documented in NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," January 1994. Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI) has confirmed the applicability of this evaluation to River Bend Station (RBS). In addition EOI will complete the actions identified in the NRC staff's safety evaluation of NEDO-32291.

Because of the continued application of other existing TS-required tests such as channel calibration, channel checks, channel functional tests, and logic system functional tests, the response time of these systems will be maintained within the acceptance limits assumed in plant safety analyses and required for successful mitigation of an initiating event. The proposed changes do not affect the capability of the associated systems to perform their intended function within their required response time, nor do the proposed changes themselves affect the operation of any equipment. As a result, EOI has concluded that the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes only apply to the testing requirements for the components identified above and do not result in any physical change to these or other components or their operation. As a result, no new failure modes are introduced. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accidents previously evaluated.

The current TS-required response times are based on the maximum allowable values as assumed in the plant safety analyses. These analyses conservatively establish the margin of safety. As described above, the proposed changes do not affect the capability of the associated systems to perform their intended function within the allowed response time used as the basis for the plant safety analyses. The potential failure modes for the components within the scope of this request were evaluated for impact on instrument response time. This evaluation confirmed that, with the exception of loss of fill-oil of Rosemount transmitters, the remaining TSrequired testing is sufficient to identify failure modes or degradation in instrument response times and ensure operation of the instrument within the scope of this request is within acceptable limits. The actions taken in response to NRC Bulletin 90-09 and Supplement 1 are adequate to identify loss of fill-oil failures of Rosemount transmitters. As a result, it has been concluded that plant and systems response to an initiating event will remain in compliance with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

Further, although not explicitly evaluated, the proposed changes will provide an improvement to plant safety and operation by reducing the time safety systems are unavailable, reducing the potential for safety system actuations, reducing plant shutdown risk, limiting radiation exposure to plant personnel, and eliminating the diversion of key personnel resources to conduct unnecessary testing. Therefore, EOI has concluded that this request will result in an overall increase in the margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Government Documents Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803

Attorney for licensee: Mark Wetterhahn, Esq., Winston & Strawn, 1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005

NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation, Docket No. 50–443, Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1, Rockingham County, New Hampshire

*Date of amendment request:* September 22, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would modify a requirement of the Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications. Specifically, the proposed amendment would change the ACTION referenced in Table 3.3–3, **Engineered Safety Features Actuation** System Instrumentation, for Functional Unit 8.b. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump/RWST Level Low-Low. The ACTION requirement would be changed to ACTION 15 from ACTION 18. ACTION 15 requires an inoperable channel to be placed in bypass (with no time limit specified) while ACTION 18 requires an inoperable channel to be placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c). The NRC staff's review is presented below.

A. The change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated (10 CFR 50.92(c)(1)) because the proposed change would result in an inoperable Functional Unit 8.b. protective channel being placed in the bypassed condition vice tripped condition. Functional Unit 8.b. is not involved in any accident initiation sequence; therefore, the probability of a previously-analyzed accident is not increased. Placing an inoperable Functional Unit 8.b. in bypass vice trip reduces the probability of premature opening of the containment building sump isolation valves thereby reducing the potential for increasing the consequences of a previously-analyzed

accident. Thus, the consequences of a previously-analyzed accident is not increased.

B. The change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated (10 CFR 50.92(c)(2)) because the change does not reduce the minimum required number of channels of instrumentation to be operable. The change does not alter the function of or affect the failure modes of Functional Unit 8.b. instrumentation channels. The proposed change does not otherwise affect the manner by which the facility is operated, and it does not involve any changes to equipment or features which affect the operational characteristics of the facility.

C. The change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety (10 CFR 50.92(c)(3)) because the change does not reduce the minimum required number of channels of instrumentation to be operable, and it does not involve any changes to equipment or features which affect the operational characteristics of the facility. Therefore, the protection previously provided remains unchanged.

Based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Exeter Public Library, Founders Park, Exeter, NH 03833.

*Attorney for licensee:* Lillian M. Cuoco, Esquire, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Post Office Box 270, Hartford CT 06141–0270.

*NRC Project Director:* Phillip F. McKee

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50–336, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2, New London, Connecticut

*Date of amendment request:* May 26, 1995, supplemented and revised October 20, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed changes would modify TS 3.8.1.1., "Electrical Power Systems, A.C. Sources, Operating," TS 3.8.1.2, "Electrical Power Systems, Shutdown," TS 3.8.2.2, "Electrical Power Systems, A.C. Distribution - Shutdown," and TS 3.8.2.4, "Electrical Power Systems, D.C. Distribution - Shutdown," to provide operational flexibility as well as consistency between action statements and to eliminate certain surveillance requirements that are not applicable in Modes 5 or 6.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration (SHC), which is presented below: