Based on the considerations regarding the addition of a footnote for proper bus alignment during operating conditions, the licensee submitted the following analysis in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92.

1. The proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the probability of an LOSP or an SBO is not increased by the allowance of having both redundant emergency busses of 4160 volt switchgear connected to one offsite source (RAT). The probability of having an LOSP is not increased since the TS currently allow for a 72 hour LCO for one offsite power source and the time the two redundant 4160 volt safety busses will be temporarily aligned to one RAT is well within this time frame. During this time the busses are interconnected, each bus is provided adequate protection and separation by having separate and redundant Class 1E circuit breakers, one per bus. The probability of an SBO is not increased since neither bus' EDG will be affected during this operation, and since this is a proceduralized manual alignment, the interconnection to one RAT will not be initiated if either EDG were inoperable. Also, the addition of the new "swing" offsite power source (SAT), increases availability and flexibility of the VEGP response to either an LOSP or SBO.

2. The proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the only postulated adverse consequences of tying both redundant 4160 volt safety busses together to one RAT is an LOSP. An LOSP is a design basis event which has already been analyzed for VEGP. In response to an LOSP, both EDGs remain capable of carrying the required loads to mitigate the consequences of any postulated design basis accident during or coincident with an LOSP.

3. The proposed addition to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the only accident mitigating equipment and/or power sources which will be unavailable during the transfer of offsite power sources is the offsite power source being removed from service, allowed by existing TS LCO 3.8.1.1(a). The 13.8 kV loads associated with the RAT being removed from service and all of the 4160 volt non-Class 1E loads fed from either RAT will be unavailable during this temporary alignment. All of these loads are nonsafety related and therefore are enveloped by the existing LOSP analysis.

Based on the considerations regarding clarification of SAT Use and Expanded Bases, the licensee submitted the following analysis in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92.

1. The proposed change to the TS does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because only clarifications to existing TS action statements and an additional expanded bases are being made. No changes to the existing TS requirements for A.C. sources are being made. The safety function of the offsite power source is unchanged by the addition of the SAT and the probability of an LOSP or SBO is not increased. In actuality, the addition of the SAT increases the availability and flexibility of VEGP responses to either an LOSP or SBO.

2. The proposed change to the TS does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the loss of the SAT while being utilized to meet TS offsite power source requirements is enveloped by existing LOSP analysis.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because although the SAT has no 13.8 kV secondary winding, nor the same capacity as a RAT for accepting 4.16 kV non Class 1E loads, these loads are nonsafety related and therefore enveloped by existing analysis. If a unit trip were to occur while one 4.16 kV safety bus is being powered from the SAT, the effect is a loss of the 13.8 kV and non Class 1E 4.16 kV loads associated with the out of service RAT. This scenario is enveloped by existing LOSP analysis.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket Nos. 50–315 and 50–316, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan

Date of amendment requests: August 12, 1992 and supplemented April 12, 1993.

Description of amendment requests: The proposed amendments would change the minimum channels operable for the pressurizer safety valve position indicator acoustic monitor to two out of three total from one per valve. The amendments also delete footnotes which are no longer applicable.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: We [the licensee] have evaluated the proposed T/Ss exemption and have determined that it should not require a significant hazards consideration based on the criteria established in 10CFR50.92(c). Operation of the Cook Nuclear Plant in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Although the proposed exemption results in the operator having one less source of information on plant status, it does not create a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The acoustic monitors do not perform a function vital to safe shutdown or to the isolation of the reactor, or the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, nor is there a mechanism involving an operable or inoperable pressurizer safety valve acoustic monitor which would initiate an accident. These monitors were added to meet the requirements of NUREG-0578 and NUREG-0737. During normal operations, other instrumentation exists that provides the operator with indication of safety valve actuation. The acoustic monitors are not necessary to and are not used in the emergency operating procedures. In addition, the acoustic monitors being inoperable will not result in an uncontrolled release of radiation to the environment and will not initiate an accident. Finally, although the operator may have one less channel operable, the operator receives no less information than if all three channels are operable because one valve opening causes all operable channels to actuate. Therefore, we conclude that the proposed T/Ss changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

As previously stated, the purpose of the acoustic monitor is to provide the operator with information regarding safety valve position that may assist in the mitigation of the consequences of an accident. Specifically, it provides information that a safety valve has lifted. However, the operator has other mechanisms for obtaining equivalent information. In addition, the signals generated by an acoustic monitor do not initiate any other equipment actuation, nor will the inoperability of an acoustic monitor initiate any accident. Consequently, the proposed T/Ss changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed T/Ss changes result in the operator potentially having one less source of information on plant status. However, we believe the margin of safety is not reduced for several reasons. First, the operator is provided with other viable flow detection devices to determine pressurizer safety valve position, i.e., the temperature sensor on the discharge line associated with the inoperable acoustic monitor, and pressurizer relief tank level (NLA–351), temperature (NTA–351)