1. The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because:

(a) The Spent Fuel Pool conditions are not indicative of accident initiators.

(b) Design and operability requirements of equipment important to safety are not affected.

(c) If only one Spent Fuel Pool cooling train is available, boiling would not occur and the Spent Fuel Pool components would remain within their design basis.

(d) The complete loss of Spent Fuel Pool cooling event has previously been analyzed and described in Supplement 6 to the Safety Evaluation Report, Appendix BB. The dose consequences for this event have been evaluated and the safety evaluation is described in Updated Safety Analysis Report Section 9.1.3.3.4. The results of the evaluation show that the Spent Fuel Pool components would remain within their design bases. Also, the dose consequences of iodine release as a result of Spent Fuel Pool boiling are significantly below the allowable dose limits of 10 CFR 100.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously because:

(a) The operability of safety-related equipment is not impacted.

(b) The probability of safety-related equipment malfunctioning is not increased.

(c) The scope of the change does not establish a potential new accident precursor.

(d) The Spent Fuel Pool design considers design basis heat loads for the modified refueling procedure which includes a fullcore offload.

(e) For the design basis case, the integrity of the Spent Fuel Pool Boraflex is not adversely impacted.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because:

(a) No fuel damage would occur as a result of the proposed change.

(b) Technical Specification operability and surveillance requirements are not reduced.

(c) The Spent Fuel Pool boiling doses would be significantly below the allowable dose limits of 10 CFR 100.

(d) The modified refueling procedure (fullcore offload) continues to have acceptable margins of safety.

(e) For the design basis case, the integrity of the Spent Fuel Pool Boraflex is not adversely impacted.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the request for amendments involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Wharton County Junior College, J. M. Hodges, Learning Center, 911 Boling Highway, Wharton, Texas 77488

Attorney for licensee: Jack R. Newman, Esq., Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., 1615 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

Illinois Power Company and Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc., Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1, DeWitt County, Illinois

Date of amendment request: June 9, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would modify Technical Specification (TS) 4.1, "Site Location," to incorporate a description of the exclusion area boundary. The proposed change is necessary to ensure the content of the TS conforms to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a) the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

(1) The proposed change does not involve a change to the plant design or operation. As a result, the proposed change does not affect any of the parameters or conditions that could contribute to the initiation of any accidents previously evaluated. In addition, the physical location of the [exclusion area boundary] EAB has not been changed; a description of its location has merely been added to the TS. Thus, the proposed change cannot increase the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

(2) The proposed change does not involve a change to the plant design or operation. As a result, the proposed change does not affect any parameter or condition that could contribute to the initiation of any accidents. Thus, the proposed change cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) The proposed change only affects regulatory controls on the accepted configuration of the EAB. The proposed change does not involve an actual change to the location of the EAB. The proposed change will restore compliance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and require prior NRC approval of any changes to the physical location of the EAB. As a result, IP has concluded that the proposed change will not result in a reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Vespasian Warner Public Library, 120 West Johnson Street, Clinton, Illinois 61727

Attorney for licensee: Leah Manning Stetzner, Vice President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary, 500 South 27th St., Decatur, Illinois 62525 NRC Project Director: Gail H. Marcus

Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket No. 50-315, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1, Berrien County, Michigan

Date of amendment request: February 3, 1995, as supplemented April 25, 1995 (AEP:NRC:1166Q and 1166R)

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would allow continued use of a steam generator (SG) tube support plate interim plugging criteria for fuel cycle 15. The change would allow SG tubes with bobbin coil eddy current indications less than or equal to 2.0 volts at tube support plate intersections to remain in service if the projected end-of-cycle distribution of crack indications is shown to result in primary-to-secondary leakage less than 12.6 gpm during a postulated steam line break (SLB). The change would also allow indications greater than 2.0 volts but less than or equal to 5.6 volts to remain in service if a motorized rotating pancake coil probe inspection does not detect degradation.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a) the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

In accordance with the three factor test of 10 CFR 50.92(c), implementation of the proposed license amendment is analyzed using the following standards and found not to 1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; 2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or 3) involve a significant reduction in margin of safety. Conformance of the proposed amendment to the standards for a determination of no significant hazards as defined in 10 CFR 50.92 (three factor test) is shown in the following paragraphs.

1) Operation of Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed license amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Testing of model boiler specimens for free span tubing (no tube support plate restraint) at room temperature conditions show burst pressures in excess of 5000 psi for indications of outer diameter stress corrosion cracking with voltage measurements as high as 19 volts. Burst testing performed on pulled tubes from Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 with up to a 2.02 volt indication shows measured burst pressure in excess of 10,000 psi at room temperature. Burst testing performed on pulled tubes from other plants with up to 7.5 volt indications show burst pressures in excess of 6,300 psi at room temperatures. Correcting for the effects of temperature on