for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)–(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment dated January 5, 1994, as supplemented on April 26, 1994, September 30, 1994, and January 12, 1995, which are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located a the Wilmington Township Public Library, 201 S. Kankakee Street, Wilmington, Illinois 60481.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of January 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Ramin R. Assa,

Project Manager, Project Directorate III-2, Division of Reactor Projects—III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–1814 Filed 1–24–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–M

## [Docket Nos. STN 50–454, STN 50–455, STN 50–456 and STN 50–457]

## Commonwealth Edison Company; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments To Facility Operating Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF– 37, NPF–66, NPF–72 and NPF–77, issued to the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) for operation of the Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, located in Ogle County, Illinois, and the Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, located in Will County, Illinois.

The proposed amendments would revise the Byron Station, Unit 1 and 2, and Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3/ 4.7.6 concerning the Control Room Ventilation (VC) System. These changes are consistent with the revised Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Plants. Specifically, the allowed outage time for one train of the system would be changed from 7 to 30 days, if the train was declared inoperable only due to an inoperable chiller unit. An alternative action would also be added to TS 3.7.6.a, requiring the cessation of all core alterations,

reactivity, additions, and spent fuel movement if one train of the system is inoperable during refueling operations. By letter dated July 19, 1994, the licensee responded to the Commission staff's comments and proposed to revise TS 3/4.7.6 by adding a surveillance requirement to demonstrate the control room ventilation heat load removal capability every 18 months. Revisions to associated Bases and minor editorial changes would also be made for the purpose of updating and clarifying the TS.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

A. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The first proposed change will increase the allowed outage time (AOT) for a VC chiller from seven days to thirty days in Modes 1 through 4. The thirty day AOT is based on the low probability of an event requiring control room isolation concurrent with failure of the redundant train of VC. Therefore, one train of VC will always be available to remove normal and accident heat loads and provide control room isolation. Consequently, this change will not result in an increase to offsite dose rates or the exposure of control room operators.

Increasing the AOT will allow for more extensive maintenance and should increase overall availability of the VC chillers. This provides additional assurance that a chiller will be operable on at least one train of VC. In the unlikely event that both VC chillers became inoperable, alternate non-safety related means to maintain control room temperature are available. Based on the above, the proposed increase to the AOT will not increase the probability or consequences of any previously analyzed accident.

The proposed change to the Action a for Modes 5 and 6 adds an alternative to placing the remaining operable VC train in the makeup mode. The alternative would allow the option to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, and movement of irradiated fuel. In Modes 5 and 6, this greatly reduces the probability of an event that would require control room isolation. The change will have no impact on the consequences of an accident since the remaining train of VC would be capable of isolating the control room on a high radiation signal and providing the necessary temperature control. Based on this review, the proposed Action will not result in an increase in the probability or consequences of a previously analyzed accident.

As noted above, the proposed amendment adds a restriction to suspend movement of irradiated fuel. This change reduces the probability of the occurrence of a fuel handling accident and has no impact on the consequences of any accident. In addition, the wording in Action b was revised to be consistent with the wording in Action a. This change is purely editorial and, therefore, has no impact on the probability or consequences of an accident.

The proposed changes to Section 3/4.7.6 are requested to ensure that surveillances are performed to verify that the Control Room Ventilation System remains capable of performing its design function. Operability of the Control Room Chillers ensures that the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by the Control Room Ventilation System. The ability of the Control Room Ventilation System to limit the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent, is not affected by the addition of this surveillance requirement. The proposed changes do not affect any accident initiators or precursors and do not change or alter the design assumptions for the systems or components used to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Consequently, the changes do not impact any accident previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

B. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The first proposed change will increase the AOT for a VC chiller from seven days to thirty days in Modes 1 through 4. During the time one chiller is inoperable, the redundant train is capable of handling the heat loads during normal operation and during all accident scenarios. No new operating conditions are created by this change. Therefore, this change will not result in any new or different accident from those previously analyzed.

The proposed change to the Action for Modes 5 and 6 adds an alternative to allow the option to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, and movement of irradiated fuel. In Modes 5 and 6, this greatly reduces the probability of an event that would require control room isolation. Also, the remaining train of VC would still be