public document room for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station located at the Ocean County Library, Reference Department, 101 Washington Street, Toms River, NJ 08753. A decision regarding Requests (3), and (4) of the September 19, 1994 Petition, and Requests (2), (3), and (4), of the December 13, 1994, supplemental Petition will be issued under separate cover upon completion of the NRC staff's review.

A copy of this Partial Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As provided in that regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the issuance of the Decision, unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 4th day of August 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William T. Russell, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Appendix A—Partial Director's Decision Under 10 CFR §2.206 (DD95– 18)

I. Introduction

By letter dated September 19, 1994, Reactor Watchdog Project, Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), and Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch (Petitioners), submitted a Petition pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 C.F.R. § 2.206), requesting that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) take action with regard to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (OCNGS), operated by the GPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN or the Licensee). By letter dated December 13, 1994, Petitioners supplemented the Petition.

The September 19, 1994, Petition requests that the NRC (1) immediately suspend the OCNGS operating license until the Licensee inspects and repairs or replaces all safety-class reactor internal component parts subject to embrittlement and cracking, (2) immediately suspend the OCNGS operating license until the Licensee submits an analysis regarding the synergistic effects of through-wall cracking of multiple safety-class components, (3) immediately suspend the OCNGS operating license until the Licensee has analyzed and mitigated any areas of noncompliance with regard to irradiated fuel pool cooling as a single-unit boiling-water reactor (BWR), and (4) issue a generic letter requiring

other licensees of single-unit BWRs to submit information regarding fuel pool boiling in order to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, and to promptly take appropriate mitigative action if the unit is not in compliance.

The December 13, 1994, supplemental Petition requests that the NRC: (1) suspend the license of the OCNGS until the Petitioners' concerns regarding cracking are addressed, including inspection of all reactor vessel internal components and other safety-related systems susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) and completion of any and all necessary repairs and modifications; (2) explain discrepancies between the response of the NRC staff dated October 27, 1994, to the Petition of September 19, 1994, and the time-to-boil calculations for the FitzPatrick plant; (3) require GPUN to produce documents for evaluation of the time-to-boil calculation for the OCNGS irradiated fuel pool; (4) identify redundant components that may be powered from onsite power supplies to be used for spent fuel pool cooling as qualified Class 1E systems; (5) hold a public meeting in Toms River, New Jersey, to permit presentation of additional information related to the Petition; and (6) treat the Petitioners letter of December 13, 1994, as a formal appeal of the denial of the Petitioners' request of September 19, 1994, to immediately suspend the OCNGS operating license.

The September 19, 1994, Petition sought relief concerning safety-class reactor internal components based on the following premises: (a) the core shroud in General Electric BWRs is vulnerable to age-related deterioration; (b) 12 domestic and foreign BWR owners have found extensive cracking on welds of the core shroud; (c) only 10 of 36 U.S. BWR owners have inspected their core shrouds and 9 of the 10 core shrouds had cracks; (d) 19 of 25 selected BWR internal components are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking and 6 of 19 are susceptible to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking; (e) as the oldest operating General Electric Mark I BWR and the third oldest operating reactor in the United States, OCNGS has been subjected to the longest period of operational conditions that cause embrittlement and cracking; (f) the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) stated that cracking of the core shroud is a warning signal that additional safety-class reactor internals are increasingly susceptible to age-related deterioration; (g) cracking of any single part or multiple components jeopardizes safe operation of that nuclear station; (h)

Oyster Creek did not inspect for core shroud cracking prior to the current refueling outage and other safety-class reactor internals have not been adequately inspected for cracking; and (i) a safety analysis has not been performed on the potential synergistic effects of multiple-component cracking.

The September 19, 1994, Petition also sought relief concerning fuel pool cooling design deficiencies, based on the following premises: (a) various design defects in BWR fuel pool cooling systems pose a significant increase in risk to the public safety and violate 10 CFR 50.59; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 63: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III; and Regulatory Guides 1.13, 1.89, and 1.97; (b) OCNGS is a single-unit facility with no adjacent units to rely upon in the event that a design-basis event were to disable the fuel pool cooling system; and (c) OCNGS has not docketed any material with regard to BWR design deficiencies identified in the 10 CFR Part 21 Report of Substantial Safety Hazard (November 27, 1992) of Messrs. Lochbaum and Prevatte, and thus OCNGS may be in violation of NRC regulatory requirements.

The Petitioners assert the following bases to support their requests in the December 13, 1994, supplemental Petition: (a) the October 27, 1994, letter of the NRC staff, acknowledging receipt of the Petition and denying the requests for immediate suspension of the operating license, failed to address concerns central to the Petition, such as the Licensee's failure to recognize that IGSCC indicates that cracking could be occurring in additional safety-class reactor internal components and the Licensee's failure to perform inspections of all safety-class components to determine whether cracking is occurring; (b) recently discovered cracking in the top guide and core plates in foreign BWRs and cracking discovered on December 8, 1994, at the New York Power Authority's (NYPA's) FitzPatrick reactor underscore the Petitioners' concern that additional safety-class components at OCNGS are degrading; (c) the Licensee did not conduct an enhanced inspection of the core plate and top guide of the OCNGS facility during the current outage, despite notification by the General Electric Rapid Information **Communication Service Information** Letter (GE RICSIL) 071 dated November 22, 1994; (d) the Licensee, the NRC, and the BWR Owners Group (BWORG) have failed to provide an analysis of the synergistic effects of multiplecomponent cracking of additional safety-class reactor internal