capable of temperature control and isolating the control room on a high radiation signal. This change will not create any new plant operating conditions. Based on this review, the proposed Action will not result in a new or different kind of accident.

The additional restriction on the movement of irradiated fuel in Modes 5 and 6 will not create any new condition which has not been previously analyzed. In addition, for consistency with the wording in Action a, the word "changes" was replaced by the word "additions." This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has no potential to create a new kind of accident.

The proposed changes to add a surveillance requirement to Section 3/4.7.6 do not affect the design or operation of any system, structure, or component in the plant. There are no changes to parameters governing plant operation; no new or different type of equipment will be installed. The proposed changes ensure that equipment remains capable of performing its design function.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The basis for the VC Technical Specification to ensure that the temperature in the control room does not exceed maximum allowable for the equipment and instrumentation inside. The VC system is also required to limit radiation exposure to control room personnel following an accident. Either of the two redundant trains can perform both of these functions. As long as one train of VC is available, the margin of safety assumed in the bases for this specification is maintained.

Increasing the AOT for one VC chiller unit has no impact on the redundant train of VC. Although one train of VC may be inoperable for a longer period of time, the redundant train can perform all normal and accident functions. The length of the AOT is sufficiently short to assure that a scenario involving an accident requiring control room isolation concurrent with the failure of the redundant train is not credible. Therefore, one train of VC will remain available and no reduction is made to the margin of safety.

The second change involves adding an alternative Action in Modes 5 and 6 that would restrict CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity additions, and movement of irradiated fuel. The existing Action requires that the operable train of VC be placed in the makeup mode of operation. This Action ensures that any failures are readily detected. The alternate Action reduces the potential of an event that would require control room isolation while maintaining one train of VC operable. In both cases, the Actions assure that one train of VC is available for normal and emergency use. Therefore, the proposed change maintains the margin of safety.

Another proposed change involves the condition with no VC trains operable in Modes 5 and 6. Since VC is not available, alternative means must be used to maintain control room temperature. Since the primary

alternative involves utilization of outside air, the most appropriate action is to reduce the probability of an event that would require control room isolation. The proposed additional restriction on the movement of irradiated fuel provides added assurance that such an event will not occur. Therefore, the margin of safety is maintained. Also, for consistency with the wording in Action a, the word "changes" was replaced by the word "additions." This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has no impact on the margin of safety.

The final proposed change to add a surveillance requirement does not affect the margin of safety for any Technical Specification. The initial conditions and methodologies used in the accident analyses remain unchanged, therefore, accident analysis results are not impacted. The addition of a Technical Specification surveillance provides further assurance that the Control Room Ventilation System is operable and capable of maintaining the ambient air temperature below the allowable temperature for the continuous duty rating of the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system. These changes also provides consistency with Standard Technical Specifications.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and

Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page number of this **Federal Register** notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By February 24, 1995, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document rooms located at the Byron Public Library, 109 N. Franklin, P.O. Box 434, Byron, Illinois 61010 for the Byron Station; for Braidwood, the Wilmington Township Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the