which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Ocean County Library, Reference Department, 101 Washington Street, Toms River, NJ 08753.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day of November 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Vernon L. Rooney,

Acting Director, Project Directorate I-3, Division of Reactor Projects—I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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[Docket Nos. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254, 50-265, 50-373, and 50-374]

Commonwealth Edison Company and Midamerican Energy Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. DRP–19, DRP–25, DRP–29, DRP–30, NPF–11, and NPF–18 issued to Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd, the licensee) for operation of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, located in Grundy County, Illinois, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, located in Dixon County, Illinois, and LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2, located in LaSalle County, Illinois.

The proposed amendment would change the technical specifications of these plants to incorporate 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, "Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing For Water-Cooled Power Reactors", Option B.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from

any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because of the following:

10 CFR 50, Appendix J has been amended to include provisions regarding performancebased leakage testing requirements (Option B). Option B allows plants with satisfactory Integrated Leak Rate Testing (ILRT) performance history to reduce the Type A testing frequency from three tests in ten years to one test in ten years. For Type B and Type C tests, Option B allows plants to reduce testing frequency based on the leak rate test history of each component. In addition, Option B establishes controls to ensure continued satisfactory performance of the affected penetrations during the extended testing interval. To be consistent with the requirements of Option B to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, ComEd proposes to include appropriate changes to the Technical Specifications that incorporate the necessary revisions associated with Option B of 10 CFR

The proposed amendment represents the conversion of current Technical Specification requirements to maintain consistency with those requirements specified by Option B to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. The proposed changes are consistent with the current plant safety analyses. Implementation of these changes will provide continued assurance that specified parameters associated with containment integrity will remain within their acceptance limits, and as such, will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

Some of the proposed changes represent minor curtailments to current Technical Specification requirements, but are based on the requirements specified by Option B to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. Any such changes are consistent with the current plant safety analyses and have been determined to represent sufficient requirements for the assurance and reliability of equipment assumed to operate in the safety analyses, or provide continued assurance that specified parameters associated with containment integrity remain within their acceptance limits. As such, these changes will not significantly increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated accident.

The associated systems affecting the leak rate integrity related to this proposed amendment request are not assumed in any safety analyses to initiate any accident sequence; therefore, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not increased by this proposed amendment which incorporates the requirements of Option B to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. In addition, the proposed limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements for the proposed amendments to any such

systems that affect the leak rate integrity are consistent with the current requirements specified within the Technical Specifications. The proposed changes to any Technical Specification limiting condition for operation or surveillance requirement maintain an equivalent level of reliability and availability for all affected systems. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not increase the consequences of any accident previously evaluated as the probability of the affected systems associated with leak rate integrity, from performing their intended function, is unaffected by the proposed limiting conditions for operation or surveillance requirements.

There is no change to the consequences of an accident previously evaluated because maintaining leakage within the analyzed limit assumed for any associated accident analyses does not adversely affect either the on-site or off-site dose consequences resulting from an accident. In addition, containment leakage is not an accident initiator. As such, there is no adverse impact on the probability of accident initiators. Thus, there is no significant increase in the probability of any previously analyzed accident.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because:

Option B of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J specifies, in part, that a Type A test which measures both the containment system overall integrated leakage rate at the containment pressure and system alignments assumed during a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA), and demonstrates the capability of the primary containment to withstand an internal pressure load, may be conducted at a periodic interval based on the performance of the overall containment system. The acceptable leakage rates are specified in the plant's Technical Specifications. For Type B and Type C tests, intervals are proposed for establishment based on the performance history of each component. Acceptance criteria for each component is based upon demonstration that the sum leakage rates at design basis pressure conditions for applicable penetrations, is within the limit specified in the Technical Specifications.

The proposed amendment represents the conversion of current Technical Specification requirements to maintain consistency with those requirements specified in Option B to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J. The proposed changes are consistent with the current plant safety analyses. Some minor curtailments of current Technical Specification requirements, associated with containment integrity are based on generic guidance or similarly approved provisions for other stations. These changes do not involve revisions to the design of the station. Some of the changes may involve revision in the testing of components at the station; however, these are in accordance with the current plant safety analyses, and provide for appropriate testing or surveillance that are consistent with Option B to 10 CFR part 50, Appendix J. The proposed changes will not introduce new failure mechanisms beyond those already considered in the current plant safety analyses.