reactor pressure does not preclude the ability of the Core Spray (CS) or Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Systems to perform their safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents or of any other safety system to accomplish its safety functions. Proper post-accident ECCS functioning will still be provided by safety class instruments used to measure reactor pressure.

The change to instrument Tag Nos. as listed in the Technical Specifications has no affect on the bases of Protective Instrumentation which is to operate to initiate required system protective actions. The changes to be implemented which have resulted in a need to change the Technical Specifications will actually improve the accuracy of reactor pressure measuring loops.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Brooks Memorial Library, 224 Main Street, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301.

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NRC Project Director: Walter R. Butler.

Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket Nos. 50–266 and 50–301, Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin

Date of amendment request: December 22, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would modify Point Beach Nuclear Plant Technical Specification (TS) Section 15.3.3, "Emergency Core Cooling System, Auxiliary Cooling Systems, Air Recirculation Fan Coolers, and Containment Spray," TS Section 15.3.4, "Steam and Power Conversion System," TS Section 15.3.5, "Instrumentation System," TS Section 15.3.7, "Auxiliary Electrical Systems," TS Section 15.3.14, "Fire Protection System," and TS Section 15.4.1, "Operation Safety Review." The modifications would delete obsolete TSs, would provide spring 1995 outage-specific TSs as part of the ongoing diesel upgrade project, would update several TSs to be consistent with the upgrade project design changes, and would change one monthly testing requirement. In addition, the bases for Section TS 15.3.7 would be modified to be consistent with the proposed TS changes.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a), Wisconsin Electric Power Company (Licensee) has evaluated the proposed changes against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the operation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the proposed amendments [sic] does not present a significant hazards consideration. The analysis of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92 and the basis for this conclusion are as follows:

1. Operation of the facility under the proposed Technical Specifications will not create a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The probabilities of accidents previously evaluated are based on the probability of initiating events for these accidents. Initiating events for accidents previously evaluated for Point Beach include: control rod withdrawal and drop, CVCS malfunction (Boron Dilution), startup of an inactive reactor coolant loop, reduction in feedwater enthalpy, excessive load increase, losses of reactor coolant flow, loss of external electrical load, loss of normal feedwater, loss of all AC power to the auxiliaries, turbine overspeed, fuel handling accidents, accidental releases of waste liquid or gas, steam generator tube rupture, steam pipe rupture, control rod ejection, and primary coolant system ruptures.

This license amendment request proposes to remove the specifications associated with the 4160 volt safeguards bus tie, add and modify specifications associated with the degraded and loss of voltage protection functions, and remove specifications and surveillance exceptions that are obsolete. The modifications being performed and the changes proposed by this license amendment request have been reviewed and we conclude that these changes do not increase the probability of any initiating event for accidents previously analyzed for Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

The consequences of the accidents previously evaluated in the PBNP FSAR are determined by the results of analyses that are based on initial conditions of the plant, the type of accident, transient response of the plant, and the operation and failure of equipment and systems. The changes proposed in this license amendment request provide appropriate limiting conditions for operation, action statements, allowable outage times, surveillances and bases for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Technical Specifications.

The proposed specification that allows a Train A service water pump powered from the alternate shutdown system to be considered operable under the provisions of Technical Specification 15.3.0.c is appropriate to maintain operability of the service water system for the continued safe operation of Unit 2 under the applicable standby emergency power limiting condition for operation. The modifications that are being performed have been designed and will be installed in accordance with the applicable design and installation requirements for Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

Therefore, this proposed license amendment does not affect the consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the Point Beach Nuclear Plant FSAR because the factors that are used to determine the consequences of accidents are not being changed.

2. Operation of this facility under the proposed Technical Specifications change will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

New or different kinds of accidents can only be created by new or different accident initiators or sequences. New and different types of accidents (different from those that were originally analyzed for Point Beach) have been evaluated and incorporated into the licensing basis for Point Beach Nuclear Plant. Examples of different accidents that have been incorporated into the Point Beach Licensing basis include anticipated transients without scram and station blackout.

The modifications being performed and the changes proposed by this license amendment request have been reviewed and we conclude that these changes do not create any new or different accident initiators or sequences. Therefore, these modifications and proposed Technical Specification changes do not create the possibility of an accident of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Point Beach FSAR.

3. Operation of this facility under the proposed Technical Specifications change will not create a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The margins of safety for Point Beach are based on the design and operation of the reactor and containment and the safety systems that provide their protection. The modifications that are being performed have been designed and will be installed in accordance with the applicable design and installation requirements for Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

The modification to change the loss of voltage protection function from 1-out-of-2 logic on each bus to 2-out-of-3 logic on each bus is an improvement over the original design, because with the new design an inadvertent trip of a single channel will not cause the protection actions. Also, when any single channel is taken out-of-service for testing, maintenance, or calibration it can be placed in the trip condition to allow actuation of the protection function by the trip of either of the remaining operable channels.

The Technical Specification change to allow an operating pump powered from alternate shutdown to be considered operable is justified because the pump is able to perform its safety function powered from the alternate shutdown power source. The alternate shutdown system is powered via offsite power or from the onsite gas turbine generator and is being considered a normal power supply for the service water pump.

The alternate shutdown system was installed to provide an alternate means of