BRIEFING FOR PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON BERLIN

     After the wall went up on August 13, 1961, the US and its
allies intensified their planning regarding Berlin.  During the
summer of 1962, General Maxwell Taylor suggested that President
Kennedy should have a briefing on this planning.  Since I had
prepared such a briefing for presentation to the Berlin Task
Force, it was decided that I should give the briefing.
     Although my briefing had attracted little interest before,
news that it was to be presented to the President produced a
number of telephone calls and visitors.  After absorbing the
comments which I received, I presented the briefing to the staff
at the White House, including Mc George Bundy and General Taylor. 
General Taylor settled the matter by saying that he thought the
briefing should be given to the President.
     The next step was to give the briefing to Secretary of State
Rusk.  It is this version which I have obtained recently under
the Freedom of Information Act, with some excisions.  As I
recall, I made several minor revisions as a result of Secretary
Rusk's comments, but this is essentially the briefing which I
gave to President Kennedy.
     Present at the briefing, in addition to the President, were
a number of senior officials, including Secretary Rusk, Secretary
of Defense Mc Namara, Paul Nitze, General Taylor, and Mc George
Bundy.  I do not know the date of the briefing, but it would have
been in August, 1962.  Other than some comments by the President
regarding nuclear weapons, the briefing was received in silence.
     Shortly after this briefing, I accompanied Paul Nitze to
Paris, where he presented the briefing to the NATO ambassadors. 
On the insistence of the French, however, the part about nuclear
weapons was omitted.  It is important to understand that what was
under discussion here was not so much Berlin planning as US and
NATO strategy.
     Not long after we returned from Paris, the Berlin crisis
took an unexpected turn, when it was found that Khruschev had
decided to install some missiles in Cuba.

                                        John C. Ausland
                                        Oslo, May 26, 1991

NOTE:  The document I received from the State Department was a
copy of a carbon copy.  It is, therefore, not easy to read.  I
have, therefore, retyped it, noting where words were unclear and
where there were excisions.  From the context, the latter seem
to concern covert operations and nuclear planning.  The briefing
was originally classified Top Secret.                             

John C. Ausland CIS: 73240,2704
Internet: d_ausland_j@kari.uio.no


MEMORANDUM

                                         August 2, 1962

To: BTF - Mr. Hillenbrand
From: BTF - J.C. Ausland
Subject: Briefing for President on Berlin

     I attach a revised draft briefing for the President on
Berlin, which takes into account the various comments I have
received.  Subject to any changes you would like made, I propose
to use it for the preliminary presentation for the Secretary
tomorrow.  I will then further revise the script, in the light
of his comments.


cc: White House - Mr. Klein
JCS - Col. Spragins
ISA - Capt. Cotton
White House - Col. Legere


TEXT OF BRIEFING

                  BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING

     During the past year, the United States and its allies have
devoted considerable time and effort to contingency planning for
Berlin.  The Berlin Task Force has prepared an inventory of this
planning, with the view to determining what has been accomplished
and what remains to be done.
     This briefing is designed to review the results of this
inventory.  In doing this, we shall use the four phase framework
set forth in NSAM 109 (or Poodle Blanket).
     I shall begin by reviewing in general terms the four phases. 
I shall then examine each of the phases in more detail.  This
examination will describe military, economic, and covert actions
which might occur in each phase.  The description will include
an account of Allied planning, the extent of Allied agreement,
and the degree to which governments are committed in advance to
a given course of action.
     Following the review of the four phases, I should like to
examine briefly the Allied organizational arrangements for Berlin
planning and operations.
     Finally, I shall review briefly some of the major gaps which
remain in our planning.
______________________________________________________________

                          FOUR PHASES                  SLIDE 1

Phase I        Soviet/GDR interference with access.

Phase II       Significant blockage of access.  Diplomatic
               activity.  Non-combatant.  NATO Military 
               buildup.  Economic and naval countermeasures.

Phase III.     Non-nuclear ground and/or action to restore
               access, supplemented by naval measures.

Phase IV.      Nuclear weapons.

_______________________________________________________________

FOUR PHASES

     National Security Action Memorandum 109 divides a developing
Berlin crisis into four possible phases:
     Phase I.  During which Soviet/GDR interference with access
is short of significant blockage of access to Berlin.
     Phase II.  After there is a significant blockage of access,
such as a blockage of civilian ground access to Berlin.  This
non-combatant phase would be characterized primarily by intense
diplomatic activity, a NATO military mobilization, and economic
and naval countermeasures.
     Phase III.  During which substantial blockage of access
continues.  The dominant event in this phase would be the use of
force, which could include non-nuclear ground and/or air action
in East Germany and/or in Eastern Europe.  This could be
supplemented by world-wide naval measures.  The purpose would be
to induce the Soviets to restore access.
     Phase IV.  Would take place only after non-nuclear action
had failed to restore access.  The dominant event in this phase
would be the use of nuclear weapons.
     I should like to emphasize at this point that this is a
conceptual framework, which indicates the order in which we would
prefer events to occur.  It is not an attempt to predict how
history will unroll.  I might also mention that we have no idea
of rushing from one phase to another.  Our aim rather would be
to stabilize the situation as early in the scenario as possible
and work out an acceptable arrangement on Berlin with the
Soviets.
     The four phases have now been examined quadripartitely in
some detail.  I believe it is safe to say that there is
considerable agreement on them.  The differences regarding some
of the details will emerge in the course of the briefing.
     I should now like to examine the four phases in more detail.

REMOVE SLIDE 1

PHASE I

     During Phase I. Allied vital interests remain substantially
intact but are actively challenged by the Soviets and/or the GDR. 
I should say that we are at present in this phase.  We will
remain in it until some means of access to Berlin is interrupted
or until an agreement of some sort on Berlin is reached.
     The US goal during this phase is to maintain its vital
interests and to seek an agreement on Berlin with the Soviet
Union.
     The bulk of Allied planning has been devoted to this stage. 
There is general agreement on measures to be taken in this stage,
particularly with regard to preservation of ground and air access
to Berlin.  The major exception is related to naval
countermeasures.  We, France, and Germany believe that it might
be suitable to use naval measures not involving use of force to
supplement direct responses to Soviet/GDR harassment of access. 
The UK, although agreeing to plan quadripartite naval measures,
does not believe they should be used before Phase II.
     Now I should like to describe the events which might occur
in Phase I in more detail.
______________________________________________________________

                            Phase I                    SLIDE 2

     1.  Diplomatic. - Discussion at Foreign Ministers and     
         Ambassadorial level.  Ad hoc action on specific       
problems.

     2.  Military. - LIVE OAK.  Air Access - JACK PINE.  Ground
         Access - FREE STYLE.  Naval measures.
     3.  Economic. - TTD restrictions (now in effect).  Limited
         selective embargo.  Travel restrictions against bloc.

     4.  Covert. - Preparation.

______________________________________________________________

     1.  Diplomatic action.  This current phase - as Phase II -
 is dominated by diplomatic activity.  Although a summit
conference is not excluded, the effort to reach agreement is
pursued primarily at the Foreign Minister and Ambassadorial
level.  As specific problems arise, a resolution is pursued at
the appropriate level.  This might be the Commandant in Berlin
(as in the case of sector border incidents) or the Foreign
Ministers in Geneva (as in the case of the air corridors in
March.)
     2.  Military action.  In 1959, the US, UK, and France set
up tripartite staff in Paris known as LIVE OAK,under the command
of CINCEUR.  Within the framework of LIVE OAK plans, the Allies
have made military preparations to deal with possible
interference with Allied access to Berlin.
     Considerable tripartite planning has been done to preserve
air access to Berlin, for the most part within the framework of
the JACK PINE plans.  This planning includes provision for
dealing with Soviet/GDR efforts to threaten or interfere with
civil flights.  In event civil flights cease, there is provision
to continue flying civil aircraft with military crews.  Should
the Soviets damage, shoot down, or force down and destroy an
aircraft, there is provision for the use of fighter protection. 
There is also provision for flights over 10,000 feet in certain
circumstances.  Within the framework of the JACK PINE plans, the
US and UK governments -- but not the French -- have delegated
certain authority to General Norstad.
     There has also been planning to deal with interference with
ground access.  Since the end of the blockade in 1949, both
German and Allied access have been subjected to intermittent but
frequent harassment.  Methods of dealing with minor harassment
have been developed informally.  They are characterized by
patient resistance and negotiation of each incident until the
incident is resolved.
     Recent formal planning concerns more serious forms of
harassment, bordering on blockage.  LIVE OAK has submitted to
governments proposals for rules of conduct for Allied convoys in
event they encounter unacceptable harassment.  The US has
approved these proposals (unclear word) for US convoys, pending
Allied agreement, which we expect to reach in the near future. 
These rules of conduct and the delegation of authority under the
JACK PINE air access plan constitute the extent of advance
commitment by the US government regarding precisely what we will
do in various contingencies on Berlin.
     If Allied autobahn access appears to be blocked, LIVE OAK
plans provide several alternative tripartite military probes,
known as FREE STYLE.  These range from a few vehicles to platoon
size.  Governments have, however, not delegated advance authority
to employ any of these probes.
     Planning has been done to deal with German access, largely
through application of countermeasures.
     The US has suggested -- and the French and Germans have
agreed -- that the Allies might use naval measures not involving
the use of force to counter serious interference with access. 
The British have, however, thus far resisted the concept of using
naval measures prior to Phase II.
     2.  Economic.  The nearly complete ban on issuance of
Temporary Travel Documents to GDR residents, put into effect in
September, 1961, continues.  Although there would be advantages
to further relaxing ban so as to be able to use it again, on
balance we have thought it best not to lift it, in order to bring
pressure to bear on the GDR to relax restrictions on travel to
East Berlin.  Quadripartite agreement has been reached on mildly
restricting bloc travel to the West if access to East Berlin is
denied the Allies.  Tentative agreement has been reached with the
Germans and French to take selective economic countermeasures,
if persistent harassment of access to West Berlin occurs.  The
British reserve their decision until the event.  NATO has also
agreed in principle to cut off air traffic to and from the bloc
if a serious incident of physical interference with an Allied
airliner occurs in the corridors.

REMOVE SLIDE 2

     It is not possible to predict how long Phase I will last. 
By definition, it will end when it becomes clear that the
Soviets/GDR are prepared to use force to maintain a significant
blockage of access to Berlin or until a viable agreement is
reached on Berlin.  The Soviets have given every indication thus
far of preferring to minimize their risks and avoid a step which
seriously challenges Allied vital interests.  There is no
guarantee, however, that this will continue.
     There have been indications recently that the Soviets may
be planning to sign their long-heralded treaty with the GDR.  If
they do, the scenario would be significantly altered.  I should
like, therefore, to examine this contingency briefly.
     Allied planning for a peace treaty, which is now once gain
under review, has been based on two assumptions.  First, that
while we should seek to discourage the Soviets from signing a
treaty, in the last analysis we probably cannot prevent this step
without resort to force and, second, that we are prepared to
acquiesce in Soviet withdrawal from the checkpoints and accept
under protest GDR processing of Allied traffic under the
currently established procedures.
     These assumptions set the limits for Allied reaction to any
Soviet move to sign a peace treaty.  Prior to any peace
conference called by the Soviets, we would propose to take
actions designed to deter the Soviet from concluding a treaty,
especially one which would infringe our vital interest.  At the
same time, we would not want to engage our prestige too heavily
on the signature of the treaty itself.  Our actions after the
treaty would depend on our estimate of the possible effect of the
implementation of its provisions.  They would be directed toward
deterring the Soviet/GDR from taking steps which could lead to
infringement of our vital interests with respect to Berlin.
     If the Soviets decide to conclude a treaty, we would expect
the process to stretch over a matter of months, rather than days. 
We would also expect the Soviets to proceed cautiously, in order
to evaluate Allied reactions and thus minimize their risks.
     A peace treaty would undoubtedly precipitate a crisis
atmosphere.  Nevertheless, given careful handling and
determination, it should prove manageable.  It is, however,
always possible that -- either intentionally or through
miscalculation -- Soviet/GDR action will result in infringement
on our vital interests, such as a significant blockage of access
to Berlin.
     In this case, we would find ourselves in Phase II.

PHASE II

     Phase II would provide our last chance to resolve the Berlin
problem without the use of force.  The prestige of both sides
would be heavily engaged, and tensions would be running high. 
There would be strong pressures from all sides to make
concessions to the Soviets, in order to avoid the risk of war.
     The Allied goal during Phase II would be to employ non-
combatant measures to restore their vital interests.
     The Soviets on the other hand would probably aim at
negotiations without access restored, on the assumption that this
situation would exert maximum pressure on the Allies to make
concessions.
     It has become evident in our quadripartite discussions that
the US, UK, France, and Germany are in general agreement as to
the preferred configuration of Phase II.  Particularly as we have
examined the alternatives available in Phase III and IV, it has
been agreed in principle that we should be prepared to use all
measures short of force to reach a settlement in Phase II.
______________________________________________________________

                           PHASE II                    SLIDE 3
     1.  Diplomatic.  Security Council.  Warnings to Soviets and
         satellites.  Avoid formal conference without access.

     2.  Military.  NATO build-up.  Air access - JACK PINE.    
         Ground access - airlift and stockpile.  Naval measures.

     3.  Economic.  Countermeasures depend on extent of blockade.

     4.  Covert.  Passive resistance.

______________________________________________________________

     1.  Diplomatic action.  During this phase, diplomatic
activity would continue to dominate events.  At an early point,
we would probably find ourselves in the Security Council if not
on our initiative on another country's.  Plans have been
prepared, for example to go to the Security Council as soon as
Soviet activity in the air corridors requires the introduction
of fighters.
     We would at this point probably want to make unpublicized
warnings to the Soviets, as well as the satellites.
     We would, however, probably want to avoid a formal
conference until the Soviets indicate a willingness to restore
access.
     This diplomatic activity would be conducted against a
background of mounting pressure.
     2.  Military Action.  To make clear to the Soviets our
determination and prepare for the possible failure of our
combination of diplomatic and non-combatant pressures, there is
a quadripartite agreement in principle that NATO should engage
in a further military build-up or mobilization.
     If Allied ground access were affected, plans exist for a
garrison airlift to carry the necessary passengers and freight. 
If civilian ground access were blocked,it would become necessary
to resort to the Berlin stockpile and implement QBAL - The
Quadripartite Berlin Air Lift.
     The quadripartite powers are also examining the possibility
of the allies taking civilian motor traffic at some point under
their aegis.  This would involve giving civilian motor traffic
the outward character of Allied military traffic.  If such an
attempt were resisted by the Soviets, as seems likely, the
Soviets would have directly engaged the Allies on the ground and
contingency planning for a blockage of Allied access would be
applicable.
     It the interruption of Phase I were related to air access,
the Soviet challenge would have been met within the framework of
JACK PINE plans.  These actions - such as the Military Sponsored
Air Service - could carry over into Phase II.
     Quadripartite agreement has also been reached that naval
measures not involving the use of force might be used at this
time to bring pressure on the Soviets.
     3.  Economic action.  There is also quadripartite agreement
that another form of pressure that we could bring to bear on the
Soviets would be economic countermeasures.  These fall into three
rough categories: severing and limiting exchanges with the bloc
in other than trade fields; restrictions on transport and
movement of persons; and selective or full trade embargo
(including interzonal trade).  The NAC has extensively examined
these measures, and the is substantial agreement on the manner
of their execution.

     (PARAGRAPH EXCISED)

REMOVE SLIDE 3

     The question is sometimes asked: how long will Phase II
last?  This is a bit hard to predict with any certainty.  Since,
however, unless the blockage were ended, it would last until
either we or the Soviets resorted to force to resolve the
impasse, we could hope that it would be a matter of months rather
than days.  We and our Allies would want to explore every avenue
for peaceful settlement.  We would also want to give the
pressures we can bring to bear on the Soviets a chance to take
effect.  Time will also be required for our mobilization to place
us in a position to use force if necessary with acceptable risk.
     It should be kept in mind, however, that the length of Phase
II will be conditioned by the fact Allied prestige will be
heavily engaged in restoration of our vital interests.

PHASES III and IV

     If, despite the actions taken in Phase II, Allied rights are
not restored -- and there is a serious deterioration of the
Berlin situation -- the US believes that the tripartite Allies
should take appropriate action to clarify whether the Soviets/GDR
intend to maintain blockage of ground and/or air access, while
at the same time making clear allied intention to obtain re-
opened access.
     1.  Military.  If it were clear the Soviet/GDR intend to
maintain blockage of access, the US believes that NATO should
initiate military actions designed to induce the Soviets to re-
open access.
     This phase -- Phase III -- would mark the commencement of
offensive non-nuclear combat, after positive verification of
deliberate Soviet/GDR blockage of access to Berlin.  It would be
implemented by means of a plan, or plans, drawn from LIVE OAK
(SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED) developed for the purpose.  It is the
view that Phase III would start under tripartite control and that
the shift to NATO would take place at the time a tripartite
operation came under attack by Soviet/GDR forces.
______________________________________________________________

                           PHASE III                   SLIDE 4

     Ground - LIVE OAK (Trade Wind and June Ball)
              (SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED)

     Air    - LIVE OAK (Jack Pine)
               (SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED)

                           PHASE IV
     Demonstrative (SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED)

     Selective

     General war

______________________________________________________________

     Plans available and suitable for implementation of Phase
III include:
     1.  On the ground - Trade Wind and June Ball, both LIVE OAK
plans, and (MOST OF LINE EXCISED)
     2.  In the air, Live Oak Jack Pine III, and
(SEVERAL LINES EXCISED)
     3.  At sea - quadripartite maritime countermeasures (SEVERAL
WORDS EXCISED).
     Phase IV, beginning, in the US view, with the first use of
nuclear weapons in any form, follows Phase III when it has become
evident that the conventional measures which have been used have
been unsuccessful in inducing the Soviets to restore Allied
rights in Berlin, and when the conventional measures still
untried offer no reasonable prospect of success.

     (SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS EXCISED)

     In addition, depending upon the circumstances at the
conclusion of Phase II, Phase IV could begin by direct recourse
to general war.

REMOVE SLIDE 4

     2.  Diplomatic.  Although it is difficult to predict
precisely what diplomatic activity would take place just before
and during these operations, it would be important that the
Allies make clear to the Soviets their intentions, particularly
the terms on which they would discontinue military operations. 
They should also make clear to the world their reasons for
undertaking military operations.

     (PARAGRAPH EXCISED)

Planning responsibilities and coordination
     Having described the framework within which Berlin planning
is taking place, I should like to turn to the machinery.

SLIDE 5

     Within the US government, coordination is accomplished by
the Berlin Task Force.
     The Ambassadorial Group is primarily responsible for the
coordination of Berlin contingency planning.
     LIVE OAK utilizes the British Commander in Germany for
ground access planning, USAFE for air access planning, and the
tripartite JACK PINE Command Post to (unclear word but probably
supervise) related to air access.
     The Bonn Quadripartite Committee is primarily responsible
for planning related to civilian access, with the assistance of
Berlin and LIVE OAK.
     The Berlin Commandants are responsible for contingency
planning regarding Berlin itself and for assisting the Bonn
Quadripartite Committee and LIVE OAK in the performance of their
functions.  The Chairman Commandant has the tripartite Allied
Staff for planning regarding Berlin.
     The governments look to the Permanent Representatives to
pursue their government's interest in NAC and the UN.
______________________________________________________________

                   WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?            SLIDE 6

     Agreement on "four phases"
     Phase I.  Work on ground access.
     Phase II.  NATO mobilization, Coordination naval       
countermeasures.

     Phase III and IV.  Preparation NATO plans.

______________________________________________________________

Conclusions

     The question now arises as to what remains to be done.
     1.  We are seeking Allied agreement on the four phases.  We
are at present discussing this quadripartitely, preliminary to
discussion in the NAC (SOME WORD EXCISED).
     2.  With regard to Phase I, we are still working on several
key elements of ground access planning.  This involves primarily
preparation of agreed rules of conduct for Allied convoys and
examination of possible Soviet/GDR actions related to civilian
access.
     3.  With regard to Phase II, we are examining two problems:
a possible NATO mobilization and the coordination of
quadripartite naval measures.
     4.  With regard to Phases III and IV, we are now ready for
NATO examination (SEVERAL WORDS EXCISED).  The SACEUR and SACLANT
papers are now before the NATO Standing Group, prior to NAC
consideration.  Field commanders are also preparing the detailed
plans.
     In a word, although considerable planning has been done, it
is by no means complete.
END OF BRIEFING

      John C. Ausland CIS: 73240,2704
      Internet: d_ausland_j@kari.uio.no