

refueling and inspection outage in September of this year.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

With the prior deletion of the steam condensing mode of RHR and the isolation of the high and low pressure interfaces, the three pressure relief valves that are being removed from the plant have no active function. Their passive function of maintaining system or containment integrity will be fulfilled by blind flanges on equivalent. Also, the RHR and RCIC piping are provided with overpressure protection from other pressure relief valves. Therefore, the removal of these pressure relief valves does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The pressure relief valves that are being removed had two primary functions. First, they provided overpressure protection for the RHR and RCIC piping during the steam condensing mode of RHR. Since the steam condensing mode has been deleted from the plant, these valves no longer have that function. Also, overpressure protection of the RHR and RCIC piping is provided by other existing pressure relief valves. Second, these valves maintained system or containment integrity. When the pressure relief valves are removed from the plant, they will be replaced with blind flanges or equivalent that will maintain system or containment integrity. Therefore, the removal of the three pressure relief valves does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Since the steam condensing mode of RHR has been eliminated, the three pressure relief valves have no active function. Their passive function of maintaining system or containment integrity will be fulfilled by blind flanges or equivalent. Also, overpressure protection of RHR and RCIC piping is provided by other existing pressure relief valves. Therefore, the removal of the three pressure relief valves does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Osterhout Free Library,

Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701.

Attorney for licensee: Jay Silberg, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Philadelphia Electric Company, Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353, Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania

Date of amendment request: May 19, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed Technical Specifications (TS) change would revise TS Table 3.3.3-3, "Emergency Core Cooling System Response Times" to reflect the value of 60 seconds for the High Pressure Coolant Injection system response time instead of 30 seconds as currently specified.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed Technical Specifications (TS) change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed TS change will increase the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system response time from 30 seconds to 60 seconds. The proposed TS change does not involve any physical change in the plant configuration which may cause an accident, or affect safety-related equipment performance or cause its failure. There is no increase in the consequences of an accident, because the HPCI response time increase does not affect the licensing basis Peak Cladding Temperature (PCT), which remains below the regulatory limit of 2200 °F.

The Loss of Feedwater Flow (LOFW) event was evaluated for being potentially affected by the increased HPCI system response time. The HPCI system is one of the systems which provides reactor vessel water makeup inventory, and is initiated automatically on a low reactor water level (Level 2) signal. The LOFW analysis shows that Level 1 is not reached and that the top of the active fuel will remain covered throughout the event. Therefore, adequate core cooling will be maintained and no fuel damage will result. The probability of fuel failure will not be increased by this proposed TS change.

Therefore, the proposed TS change does not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed TS change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed TS change will increase the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)

system response time from 30 seconds to 60 seconds. This proposed change is bounded by the current Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)—Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis for Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Units 1 and 2. The change in HPCI system response time does not involve any physical modifications to the plant systems or equipment, nor does it introduce a new operational/failure mode, which might cause a different type of accident. In case of a Loss of Feedwater Flow (LOFW) event, the HPCI system will operate as designed, maintaining adequate core cooling.

Therefore, the proposed TS change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident, from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed TS change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The following TS Bases were reviewed for potential reduction in the margin of safety:

3/4.5 Emergency Core Cooling System
2.1.4 Reactor Vessel Water Level

The TS Bases do not discuss the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system start time. The margin of safety, as defined in the TS Bases, will remain the same. The proposed TS change is in accordance with the current licensing basis Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)—Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis for LGS Units 1 and 2, and does not impact any safety limits of the plant. The HPCI system will operate as designed during the LOFW event, maintaining adequate core cooling.

Therefore, the proposed TS change does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Pottstown Public Library, 500 High Street, Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464.

Attorney for licensee: J. W. Durham, Sr., Esquire, Sr. V.P. and General Counsel, Philadelphia Electric Company, 2301 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101.

NRC Project Director: John F. Stolz.

Notice of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the