North Street, Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360.

Attorney for licensee: W. S. Stowe, Esquire, Boston Edison Company, 800 Boylston Street, 36th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02199.

NRC Project Director: Walter R. Butler.

Boston Edison Company, Docket No. 50–293, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Plymouth County, Massachusetts

Date of amendment request: November 22, 1994

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the suppression chamber water level operating range, increasing it 2 inches, and revise the water level recorder range.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The operation of Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously identified.

The probability of an accident is not increased by this proposed change because there is no relation between the Suppression Chamber water level operating range and the probability of an accident.

The consequences of an accident identified are not increased. The Suppression Chamber is an accident mitigating device. Increasing the water level operating range has been analyzed and does not significantly increase the structural loads and the calculated stress levels remain within Mark 1 Acceptance Criteria.

We have reviewed the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report] Containment Analyses and concluded that the safety margin is not affected. An increase in water level enhances the Suppression Pool's ability to mitigate an accident by providing more water for use by emergency cooling systems. The higher water level increases the sink capabilities resulting in lower torus water temperatures from steam blowdowns. There is a minor reduction in the free air volume of the torus which has a negligible effect on containment post accident pressures. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously identified.

The change in water level recorder range does not involve an increase in the probability or consequence of an accident because the new recording range accounts for instrument loop uncertainties and is thus more conservative than the previous range.

2. The operation of Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

An increase in the Suppression Chamber water level operating range does not create a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed because the Suppression Chamber is an accident mitigating device. The Suppression Chamber serves as the heat sink for any postulated transient or accident condition when the primary heat sink (main condenser) is unavailable and as a source of water for the Core Standby Cooling Systems. The structural affects of the increase in water volume have been analyzed and do not significantly effect the Mark 1 containment loads.

Revising the water level recording range is more conservative than that previously used and does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

3. The operation of Pilgrim Station in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Operation with an increased Torus water level does not affect the structure and attached piping of the Pilgrim Suppression Chamber and does not significantly affect the calculated stress levels; therefore, there is no significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The change in the water level recording range is due to replacing the transmitter with a smaller span. The change from 0 to 32 inches to -7 to +7 inches enhances resolution and accuracy of the water level instrument loop.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Plymouth Public Library, 11 North Street, Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360.

Attorney for licensee: W. S. Stowe, Esquire, Boston Edison Company, 800 Boylston Street, 36th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02199.

NRC Project Director: Walter R. Butler.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50–313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1, Pope County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: August 30, 1994.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment relocates refueling cycle specific parameters from the technical specifications to the Core Operating Limits Report as per recommendations promulgated by NRC Generic Letter 88–16. Additionally, the amendment adds a 24 hour limit on operations when only one reactor coolant pump is operating in each loop. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1—Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The relocation of cycle-specific variables from the Technical Specifications to the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) is considered to be administrative in nature and has no impact on plant operation or safety. The Technical Specifications will continue to require operation within the core operational limits for each cycle reload as calculated by the NRC approved reload methodologies. The values and setpoints placed in the COLR are addressed in the reload report for each particular fuel cycle. The reload report presents the results of evaluations of accidents addressed in the ANO-1 Safety Analysis Report. These evaluations demonstrate that changes in the fuel cycle design and the corresponding COLR do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The revision of Specification 3.1.1.1.a and addition of the footnote to Table 2.3–1 result in additional restrictions on operation with one reactor coolant pump in each loop with the reactor critical. This more restrictive specification limits operation with one reactor coolant pump in each loop to a 24 hour period when the reactor is critical. This change incorporates a more restrictive control and does not affect any previously analyzed event.

Therefore, this change does *not* involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously.

Criterion 2—Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

This relocation of cycle-specific variables from the Technical Specifications to the COLR does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The cycle-specific variables will continue to be calculated using NRC approved methodologies. Technical Specifications will continue to require operation within the required core operating limits and appropriate actions will be taken if the limits are exceeded. Because plant operation continues to be limited in accordance with the values of cycle-specific parameter limits that are established using NRC approved methodologies, the relocations included in this submittal are considered to be administrative in nature and have no impact on plant safety as a consequence.

The revision of Specification 3.1.1.1.a and addition of the footnote to Table 2.3–1 result in additional restrictions on operation with one reactor coolant pump in each loop with the reactor critical. This more restrictive specification limits operation with one reactor coolant pump in each loop to a 24 hour period when the reactor is critical. This proposed change introduces no new mode of plant operation.

Therefore, this change does *not* create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.