nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.

Alternative to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed action, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. As an alternative to the proposed action, the staff considered denial of the proposed action. Denial of the application would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the alternate action are similar.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of any resources not previously considered in the Final Environmental Statements related to operation of ANO-1&2 dated February 1973 and June 1977 respectively.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

In accordance with its stated policy, on July 26, 1995, the staff consulted with the Arkansas State official, Don Green of the Arkansas Department of Health, regarding the environmental impact of the proposed action. The State official had no comments.

Finding of No Significant Impact

Based upon the environmental assessment, the Commission concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Accordingly, the Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed action.

For further details with respect to this proposed action, see the request for exemption dated October 24, 1994, which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, The Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room located at the Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, Russellville Arkansas 72801.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 3rd day of August 1995.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

George Kalman,

Senior Project Manager, Project Directorate IV-1, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 95–19768 Filed 8–9–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

[Docket No. 50-382]

Entergy Operations, Inc.; Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3; Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from certain requirements of its regulations to Facility Operating License No. NPF–38, issued to Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), for operation of the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3) located in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

The proposed action is in accordance with the licensee's application dated October 24, 1994, for exemption from certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, "Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage." The exemption would allow implementation of a hand geometry biometric system for site access control such that picture badges and access control cards for certain non-employees can be taken offsite.

The Need for the Proposed Action

Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, paragraph (a), the licensee shall establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization.

10 CFR 73.55(d), "Access

Requirements," paragraph (1), specifies that "licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into a protected area." 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) specifies that "A numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without escort." 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the individual "receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area * *

Currently, employee and contractor identification/access control badges are issued and retrieved on the occasion of each entry to and exit from the protected areas of the Waterford 3 site. Station security personnel are required to maintain control of the badges while the individuals are offsite. Security personnel retain each identification/access control badge when not in use by the authorized individual, within appropriately designed storage

receptacles inside a bullet-resistant enclosure. An individual who meets the access authorization requirements is issued the individual picture identification/access control card which allows entry into preauthorized areas of the station. While entering the plant in the present configuration, an authorized individual is "screened" by the required detection equipment. The individual provides a personal identification number (PIN) to the issuing guard and is screened again by the issuing security officer using the picture identification on the access card. Having received the badge, the individual proceeds to the access portal, inserts the access control card into the card reader, and passes through the turnstile which is unlocked by the access card. Once inside the station, the access card allows entry only to preauthorized areas and the individual's PIN is no longer required.

This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel are required to verify badge issuance, ensure badge retrieval, and maintain the badge in orderly storage until the next entry into the protected area. The regulations permit employees to remove their badge from the site, but an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to permit contractors to take their badge offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The Commission has completed its evaluation of the licensee's application. Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to gain unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) recorded with their badge number. Since the hand geometry is unique to each individual and its application in the entry screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a badge, the requested exemption would allow employees and contractors to keep their badges at the time of exiting the protected area. The process of verifying badge issuance, ensuring badge retrieval, and maintaining badges could be eliminated while the balanced of the access procedure would remain intact. Firearm, explosive, and metal detection equipment and provisions for conducting searches will remain as well. The security officer responsible for the last access control function (controlling admission to the protected area) will also remain isolated within a bullet-resistant structure in order to assure his or her ability to respond or to summon assistance.

Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present verification