unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any airplane from the applicability of this AD.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent the inability of the tailcone to deploy, which could impede the egress of passengers from the airplane during an emergency evacuation, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD, inspect the tailcone release locking cable fitting assembly for proper operation in accordance with the procedures specified in McDonnell Douglas DC–9 Service Bulletin 53–269, dated August 11, 1994. If the swaged ball on the cable can pass into the handle hole, prior to further flight, replace or modify the fitting assembly in accordance with the service bulletin.

(b) Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD, replace or modify the fitting assembly in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC–9 Service Bulletin 53–269, dated August 11, 1994. Such replacement or modification constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD.

(c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO.

Note 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO.

(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

(e) The inspection, replacement, and modification shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 53-269, dated August 11, 1994. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90801-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Administrative Support, Dept. L51, M.C. 2-98. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, Transport Airplane Directorate, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(f) This amendment becomes effective on February 21, 1995.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 6, 1995.

Darrell M. Pederson,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 95–792 Filed 1–19–95; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–U

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94–NM–234–AD; Amendment 39–9120; AD 94–26–51]

Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T94-26-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of all McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires a revision to the FAAapproved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to prohibit autoland operation below 100 feet above ground level (AGL), and the installation of certain flight control computer software. This AD provides for an optional terminating action for the AFM revision. This amendment is prompted by reports of a loose nut on a coaxial connector on a radio altimeter receiver/transmitter rack, and the transmittal of erroneous altitude data to the flight control computers below 100 feet AGL, which resulted in abnormal flare (pitch) control during autoland operation. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent abnormal flare (pitch) control, which could result in degradation of the landing capability of the airplane. DATES: Effective February 6, 1995, to all persons except those persons to whom

persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD T94–26–51, issued December 19, 1994, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of February 6, 1995.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before March 21, 1995.

ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM–103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 94–NM– 234–AD, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055–4056.

The applicable service information may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90801-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Administrative Support, Dept. L51, M.C. 2–98. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brett Portwood, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM– 132L, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712; telephone (310) 627–5347; fax (310) 627–5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 19, 1994, the FAA issued telegraphic AD T94–26–51, which is applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11 series airplanes.

That action was prompted by two reports of abnormal flare (pitch) control that occurred during autoland operation on McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. McDonnell Douglas reported that, during one occurrence, radio altimeter #1 transmitted erroneous altitude data to the flight control computers below 100 feet above ground level (AGL). This condition caused the airplane to flare prematurely during landing. Following a subsequent occurrence of abnormal autoland operation, an operator noticed that a nut on a coaxial connector on the back of the radio altimeter receiver/transmitter rack was loose. After refastening the connector, the airplane exhibited normal flare during autoland operation.

Subsequent investigation of these reports conducted by McDonnell Douglas revealed that signals leaked between the transmitter and receiver of radio altimeter #1. The cause of this leakage has not yet been determined. In addition, the exact failure mode of the radio altimeter coaxial cable that can produce the leakage is unclear at this time. The manufacturer is conducting an investigation into the cause of this leakage in order to develop a corrective action.

Early and/or abnormal flare (pitch) control during autoland operation, if not corrected, could result in degradation of the landing capability of the airplane.