sleeving criteria. The probability of detection and identification of tubes which should be removed from service is maintained or improved by the S/N disposition strategy. The likelihood of adverse effects from plugging sound tubes is reduced. The operation of the OTSG or related structures, systems or components is otherwise unaffected.

The proposed change will not involve a significant reduction to any margin of safety.

The margins of safety defined in RG 1.121, including the required pressure used in the structural analysis, are retained. The probability of detecting degradation is unchanged since bobbin coil methods will continue to be the primary means of initial detection. The probability of leakage remains acceptably small. The proposed S/N disposition strategy is an enhancement to the inservice inspection of OTSG tubing that will provide a higher level of confidence that tubes exceeding the allowable limits are repaired while sound tubes are left in service. Based upon results of the various growth rate studies, the probability of an accident at the end of cycle is essentially the same as the beginning.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Coastal Region Library, 8619 W. Crystal Street, Crystal River, Florida 32629.

Attorney for licensee: A. H. Stephens, General Counsel, Florida Power Corporation, MAC–A5D, P. O. Box

14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733. *NRC Project Director:* David B. Matthews.

Florida Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50–250 and 50–251, Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4, Dade County, Florida

*Date of amendment request:* June 19, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to change Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications (TS) by separation of the 24-hour emergency diesel generator (EDG) run and hot restart EDG test from the loss-of-offsite-power load acceptance test. The licensee revised the original amendment request dated March 30, 1995, by letters dated May 5, 1995, and June 19, 1995.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which was previously presented in the **Federal Register** (60 FR 27339, May 23, 1995). The licensee concluded that the proposed license amendments' revisions do not alter the original conclusion that no significant hazards considerations exist pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request and its revisions involve no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199.

Attorney for licensee: J.R. Newman, Esquire, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036.

*NRC Project Director:* David B. Matthews.

Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50–321 and 50– 366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Appling County, Georgia

*Date of amendment request:* January 13, 1995, as supplemented by letters dated April 5 and June 20, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would change the Facility Operating Licenses and their corresponding Appendices A which contain the Technical Specifications (TS) to permit the implementation of the power uprate program at the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The Hatch units are currently licensed for operation at 2436 megawatts thermal (MWt). The proposed changes would redefine the rated thermal power to 2558 MWt, which represents an increase of 5% over the current licensed level in accordance with the generic boiling water reactor (BWR) power uprate program established by the General Electric Company (GE) and approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff in a letter from W. T. Russell, NRC, to P. W. Marriott, GE, dated September 30, 1991. Implementation of the proposed power uprate at Plant Hatch will result in an increase of steam flow to approximately 106% of the current value but will require no changes to the basic fuel design. Implementation of this proposed power uprate will require minor modifications, such as resetting the safety relief setpoints, as well as the calibration of plant instrumentation to reflect the uprated power. Plant operating, emergency, and other procedure changes will be made where necessary to support uprated operation.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

1. Will the changes involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

A. Rated Thermal Power is increased to 2558 MWt on page 3 of the Unit 1 Operating License, page 4 of the Unit 2 Operating License, and in Section 1.1 (Definitions) of the Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications.

## Evaluation

The changes in the Operating Licenses and Technical Specifications were evaluated and it was determined that the probability (frequency of occurrence) of design basis accidents occurring is not affected by the increased power level, as the regulatory criteria established for plant equipment (e.g., ASME Code, IEEE standards, NEMA standards, Regulatory Guide criteria) will still be complied with at the uprated power level. Scram setpoints (equipment settings that initiate automatic plant shutdowns) will be established such that there is no significant increase in scram frequency due to uprate. No new challenges to safety-related equipment will result from power uprate.

The changes in consequences of hypothetical accidents which would occur from 102% of the uprated power, compared to those previously evaluated, are in all cases insignificant, because the power uprate accident evaluations will not result in exceeding any NRC-approved acceptance limits. Enclosure 4 of Reference 1, General Electric Report NEDC-32405P, "Power Uprate Safety Analysis for Edwin I. Hatch Plant Units 1 and 2," December 1994, investigated the spectrum of hypothetical accidents and transients, and showed the plant's current regulatory criteria are satisfied at power uprate. For example, in the area of core design, the fuel operating limits will still be met at the uprated power level, and fuel reload analyses will show plant transients meet the criteria accepted by the NRC as specified in NEDO-24011, "GESTAR II." Challenges to fuel or emergency core cooling system (ECCS) performance were evaluated (Section 4.2 of NEDC-32405P) and shown to still meet the criteria of 10 [CFR] 50.46 and Appendix K. Challenges to the containment were evaluated (Section 4.1 of NEDC-32405P) and shown to still meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, Criterion 38, Long Term Cooling, and Criterion 50, Containment. Radiological release events were evaluated (Section 9.2 of NEDC-32405P) and shown to meet the criteria of 10 CFR 100 (Unit 1 FSAR Chapter 14 and Unit 2 FSAR Chapter 15).

The results of the analyses discussed above demonstrate that operation at the power uprate level does not significantly increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

B. The surveillance test discharge pressure for the standby liquid control pump at 41.2 gpm is increased from 1190 psig to 1201 psig. This value appears in Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.1.7.7 and the