

at power uprate conditions. System performance will be confirmed during the initial power ascension to uprated conditions (and periodically thereafter per the Technical Specifications). Therefore, there is no significant decrease in the margin of safety.

J. Bases Changes

Several changes to the Hatch Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications Bases are proposed for consistency with the power uprate safety analyses. These proposed changes are in addition to the Bases changes corresponding to proposed changes A through I.

i. The main steam line flow differential pressure setpoints, as shown in Bases Section B 3.3.6.1.c, and the HPCI/RCIC high flow differential pressure setpoints (Units 1 and 2 Bases Sections B 3.3.6.3.a and B 3.3.6.4.a) are changed.

The allowable values (in percent of rated) will not change for power uprate operation. However, the actual differential pressure will change due to the increase in steam flow and pressure.

ii. The HPCI and RCIC upper design pressure in Units 1 and 2 Bases Sections B 3.5.1 and B 3.5.3, respectively, is increased 34 psi.

The Bases changes support the design of these high pressure systems to pump rated flow from approximately 150 psig up to a pressure associated with the first group of SRV setpoints. This proposed design pressure conservatively considers the 30 psi higher nominal setpoints and 3 percent setpoint drift. The capability of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems to deliver design flows at these pressures was reviewed by GE and is discussed in Reference 2.

iii. The peak post accident containment pressure (P_a) is changed to 49.6 psig (Unit 1) and 45.5 psig (Unit 2). These values appear in Units 1 and 2 Bases Sections B 3.6.1.1, B 3.6.1.2, and B 3.6.1.4.

Section 4.1.1.3 of NEDC-32405P discusses the peak short-term containment pressure response which was recalculated for power uprate conditions. Containment pressure and temperatures remain below design limits and are essentially unchanged.

iv. The main condenser offgas gross gamma activity rate limit of 240 mci/second will not be changed for power uprate. A statement that the current limit is conservative for power uprate conditions was added to Units 1 and 2 Bases Section 3.7.6.

The Bases derive the current 240 mci/second limit using a rated core thermal power limit of 2436 MWt. A slightly higher limit could be justified using the uprated power level. However, adequate margin exists within the current limit.

v. The inservice hydrostatic and leak testing pressures shown in Units 1 and 2 Bases Section 3.10.1 are increased 33 psi and 30 psi, respectively.

This change is a direct result of the 30 psi increase in normal operating pressure proposed for power uprate. The leakage test is normally performed at operating pressure and the hydrostatic test at approximately 110 percent of operating pressure.

The above Bases changes i-v were evaluated, and there is no significant decrease in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket No. 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Appling County, Georgia

Date of amendment request: April 14, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to revise Plant Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS) to eliminate selected response time testing requirements from the TS. Specifically, the response time testing to be eliminated includes sensors and specified loop instrumentation for: (1) the Reactor Protection System, (2) the Isolation System, and (3) the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). The deletion of instrumentation from the ECCS response time testing necessitates moving the remaining portion of the test to the ECCS system TS. In addition, the Note for Surveillance Requirement 3.3.6.1.7, which reads: "Radiation detectors may be excluded," is being removed since response time testing is not required for any radiation detector that provides a primary containment isolation signal as indicated in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

Proposed TS Changes 1, 2, and 3 are supported by an analysis performed by the BWR Owners' Group (BWROG), with the licensee's participation. The analysis was submitted to the NRC for approval as Topical Report NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group, January 1994. The NRC approved the Topical Report by a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) issued on December 28, 1994, "Evaluation of Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group Topical Report NEDO-32291, System Analyses for the Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements." The BWROG analysis demonstrates that other

periodic tests required by TS, such as channel calibrations, channel checks, channel functional tests, and logic system functional tests, ensure that instrument response times are within acceptable limits. The applicability of the referenced analysis to Plant Hatch has been verified. Proposed Change 4 removes an unnecessary note, since no functions subject to this surveillance include radiation monitors.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

Basis for Proposed Changes 1, 2, and 3

1. The changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The purpose of the proposed changes is to eliminate response time testing requirements for selected instrumentation in the RPS [Reactor Protection System], Isolation System, and ECCS. However, because of the continued application of other existing Technical Specifications requirements, such as channel calibrations, channel checks, channel functional tests, and logic system functional tests, the response time of these systems will be maintained within the acceptance limits assumed in plant safety analyses. This will assure successful mitigation of an initiating event. The proposed Technical Specifications changes do not affect the capability of the associated systems to perform their intended function within their required response time.

The BWR Owners' Group (BWROG) has documented an evaluation in NEDO-32291, "System Analyses for Elimination of Selected Response Time Testing Requirements," which was submitted to the NRC for review and approval as a Topical Report in January 1994 and subsequently approved by an NRC SER in December 1994. This evaluation demonstrates that response time testing is redundant to the other Technical Specifications requirements listed in the preceding paragraph. These other tests are sufficient to identify failure modes or degradation in instrument response time and ensure operation of the associated systems within acceptance limits. There are no known failure modes that can be detected by response time testing that cannot also be detected by the other Technical Specifications tests.

2. The proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed. As discussed above, the proposed Technical Specifications changes do not affect the capability of the associated systems to perform their intended function within the acceptance limits assumed in plant safety analyses.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The current Technical Specifications response times are based on the maximum allowable values assumed in the plant safety