

closure technique will provide the same assurance of containment closure during core alterations or movement of irradiated fuel inside containment.

The various administrative changes and clarifications proposed will not reduce the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: University of Toledo Library, Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: Gail H. Marcus

Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio

Date of amendment request: June 23, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would relocate Technical Specifications (TS) 3/4.3.3.3 - Seismic Instrumentation, TS 3/4.3.3.4 - Meteorological Instrumentation, and TS 3/4.4.11 - Reactor Coolant System Vents and associated Bases.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Toledo Edison has reviewed the proposed changes and determined that a significant hazards consideration does not exist because operation of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit Number 1, in accordance with these changes would:

1a. Not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated because no change is being made to any accident initiator. No previous analyzed accident scenario is changed, and initiating conditions and assumptions remain as previously analyzed.

The proposed changes are deletions and relocations of specifications that do not meet the NRC Final Policy Statement [58 FR 39132, dated July 22, 1993] criteria for inclusion in TS. Furthermore, these relocations and deletions are consistent with the NRC guidance for TS provided by the "Improved Standard Technical Specifications for Babcock and Wilcox Plants," NUREG-1430, Revision 0. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed

changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

1b. Not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the proposed changes do not affect accident conditions or assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident. The proposed changes do not alter the source term, containment isolation or allowable radiological releases.

2. Not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the proposed changes do not change the way the plant is operated, and no new or different failure modes have been defined for any plant system or component important to safety, nor has any limiting single failure been identified as a result of the proposed changes. No new or different types of failures or accident initiators are introduced by the proposed changes.

3. Not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because Seismic Instrumentation, Meteorological Instrumentation, and Reactor Coolant System Vents are not inputs in the calculation of any safety margin with regard to TS Safety Limits, Limiting Safety System Settings, other TS Limiting Conditions for Operation, or other previously defined margins for any structure, system, or component important to safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: University of Toledo Library, Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43606.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: Gail H. Marcus

Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281, Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Surry County, Virginia

Date of amendment request: July 14, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed Technical Specifications (TS) changes would provide a two-hour allowed outage time (AOT) for one residual heat removal (RHR) pump to accommodate plant safety and emergency power systems surveillance testing and permit depressurizing safety injection (SI) accumulators in lieu of accumulator isolation.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the

licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Specifically, operation of the Surry Power Station in accordance with the proposed change will not:

(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Surveillance and testing requirements are necessary to assure that RHR and interfacing systems' reliability is maintained. Existing analyses demonstrate that adequate shutdown cooling will be maintained with one train of RHR Operable and in service. Analyses also demonstrate that alternate shutdown cooling modes remain available with adequate decay heat removal capability. Furthermore, the opposite train of RHR remains available while in the two hour surveillance AOT. The response time and operator actions required to place the available RHR train in service are consistent with similar operator response times and actions

required to place alternate shutdown cooling modes in service. The administrative controls and procedures in place assure adequate shutdown cooling capability is maintained as supported by existing analyses.

The existing safety analyses demonstrate that Reactor Coolant System [RCS] integrity will be maintained when SI accumulator pressure is below the pressurizer PORV [power operated relief valve] LTOPS [low temperature overpressure system] setpoint. Therefore, SI accumulator isolation is not required to ensure Reactor Coolant System integrity. With RCS temperature below the LTOPS enabling temperature, automatic actuation of the pressurizer PORVs or other TS specified relief paths ensure the assumed design basis reactor vessel beltline flaw will not propagate under design basis low temperature overpressurization accident conditions. System design and configuration adequately mitigate an LTOPS actuation due to an SI accumulator discharge with no negative consequences regarding RCS structural integrity or SBLOCA [small break loss-of-coolant accidents] concerns.

Therefore, the proposed Allowed Outage Time for an inoperable RHR loop and the ability to depressurize the SI accumulator in lieu of SI accumulator isolation do not increase the probability or consequence of any previously analyzed accidents.

(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The proposed two hour AOT for one train of the RHR System will preclude the possibility of a Technical Specification violation for conditions where a train of RHR is out of service for surveillance testing. Calculations by Westinghouse with evaluations and supporting analyses performed by Virginia Power, confirm the adequacy of decay heat removal with one RHR train in service, and multiple alternate shutdown cooling modes remain available. There are no plant modifications required by this proposed TS change. Further, the proposed change does not invalidate any