Criterion 2 - Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

The proposed change in containment cooling response time introduces no new mode of plant operation. Containment cooling response time is an analytical input and is not considered to be the initiator of any accident condition.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3 - Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

The increase in containment cooling response time has been evaluated with respect to the accident analyses resulting in peak containment pressures. This evaluation has shown no significant increase in the resulting peak containment pressure since the overall limiting accident with respect to containment pressure is still the MSLB with off-site power available. The containment peak conditions for the LOCA and MSLB analyses remain below the original FSAR conditions of 53.4 psig and 288°F.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Therefore, based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, Entergy Operations has determined that the requested change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, Russellville, AR 72801

Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005-3502

NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

Gulf States Utilities Company, Cajun Electric Power Cooperative, and Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-458, River Bend Station, Unit 1, West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana

Date of amendment request: May 25, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment revises the Physical Security Plan vital island requirements.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a) the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

The accident mitigation features of the plant are not affected by the proposed change. This change provides an equivalent level of protection to the plant and is adequate for preventing an unacceptable risk to public health and safety. This is due to continued compliance with existing regulatory requirements, the integral defense in depth design of the security program, including programs in place to minimize the threat of insiders, and historically high system reliability. The SBO (Station Blackout diesel) is designed with sufficient capacity to accommodate station blackout needs as well as those required for security. Ample protection against a design basis security threat continues to be provided. Therefore, this change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The Station Blackout diesel generator has been approved and accepted by the Staff pursuant 10CFR50.63. New systems, modes of equipment operation, failure modes, or other plant perturbations are not introduced by this change. The change provides an equivalent level of protection, does not decrease the effectiveness of the overall security program and is adequate for preventing an unacceptable risk to public health and safety. Ample protection against a design basis security threat continues to be provided with overall physical protection of the plant maintained. Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

This change does not change a safety limit, an LCO (Limiting Condition of Operation), or a surveillance requirement on equipment required to operate the plant. It is equivalent in level of protection, does not decrease the effectiveness of the security program and is adequate for preventing an unacceptable risk to public health and safety. The SBO diesel generator will provide an adequate alternative source of power to security systems. Ample protection against a design basis security threat continues to be provided. Therefore, this change does not involve a reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Government Documents Department, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803

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NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

Houston Lighting & Power Company, City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company, City of Austin, Texas, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas

Date of amendment request: May 22, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 4.8.1.1.2.e.7 to allow the performance of the 24-hour surveillance test of the diesel generators during power operation.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a) the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed change to permit the 24 hour surveillance test of the diesels to be performed during power operation does not increase the chances for a previously analyzed accident to occur. The function of the diesels is to supply emergency power in the event of a loss of offsite power. Operation of the diesels is not a precursor to any accident. Furthermore, the diesel generator being tested will remain operable and will be available to supply emergency loads within the required time. In addition, the two remaining diesel generators will be operable during the test. Consequently, if an offsite disturbance were to occur that affected the operability of the diesel being tested, the two remaining diesels would be capable of feeding the loads necessary for safe shutdown of the plant. This addresses the concerns raised in Information Notice 84-69 regarding the operation of emergency diesel generators connected in parallel with offsite power. In summary, the proposed changes do not adversely affect the performance or the ability of the diesel generators to perform their intended function.

Therefore, the proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment to the 24 hour surveillance test will not affect the operation of any safety system or alter its response to any previously analyzed accident. The diesel will automatically transfer from the test mode if necessary to supply emergency loads in the required time. The test mode is used for the monthly surveillance of the diesel generators as well, therefore, no new plant operating modes are introduced. In the event the diesel fails the surveillance test, it will be declared inoperable and the actions