Safety Injection Tank (SIT) from one hour to 24 hours. Additionally, the amendment limits power operation to 72 hours when certain SIT related instrument functions are inoperable.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1 - Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The Safety Injection Tanks (SITs) are passive components in the Emergency Core Cooling System. The SITs are not accident initiators in any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, this change does not involve an increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

SITs were designed to mitigate the consequences of Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCA). These proposed changes do not affect any of the assumptions used in deterministic LOCA analysis. Therefore, the consequences of accidents previously evaluated do not change.

In order to fully evaluate the effect of the SIT Allowable Outage Time (AOT) extension, probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) methods were utilized. The results of these analyses show no significant increase in the core damage frequency. As a result, there would be no significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. These analyses are detailed in CE NPSD-994, Combustion Engineering Owners Group ''Joint Applications Report for Safety Injection Tank AOT/STI Extension.''

The change pertaining to SIT inoperability based solely on instrumentation malfunction does not involve a significant increase in the consequences of an accident as evaluated and endorsed by the NRC in NUREG-1366, ''Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements.''

Therefore, this change does not involve an increase in the probability or a significant increase in the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2 - Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

This proposed change does not change the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3 - Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

The proposed changes do not affect the limiting conditions for operation or their bases that are used in the deterministic analyses to establish the margin of safety. PSA evaluations were used to evaluate these changes. These evaluations demonstrated that the changes are either risk neutral or risk beneficial. These evaluations are detailed in CE NPSD-994.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, Russellville, AR 72801

Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3502

NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: May 19, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment increases the allowed outage time for one train of low pressure safety injection from 72 hours to seven days.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1 - Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The low pressure safety injection system (LPSI) is part of the Emergency Core Cooling System subsystem. Inoperable LPSI components are not considered to be accident initiators. Therefore, this change does not involve an increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

The LPSI system was designed to mitigate the consequences of a large loss of coolant accident (LOCA). These proposed changes do not affect any of the assumptions used in deterministic LOCA analysis.

In order to fully evaluate the LPSI AOT extension, probabilistic safety analysis methods were utilized. The results of these analyses indicate no significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. These analyses are detailed in CE NPSD-995, Combustion Engineering Owners Group ''Joint Applications Report for Low Pressure Safety Injection System AOT Extension.''

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2 - Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

This proposed change does not change the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3 - Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

The proposed changes do not affect the technical specification limiting conditions for operation or their bases which support the deterministic analyses used to establish the margin of safety. Probabilistic evaluations used to support the requested technical specification changes have been demonstrated to be either risk neutral or risk beneficial. These evaluations are detailed in CE NPSD-995.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-3502

NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-219, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Ocean County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: June 26, 1995

Description of amendment request: The amendment revises the snubber visual inspection intervals to match the schedule developed by the NRC staff for use with a 24 month refueling interval. This schedule was documented in Generic Letter 90-09. The licensee has made wording changes not contained in Generic Letter 90-09. These changes are as follows:

a) Section 4.5.Q.1 - GL 90-09 wording ''...performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program in addition to the requirements of Section 4.0.5.''

Proposed Technical Specification wording ''...performance of the following inspection program.''

b) Section 4.5.Q.1.a - GL 90-09 wording ''...based on the criteria of Table 4.7.2 and the first inspection interval determined using the criteria shall be based upon the previous inspection interval established by the requirements in effect before Amendment (*). ''Proposed Technical Specification wording ''...based on the criteria provided in Table 4.5.1.''

c) Section 4.5.Q.1.b - GL 90-09 wording ''...All snubbers found connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be