the core when the reactor trip breakers are opened.

[^]NUREG-1366 determined that control rod movement testing is not effective in determining immovable control rods. Most of the mechanically immovable control rods are discovered during plant startup during initial pulling of the rods or during rod drop testing. Extending the surveillance interval will not affect this failure discovery method.

The accident analyses assume that the single highest worth rod is struck while fully withdrawn and will not insert. One immovable control rod will still bound this accident analysis. For these reasons, the extension of the surveillance frequency from once every two weeks to once every quarter will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

C. This Technical Specification amendment will require Reactor Coolant Systems Pressure Isolation Valves (PIV) to be surveillance tested after seven days at cold shutdown instead of after three days at cold shutdown.

The PIVs are important in preventing over pressurization and rupture of the Emergency Core Cooling System low pressure piping which could result in a LOCA [loss-ofcoolant accident] that bypasses containment. Allowable leakage from any PIV is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of possible in-series check valve failure. This change will not change the refueling outage surveillance, nor will it change the required testing to be performed after maintenance, repair, or replacement. The proposed level of surveillance is appropriate for these valves.

These valves have had very good operating performance and should continue to have the same performance record with continuation of the same maintenance and testing program. Furthermore, these valves are backed by motor or air-operated valves which have performed reliably.

For these reasons, the extension of the amount of time from three days to seven days before pressure isolation valve testing is required will not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

D. This Technical Specification amendment will revise the containment hydrogen recombiner testing surveillance from every six months to every refueling interval.

The two independent containment hydrogen recombiners provide post-accident hydrogen control of the containment atmosphere. The recombiners are designed to be passive until an accident occurs.

Industry experience and in particular, Prairie Island experience has demonstrated that this equipment is highly reliable. Since the recombiners are not required until after an accident, there would likely be time to effect accessible repairs if the equipment were not operable.

Relocation of the recombiner calibration is an administrative change which will not affect recombiner operability. Deletion of specific testing sequence will not affect the performance of recombiner testing.

Equipment redundancy, reliability and time for repairs ensures post-accident

control. For these reasons, these changes will not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

E. This Technical Specification amendment will revise the containment spray system nozzle testing surveillance from once every five years to once every ten years.

Two independent containment spray systems provide post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere and provide a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere. This surveillance test verifies by air flow test that the spray nozzles are unobstructed. The extension of the surveillance frequency does not affect administrative controls that preclude entry of foreign material into the nozzles.

At Prairie Island the piping headers and nozzles are fabricated from austenitic stainless steel. There have been no reported in-service problems noted with spray nozzle testing from plants with stainless steel headers and nozzles and there is no indication that the lines would corrode and become obstructed.

For these reasons, this change will not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

F. This Technical Specification amendment will revise the frequency for testing the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (AFWP) from monthly to semi-quarterly on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

Two 100% redundant, diverse pumps provide an emergency source of feedwater to the steam generators. The Prairie Island AFWPs have performed reliably. However, frequent testing of the pumps and associated equipment wears out the equipment resulting in equipment unavailability. AFWP availability will be increased by semiquarterly surveillance testing on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

For these reasons, this change will not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of previously evaluated accident.

Therefore, the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not affected by any of the proposed amendments.

2. The proposed amendment[s] will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

The extension of facility surveillance intervals as discussed previously will not result in changes in plant configuration or operation. The changes in recombiner calibration and testing will not result in changes in plant configuration or operation. Therefore, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated would not be created.

3. The proposed amendment[s] will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The amendments proposed in this License Amendment Request do not reduce the ability of any system or component to perform its safety related function. The basis of NUREG–1366, Generic Letter 93–05, and the analysis performed in support of this License Amendment Request is that the reduction in surveillance testing can improve safety by reducing challenges to plant systems, personnel exposure, and equipment wear or degradation. The proposed changes to surveillance frequencies do not change the method of performing any surveillance. The operation of systems and equipment remains unchanged. Therefore, a significant reduction in the margin of safety would not be involved.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.

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Northern States Power Company, Docket Nos. 50–282 and 50–306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Goodhue County, Minnesota

Date of amendment requests: December 5, 1994.

Description of amendment requests: The proposed amendments would revise Technical Specification 3.8 to allow containment airlock doors to remain open during core alterations provided certain conditions are met. This request is similar to the amendment for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant which the NRC approved on August 30, 1994. In addition, these amendments would allow containment penetrations to remain open during core alterations provided certain conditions are met.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed containment refueling integrity amendments do not affect the probability of a fuel handling accident, they only deal with the containment systems.

The containment is provided for the purpose of mitigating the consequences of postulated accidents. For the fuel handling accident in containment, the licensing basis analyses, including the NRC safety