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components to be in continuous operation while one TS-required component is inoperable. Rather, the remaining components would remain operable. The proposed change would not change the normal operation of the system, nor would any physical modifications result from the change. The function and capability of the SW systems would remain unchanged. Therefore, the proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed change would remove the requirement for the remaining SW system components to be in continuous operation while one allowed TS-required component is inoperable. Rather, the remaining TS required components would remain operable. Adequate assurance of operability is maintained by performance of regular surveillance testing. Maintaining operable status rather than placing equipment in continuous operation does not result in a change in the ability of the SW system to perform its intended function, since the system provides an automatic response to accident conditions, and the system possesses adequate capacity to perform its normal operating function with one allowed TS-required component inoperable. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Hartsville Memorial Library, 147 West College Avenue, Hartsville, South Carolina 29550

Attorney for licensee: R. E. Jones, General Counsel, Carolina Power & Light Company, Post Office Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

*NŘC Project Director:* David B. Matthews

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50–213, Haddam Neck Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: October 24, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment will increase the trip setpoints and allowable values for the low power block (P–7).

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below: In accordance with 10CFR50.92, CYAPCO has reviewed the proposed change and has concluded that it does not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC). The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposed change does not involve an SHC because the change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change will relax the power level values for the P–7 interlock by 2 percent. This change affects both the P-7 and P–7N interlocks. The P–7 interlock affects reactor trips on 1) low flow in more than one reactor coolant loop, 2) reactor coolant pump bus under voltage, 3) more than one reactor coolant pump breaker open, 4) main steam line isolation valve closure, 5) turbine trip, and 6) variable low pressure. The P-7 interlock automatically blocks these reactor trips on decreasing power and automatically unblocks these reactor trips on increasing power. The P-7N interlock affects the reactor trip on wide range, neutron flux, high startup rate. P-7N automatically enables this reactor trip on decreasing power level and automatically blocks this reactor trip on increasing power level. The Applicable Modes requirement and Action Statements for the P-7 interlock and the reactor trips associated with both P-7 and P-7N in the Instrumentation Channel and Surveillance Requirements of Technical Specification 3/ 4.3.1 are being changed by 2 percent to be consistent with the change to P-7. The interlock setpoint cannot cause an accident. Also, the proposed 2 percent increase in the power level still results in a power level well below the power level at which the P-7 interlocked reactor trips are required for accident mitigation, as well as maintaining the high startup rate trip enabled at a higher power level. This proposed power level is consistent with the technical specification requirement prior to the conversion to standard format technical specifications and is also consistent with the Standard Westinghouse technical specification value. Therefore, the proposed change can neither increase the consequences of the design basis accident nor the probability of occurrence of the design basis accidents.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change only modifies the power level for the P–7 and P–7N interlocks. The proposed setpoint is a power level at which stable plant conditions are easier to maintain while transferring the power supply for the reactor coolant pumps between offsite power and the main generator. The setpoint is also well below the power level for which the reactor protection afforded by the trips that are bypassed by P–7 is needed. This cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change maintains the power level for the P–7 interlock below the power level for which the reactor trips that are blocked by the P–7 interlock are required. It also raises the power level to a value at which it is easier to maintain stable plant conditions. This will reduce the likelihood of an automatic reactor trip during the transferring of power for the reactor coolant pumps between offsite power and the main generator. The proposed change will result in the high startup rate reactor trip being enabled at a higher power level. This is conservative since it expands the range of coverage for the trip. Therefore, the proposed change does not impact the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, CT 06457.

Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq., Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, P.O. Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141–0270.

*NRC Project Director:* Phillip F. McKee

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50–213, Haddam Neck Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: November 1, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment will modify Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.2, "Containment Isolation Valves," (CIVs) to change the surveillance interval from at least once per 18 months to at least once per refueling interval.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

CYAPCO has reviewed the proposed change in accordance with 10CFR50.92 and concluded that the change does not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC). The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposed change does not involve an SHC because the change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3.2 of the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications extends the frequency for verifying that each CIV actuates to its required position in response to a safety injection actuation test signal. The proposal would extend the frequency from at least once per 18 months to at least once per