philosophy of protection by multiple barriers used in containment design for limiting fission product release to the environment. Furthermore, as previously identified, based on the evaluations discussed in NEDC 31858P, Revision 2, and the seismic evaluation provided in the Enclosure 2 [of application dated November 21, 1994] report, "MSIV Leakage Alternate Treatment Method Seismic Evaluation," the design of the MSIV leakage alternate drain pathway, meets the intent of the 10CFR100, Appendix A requirement for seismic qualification. Therefore, the proposed method is highly reliable and effective for MSIV leakage treatment.

The revised calculated LOCA doses remain within the regulatory limits for the off-site and the control room. Therefore, the proposed method maintains a margin of safety for mitigating the radiological consequences of MSIV leakage for the proposed TS leakage rate limit of 100 scfh per main steam line, not to exceed a total of 300 scfh for all four main steam lines.

The proposed change to delete LCS isolation valves from TS Table 3.6.3-1 and Table 3.8.4.2.1-1 does not reduce the margin of safety. Welded and/or capped closure of the LCS lines assures that the primary containment integrity and leak testing capability are not compromised. These welds and/or caps will be periodically leak tested as part of the CILRT. The LCS motor operated valves will be eliminated so their thermal overloads will not need to be bypassed. Therefore, the proposed deletion of the LCS isolation valves does not involve a reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Osterhout Free Library, Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701

Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street NW., Washington, DC 20037

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: November 18, 1994

Description of amendment request: The proposed change would revise the Reactivity Control System Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation for boration flow paths and charging pumps by reducing the number of operable charging pumps required for boron addition in Mode 4 from two to one. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated.

The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) requirements assume that only one charging pump will be available below 350°F without single failure considerations on the bases of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and limited core cooling requirements. Therefore, the Mode 4 Applicability has been deleted from LCOs 3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.4, and was added to LCOs 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.3 consistent with the requirements of LCO 3.5.3.

The current Bases for the Unit 2 Technical Specification for boration system flow paths via the charging pumps supports the use of a similar LCO for Salem Unit 1.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be operable when the RCS temperature is less than or equal to 312°F has been added to LCO 3.1.2.3 for clarity and is consistent with the Cold Overpressure Protection (POPS) analysis and the requirements of Technical Specification 3.5.3.

The requirements for Boric Acid Transfer Pump operability are adequately addressed in Technical Specifications 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2 which specify the boron injection flow paths to be operable and the components required to perform this function. This includes the availability of the transfer pumps to meet this Technical Specification requirement.

Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

2. Will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

As discussed in response to Question 1 above, the proposed amendment to the number of charging pumps required to be operable in Mode 4 is consistent with the current Technical Specification requirements for the ECCS LCO and the POPS. The current bases for the Unit 2 Technical Specification for boration system flow paths via the charging pumps supports the use of a similar LCO for Salem Unit 1. The requirements for Boric Acid Transfer Pump operability for Unit 1 are adequately addressed in Technical Specifications 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2 which specify the boron injection flow paths to be operable and the components required to be available to perform this function including the transfer pumps. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed amendment to the number of charging pumps required to be operable in Mode 4 will not result in any changes to the assumptions or

conditions for the current ECCS analysis and POPS analysis. The current bases for the Unit 2 Technical Specification for boration system flow paths via the charging pumps supports the use of a similar LCO for Salem Unit 1 (i.e., the Bases are essentially the same). The requirements for Boric Acid Transfer Pump operability for Unit 1 are adequately addressed in Technical Specifications 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2 which specify the boron injection flow paths to be operable and the components required to be available to perform this function including the transfer pumps. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Houston County, Alabama

Date of amendments request: December 19, 1994Description of amendments request: The proposed change to Table 3.7-3 of the Technical Specifications includes the revision to the main steam safety valve (MSSV) setpoint tolerance from plus or minus 1 percent to plus or minus 3 percent and modifies the bases to 3/4.7.1.1 to increase the relieving capacity of the MSSVs to at least 12,984,660 pounds per hour which corresponds to approximately 112 percent of total secondary steam flow at 100 percent rated thermal power. In addition, modifications to Table 3.7-1 are proposed to reduce the allowable power range neutron flux high setpoints for multiple inoperable steam generator safety valves. The proposed amendment includes an editorial correction to Bases 3/4.7.1.2 to indicate required auxiliary feedwater flow at "1133 psia" rather than "1133 psig.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed license amendment does not involve a significant increase in the