

licensees to develop an implementation plan with supporting analyses and justifications and to notify NRC of implementation of that plan prior to establishing a performance-based leak test program.

Copies of the submittal may be inspected or obtained for a fee from the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., Lower Level, Washington, DC 20037.

Comments and questions can be directed by mail to the OMB reviewer: Troy Hillier, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150-0011), NEOB-10202, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Comments may also be communicated by telephone at (202) 395-3085.

The NRC Clearance Officer is Brenda Jo Shelton, (301) 415-7233.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of February, 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Gerald F. Cranford,**

*Designated Senior Official for Information Resources Management.*

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[Docket No. 50-461]

**Illinois Power Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing**

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-62, issued to the Illinois Power Company (the licensee) for operation of the Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, located in DeWitt County, Illinois.

The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown;" 3.8.5, "DC Sources-Shutdown;" and 3.8.8, "Inverters-Shutdown." The proposed changes revise the operability requirements for the Division 3 diesel generator and the Division 3 and 4 batteries, battery chargers, and inverters to apply only when the high pressure core spray system is required to be OPERABLE.

The onsite Class 1E safety-related power systems at the Clinton Power Station include AC, DC and uninterruptible AC bus power systems. The Class 1E AC power system supplies power to the unit Class 1E loads and consists of 4160-V switchgear, 480-V unit substations, and 480-V motor control centers (some of which include

480-120/208-V transformers and distribution panels). The system includes diesel generators that serve as standby power sources, independent of any other onsite or offsite source. The onsite system is divided into three divisions, each with its own independent distribution network, diesel generator (DG), and redundant load group. Each division is capable of being supplied by one onsite (DG) and two offsite sources of electrical power for serving the unit Class 1E AC loads.

The Class 1E DC power system supplies 125 VDC power to unit Class 1E loads. The primary sources are battery chargers. The system includes batteries, battery chargers, motor control centers, and DC distribution panels. The system is divided into four divisions, each with its own independent distribution network, battery charger and redundant load group.

The Class 1E uninterruptible AC bus power system supplies 120 VAC power to the nuclear system protection system (NSPS) and miscellaneous Class 1E loads. The system is also divided into four divisions and includes uninterruptible power supplies and buses. The uninterruptible AC bus power supply system is designed to provide adequate uninterruptible power to all the NSPS loads during all modes of operation including abnormal and accident conditions. Loads include NSPS logic power, neutron monitoring, process radiation monitoring, portions of the leak detection system, reactor water cleanup and residual heat removal system sample line valves, and scram discharge volume controls and indication. The Division 4 Class 1E power system components, which require AC power to operate are supplied by the Division 2 Class 1E AC power system.

Since safety-related loads supplied power by electrical power distribution subsystems that are "fail-safe" or otherwise do not need an electrical power source to perform their intended safety functions, Illinois Power believes that the technical specification requirements are overly restrictive as related to Division 3 and 4, and place unnecessary constraints on when certain work can be performed or when certain systems can be removed from service relative to an optimal refueling outage work schedule. The applicable loads are primarily supplied by the Division 3 and 4 electrical power systems. Thus, Illinois Power is requesting a relaxation from the technical specification requirements associated with Division 3 and 4 electrical power system requirements

that are applicable during plant shutdown conditions.

The need for the technical specification change was recently identified during outage planning in preparation for the fifth refueling outage, scheduled to begin March 12, 1995, at the Clinton Power Station. The change significantly affects "critical path" work activities during the outage and will prevent unnecessary delays in plant startup. Any unnecessary delays would result in a significant financial impact on the utility.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issues of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

(1) The proposed changes do not involve a change to plant design and are limited to requirements for operability of electrical power sources when the plant is not operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3. The proposed changes will still ensure that sufficient electrical power is required to be operable to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. As described previously, and except for the source range monitors (SRMs), the reduced redundancy of electrical power sources to non-high pressure core spray (HPCS) system loads is not safety significant due to the fail-safe nature of those loads. With respect to the SRMs, the SRMs are not assumed to function to mitigate any design basis accidents or transients. The SRMs provide monitoring during plant startup and refueling operations. In addition, there are no accidents postulated to occur as a result of a malfunction of electrical power sources with the plant shut down. As a result, the proposed changes will not result in an increase in the probability or consequence of any accident previously evaluated.

(2) The proposed changes do not involve a change to plant design and are limited to requirements for operability of electrical power sources when the plant is not operating in MODES 1, 2, or 3. In addition, there are no accidents postulated to occur as a result of a malfunction of electrical power