geographically adjacent BTAs and/or in several regions of the country will be able to make more informed bidding decisions in a simultaneous auction where all BTA service areas may be bid upon at the same time.

73. In addition to issues of cost and interdependence, other considerations support the use of simultaneous multiple round bidding for MDS. Compared with other bidding mechanisms, including open outcry and sealed bidding, simultaneous multiple round bidding will generate the most information about the value of BTA service areas during the course of the auction. Thus, it is the most likely auction method to award BTA authorizations to the bidders who value them most highly. We also note that an auction method awarding BTA authorizations to the parties who value them most highly should result in the award of authorizations to bona fide wireless cable operators, rather than to speculators, because bona fide operators will likely value authorizations more highly than, and will therefore outbid, speculators, who may be reluctant to pay up front the amounts necessary to obtain authorizations through competitive bidding.38 Moreover, given the uncertainty as to the value of the MDS spectrum, the information generated by simultaneous multiple round bidding should prove particularly valuable by giving bidders more flexibility to pursue back-up strategies. Because of the superior information and flexibility it provides, this auction method should also yield more revenue for the MDS spectrum than other auction designs, including open outcry.39 Although the raising of revenue is not our dominant concern, we note that Congress directed the Commission, in designing auction methodologies, to promote "recovery for the public of a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource." 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)(C). Finally, the employment of simultaneous multiple round bidding for MDS, rather than

open outcry, will eliminate the need for the Commission to select the order in which the BTA service areas will be auctioned. See Second Report and Order at 2360, 2363, 2366.

74. The simultaneous multiple round auction design adopted herein also includes several features that should reduce the possible burdens on bidders. We expect, for example, to have bidding rounds of shorter duration than in other simultaneous multiple round auctions, such as broadband PCS. This measure should shorten the MDS auction substantially so that the length of the auction should not prove burdensome to bidders. In addition, the burden on bidders will be reduced by the variety of methods through which they may participate in the MDS simultaneous multiple round auction. Bidders will be able to submit bids on site, via personal computers using remote bidding software, or via telephone; 40 however, given the space limitations for on site bidding and the uncertainty as to the exact number of prospective bidders, the Commission reserves the right to have only remote bidding—by personal computer and by telephone—for the MDS auction. Thus, the expense to the bidders of participating in a simultaneous multiple round auction should be less than in an open outcry auction, where bidders (and/or their representative(s)) would need to travel to and remain in Washington, DC for the duration of the auction. Finally, the Commission will hold a seminar for prospective bidders to acquaint them with this bidding design and all alternative bid submission methods.

75. Given the numerous advantages of the generally preferred auction method of simultaneous multiple round bidding, we believe that this methodology will best serve for conducting MDS auctions. We note, however, that the presence of incumbents in the BTA service areas could affect the relative desirability and value of BTA authorizations in ways we do not anticipate. In the event that the filings of short-form applications indicate that the BTA authorizations have relatively little interdependence and lower than expected value, we delegate authority to the Mass Media Bureau and the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to

reconsider the issue of whether another auction design would be more appropriate.

76. MDS Bidding Procedures. There will be one authorization offered in each BTA and the BTA authorizations will be awarded by simultaneous multiple round bidding. All BTA service areas will be auctioned at the same time. Bids will be accepted at the same time on all BTA service areas in each round of the auction. High bid amounts will be posted after the end of the bid submission period in each round of bidding. With modifications to take account of the unique characteristics of MDS and to reduce length, MDS auctions will follow the general bidding procedures we have used to date to conduct the narrowband and broadband PCS auctions.

77. In using simultaneous multiple round bidding to award the BTA authorizations, it is important to specify minimum bid increments. The bid increment is the amount or percentage by which the bid must be raised above the previous round's high bid in order to be accepted as a valid bid in the current bidding round. The application of a minimum bid increment speeds the progress of the auction and, along with activity and stopping rules, helps to ensure that the auction comes to closure within a reasonable period of time. Establishing an appropriate minimum bid increment is especially important in a simultaneous auction with a simultaneous stopping rule. In that case, all markets will remain open until there is no bidding on any market, and a delay in closing the bidding on one market will delay the closing of all markets. Second Report and Order at 2369.

78. Because we plan to use simultaneous multiple round bidding with a simultaneous stopping rule to award BTA authorizations, we believe that it is necessary to impose a minimum bid increment to ensure that the MDS auction conclude within a reasonable period of time. As we recognized in the Second Report and Order, it is important to establish the amount of the minimum bid increment as the greater of a percentage and fixed dollar amount. This will ensure a timely completion of the auction even if bidding begins at a very low dollar amount. Id. at 2369. Accordingly, we will impose a minimum bid increment of some percentage of the high bid from the previous round or a fixed dollar amount, whichever is greater, in MDS auctions where simultaneous multiple round bidding is used. We will announce by public notice prior to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Sealed bidding is not supported by the Commission for MDS, because this bidding method will generate no information about the value of the BTA service areas during the course of an auction, and thus may not award BTA authorizations to the parties who value them the most. See Second Report and Order at 2362.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> A simultaneous auction for MDS will tend to raise more revenue than a sequential oral auction for two reasons. First, it will increase the value of the BTA service areas by facilitating efficient aggregation. Second, because it will provide more information about the value of the BTA service areas, it will reduce the propensity of sophisticated bidders to bid cautiously to avoid the "winner's curse"—the tendency for the winner to be the bidder who most overestimates the value of the item up for bid.

<sup>40</sup> Telephonic bidding should, in particular, be a simple and inexpensive method for bidders to submit bids. If submitting bids by telephone, bidders may utilize the Internet to learn of the round-by-round results of the auction; on-line services such as Compuserve provide Internet access at low cost. Bidders may also, at negligible cost, utilize a bulletin board service, accessible by long distance telephone, from which auction results can be downloaded to a personal computer.