plant modification. In addition, operation with the revised APRM flow-biased scram/control rod block setpoints and allowable values would not create any new operating modes, accident scenarios, equipment failure modes, or fission product release paths. Based upon the above information, we conclude that the proposed changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

B. Transfer of RBM Setpoint Control to the COLR

The proposed transfer of control of the RBM setpoint and allowable value to the COLR would not alter the function of the RBM system nor involve any type of plant modification. In addition, operation with the revised setpoint and allowable value would not create any new operating modes, accident scenarios, equipment failure modes, or fission product release paths. Based upon the above information, we conclude that the proposed changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

C. RCS Recirculation Flow Revisions

The proposed changes would not alter the function of the RCS recirculation flow upscale trip function nor involve any type of plant modification. In addition, operation with the revised RCS recirculation flow upscale trip setpoint and allowable value would not create any new operating modes, accident scenarios, equipment failure modes, or fission product release paths. Based upon the above information, we conclude that the proposed changes would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

A. Changes to APRM Flow-Biased Scram/Control Rod Block

The Bases for Hope Creek Technical Specification 2.2.1 state that the APRM setpoints were selected to provide adequate margin for the safety limits while allowing operating margins that reduce the possibility of unnecessary shutdowns.

The proposed changes would ensure that these objectives are met. The Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) operating limit specified in the Hope Creek COLR was determined using the APRM flow-biased scram/control rod block setpoints and allowable values proposed in this amendment application and has been chosen to ensure that the cladding safety limit would not be violated during normal plant operations and anticipated transients. Since the operating limit MCPR is chosen such that the cladding safety limit is maintained, adequate margins for the safety limits are ensured. The proposed changes would also serve to ensure that the objective of avoiding unnecessary shutdowns is met by furnishing greater margin between the operating envelope and the setpoint at lower flows.

Based on the above information, we conclude that the proposed changes would not significantly reduce a margin of safety.

B. Transfer of RBM Setpoint Control to the COLR

The proposed transfer of control of the RBM setpoint and allowable value to the COLR would not affect the methodology for establishing the core operating limits. The setpoint and allowable value are modified to incorporate a controlling value which will be included in the COLR and indicated as such by reference in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the setpoint and allowable value would continue to be controlled in a manner that would ensure that safety analysis limits are met. We conclude that implementation of the proposed changes would not significantly reduce a margin of safety.

C. RCS Recirculation Flow Revisions

The HCGS was licensed to operate up to 105% of rated core flow as part of Amendment 15. The analysis used to justify operation up to 105% of rated core flow is contained in NEDC-31487. NEDC-31487 addresses the full range of transient and accident events associated with operation up to 105% of rated core flow. The affects of operation with the revised RCS recirculation flow upscale trip setpoint and allowable value are bounded by the analysis presented in NEDC-31487.

In addition, cycle specific analysis performed for Reload 5/Cycle 6, have incorporated the assumptions of operation up to 105% of rated core flow and have confirmed that operation is within allowable design limits.

Based on the above information, we conclude that the proposed changes would not significantly reduce a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz

Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: January 11, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed Technical Specification (TS) revision provides changes to TS Section 3/4.3.8 ''Turbine Overspeed Protection System.'' The proposed revision removes these requirements from the TS and relocates the Bases to the Hope Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the Surveillance Requirements to the applicable surveillance procedures. The Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) would be eliminated.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes involve no hardware changes, no changes to existing structures, and no changes to the operation of any systems or components. Specifically, the deletion of the LCO's by this submittal will not alter established turbine overspeed protection system operation. Procedural guidance will be provided in the event of an inoperable control, stop, or intermediate valve to place the system in a safe condition. The relocation of this specification to the UFSAR and surveillance procedures will continue to ensure that the probability of unacceptable damage to safety-related structures, systems, and components from turbine missiles remains acceptably low. Relocation of this specification's Bases and Surveillance Requirements to the UFSAR and surveillance procedures, respectively, and the deletion of the LCO's represents changes that do not affect plant safety and do not alter existing accident analyses.

2. Will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The proposed changes are procedural in nature concerning the location of the descriptive information and surveillance requirements for the turbine overspeed protection system. Removing these specifications from the Technical Specifications and placing them in the UFSAR and surveillance procedures will not alter the operation of the turbine overspeed protection system or its ability to perform its intended function. Procedural guidance will be provided to assist in placing the system in a safe condition while maintenance and testing of this system will continue in accordance with the turbine manufacturers recommendations taking into consideration plant operating experience and ASME guidance. Therefore, these changes will not create a new or unevaluated accident or operating condition.

3. Will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes relocate the Turbine Overspeed Protection System portion of the Technical Specifications to the UFSAR and surveillance procedures in accordance with guidance provided by the NRC Final Policy Statement regarding the improvement of Technical Specifications. The requirements that will reside in the UFSAR for the turbine overspeed protection system will ensure that the system remains capable of protecting against excessive turbine overspeed. Therefore, the proposed changes will not involve a significant reduction in any margins of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this