amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Ms. L. M. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Post Office Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141–0270.

*NRC Project Director:* Phillip F. McKee.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50–423, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: January 18, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed changes to the technical specifications will increase the minimum required boron concentration in the boric acid tank (BAT) from 6300 ppm to 6600 ppm.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (SHC), which is presented below:

\* \* The proposed changes do not involve an SHC because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The change affects the minimum required boron concentration in the BAT. Changes in the tank's boron concentration will not affect the probability of any plant accident.

An increase in the minimum BAT concentration of 6600 ppm was recommended by Westinghouse based on their Cycle 6 BORDER evaluation. The BORDER evaluation conservatively determines the ability to maintain shutdown margin when the plant is taken from an initial operating condition of Mode 1 or 2 to a final condition of Mode 5 or 6 using an assumed minimum BAT concentration. Therefore, the ability to maintain shutdown margin is assured and the change will not adversely affect the consequences of any plant accident.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any Previously Analyzed.

The change conservatively increases the minimum required boron concentration in the BAT from 6300 ppm to 6600 ppm. There is no impact on the operability of plant systems or equipment. Therefore, the change does not create a malfunction that is different from those previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed increase in the minimum boron concentration in the BAT provides conservatism in the calculated shutdown margin for Millstone Unit No. 3. The change does not adversely affect any equipment credited in the safety analysis. Also, the change does not adversely affect the probability or consequences of any plant accident, including the calculated PCT [peak clad temperature] or offsite doses. Therefore, there is no impact on the margin of safety as specified in the Technical Specifications.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Ms. L. M. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Post Office Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141–0270.

*NRC Project Director:* Phillip F. McKee.

Northern States Power Company, Docket Nos. 50–282 and 50–306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Goodhue County, Minnesota

Date of amendment requests: January 10, 1995.

Description of amendment requests: The proposed amendments would revise the Prairie Island Event Monitoring Instrumentation Technical Specifications and associated Bases to conform to Standard Technical Specifications for post-accident monitoring.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed amendment[s] will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The primary purpose of post accident monitoring instrumentation is to display

plant variables that provide information to the control room operators during accident situations. Plant instrumentation was evaluated for importance for this function when Regulatory Guide 1.97 ["Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident"] classifications were determined. The Prairie Island Regulatory Guide 1.97 classification of instruments was previously approved by the NRC on October 18, 1985. This amendment request proposes to base **Prairie Island Technical Specifications** on the results of the Regulatory Guide 1.97 evaluation in accordance with the guidance of the industry standard.

Revising the allowed outage time for these instruments will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident since these instruments do not initiate automatic actions, there are available backup indications and the probability of an event requiring these instruments to be operable is very low.

Therefore, the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not affected by any of the proposed amendments.

2. The proposed amendment[s] will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

The license amendment request proposes to add instruments to the Technical Specifications which have been previously determined to be important for post accident monitoring, and to remove instruments from Technical Specifications which have been previously determined to be less important for post accident monitoring. This amendment ensures the control room operators are provided with the instrumentation required to properly manage an accident situation.

Therefore, based on the above considerations, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated would not be created.

3. The proposed amendment[s] will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The post accident monitoring functions do not initiate any automatic actions. The instrumentation to be added to the Event Monitoring Instrumentation Table was previously recognized through the Regulatory Guide 1.97 evaluation process as important for post accident monitoring and would be relied upon if there were an event without this license amendment. Instrumentation to be removed from Technical Specifications was previously recognized to be less