepare most tax=20
returns,' said Coleta Brueck, the agency's top=20
document processing official.  'If I know what=20
you've made during the year', she said, 'if I know=20
what your withholding is, if I know what your=20
spending pattern is, I should be able to generate for=20
you a tax return...' " [14]. =20

=09We have nothing to fear, apparently, but=20
*fiends who hide their spending patterns*.  Well,=20
Coleta, you had better prepare for a flood of data=20
that is spending-pattern impaired, because=20
according to the Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, "Just=20
as the technology of printing altered and reduced=20
the power of medieval guilds and the social power=20
structure, so too will cryptologic methods=20
fundamentally alter the nature of corporations and=20
of government interference in economic=20
transactions" [15].=20

=09How did we come to this state of catch as=20
catch can, and where are we going from here? =20
Perhaps history will give some perspective.  Let's=20
start with that big bugaboo--drugs. In article logic,=20
drug prohibition leads to money laundering, which=20
leads to increased surveillance of banking=20
transactions, and heightens interest in anonymity=20
through cryptology.

Oh, What a Lovely War!

=09In the mid-1990s the United States and other=20
countries were spending a good deal of money on a=20
"war on drugs."  What the phrase meant was unclear=20
in a nation where 50 million people used tobacco,=20
over 100 million used alcohol, and virtually=20
everyone used aspirin or an equivalent pain-reliever. =20
But certainly there was a prohibition in using, or=20
dealing in, certain drugs.  Naturally these drugs=20
were still available on the black market despite the=20
prohibition.  The market supplied the consumption=20
needs not only of the general public, but also of =20
federal prisoners.  Thus even if the country were=20
turned into a police state, such drugs would still be=20
available.  Given this, what was the purpose or=20
function of the prohibition?  The simple economic=20
rationale was this: the war on drugs was a source of=20
profit both to those who dealt in prohibited drugs,=20
and those who conducted the war against them.

=09The prohibition of anything is a restriction=20
in supply.  Supply restriction drives up the price.  In=20
1973-4 the OPEC cartel caused a quick four-fold=20
increase in the price of oil by restricting its supply. =20
It also greatly increased the profit margin on each=20
barrel pumped out of the ground.  In a similar way,=20
prohibition of drugs increases their black market=20
price and the potential profit margin from supplying=20
them to the public. But legitimate businessmen are=20
deterred from entering the market.  Hence drug=20
prohibition creates a bonanza--high profit margins
--only for those willing to deal in prohibited=20
products.   Just as alcohol prohibition financed the=20
growth of powerful mobsters like Al Capone earlier=20
in the century, so did prohibition of cocaine  finance=20
the growth of powerful production and supply=20
cartels, such as the Cali cartel in Colombia.   The=20
U.S. government's prohibition made it possible for=20
them to become rich, and then powerful.

=09Because trade in drugs is illegal, contracts=20
cannot be enforced in court.  One cannot resort to=20
common or commercial law.  Hence contracts are=20
often enforced via the barrel of a gun.  And as there=20
is no countervailing authority, those who enforce=20
their contracts with guns may use the same method=20
to simply eliminate competition.  Territory is=20
acquired or defended by force. Steven B. Duke, the=20
Law of Science and Technology Professor at Yale=20
University states simply:  "The use of drugs--
except, of course, alcohol--causes almost no=20
crime."  But drug *prohibition* does cause crime. The=20
firearm assault and murder rates rose in the U.S.=20
with the start of Prohibition in 1920, and remained=20
high during it, but then declined for eleven=20
consequence years after Prohibition was repealed.=20
In the U.S. today, perhaps one-third of murders are=20
related to contract enforcement and competition=20
over dealing territory [16]. =20
=09
=09Prohibition turns others into crime victims. =20
Because certain drugs cannot be obtained at the=20
local neighborhood drugstore, drug consumers visit=20
unsafe parts of a city, and are simply assaulted. =20
Such victims, naturally, are not in a position to=20
complain to the police. Others become victims=20
because of the lack of quality control.  Because=20
drugs are illegal, rip-off artists who deal in=20
substitute or impure products know they will not be=20
sued.  Other suppliers simply make mistakes in=20
production, but these mistakes are not caught right=20
away because information flow is not efficient in a=20
non-public market.  This results in injuries, often=20
caused not the use of the prohibited drugs=20
themselves, but by the constraint on the flow of=20
information brought about by prohibition. =20

=09During the earlier era of alcohol Prohibition=20
in the U.S., many of a city's leading citizens became=20
criminals by the fact of visiting the bar of a local=20
speakeasy.  There, naturally, they associated with=20
the proprietors, mobsters, who began to acquire=20
increasing political influence. Today billions of=20
dollars in cocaine profits leads to wide-spread=20
corruption [17].

=09About 1.2 million suspected drug offenders=20
are arrested each year in the U.S., most of them for=20
simple possession or petty sale [18]. Currently in=20
the U.S., police spend one-half their time on drug-
related crimes. The court system is on the verge of=20
collapse because of the proliferation of drug cases,=20
which-because they are criminal cases-have=20
priority over civil cases. Six out of ten federal=20
inmates are in prison on drug charges. Probably=20
another two of the ten are there on prohibition-
related offenses.  There is a crisis in prison=20
crowding (forty states are under court order to=20
reduce overcrowding), with the result that violent=20
criminals--including child molesters, multiple=20
rapists, and kidnappers--are often released early. =20
This is reinforced by mandatory sentencing laws. =20
Consensual drug offenses are not only treated as the=20
moral equivalent of murder, rape, or kidnapping: =20
they are given harsher punishment.  Youths are sent=20
to prison for life for selling drugs, while murderers=20
were eligible for early parole for good behavior=20
[19].  As one example,  Florida punishes "simple=20
rape" by a maximum prison term of 15 years,=20
second-degree murder with no mandatory minimum=20
and a maximum of life in prison , first degree=20
murder (where the death penalty is not imposed)=20
with a mandatory minimum penalty of 25 years,=20
after which one is eligible for parole, but trafficking=20
in cocaine is punished with life imprisonment=20
"without the possibility of parole."

=09The war on drugs has turned into a war on=20
civil liberties  The reason is simple.  The war is a=20
war on people suspected of using, or dealing in, or=20
otherwise being involved in drugs.  But the drug=20
industry survives because tens of millions of people=20
engage in voluntary transactions, which they try to=20
keep secret.  Hence law enforcement must attempt=20
to penetrate the private lives of millions of =20
suspects, which could be almost anyone.  A Nobel=20
prize-winning economist wrote:  "Every friend of=20
freedom . . . must be as revolted as I am by the=20
prospect of turning the U.S. into an armed camp, by=20
the vision of jails filled with casual drug users and=20
of an army of enforcers empowered to invade the=20
liberty of citizens on slight evidence" [20].=20
Unfortunately, not everyone is a friend of freedom. =20
A mayor of New York advocated strip searching=20
travelers from Asia and South America.  A U.S.=20
congressman introduced a bill to create an=20
"American Gulag" of Arctic prison camps for drug=20
offenders.  And so on.

=09The drug trade is sustained by prohibition=20
itself.  Agencies like the Drug Enforcement=20
Administration (DEA) grew up to "fight" the drug=20
war.  Their budgets, prestige, and paychecks depend=20
on the war's continuation.  These agencies have vast=20
sums to spend on public relations and propaganda=20
("education"), and a vested interest against=20
legalization.  Since these agencies profit from=20
crime, they have an incentive to cultivate=20
criminality as a natural resource.  The sheriff of=20
Broward County, Florida, manufactured his own=20
crack cocaine to sell to buyers in order to arrest=20
them [21].  Others employ cocaine gigolos, who=20
then pressure unsuspecting boyfriends/girlfriends=20
into purchasing drugs from undercover agents (e.g.,=20
United States v. Eugenio Llamera, No. 84-167-Cr=20
(S.D. Fla. 1984)).  Periodically a new "biggest ever"=20
drug bust (such as 22 tons of cocaine in a Los=20
Angeles warehouse) is proudly announced, with no=20
apparent perception that such busts prove the=20
agencies are failing in their alleged goal of drug=20
elimination. Meanwhile, some government=20
employees-drug warriors-themselves engage in=20
criminal acts for enjoyment or to supplement their=20
income.  Drug dealers, in particular, can be killed=20
and robbed with impunity.  Forfeiture laws, which=20
allow the seizure of money, houses, boats, cars,=20
planes, and other property on the basis of a=20
circumstantial connection with prohibited drugs,=20
have also been profitable.  The associate deputy=20
attorney general in charge of the U.S. Justice=20
Department's forfeiture program said "we're not at=20
all apologetic about the fact that we do benefit=20
(financially) from it" [22].

=09Others are paid to extend the war=20
internationally.  Examples include Latin American=20
coca crop eradication and substitution programs. =20
These have had almost no success, and have created=20
massive social problems [23]. Poor farmers can=20
make four to ten times as much growing coca as in=20
growing legal crops [24]; they can grow coca and=20
marijuana in regions with poor soil; and they can=20
avoid oppressive agricultural regulations=20
encountered with the production and sale of crops=20
lacking an efficient alternative to government=20
marketing organizations.  The 200,000 peasant=20
families (1 million people) engaged in coca=20
production in Peru are oblivious to campaigns=20
urging them to "just say no" to the source of their=20
livelihood.=20

=09In the last few years, the use of, and hence=20
the demand for,  cocaine has fallen.  But there are=20
always new ways to justify increased drug war=20
budgets.  The U.S. Department of State notes, with=20
no awareness of the irony of the statement: "The=20
economics of the heroin trade are also important. =20
While at U.S. street prices, cocaine and heroin are=20
competitive, at the wholesale level heroin has a=20
strong advantage.  A kilo of cocaine wholesales for=20
between $10,500 and $40,000; a kilo of heroin will=20
fetch on average between $50,000 and $250,000. =20
With the likelihood that heroin will be to the 1990's=20
what cocaine was to the 1980's, Latin American=20
trafficking organizations are poised to cash in on a=20
heroin epidemic" [12].   And, naturally, so also are=20
those who fight them. =20

=09For at some point it occurred to these drug=20
warriors, mighty and bold, that there were easier=20
ways to make a living.  Why not just go after the=20
cash?  After all, if you go out to the poppy fields=20
you may get your boots muddy, and (more=20
importantly) bankers don't carry guns.

99 and 44/100 Percent Pure

=09The House of Representatives report on the=20
banking legislation leading up to the U.S. Banking=20
Secrecy Act of 1970 noted that "secret foreign bank=20
accounts and secret foreign financial institutions"=20
had been used, among other things, to "purchase=20
gold," and to serve "as the ultimate depository of=20
black market proceeds from Vietnam" [25]. The=20
report does not explain why the purchase of gold=20
was a menace to society, nor elaborate on the role of=20
the House in creating a black market in Vietnam. =20
Within a few years gold was legalized, and the=20
absence of U.S. military forces in Vietnam=20
eliminated the black market.  The report also noted: =20
"Unwarranted and unwanted credit is being pumped=20
into our markets."  This was also attributed to=20
foreign banks with secrecy laws, although the=20
Federal Reserve*the real source of excess credit in=20
the years leading up to the breakdown of Bretton=20
Woods*is not foreign.  In short, the House report=20
was a broad-based attack with little rhyme or=20
reason, setting the tone for similar future studies.  =20

=09As is usual in political double-speak, the=20
Banking Secrecy Act was an act of legislation=20
intended to prevent, not preserve, banking secrecy. =20
It created four requirements that were supposed to=20
address the issue of money laundering:  1) A paper=20
trail of bank records had to be maintained for five=20
years.  2) A Currency Transaction Report (CTR)=20
had to be filed by banks and other financial=20
institutions for currency transactions greater than=20
$10,000.  CTRs were filed with the IRS.  3) A=20
Currency or Monetary Instrument Report (CMIR)=20
had to be filed when currency or monetary=20
instruments greater than $5,000 were taken out of=20
the U.S.  CMIRs were filed with the Customs=20
Service. 4) A Foreign Bank Account Report=20
(FBAR) had to filed whenever a person had an=20
account in a foreign bank greater than $5,000 in=20
value. (The latter two requirements have been=20
increased to $10,000.)

=09These reports mostly collected unread=20
during the 1970s.  But that was to change with the=20
growth in computerized recordkeeping and artificial=20
intelligence processing, and with the escalation of=20
the "war on drugs."  In the early 1980s, a Senate=20
staff study noted in alarm "what appears to be=20
otherwise ordinary Americans engaged in using=20
offshore facilities to facilitate tax fraud.  These=20
cases signify that the illegal use of offshore=20
facilities has enveloped 'the man next door'--a trend=20
which forecasts severe consequences for the=20
country"  [26]. =20
=09
=09The same report made a concerted effort to=20
draw connections between the eurodollar market=20
and criminal activity, noting "few banking=20
authorities address the issue of primary concern to=20
us here: criminal uses of Eurobanking."  The focus=20
was not banking fraud or theft:  "The most visible=20
and notorious aspect of offshore criminality=20
involves drug traffic."  One of the report's many=20
recommendations was that the Treasury Department=20
should  work with the "Federal Reserve Board to=20
develop a better understanding of the financial=20
significance and use of currency repatriation data as=20
well as information about foreign depositors'=20
currency deposits."  Subsequently, Panama was=20
identified as the major banking center for the=20
cocaine trade, and Hong Kong as the major center=20
for the heroin trade, based largely on the amount of=20
U.S. dollars, including cash, being return to the=20
Federal Reserve by, respectively, the Banco=20
National de Panama and by Hong Kong-based=20
banks [27].

=09Thus, with that simple act, the Federal=20
Reserve Board was transformed from an institution=20
that watched over the currency to a co-conspirator=20
that watched over currency users.

=09Efforts were extended internationally to=20
trace cash movements.  The Bank for International=20
Settlements (BIS) Code of Conduct (1984)=20
recommended a global version of the CRT. =20
Information from the global CRT was to be=20
processed by the OECD and shared with tax=20
authorities in all industrialized countries. The G-7=20
countries in 1989 agreed to form the Financial=20
Action Task Force (FATF), with staffing and=20
support to be provided by the OECD. FATF now=20
includes 26 governments. In May 1990, FATF=20
adopted forty recommendations on money=20
laundering countermeasures.  These included=20
provisions that a global currency tracking system=20
(the global CRT proposed earlier by the BIS) be=20
created, that financial institutions be required to=20
report "suspicious transactions" to law enforcement=20
authorities, that global sting operations be used=20
against launderers, and that electronic money=20
movements, especially international wire transfers,=20
be monitored.=20

=09So better beware your banker:  by law, he's a=20
snitch.  Maybe even a government employee.  In=20
one recent example of a global sting,  government=20
officials set up a bank in the Caribbean (Anguilla),=20
and advertised their services in confidential=20
banking.  They then turned all the information over=20
to tax authorities.  Did you ever wonder why=20
uneducated people believe in international banking=20
conspiracies?

The Digital World of Money

=09Money is a mechanism for making payment. =20
What we want from a payments mechanism is fast,=20
reliable (secure) service at a low cost.  In current=20
technology that means that the payment mechanism=20
will be determined by transactions costs.  Hence=20
money in a modern economy exists chiefly in the=20
form of electronic entries in computerized=20
recordkeeping systems or data bases. Money exists=20
as a number (e.g. 20) beside which is attached a=20
currency or country label (e.g. DM or BP or U.S.$)=20
and also an ownership label (e.g. "Deutsche Bank"=20
or "Microsoft" or "Jack Parsons").  Physical goods=20
are transported to different geographical locations,=20
but currencies by and large are not.  This is true=20
both domestically and internationally. A bank in=20
London will sell British pounds to a bank in=20
Frankfurt for deutschemarks by having the=20
Frankfurt bank's name recorded as the new owner of=20
a pound deposit in London, while the London=20
bank's name is recorded as the new owner of a=20
deutschemark deposit in Frankfurt.  =09=09

=09Payment between banks is made by an=20
exchange of electronic messages.  The scope and=20
size of transactions mandates this type of payment=20
mechanism.  The most important communications=20
network for international financial market=20
transactions is the Society for Worldwide Interbank=20
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a Belgian=20
not-for-profit cooperative. This system for=20
transferring foreign exchange deposits and loans=20
began actual operation in May 1977 and by 1990=20
had 1,812 members, and connected 3,049 banks and=20
securities industry participants in eighty-four=20
countries.  It carried an average of 1.1 million=20
messages per day. SWIFT messages are transmitted=20
=66rom country to country via central, interconnected=20
operating centers located in Brussels, Amsterdam,=20
and Culpeper, Virginia. These three operating=20
centers are in turn connected by international data-
transmission lines to regional processors in most=20
member countries. Banks in an individual country=20
use the available national communication facilities=20
to send messages to the regional processor. A bank=20
in London, for example, will access SWIFT by=20
sending messages to a regional processing center in=20
the north of London [28]. The message will be=20
received by a bank in New York via the SWIFT=20
operating center in Culpeper, Virginia.

=09Within the U.S. the most important=20
communications-money-channels are Fedwire=20
and CHIPS.  Eleven thousand depository=20
institutions have access to Fedwire, the electronic=20
network system of the Federal Reserve System. =20
(About a thousand of these access the system=20
through the New York Fed.)  In 1991 an average of=20
$766 billion daily went through the net, of which=20
$435 billion involved the New York Fed.  The=20
average size of a funds transfer was $3 million. =20
There were 258,000 average daily  transfers.

=09The New York Clearing House Association=20
(twelve private commercial banks) operate the=20
Clearing House Interbank Payments System=20
(CHIPS) to settle foreign exchange and eurodollar=20
transactions.  CHIPS connected 122 participants in=20
1991.  On an average day $866 billion went through=20
the CHIPS network, with 150,000 average daily=20
transfers (or an average transfer size of about $5.7=20
million).  Sometimes there are large fluctuations in=20
the level of payments.  On January 21, 1992,=20
$1.5977 trillion went through the CHIPS system.=20
That is, the U.S. M1 money stock turned over=20
several times in a single day. The CHIPS system=20
maintains an account at the New York Fed.  Much=20
of the nation's money flows through what is literally=20
an underground economy:  the computer banks=20
located beneath 55 Water Street in Manhattan.

=09These systems, even the Fedwire system, did=20
not arise by centralized government planning.  ". . .=20
it is historically accurate that the Fedwire system=20
evolved in almost a 'natural' manner; no one at the=20
Board or at a Reserve bank ever sat down and said=20
'let there be a wire transfer system.'  Thus, Fedwire=20
can be regarded as an example of a market tendency=20
to evolve, over time, in an efficient manner" [29].

=09In Europe, banks have available=20
CEBAMAIL, a shared voice and data network=20
established by European central banks and later=20
expanded to other users.  European banks also use=20
IBM's International Network and DIAL service to=20
communicate with the Bank for International=20
Settlements in Basle, Switzerland, and with each=20
other.

=09Money, then, is part of the worldwide=20
information superhighway (or infobahn).  The=20
Clinton administration's proposal for a "National=20
Information Infrastructure" (NII) was announced in=20
1994:  "All Americans have a stake in the=20
construction of an advanced National Information=20
Infrastructure (NII), a seamless web of=20
communications networks, computers, databases,=20
and consumer electronics that will put vast amounts=20
of information at users' fingertips.  Development of=20
the NII can help unleash an information revolution=20
that will change forever the way people live, work,=20
and interact with each other" [30].=20
=09
=09To be sure, the ensuing hype has made the=20
whole thing sound like more circuses to keep the=20
masses pacified and thirsty:  500 channels of MTV=20
with beer and Pepsi ads, and insurance salesmen=20
popping out of your home computer. But the=20
information revolution was already well underway,=20
and had been so for years. The real agenda for=20
government involvement was stated in the White=20
House Press release, April 16, 1993: "Sophisticated=20
encryption technology has been used for years to=20
protect electronic funds transfer.  . . While=20
encryption technology can help Americans protect=20
business secrets and the unauthorized release of=20
personal information, it also can be used by=20
terrorists, drug dealers, and other criminals."

=09Now, in fact, almost all modern technology,=20
=66rom can openers to automobiles, can be used by=20
terrorists, drugs dealers, and criminals (even the=20
thieves in the Justice Department who preside over=20
asset forfeitures). But what is special about=20
cryptography is that it threatens to slow or nullify=20
the effectiveness of government-sponsored=20
computer surveillance of individuals and private=20
business.  To get a handle on this, let's brush up our=20
high school cryptography, which has probably=20
grown rusty from lack of use.  Eager students can=20
read an exhaustive history of the subject written by=20
David Kahn [31], but we will only focus on the tail-
end, post-Kahnian part of the story, on something=20
called "public key cryptography" [32].

Public Key Cryptography in One Easy Lesson=20

=09Public key cryptography relies on two=20
scrambling devices, called "keys", that have the=20
following relationship.  There is a public key P and=20
a private key R.  Suppose I write a sweet, sensitive=20
love letter, filled with spiritual values, genetic=20
imperatives, and sexual innuendo, to my current=20
flame Veronica.  Let's refer to this letter as the=20
message M.  I sign it with Veronica's public key P,=20
producing the encrypted message P(M).  Anyone=20
looking at P(M) will only see a string of=20
meaningless symbols, gibberish. When Veronica=20
receives it, she will apply her private key R to the=20
encrypted message, producing R(P(M)) =3D M,=20
turning the apparent randomness into tears, joy, and=20
erotic fantasy. =20

=09The key pairs P and R must have the=20
relationship that for any message M, R(P(M)) =3D M.=20
In addition, it should be practically impossible for=20
anyone to determine M from P(M), without the=20
associated private key R.  For any other private key=20
R',  R'(P(M)) is not equal to M--it's still gibberish.  =20
The key pairs P and R also have the commutative=20
relationship P(R(M)) =3D M:  if you encrypt a=20
message with your private key R, then anyone can=20
decrypt it using your public key P. =20

=09Being able to send secure messages is one=20
function of public key cryptography.  Another=20
function is authentication. Suppose you sent a=20
message M to Bill.  He receives the=20
message M*.  Bill doesn't know whether M* is=20
really from you; or, even if it is from you, whether it=20
has been altered in some way (that is, if the M* he=20
receives is the same as the M you sent).  The=20
solution to this problem, using public key=20
cryptography, is that you also send Bill a digital=20
signature S along with the message M.  Here is how=20
this authentication process works.

=09For simplicity, assume you don't even=20
encrypt the message to Bill.  You just send him the=20
plain message M, saying "Dear Bill:  You are wrong=20
and I am right. Here is why, blah blah blah [for a=20
few thousand words]."  Then you just sign it by the=20
following procedure.=20

=09First you chop your message down to size,=20
to produce a (meaningless) condensed version,=20
where one size fits all.  To do this, you need a=20
message chopper called a "hash function."  You=20
apply the hash function H to the message M to=20
produce a "message digest" or "hash value" H(M)=20
which is 160 bits long.  You then sign the hash=20
value H(M) with your own private key R, producing=20
the signature S =3D R(H(M)).=20

=09The receiver of the message, Bill, applies the=20
same hash function to the received message M* to=20
obtain its hash value H(M*).  Bill then decrypts=20
your signature S, using your public key P, to obtain=20
P(S) =3D P(R(H(M))).  He compares the two.  If =20
H(M*) =3D P(R(H(M))), then he knows the message=20
has not been altered (that is, M* =3D M), and that you=20
sent the message. That's because the equality will=20
fail if either (1) the message was signed with some=20
other private key R', not yours, or if (2) the received=20
message M* was not the same as the message M=20
that was sent [33].   =20

=09By some accident, of course, it could be that=20
Bill finds H(M*) =3D P(R(H(M))) even if  the message=20
has been altered, or it is not from you.  But the odds=20
of this happening are roughly 1 in 2^160, which is=20
vanishingly small; and even if this happens for one=20
message, it is not likely to happen with the next.=20

The Growth of the Information Superspyway

=09NSA is the U.S. intelligence agency located=20
in Ft. Mead, Maryland, which is responsible for=20
collecting electronic and signals intelligence.=20
Activities include monitoring the conversations of=20
foreign leaders, listening in on most international=20
communications (including financial transactions),=20
breaking codes, and setting the cryptological=20
standards for U.S. military and security agencies=20
[34]. In 1975 at the University of California at=20
Berkeley, I made a special trip over to the=20
employment office to see the NSA recruitment=20
posters.  They were, after all, a novelty.  Hardly=20
anyone knew the NSA ("No Such Agency") existed,=20
and the word was just getting around that=20
mathematicians could compete with physicists for=20
Defense Department largess.

=09A couple of years later, Bobby Inman=20
departed his post as head of Naval Intelligence,=20
=66rom which vantage point he had leaked Watergate=20
revelations to Bob Woodward, to become head of=20
NSA.  Soon thereafter, the NSA began harassing=20
certain mathematicians in the private sector,=20
claiming "sole authority to fund research in=20
cryptography" [35].=20

=09In those days such a monopoly was possible.=20
The computer culture was hierarchically structured=20
and mind-bogglingly pedantic. Peon programmers=20
produced a token 20 lines of code per day, which=20
allowed them plenty of time to attend "efficiency"=20
meetings. Systems analysts involved themselves in=20
busy work--creating elaborate flow charts to explain=20
self-evident routines. Only those who learned to toe=20
the line were allowed gradual access to better=20
equipment and more CPU time. NSA, meanwhile,=20
was one of the top markets for expensive,=20
sophisticated computer equipment. If you wanted to=20
be a cryptologist [36], you bit the bullet and bowed=20
to  NSA and IBM.

=09The federal encryption standard for=20
unclassified government computer data and=20
communications, an encryption algorithm called=20
Lucifer, had been developed by IBM in the early=20
70s.  It was later certified by a civilian agency, the=20
National Bureau of Standards (now NIST), as the=20
Data Encryption Standard (DES)  in 1976.  Unlike=20
public key cryptography which uses two keys=20
(either one of which may be used to encrypt, and the=20
other to decrypt), DES was a symmetric key system,=20
using a single key to both encrypt and decrypt. =20
Because of the single key, DES could be used for=20
encryption or authentication, but not both=20
simultaneously.

=09Through the American Bankers Association=20
and ANSI's Financial Institution Wholesale Security=20
Working Group, DES entered the banking world as=20
a method of encryption and message authentication=20
in electronic funds transfer.  But for digital=20
signatures it made more sense to rely on public key=20
cryptography. And although the NIST began to=20
solicit public-key cryptographic algorithms in 1982,=20
nothing would be approved for another decade, so=20
both federal agencies and private organizations,=20
including banks, began to look to commercial=20
sources of digital signature technology. (They=20
basically settled on one called the Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) system.)

=09Meanwhile, the anarchy of the personal=20
computer had been unleashed.  The PC allowed one=20
person to be in charge of the entire software=20
development process.  She could be hardware=20
technician, systems analyst, mathematician,=20
programmer, artist-in-residence, and general hell-
raiser rolled into one.  Just as Gutenberg inspired=20
later generations to learn to read precisely because=20
they had, Pogo-like, acquired the ability to write, so=20
did the appearance of the microprocessor inspire a=20
generation of  talented and creative people to absorb=20
themselves in computer-accentuated tasks which no=20
longer mandated interaction with a phalanx of=20
mandarins whose notion of Eros was a COBOL=20
routine to insert Tab A into Slot B.  To be sure, the=20
PC was not powerful enough to break codes=20
(cryptanalysis), but it was a good enough tool for=20
creating cryptography software.

=09In 1984 Reagan's National Security Decision=20
Directive 145 (NSDD-145) shifted the=20
responsibility for certifying DES-based products to=20
NSA.  Executive Order 12333 in 1980 had made the=20
Secretary of Defense the government's executive=20
agent for communications security, and NSDD-145=20
expanded this role to telecommunications and=20
information systems.  The Director of NSA was=20
made responsible for the implementation of the=20
Secretary's responsibilites.  In 1986 NSA created an=20
uproar by saying it would no longer endorse DES=20
products after 1988, and would substitute a new set=20
of incompatible, classified, hardware standards. =20
Banks and software vendors weren't happy with the=20
news because they had only recently invested=20
heavily in DES-based systems. But Congress=20
effectively  rejected NSDD-145's federal computer=20
security plan by passing the Computer Security Act=20
of 1987, and DES was reaffirmed anyway (with the=20
NIST reinstated as the certifier of applications that=20
met the standard), and then affirmed again in 1993.  =20
(The next DES review is scheduled for 1998.)

=09Changes in technology were creating both=20
new security concerns and spying opportunities.  On=20
the one hand, a rank amateur with a scanner could=20
sit in his apartment and monitor his neighbors'=20
cordless and cellular telephone conversations. (After=20
all, if a signal makes it into your bedroom, you may=20
feel you have a right to tune it in.)  On the other=20
hand, the NSA could in the same way make use of=20
the electromagnetic signals sent out by computer=20
hardware components. Unshielded cables act as=20
radio broadcast antennas. Related signals, especially=20
=66rom the computer monitor and the computer's=20
CPU, are sent back down the AC power cord and=20
out into the building's electrical wiring. Signals may=20
also be transmitted directly into the phone line=20
through a computer modem (which isn't in use).=20
These frequencies  can be tuned, so that what=20
appeared on one person's computer screen can be=20
displayed on an observer's screen a block away. =20
(There were no laws against monitoring computer=20
radiation then, and there are none now, so the NSA=20
can take the position that it is doing nothing illegal=20
by parking its monitoring vans in domestic spots in=20
New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and=20
Washington, D.C.  [37].)

 =09The erosion of the spying monopoly lead to=20
the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act=20
(ECPA) which prohibited phone and data-line=20
tapping--except, naturally, by law enforcement=20
agencies and employers. ECPA made cellular (but=20
not cordless) phone monitoring illegal. President=20
Bush would later sign a second law which=20
prohibited even the *manufacture or import* of=20
scanners that are capable of cellular monitoring. =20
But the latter law was nonsensical, since *every=20
cellular phone is itself a scanner*. In a=20
demonstration for a Congressional subcommittee, it=20
took a technician only three minutes to reprogram a=20
cellular phone's codes so that it could be used for=20
eavesdropping [38].=20

=09 With the worldwide collapse of=20
Communism, federal agents quickly discovered a=20
new fount of terrorist activity: American teenagers,=20
hackers. The Secret Service crusade to conquer=20
children started when Congress passed the=20
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in 1986, and=20
culminated in May 1990 with Operation Sundevil,=20
in which 42 computer systems were seized around=20
the country, along with 23,000 floppy disks.

=09One college-age hacker, Chris Goggans=20
(a.k.a. Eric Bloodaxe) upon receiving information=20
which lead him to suspect the coming raid, went=20
home and (like any good host) cleaned and=20
vacuumed his apartment, placed little notes in=20
drawers ("Nope, nothing in here";  "Wrong, try=20
again"), and adorned his desk with brochures from=20
the local Federal Building--titles like How to=20
Become an FBI Agent, . . . Secret Service Agent, etc. =20
The raid came one morning while Goggans was in=20
bed. "Leading the pack is Special Agent Tim=20
Foley,"  Goggans recounts, "and he's got his service=20
revolver out, and he's got it pointed at me. He's a=20
pretty big guy and I'm me. . . . Hackers are a=20
notoriously violent group of people who are known=20
for their physical prowess, so  guns are definitely=20
always necessary" [39 ].

=09Paranoia verged on the imbecilic. AT&T=20
Security found a description of 911 system=20
administration, called "E911," on one bulletin board=20
service. They claimed in court the theft of this=20
information was worth exactly $79,449, but the case=20
fell apart when the defense showed the same=20
information, with more technical details, about the=20
911 system was publicly available from AT&T for=20
the mere price of $13.

=09The FBI, meanwhile, was undergoing=20
culture shock. Telephone carrier signals were now=20
digital and multiplexed, so that any specific channel=20
might be interleaved among many others in a=20
continuous stream of bits which the FBI could no=20
longer access with only a pair of alligator clips. In=20
March 1992 the FBI proposed Digital Telephony=20
legislation (code-named in FBI documents=20
"Operation Root Canal") that would require private=20
industry to provide access ports in digital equipment=20
for the purpose of tapping specific conversations.=20

=09The FBI proposal didn't sit well with the=20
General Services Administration (GSA), the largest=20
purchaser of telecommunications equipment for the=20
U.S. government.  GSA noted that the "proposed=20
bill would have to have the FCC or another agency=20
approve or reject new telephone equipment mainly=20
on the basis of whether the FBI has the capability to=20
wiretap it." So GSA opposed the legislation for=20
security reasons, noting it would "make it easier for=20
criminals, terrorists, foreign intelligence (spies) and=20
computer hackers to electronically penetrate the=20
public network and pry into areas previously not=20
open to snooping.  This situation of easier access=20
due to new technology changes could therefore=20
affect national security"  [40].=20

=09Ironically, the World Trade Center was=20
subsequently bombed by a group that was already=20
under FBI surveillance, so one could make a case=20
that *voyeurism*, not public security, was the real=20
intent of the proposed legislation [41]. The 1992=20
Digital Telephony proposal would have also given=20
the Justice Department the unilateral and exclusive=20
authority to enforce, grant exceptions, or waive=20
provisions of the law, or enforce it in Federal Court. =20
You know, the *Justice Department*: that splendid=20
collection of righteous lawyers, whose recent=20
triumphs include overseeing the slaughter of a=20
religious group in Waco, Texas [42], running a=20
software company into bankruptcy and=20
appropriating its software [43], and allegedly=20
manipulating the machinery of justice to cover=20
tracks left by financial thieves [44].=20

=09Now the Computer Security Act of 1987 had=20
authorized a U.S. government project to develop=20
standards for publicly-available cryptography. On=20
April 16, 1993 the Clinton Administration=20
announced two new controversial Federal=20
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) which=20
embodied Capstone's principal elements.  These=20
were the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)--
a.k.a. "Clipper"--and the Digital Signature Standard=20
(DSS).  All private companies doing business with=20
the government might be affected.

The Escrowed Encryption Standard
=09
=09The EES was promulgated by the Clinton=20
Administration as a voluntary (for now, anyway)=20
alternative to the Data Encryption Standard (DES).=20
It involved a bulk data encryption algorithm called=20
Skipjack, which would be contained on a tamper-
resistant chip, called the Clipper Chip (or MYK-78).=20
The chip would be manufactured by VLSI Logic,=20
and programmed with the algorithms and keys by=20
Mykotronx at a facility in Torrance, California. =20
Each chip would contain a trapdoor that would=20
allow the government, using a two-part key (U =3D=20
U1+U2), each half deposited with a different escrow=20
agency, to decode any communications sent through=20
the chip [45]. =20

=09Here is how the process works. (You can=20
skip this paragraph and the next one if you like.) In=20
addition to the Skipjack encryption algorithm, each=20
chip will contain a 80-bit family key F that is=20
common to all chips; a 30-bit serial number N; and=20
an 80-bit secret "unique" key U which can be used=20
to unlock all messages sent through the chip. =20
Suppose I have my secure device get in touch with=20
Veronica's secure device.  The first thing that=20
happens is our two chips agree on a randomly=20
generated 80-bit symmetric session key K, which=20
will be used only for this one conversation.  The=20
Clipper Chip takes our whispered message stream=20
M and encrypts it with K, using the Skipjack=20
algorithm, producing the encrypted message K(M).=20
Simple enough.  But my chip also has other ideas. =20
As an entirely separate process, it also takes the=20
session key K and encrypts it with the secret key U,=20
producing U(K).  Then it tacks the serial number N=20
on to the end of the encrypted session key, giving=20
the sandwich U(K)+N.  Then it takes the family key=20
F and encrypts the sandwich, giving F[U(K)+N]. =20
The encrypted sandwich, F[U(K)+N], is called the=20
LEAF, or "Law Enforcement Access Field."  Both=20
my encrypted message K(M) and the LEAF,=20
F[U(K)+N], are sent out over the telephone line. =20
Veronica's chip receives both these, but mostly=20
ignores the LEAF.  Her chip simply takes the=20
previously agreed session key K and uses it to=20
decrypt the encrypted message, yielding K[K(M)] =3D=20
M.  =20

=09Now suppose Fred is a horny FBI agent who=20
wants to listen in on all this.  He gets a warrant=20
(maybe), and has the phone company plug him into=20
the conversation.  With his listening device, he=20
siphons off both my encrypted message K(M) and=20
the LEAF, F[U(K)+N].  As a member of the FBI he=20
is allowed to know the family key F, which he uses=20
to decrypt the LEAF, yielding the sandwich: =20
F{F[U(K)+N]} =3D U(K)+N.  So now he knows the=20
serial number N.   He then takes N along with his=20
warrant over to the first escrow agency, which gives=20
him half of the secret key, U1.  He takes N with his=20
warrant over to the second escrow agency, which=20
gives him the other half, U2.  He now knows the=20
secret key U =3D U1+U2.  He uses U to decrypt the=20
encrypted session key:  U[U(K)] =3D K.  Now he=20
knows the session key K, which he uses to decrypt=20
my encrypted message:  K[K(M)] =3D M.  To his great=20
disappointment, he discovers I was only calling to=20
thank Veronica for the pepperoni and cheese pizza=20
she sent over.
=20
=09Industry was urged to build the EES into=20
every type of communication device: computer=20
modem, telephone, fax, and set-top TV converter. =20
Of course to do so (surprise, surprise) will make a=20
product subject to State Department ITAR export=20
controls. But AT&T, at least, promptly popped the=20
Clipper Chip into the AT&T Security Telephone=20
Device 3600, which has a retail price of about=20
$1,100, because they had been "suitably=20
incentivised" (see below).
=09=09
=09Another implementation of the ESS is the=20
Capstone Chip (Mykotronx MYK-80), which=20
includes Clipper's Skipjack algorithm, and adds to it=20
digital signature, hash, and key-change functions. =20
While Clipper is mostly intended for telephone=20
communication, Capstone is designed for data=20
communication.  Finally there is Tessera, which is a=20
PCMCIA card that contains a Capstone Chip. =20
Despite generating universally negative comments,=20
EES was  approved by the Department of=20
Commerce as a federal standard in February 1994.

=09The details of the NSA-developed Skipjack=20
algorithm are classified.  However, it uses 80-bit=20
keys and scrambles the data for 32 steps or rounds. =20
The earlier standard, DES, uses 56-bit keys and=20
scrambles the data for only 16 rounds. But the=20
secrecy of Skipjack removed some of its credibility.=20
People are confident in the security of DES, because=20
its details are public.  Hence people have probed=20
DES over the years and failed to find any=20
weaknesses.  The primary reason for Skipjack's=20
classification appears to be an attempt to prevent its=20
use without transmission of the associated LEAF=20
field.

=09An outside panel of expects concluded there=20
was no significant risk that messages encrypted with=20
the Skipjack algorithm would be breakable by=20
exhaustive search in the next 30 to 40 years.  The=20
same cannot be said for the EES protocol as a=20
whole.  Matthew Blaze, a researcher at AT&T =20
showed there are ways to corrupt the LEAF, so that=20
the session key K cannot be recovered, and hence=20
messages cannot be decrypted [46].  Of course if=20
you are sending data files, and not voice, you can=20
ignore the presence or absence of the Clipper Chip=20
altogether.  Just encrypt your file with, say, Pretty=20
Good Privacy, before you send it through the=20
Clipper Chip.  Thus your original message is an=20
already-encrypted file, and it won't matter if  FBI =20
Fred reads it or not.  But things are not so simple=20
with voice messages.  So the first target for a=20
government ban is alternative encryption devices=20
for voice communication, particularly if the Clipper=20
Chip doesn't catch on.  Which would be nothing=20
new:  for years ham radio operators have been=20
prohibited from using encryption on the air.=20

=09The future of the EES may depend on the=20
coercive purchasing power of the U.S. government. =20
A memorandum prepared for the Acting Assistant=20
Secretary of Defense had noted a number of U.S.=20
computer industries objections to a trapdoor chip,=20
such as the Clipper Chip:  "The industry argues=20
persuasively that overseas markets (much less drug=20
lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S.=20
products which have known trapdoors  when=20
offshore products which do not have them are=20
available.  In support of their argument, they note=20
that powerful public-key cryptography developed=20
and patented by RSA using U.S. tax dollars is free=20
to developers in Europe, subject to royalties in the=20
United States, and cannot be exported without=20
expensive and time-late export licenses.  These=20
charges are true.  . . .Despite these concerns, the=20
President has directed that the Attorney General=20
request that manufacturers of communications=20
hardware use the trapdoor chip, and at least AT&T=20
has been reported willing to do so (having been=20
suitably incentivised by promises of government=20
purchases)" [47].


The Digital Signature Standard

=09The second announced standard, DSS, uses=20
a digital signature algorithm (DSA) to authenticate=20
the source and validity of messages [48].  Digital=20
signatures are the equivalent of handwritten=20
signatures on legal documents.  While there is yet=20
no body of case law dealing with the subject,=20
documents signed with proper digital signatures will=20
almost certainly be legally binding, both for=20
commercial use as defined in the Uniform=20
Commercial Code (UCC), and will probably also=20
have the same legal standard as handwritten=20
signatures. =20

=09The computer industry had generally wanted=20
the U.S. government to choose instead the RSA=20
algorithm, which was currently the most widely=20
used authentication algorithm. The banking and=20
financial services industry were using both the RSA=20
algorithm and a modified form of the DSA=20
algorithm [49].

=09As we saw previously, it is typically not the=20
entire message that is signed, but rather a condensed=20
form of it, a hash value.  The hash function for the=20
DSS is the Secure Hash Standard (SHS), which=20
accepts a variable-size input (the message) and=20
returns a 160-bit string.  SHS was adopted as a=20
government standard in 1993 [50]. =20

=09That both EES and DSS were rushed forth in=20
an attempt to break the spread of good cryptography=20
in the private sector is acknowledged even by a=20
government agency, the Office of Technology=20
Assessment (OTA):  "In OTA's view, both the EES=20
and the DSS are federal standards that are part of a=20
long-term control strategy intended to retard the=20
general availability of 'unbreakable' or 'hard to=20
break' cryptography within the United States, for=20
reasons of national security and law enforcement. It=20
appears that the EES is intended to complement the=20
DSS in this overall encryption-control strategy, by=20
discouraging future development and use of=20
encryption without built-in law enforcement access,=20
in favor of key-escrow encryption and related=20
technologies" [51].

=09Which brings us back to privacy and the=20
monetary system.

The Buck Stops Here

=09In 1993 SWIFT began asking users of  its=20
messaging system to include a purpose of payment=20
in all messages, as well as payers, payees, and=20
intermediaries.  This type of arrangement would=20
allow NSA computers to scan for any names in=20
which they were interested.  To be sure,=20
$10,000,000 for the "Purchase of Plutonium" would=20
have been scanned for anyway.  But now they can=20
search for "Hakim 'Bobby' Bey," because someone=20
has decided he's a terrorist.  Or someone decided=20
they just don't like him, and so they claim he's a=20
terrorist.

=09In addition, proposals resurfaced for a two-
tier U.S. currency.  When such a proposal was=20
rumored around 1970 during the slow breakdown of=20
the Bretton Woods agreement, the rumor was=20
dismissed as a paranoid fantasy. Recently the=20
proposal itself has been discussed on the Federal=20
Page of the Washington Post, which gives support=20
to the plan of "an expert on terrorism" (*another=20
one?*) to have two separate U.S. currencies, "new=20
greenbacks for domestic use and new 'redbacks' for=20
overseas use."  The International Counterfeit=20
Deterrence Strike Force (an inter-agency working=20
group informally called the "Super-Bill=20
Committee") supports a revived 1989 DEA plan for=20
the forced conversion of "domestic" dollars into=20
"international" dollars by U.S. travelers at the=20
border, which would be re-exchanged on their=20
return [52].=20

=09While Customs deals with physical cash,=20
NSA is set to deal with the electronic variety. That=20
NSA has in some circumstances already monitored=20
international banking transactions since at least the=20
early 1980s seems evident from the inclusion of=20
detailed banking transactions between the=20
Panamanian branch of the Discount Bank and Trust=20
of Switzerland and a Cayman Islands bank in a=20
classified report to the Secretary of State during the=20
Reagan administration. The information in the=20
report seemingly could only have come from=20
electronic access to the bank's computerized=20
records.  Some observers have speculated that a=20
bugged computer program, Inslaw's PROMIS, was=20
involved. This program, allegedly stolen from=20
Inslaw by the U.S. Department of Justice, was sold=20
to dozens of banks. (A federal bankruptcy judge=20
found that the Justice Department had purposefully=20
propelled Inslaw into bankruptcy in an effort to=20
steal the PROMIS software through "trickery, deceit=20
and fraud" [53].)  The program was said to have=20
been altered in such a way to allow government=20
agencies trapdoor access into a bank's transaction=20
records [54].

=09The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation=20
(FDIC) is the government corporation that insures=20
deposits at U.S. member banks.  The FDIC=20
Improvement Act of 1991 required the FDIC to=20
study the costs and feasibility of tracking every=20
bank deposit in the U.S.  The notion was it was=20
necessary to compute bank deposit insurance=20
requirements in real time.  Not everyone thought=20
this was a good idea.  The American Banker's=20
Association noted it was inconceivable that such=20
data would "be used only by the FDIC in deposit=20
insurance coverage functions." And even though the=20
FDIC itself argued against the proposal in its draft=20
report to Congress in June 1993, FinCEN used the=20
occasion to propose a "Deposit Tracking System"=20
(DTS) that would also track deposits to, or=20
withdrawals from, U.S. banks accounts in real time. =20

=09So advances in cryptography come face to=20
face with round-the-clock, round-the-border=20
surveillance.

=09F.A. Hayek argued for the denationalization=20
of money, an abolition of the government monopoly=20
over the money supply, and the institution of a=20
regime of competitive private issuers of currency=20
[55]. One reason was to stop the recurring bouts of=20
acute inflation and deflation that have become=20
accentuated over this century.  Another reason was=20
to make it increasingly impossible for governments=20
to restrict the international movement of=20
individuals, money and capital, and thereby to=20
safeguard the ability of dissidents to escape=20
oppression.  He said that "attempts by governments=20
to control the international movements of currency=20
and capital" is at present "the most serious threat not=20
only to a working international economy but also to=20
personal freedom; and it will remain a threat so long=20
as governments have the physical power to enforce=20
such controls." =20

=09Two decades ago, Hayek's proposal seemed=20
to have scant probability of ever coming about.   No=20
longer. =20

=09Hayek's dream is about to be realized.

PART  II:  DIGITAL CASH

[To Be Continued]

Footnotes

[1]   The Principia Discordia, or How I Found=20
Goddess and What I Did to Her When I Found Her=20
was authored by Malaclypse the Younger (a=20
computer programmer named Greg Hill) and =20
recounts the visionary encounter he and Omar=20
Ravenhurst (Kerry Thornley) had with Eris, the=20
Goddess of Chaos, in an all-night bowling alley. =20
Kerry Thornley is also the author of Zenarchy as=20
well as a novel about Lee Harvey Oswald, whom=20
Kerry knew in the Marines.  Some of the early=20
Erisian (Discordian) writings were mimeographed=20
at the office of Jim Garrison, the New Orleans=20
District Attorney, where a friend of Kerry's worked. =20
Principia Discordia may be found on the Internet at=20
the wiretap.spies.com gopher, in the directory=20
Electronic Books, filed under Malaclypse the=20
Younger.  It and the other works mentioned in this=20
footnote are also available from Loompanics=20
Unlimited, P.O. Box 1197, Port Townsend, WA=20
98368. Phone: 206-385-2230, Fax: 206-385-7785.

[2]  The NSA employee handbook notes:
"It is the policy of the National=20
Security Agency to prevent and=20
eliminate the improper use of drugs=20
by Agency employees and other=20
personnel associated with the=20
Agency.  The term "drugs" includes=20
all controlled drugs or substances=20
identified and listed in the Controlled=20
Substances Act of 1970, as amended,=20
which includes but is not limited to:=20
narcotics, depressants, stimulants,=20
cocaine, hallucinogens and cannabis=20
(marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil).=20
The use of illegal drugs or the abuse=20
of prescription drugs by persons=20
employed by, assigned or detailed to=20
the Agency may adversely affect the=20
national security; may have a serious=20
damaging effect on the safety [of=20
yourself] and the safety of others;=20
and may lead to criminal=20
prosecution.  Such use of drugs=20
either within or outside Agency=20
controlled facilities is prohibited."
A copy of this handbook may be found in the=20
hacker publication Phrack Magazine, No. 45, March=20
30, 1994, which is available on the Internet at =20
ftp.fc.net/pub/phrack. =20

[3]  Governments have always been in the drug=20
business, and perhaps always will be.  In earlier=20
times, governments attempted a monopoly on drugs,=20
sex, and religion.  But in recent years the ungodly=20
have stopped paying tithes, so many governments=20
have gotten out of the religion business, and private=20
competition has forced them out of the sex business. =20
Of the big three, most governments are left with=20
only drugs, which explains why drugs are politically=20
more important than either sex or religion.  Two=20
references on historical drug politics are Jack=20
Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars, Harcourt=20
Bruce Jovanovich, New York, 1975, and Alfred W.=20
McCoy, The Politics of Heroin:  CIA Complicity in=20
the Global Drug Trade, Lawrence Hill Books, New=20
York, 1991. Two references on more recent U.S.=20
government involvement include the well-
documented book by Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan=20
Marshall, Cocaine Politics: Drugs, Armies, and the=20
CIA in Central America, The University of=20
California Press, Berkeley, 1991, and the less well=20
substantiated, but provocative, Compromised: =20
Clinton, Bush, and the CIA, by Terry Reed & John=20
Cummings, Shapolsky Publishers, New York, 1994.

[4] The following may be related, although no=20
charges have been filed.  In 1987 Tallahassee police=20
traced an alleged child porn operation back to a=20
warehouse in Washington, D.C.  The warehouse=20
was operated by a group called The Finders, whose=20
leader has an extensive background in intelligence. =20
Customs agents had information that was, according=20
to Customs and FBI documents posted on the=20
Internet by Wendell Minnick (author of Spies and=20
Provocateurs: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of=20
Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert Action,=20
1946-1991), "specific in describing 'blood rituals'=20
and sexual orgies involving children, and an as yet=20
unsolved murder in which the Finders may be=20
involved."  The evidence included a telex which=20
"specifically ordered the purchase of two children in=20
Hong Kong to be arranged through a contact in the=20
Chinese Embassy there" and a photographic album. =20
"The album contained a series of photos of adults=20
and children dressed in white sheets participating in=20
a blood ritual.  The ritual centered around the=20
execution of at least two goats. . . ."  As the=20
investigation proceeded, the "CIA made one contact=20
and admitted to owning the Finders organization as=20
a front for a domestic computer training operation,=20
but that it had 'gone bad.'  CIA defers all further=20
contacts to FCIA (Foreign Counter Intelligence=20
Agency).  FCIA is distinct and autonomous=20
organization within FBI. . . . FCIA contacts=20
[Washington] MPD Intelligence and advised that all=20
reports regarding Finders are to be classified at the=20
Secret level.  FCIA also advised that no information=20
was to be turned over to the FBI WFO [Washington=20
Field Office] for investigation, and that the WFO=20
would not be advised of the CIA or FCIA=20
involvement/contact." =20

I've since checked with all my programming=20
friends, but no one remembers seeing a computer=20
training film involving the sacrifice of goats.

[5]  It is argued that the creation and distribution of=20
images of  nude children should be prohibited, since=20
they might be used "for the purpose of sexual=20
stimulation or gratification of any individual who=20
may view such depiction" (Edward De Grazia, The=20
Big Chill: Censorship and the Law, Aperture, Fall=20
1990, page 50). Where I grew up, children=20
sometimes played naked.  However, I guess in that=20
case rays of natural light seen by the human eye=20
underwent a mysterious *transubstantiation* that=20
turned the data into *pastoral innocence* before=20
digitized messages were sent to the brain.  By=20
contrast, .gif files stored in a computer have not=20
undergone transubstantiation, and remain slimy=20
with evil inherited from the Original Snub. =20

[6]  The Justice Department's Office of General=20
Counsel issued a legal opinion on the First=20
Amendment constitutionality of ITAR restrictions=20
on public cryptography on May 11, 1978. The=20
opinion--addressed to Dr. Frank Press,  the Science=20
Adviser to the President--concluded: "It is our view=20
that the existing provisions of the ITAR are=20
Unconstitutional insofar as they establish a prior=20
restraint on disclosure of cryptographic ideas and=20
information developed by scientists and=20
mathematicians in the private sector."  The ITAR=20
regulations are also referred to as Defense Trade=20
Regulations.  See Department of State, Defense=20
Trade Regulations, 22 CFR 120-130, Office of=20
Defense Trade Controls, May 1992.  The State=20
Department turns all cryptology decisions over to=20
NSA.

[7] Stewart A. Baker, "Don't Worry, Be Happy,"=20
Wired Magazine, June 1994.

[8] Remarks at Computers, Freedom and Privacy=20
Conference IV, Chicago, March 26, 1994.

[9]  Denning, Dorothy E., "Encryption and Law=20
Enforcement," Georgetown University,  February=20
21, 1994.

[10] Which explains, I guess, why I am no longer=20
able to get any smack with my pepperoni and=20
cheese.

[11] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of=20
International Narcotics Matters, International=20
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, U.S.=20
Government Printing Office, April 1994.

[12]  Ibid.

[13]  Kimery,  Anthony L.,  "Big Brother Wants to=20
Look into Your Bank Account (Any Time It=20
Pleases),"  Wired Magazine,  December 1993.

[14]  Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1995.

[15] Timothy C. May,  "The Crypto Anarchist=20
Manifesto," September 1992.

[16] Steven B. Duke and Albert C. Gross, America's=20
Longest War:  Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade=20
Against Drugs, Putnam, New York, 1993.

[17] Examples may be found in Steven Wisotsky,=20
Beyond the War on Drugs, Prometheus Books,=20
Buffalo, New York, 1990.

[18] John Powell and Ellen Hershenov, "Hostage to=20
the Drug War: The National Purse, The=20
Constitution, and the Black Community,"=20
University of California at Davis Law Review, 24,=20
1991.

[19] David B. Kopel, "Prison Blues:  How=20
America's Foolish Sentencing Policies Endanger=20
Public Safety," Policy Analysis No. 208, Cato=20
Institute, Washington, D.C., May 17, 1994.

[20] Milton Friedman, "Open Letter to Bill Bennet,"=20
Wall Street Journal, September 7, 1989.

[21] Larry Keller,  "Sheriff's Office Makes Own=20
Crack for Drug Stings," Fort Lauderdale News &=20
Sun Sentinel, April 18, 1989.

[22] The quote may be found on page 5 in Andrew=20
Schneider and Mary Pat Flaherty, Presumed Guilty: =20
The Law's Victims in the War on Drugs, reprinted=20
=66rom The Pittsburgh Press, August 11-16, 1991.=20

[23]  Melanie S. Tammen, "The Drug War vs. Land=20
Reform in Peru,"  Policy Analysis No. 156, Cato=20
Institute, Washington, D.C., July 10, 1991.

[24] Rensselaer W. Lee, The White Labyrinth: =20
Cocaine and Political Power, Transaction, New=20
Brunswick, NJ, 1989.

[25] House of Representatives, Banks Records and=20
Foreign Transactions concerning P.L. 95-508,=20
House Report 91-975, October 12, 1970.=20

[26] U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on=20
Investigations, Crime and Secrecy: The Use of=20
Offshore Banks and Companies, U.S. Government=20
Printing Office, February 1983.

[27]  President's Commission on Organized Crime,=20
The Cash Connection:  Organized Crime, Financial=20
Institutions, and Money Laundering, U.S.=20
Government Printing Office, October 1984.

[28] Bank for International Settlements, Large=20
Value Funds Transfer Systems in the Group of Ten=20
Countries, May 1990.

[29]  Ernest T. Patrikis, Thomas C. Baxter Jr., and =20
Raj K. Bhala,  Wire Transfers:  A Guide to U.S. and=20
International Laws Governing Funds Transfer,=20
Probus Publishing Company, Chicago, IL, 1993.

[30]  The National Information Infrastructure:=20
Agenda for Action.=20
[31] David Kahn, The Codebreakers:  The Story of=20
Secret Writing, Macmillan, New York, 1967.

[32] The best accessible book on the subject is=20
Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, John Wiley=20
& Sons, New York, 1994.

[33] It could also fail for other reasons, such as a=20
signature garbled in transmission (solution: resend=20
it), or disagreement on the hash function (solution:=20
adopt a common standard, such as the Secure Hash=20
Standard, discussed later).

[34]  The activities of the NSA were first=20
comprehensively surveyed in James Bamford, The=20
Puzzle Palace: a Report on NSA, America's Most=20
Secret Agency, Houghton Mifflin   Company,=20
Boston, 1982.=20

[35]  David Burnham, The Rise of the Computer=20
State, Random House, New York, 1983.

[36]  Cryptology is divided into cryptography, the=20
art of secret writing (encryption), and cryptanalysis,=20
the art of code breaking.  By analogy, thinking of=20
the world of banking divided into vault-keepers and=20
thieves.=20

[37]  Computer Monitor Radiation (CMR) is=20
involved in the plot of Winn Schwartau's *Terminal=20
Compromise*, the best hacker novel available.  A=20
freeware version, replete with misspellings and=20
other typos, under the filename termcomp.zip, is=20
available by ftp or gopher from many sites.  One=20
location is ucselx.sdsu.edu/pub/doc/etext.

[38]  Cindy Skrzycki, "Dark Side of the Data Age,"=20
Washington Post, May 3, 1993.

[39] Interviewed by Netta Gilboa in Gray Areas=20
Magazine.  Interview reprinted in The Journal of=20
American Underground Computing,  1(7),  January=20
17, 1995.

[40] Attachment to memo from Wm. R. Loy 5/5/92,=20
(O/F)-9C1h(2)(a)-File (#4A).

[41] I was a block away in a building with a view of =20
one of the World Trade Center towers when the=20
explosion occurred, but, along with all the Barclays=20
Precious Metals dealers, only found out about the=20
bomb when the news came across the Telerate=20
monitor a few minutes later.

[42]  Not that there weren't good motives for the=20
operation.  For example, the four BATF agents slain=20
in the attack on the Branch Davidians were all ex-
bodyguards for the Clinton presidential campaign,=20
and heaven knows we've already heard *enough*=20
revelations from Clinton's ex-bodyguards.=20

[43] INSLAW, discussed further below.

[44]  The latter statement is speculation on my part,=20
and I have no evidence to back it up.  I am certainly=20
*not* referring to the following alleged sequence of=20
events, cited by Nicholas A. Guarino ("Money,=20
Fraud, Drugs, and Sex," January 26, 1995): When=20
Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan folds, it is=20
somewhere between $47 and $68 million in the=20
hole. The tab is settled at $65  million.  One of the=20
biggest debtors to Madison is a Madison director, =20
Seth Ward, who is the father-in-law of Webb=20
Hubbell. Webb is Hillary Clinton's former law=20
partner and afterward (until April 1994) Associate=20
Attorney General (the Number 3 position) at the=20
Justice Department, who gets assigned to=20
investigate Whitewater. But when the Resolution=20
Trust Corporation (RTC) takes over Madison=20
Guaranty Savings & Loans, Hillary  has been on=20
retainer to Madison for many   months.  The  RTC=20
brings suit to obtain $60 million from Madison=20
Guaranty's debtors. But Hillary negotiates the RTC=20
down from $60 million to $1 million.  Hillary then=20
gets the RTC to forgive the $600,000 debt Seth=20
Ward owes the RTC, leaving the RTC with=20
$400,000 out of the original $60 million owed.  But=20
(surprise) Hillary does this as the counsel for the=20
RTC, not Madison.  Her fee for representing the=20
RTC?  $400,000, which leaves the RTC with=20
nothing.
=20
[45] Dorothy E. Denning, "The Clipper Encryption=20
System,"  American Scientist, 81(4), July/August=20
1993, 319-323.  The NIST and the Treasury=20
Department's Automated Systems Division were=20
designated as the initial escrow agents.

[46] Matt Blaze, "Protocol Failure in the Escrowed=20
Encryption Standard," AT&T Bell Laboratories,=20
June 3, 1994.

[47] Ray Pollari, Memorandum for the Acting=20
Assistant Secretary of Defense (C31), April 30,=20
1993.

[48] National Institute of Standards and Technology=20
(NIST), The Digital Signature Standard, Proposal=20
and Discussion, Communications of the ACM,=20
35(7), July 1992, 36-54.

[49] American National Standards Institute,=20
American National Standard X9.30-199X: Public=20
Key Cryptography Using Irreversible  Algorithms=20
for the Financial Services Industry: Part 1: The=20
Digital  Signature Algorithm (DSA), American=20
Bankers Association, Washington, D.C., March 4,=20
1993.

[50] National Institute of Standards and Technology=20
(NIST),  Secure Hash Standard (SHS),  FIPS=20
Publication 180, May 11, 1993.

[51] Office of Technology Assessment (OTA),=20
Information Security and Privacy in Network=20
Environments, September 9, 1994.

[52]  "TerrorDollars:  Counterfeiters, Cartels and=20
Other Emerging Threats to America's Currency," =20
Washington Post,  March 6, 1994.

[53] Maggie Mahar, "Beneath Contempt Did the=20
Justice Dept. Deliberately Bankrupt INSLAW?,"=20
Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly,=20
March 21, 1988; and "Rogue Justice:  Who and=20
What Were Behind the Vendetta Against=20
INSLAW?,"  Barron's National Business and=20
Financial Weekly, April 4, 1988;  U.S. Congress,=20
Committee on the Judiciary,  The Inslaw Affair,=20
House Report 102-857, September 10, 1992.

[54] Thompson's, Congress backs claims that spy=20
agencies bugged bank software, Thompson's=20
International Banking  Regulator, Jan. 17, 1994.

[55] Hayek, Friedrich A. von, Denationalisation of=20
Money:  An Analysis of  the Theory and Practice of=20
Concurrent Currencies, The Institute of Economic=20
Affairs, Lancing, 1976.


=A9 1995 J. Orlin Grabbe, 1280 Terminal Way #3, Reno, NV=20
89502.  Internet address: kalliste@delphi.com  =20