exposure to radiation and potential heat stress. These inspections are to verify that no debris that might be transported to the containment sump is left behind at the conclusion of the entry. Typically, containment entries above cold shutdown are for specific purposes and involve a limited area of containment. The expectation for job performance at ANO-2 is that a job site is left cleaner than found. The inspection serves as a verification that any materials taken into the containment building which might foul the sump screens have been removed or have been properly anchored. Performing this inspection on a daily frequency will not result in changing the work practices at ANO-2, therefore the amount of debris generated or left in containment should not increase. The daily inspection will be sufficient verification that conditions in containment are not degrading; therefore, there will be no significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2 - Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

Because the proposed amendment will not change the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3 - Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

There will be no adverse effects on margins of safety since materials that are considered acceptable to remain in containment has not changed. By reducing the number of inspections, no mechanism has been created that will generate more debris in containment nor have work practices been altered to allow less stringent controls over what is taken in or left in containment. Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, Russellville, AR 72801

Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005-3502

NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: April 4, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment deletes requirements associated with part length control element assemblies. During the upcoming refueling outage all part length control assemblies will be removed from the reactor.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a) the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1 - Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The proposed changes maintain conservative restrictions on the operation of those control element assemblies (CEAs) formerly specified as part length CEAs (PLCEAs) and are considered to be administrative in nature. The Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 (ANO-2) Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Chapter 15 accident analyses identify four families of analyses associated with the CEAs. Each of these analyses is evaluated in the development of the Reload Report for each fuel cycle, and the appropriate limitations to insure acceptable analysis results are incorporated in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) for the fuel cycle. The modification replacing the PLCEAs with full length CEAs will be evaluated under the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) 10CFR50.59 process prior to implementation. The Reload Report and changes to the COLR are also evaluated under the ANO 10CFR50.59 process prior to incorporating the identified changes. Movement of the PLCEAs during power operation has typically resulted in more dropped CEAs than movement of the full length CEAs due to the greater weight of the PLCEAs. Replacement of the PLCEAs with full length CEAs should result in a reduction in the probability of a dropped CEA.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2 - Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

The proposed changes introduce no new mode of plant operation and are considered to be administrative in nature. Operating experience has shown that the full length CEAs are capable of controlling the axial power distribution function intended for the PLCEAs. The PLCEAs will be replaced with the same type of full length CEAs used in shutdown and regulating CEA groups.

Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3 - Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin Safety.

The proposed changes may improve overall safety margins. Replacement of the PLCEAs with full length CEAs and including these Group P CEAs in the CEA drop time testing will allow ANO-2 to credit these CEAs in the shutdown margin calculations. This should result in an increase in the available shutdown margin during reactor operation.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, Russellville, AR 72801

Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20005-3502

NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket No. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 2, Pope County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: April 4, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment revises the containment cooling response time to reduce the likelihood of a water hammer event in service water piping.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a) the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1 - Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The containment cooling system and the service water system are not considered to be accident initiators for any analyzed accident. The containment cooling system functions to mitigate the effects of a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) or Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) on the containment environment. The proposed change does not affect the limiting MSLB analysis as the proposed increase in containment cooling response time is only instituted on a loss of off-site power. The limiting LOCA analysis has been evaluated with respect to the proposed containment cooling response time. Although the analysis shows an increase in the containment peak pressure (approximately 0.1 psig), this increase in the peak containment pressure is not considered significant since the MSLB accident with offsite power available is still the overall limiting accident condition with respect to containment peak pressure. The containment peak conditions for the LOCA and MSLB analyses remain below the original Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) conditions of 53.4 psig and 288°F.

Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase int he probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.