surveillance requirements for the power range neutron flux instrumentation to permit entering reactor operating modes 1 and 2 to perform necessary test for power range detectors.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (SHC), which is presented below:

* * * The proposed changes do not involve an SHC because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously analyzed.

NNECO is proposing to modify Table 4.3–1 by adding Note 5 to Functional Units 2b, 3, and 4. This note provides an exception from the provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.4. Entry into Mode 2 or Mode 1, as appropriate, would allow for appropriate test conditions to complete the channel calibration of power range neutron detectors (i.e., Functional Units 2b, 3, and 4 of Table 4.3–1). This will improve plant safety by performing tests at proper conditions. The acceptance criteria, such as response times, test frequency, or test methods, are not revised. Therefore, the power range neutron detectors will perform their intended function when called upon. Additionally, the proposed changes are consistent with the new, improved STS for the Westinghouse plants (NUREG–1431).

Based on the above, the proposed changes to Functional Units 2b, 3, and 4 of Table 4.3–1 of the Millstone Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

The proposed changes to Functional Units 2b, 3, and 4 of Table 4.3–1 do not make any physical or operational changes to existing plant structures, systems, or components. The proposed changes do not introduce any new failure mode. They simply allow tests to be performed at appropriate conditions (e.g., Mode 2 or Mode 1 rather than Mode 4 or Mode 3).

Additionally, the proposed changes do not modify the acceptance criteria for the tests. The purpose of the tests is to ensure that the power range neutron detectors can perform their intended function.

Thus, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed changes to Functional Units 2b, 3, and 4 of Table 4.3–1 do not have any adverse impact on the design basis accident analyses. The applicable acceptance criteria for the power range neutron detectors will not be modified by the proposed changes. The proposed changes will permit the tests to be conducted under the proper conditions, so that the ability of the power range neutron detectors to perform their intended safety function can be confirmed.

Based on the above, there is no significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resource Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Ms. L. M. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Post Office Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141–0270.

NRC Project Director: Phillip F. McKee.

Northern States Power Company, Docket Nos. 50–282 and 50–306, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Goodhue County, Minnesota

Date of amendment requests: August 30, 1994.

Description of amendment requests: The proposed amendments would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant as recommended by Generic Letter (GL) 93–05, ''Line-Item Technical Specification Improvements to Reduce Surveillance Requirements for Testing During Power Operation.'' The proposed amendments would also revise testing and calibration requirements associated with the containment hydrogen recombiners. The proposed TS changes are as follows:

(1) TS Table 4.1–1C, ''Miscellaneous Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements.'' Delete Item 14, ''Accumulator Level and Pressure'' and corresponding frequency interval designations.

(2) TS Table 4.1–2A, ''Minimum Frequencies For Equipment Tests,'' Item 2. Revise the frequency for partial movement of all control rod assemblies from every 2 weeks to once per quarter.

(3) TS 4.3, ''Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Values.'' Under Specification heading, extend the amount of time the plant can be shut down before pressure isolation valve testing will be required from 72 hours to 7 days.

(4) TS SR 4.4.I, 4.4.I.a, 4.4.I.b, 4.4.I.b.1, 4.4.I.b.2, and 4.4.I.b.3, ''Electrical Hydrogen Recombiners.'' Revise the containment hydrogen recombiner testing surveillance frequency from every 6 months to every refueling interval. Delete the specific requirement to perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION of recombiner instruments and control circuits. Delete the requirement to sequentially perform the resistance to ground test following the functional test.

(5) TS SR 4.5.A.2.b, ''Containment Spray System.'' Revise the containment spray system nozzle testing surveillance frequency from once every 5 years to once every 10 years.

(6) TS SR 4.8.A.1, 4.8.A.2, and Footnote, ''Auxiliary Feedwater System.'' Revise the testing frequency for the auxiliary feedwater pumps from intervals of 1 month to semi-quarterly on a staggered test basis.

(7) BASES 4.8, ''Steam And Power Conversion Systems.'' Revise the Bases to include testing frequency for the auxiliary feedwater pumps from intervals of 1 month to semi-quarterly on a staggered test basis.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed amendment[s] will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Except for hydrogen recombiner changes to conform to Standard Technical Specifications, the requested changes were extensively reviewed by the NRC during the preparation of NUREG–1366 and Generic Letter 93–05. For the sake of clarity each proposed change is discussed separately in the order appearing in the Prairie Island Technical Specifications.

A. This Technical Specification amendment removes the accumulator water level and pressure channel surveillance from the Technical Specifications and places them into a licensee controlled test procedure. These changes are consistent with industry recognition that accumulator instrumentation operability is not directly related to the capability of the accumulators to perform their safety function.

Relocating the instrumentation surveillance requirements is an administrative change which will not affect equipment testing, availability, or operation. Therefore, it will not have an effect on the probability or consequences of an accident.

B. This Technical Specification amendment changes control rod movement from every two weeks to once every quarter. Control rod movement testing is performed to determine if the control rods are immovable. Control rods may be electrically stuck due to a problem in the control rod drive circuitry or mechanically stuck. Electrical problems with the control rod drive system, in general, do not prevent insertion of a control rod into