that degradation would cause leakage to exceed that assumed in the accident analysis.

2. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The change to the Surveillance Requirement is a one time [extension] to extend the surveillance interval from the maximum of 50 months to approximately 54 months for performance of the third ILRT in the first service period. There are no design changes being made that would create a new type of accident or malfunction and the method and manner of plant operation remain unchanged. Extension of the surveillance interval for performing the ILRT does not adversely impact the surveillances ability to show that containment integrity is maintained.

3. The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

There are no changes being made to the safety limits or safety system settings that would adversely impact plant safety. The change is a one time [extension] to extend the time interval for performing an ILRT approximately four months beyond the current maximum interval. In addition to the indication of continued containment integrity provided by the Local Leak Rate Testing program, the surveillance test data from the first and second ILRTs illustrates that there is sufficient leakage margin to remain well below the allowable leakage rate of La. The as-left leakage rate for the last ILRT was 0.0614 [weight percent per day], which is well below the 0.075 [weight percent per day] allowed by the T.S., and therefore provides margin for degradation that is greater than the minimum provided by the Technical Specifications. Therefore, this change does not significantly reduce the margin of safety for Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Cameron Village Regional Library, 1930 Clark Avenue, Raleigh, North Carolina 27605.

Attorney for licensee: R. E. Jones, General Counsel, Carolina Power & Light Company, Post Office Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602.

NRC Project Director: William H. Bateman.

Consumers Power Company, Docket No. 50–255, Palisades Plant, Van Buren County, Michigan

Date of amendment request: December 29, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would affect the method of controlling the pH of the post-LOCA containment sump solution by allowing the replacement of the existing operator actuated Iodine Removal System with a passive system of baskets of Trisodium Phosphate (TSP) in the lower regions of the containment. The current Iodine Removal System provides sodium hydroxide (NaOH) for injection into the containment spray to maintain pH of the sump solution.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

The following evaluation supports the finding that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change from NaOH to TSP requirements would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The substitution of TSP baskets for the NaOH addition equipment would not cause any changes to the capability, settings, or operation of the plant systems (other than the Iodine Removal System itself) and would not, therefore, have any effect on the probability of occurrence of an accident.

The substitution of TSP baskets for the NaOH addition equipment has the effect of providing more immediate control of post-LOCA sump pH, thereby increasing the assurance that iodine will remain in solution throughout a postulated event. The consequences of accidents evaluated in the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report] will not be increased by this increased assurance.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The TSP baskets are passive components which have no interaction with plant equipment unless flooding occurs in the containment. They are designed and located such that they will not interact with any plant safety equipment during a seismic event. The NaOH equipment, which will be replaced by the TSP baskets, has no function or effect on other equipment except during accident conditions. Therefore, the substitution of TSP baskets for NaOH addition equipment cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The substitution of TSP baskets for the NaOH addition equipment would assure that the sump pH at the initiation of RAS [recirculation actuation signal] is between 7.0 and 8.0 as assumed in the MHA [maximum hypothetical accident] analysis. Therefore, this change would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Van Wylen Library, Hope College, Holland, Michigan 49423.

Attorney for licensee: Judd L. Bacon, Esquire, Consumers Power Company, 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201.

NRČ Project Director: John N. Hannon.

Duke Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

Date of amendment request: December 7, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The amendments revise the Technical Specification action statement to allow the Control Room Air Intake to remain open when radiation monitors (EMF– 43A and EMF–43B) are inoperable. Immediate action to return the monitors to service would be required.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report].

The amendment change will ensure correct Control Room Ventilation system alignment in order to mitigate the consequence of a Design Basis LOCA as described in FSAR Section 15.6.5.3, Environmental Consequences of a Loss of-Coolant Accidents, Control Room Operator Dose.

The amendment change will permit the intake to remain open and will specify that action to repair the affected monitor shall be taken immediately. The change itself is not considered to be an initiator of any previously evaluated accident. Maintaining the VC intake open with an inoperable monitor will not result in any accidents that have not been previously evaluated. The implementation of immediate actions to repair the inoperable monitor does not in itself represent any accidents that have not been previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed Technical Specification change does not increase the occurrence probability of previously evaluated accidents.

The change to permit maintenance of open intakes will not increase the consequences of any previously evaluated accidents. The proposed amendment change is consistent with the original Safety Analysis concerning the Dose to the Operators.

The analysis determined that the Doses to the Operators were within acceptable ranges given the assumptions that the intakes would