study, would result in anomalous results.

Response: The staff concurs that seismic rebinning solely on the basis of generic seismic fragilities could result in anomalous results, since such items as the plant design basis and vintage of the plant might not be appropriately included. For instance, plants located at the same site were put in different bins (Salem and Hope Creek), and the plants in the New Madrid area were placed in the modified-scope bin. These observations contributed to the staff's decision to eliminate the use of an absolute risk criterion in the seismic scope modifications.

(9) Information exchange through a workshop on lessons learned from *IPEEE:* An information exchange workshop on IPEEE lessons learned to discuss the experience gained from practical or more efficient ways of carrying out the seismic IPEEEs (i.e., relay chatter issue) would benefit both industry and staff.

Response: The staff will consider such a workshop in the future.

(10) Components and items needing evaluation and bases: Certain evaluations of a few known weaker and critical components and items need to be retained in the seismic IPEEE program.

Response: Those components and items identified as needing evaluation and the bases for the retention are briefly described below:

## (a) Relay Chatter Issue

While preparing the original guidance in NUREG-1407, the NRC staff developed its position on relay chatter issue after thoroughly discussing the issue with industry and evaluating the results of previous studies. The staff drastically reduced the scope of relay chatter evaluation, retaining only the identification of bad actor relays. Since these relays are of low capacity, their identification is considered minimum scope for the IPEEE review. The guidance does not preclude any efficient and expeditious means of identifying these relays.

#### (b) Masonry and Block Walls

Probabilistic risk assessments and margin studies have demonstrated that failure of masonry or block walls might be a significant safety concern in existing nuclear power plants. The earthquake experience database and analytical evaluations of seismic fragility demonstrate that masonry and block walls without proper reinforcements are vulnerable to earthquake motion. Although this type of construction would not be

appropriate for use in the current design of nuclear power plants, it has been used in several plants. In evaluating these walls, more lenient criteria were used; thus, the available margins beyond the safe shutdown earthquake may not be comparable to those of other components of the plant. Therefore, in doing the seismic IPEEE review, the licensee needs to identify and evaluate masonry and block walls where they may affect safety components required for safe plant operation. The licensee would need to correct, if warranted, any situation that may present a significant threat to plant safety.

## (c) Flat-Bottom Tanks

Earthquake experience data and analytical fragility evaluations have demonstrated that flat-bottom tanks with poor anchorage are vulnerable to earthquake ground motion. The typical failure mode of concern is the buckling at the base of the tank, which could cause the liquid contents to escape or cause the tank to collapse. If a flatbottom tank fails, it could flood surrounding areas in the plant, in addition to the consequences of loss of function of the tanks. Past seismic studies of nuclear power plants have designated flat-bottom tanks as lowcapacity components. Such components include the refueling water storage tank and the condensate storage tank, whose failures would often significantly affect plant safety. The identification and evaluation of flat-bottom tanks should, therefore, be included as a fundamental element of the seismic IPEEE review to correct, if warranted, any situation that may threaten plant safety.

### (d) Other Items

The licensee would also need to consider several other items that pertain to inadequate anchorage and bracing, adverse physical interactions, building impact, or pounding. These items include the weaker components of the diesel generators or pumps. However, the licensee's seismic review team should determine whether seismic capacities of those components need to be evaluated in the seismic review.

## Attachment 2—References

- [1] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement No. 4, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-10 CFR 50.54(f)," June 1991.
- [2] NRC, NUREG-1407, "Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," Final Report, June 1991.

- [3] NRC, NUREG/CR-5250, "Seismic Hazard Characterization of 69 Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Mountains," January 1989.
- [4] Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), NP-6395-D, "Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Evaluation at Nuclear Plant Sites in the Central and Eastern United States: Resolution of the Charleston Issue." April 1989.
- [5] NRC, NUREG-1488, "Revised Livermore Seismic Hazard Estimates for 69 Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Mountains," April 1994. [6] Letter from W. Rasin (NEI) to A. Thadani
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- [7] NRC IN 94-32, "Revised Seismic Hazard Estimate," April 29, 1994.
- [8] Energy Research, Inc. (ERI) Report (ERI/ NRC 94-502), "A Proposed Approach to Seismic Scope Re-assessment for Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE)," Final Draft, September 1994
- [9] ERI/NRC 94-504, "Approaches for Proposed Modifications of Seismic IPEEE Guidelines for Focused-Scope Plants", Final Draft, September 1994.
- [10] NRC Transcript, "Workshop in Seismic IPEEE Revisit," October 21, 1994.
- [11] EPRI NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin," October 1988.
- [12] NRC Generic Letter 94-03, 'Intergranular stress Corrosion Cracking of Core Shrouds in BWR Reactors," July
- [13] NRC memorandum from W. Russell to E. Beckjord, "NRR User Need Request for Support of Resolving Problem of Stress Corrosion of Reactor Vessel Internal Components," December 2, 1994.

Dated at Rockville, Marvland, this 20th day of January 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

# Brian K. Grimes,

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## **Nominations for Medical Visiting Fellow Program**

**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**ACTION:** Call for nominations.

**SUMMARY:** The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is re-opening the invitation period for nominations of physicians, having expert qualifications in the medical specialty field of Radiation Oncology (Therapy), to apply for positions as Medical Visiting Fellows (Fellows). Others having expert qualifications in related fields such as Therapeutic Radiological Physics are also invited to apply. NRC noticed an