

Changing the methodology used to determine the setpoints, and lowering the setpoints themselves, do not create a new condition that could lead to a credible accident. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The action statements remain in effect to perform the intended function of protecting the plant's secondary side when the main steam safety valves are inoperable. They have only been modified to correct the overly restrictive language that specifies when, in each mode, specific actions must be taken. Therefore, the proposed change does not create a new or different type of accident.

Because the proposed 4.0.4 exemption requires neither physical changes to the plant nor changes to the safety analyses, we believe that they will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

#### *Criterion 3*

The margin of safety presently provided is not reduced by the proposed change in the setpoints. The change will correct the limiting power levels that are to be implemented when MSSVs are inoperable. This action does not adversely affect the margin that was previously allocated for the ability of the MSSVs to relieve secondary side pressure. Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

*The margin of safety is also not significantly reduced by the proposed change to the action statements of the T/S. The proposed revision clarifies when specific actions are to be taken in response to inoperable main steam safety valves. The changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the actions to be taken; therefore, they do not significantly reduce any margin of safety.*

The margin of safety is not adversely affected by the proposed exemption to T/S 4.0.4, since the surveillance conditions allowed by the exemption are bounded by the normal surveillance conditions seen immediately after shutdown or during power operation.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. The initial application was noticed in the Federal Register on June 21, 1995 (60 FR 32368).

**Local Public Document Room location:** Maud Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, Michigan 49085

**Attorney for licensee:** Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037

**NRC Project Director:** Brian E. Holian, Acting

Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan

**Date of amendment requests:** November 10, 1995 (AEP:NRC:0896X) (Supersedes application dated June 15, 1995.)

**Description of amendment requests:** The proposed amendments would change the 18-month emergency diesel generator (EDG) surveillance test from a 24-hour run to an 8-hour run and would add voltage and frequency measurement and power factor monitoring.

**Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:** As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

#### *Criterion 1*

The safety function of the EDGs is to supply AC electrical power to plant safety systems whenever the preferred AC power supply is unavailable. Through surveillance requirements, the ability of the EDGs to meet their load and timing requirements is tested and the quality of the fuel and the availability of the fuel supply are monitored. Reduction of the 24 hour run to 8 hours will not reduce the surveillance effectiveness and will sufficiently exercise the EDG and its support systems to identify potential conditions that could lead to performance degradation (See Attachment 4 [of amendment request]). Further, monthly full-load testing will provide confidence in diesel reliability and performance capability. Based on these considerations, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

#### *Criterion 2*

The proposed changes do not involve physical changes to the plant or changes in plant operating configuration. The changes only involve EDG surveillance test requirements. These changes will not affect EDG operability and are designed to improve surveillance effectiveness. Also, paralleling the diesel to the system grid during normal operations has been performed to fulfill monthly surveillance requirements when the resistive load banks were not available.

It is recognized that, during the 1 hour monthly surveillance test period, the diesel could be exposed to electrical system transients (e.g., transients induced by inclement weather conditions) which could cause the paralleled diesel output breaker to trip open. Such a scenario, although unlikely, is mitigated by the availability of the alternate EDG which is placed in the auto start mode prior to the surveillance. In addition, during testing, an operator is continuously monitoring the diesel control panel and can, if necessary, reset the affected EDG lockout relays to restore EDG availability. Therefore, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not create the

possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

#### *Criterion 3*

Although the duration of the EDG 18 month 24 hour surveillance test would be reduced, the EDG components will continue to be sufficiently exercised such that the ability to detect incipient and degraded conditions will be maintained (See Attachment 4, Figure 2 [of amendment request]). Also, the added review of diesel reactive loading ensures that test conditions closely match potential emergency conditions. In addition, the monthly full-load testing will provide confidence in diesel reliability and performance capability without impacting diesel operability. During the monthly test, the impact on plant safety due to potential exposure to transient grid conditions is considered to be insignificant based on the likelihood of such transients coincident with the testing and the mitigating factors discussed in Criterion 2 above.

Based on the above considerations, it is concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. This notice supersedes the staff's notice published in the Federal Register on July 19, 1995 (60 FR 37096).

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**NRC Project Director:** Brian E. Holian, Acting

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Docket No. 50-245, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, New London County, Connecticut

**Date of amendment request:** October 25, 1995

**Description of amendment request:** The amendment request would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to relocate the flow-biased average power range monitor (APRM) scram and rod block setpoint requirements for reactor operation with excessive core peaking, which will also include surveillance requirements to verify the setpoints. The amendment would also delete TS Figure 2.1.2, and any references to the figure. APRM meter setting adjustments would be changed to allow setpoint adjustment to be made at power levels less than or equal to 90% of the rated, and the