As explained in NUREG–1366, ''Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements,'' the present surveillance test frequency requirements were developed for fossil units and carried over to nuclear units due to the similarity in design. However, the particulate concentration, phosphate chemistry and higher steam temperatures present in earlier fossil secondary systems, which were major contributing factors to problems identified by these tests, are not present in the Arkansas Nuclear One-Unit 2 (ANO–2) secondary systems. The operating history of turbine valves at ANO–2 is very good, with no failures identified during the performance of overspeed protection system surveillance testing. Therefore, that change does not involve a significant increase in the probability of any accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, this change does *not* involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2—Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

Because the proposed changes do not alter the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant, they do *not* create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3—Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

These proposed changes do not alter the acceptance of any surveillance requirements, alter any assumptions used in accident analysis, change any actuation setpoints, nor allow operations in any configuration not previously evaluated. This change in surveillance frequency is based on an operating history of the turbine overspeed protection system which indicates that reducing the test frequency will have no adverse impact on the continued safe operation of the unit.

Therefore, this change does *not* involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, Russellville, AR 72801

Attorney for licensee: Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esquire, Winston and Strawn, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005–3502.

NRC Project Director: William D. Beckner.

Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50–302, Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit No. 3, Citrus County, Florida

Date of amendment request: May 31, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Crystal River Unit 3 to facilitate a 24 month operating cycle by changing the surveillance interval for appropriate TS surveillance requirements that are generally performed during a refueling outage. Additionally, the functional description and the ''Allowable Value'' for three Reactor Protection System and one Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control System setpoints would be revised. The quantitative limits for determining the operational status of the reactor coolant pumps, the main feedwater pumps, and the main turbine would be relocated from the TS to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The surveillance associated with the high radiation setpoint for control room isolation would also be changed to reflect that the setpoint is an ''approximate value'' instead of an ''Allowable value''. The current specified surveillance interval for some equipment and systems which were not re-evaluated or which could not be justified by the evaluation process would not be changed.

Specifically:

1. TS Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.3.1.6, SR 3.3.5.3, SR 3.3.6.1, SR 3.3.9.2, SR 3.3.10.2, SR 3.3.11.3, SR 3.3.17.2, SR 3.3.18.2, and SR 3.9.2.2 would be revised to extend the surveillance frequency from 18 to 24 months. Also, in TS SR 3.3.17.2 a note would be added indicating the frequency for Function 12 is 18 months.

2. In TS Table 3.3.1–1,

(a) the Function for ''Reactor Coolant Pump Power Monitor (RCPPM)'' would be changed to ''Reactor Coolant Pumps,'' and the ''Allowable Value'' column for this function would be revised to delete the quantitative value and to indicate ''More than one pump tripped'',

(b) the Function for ''Main Turbine Trip (Control Oil Pressure)'' would be changed to ''Main Turbine,'' and the Allowable Value is changed to ''Turbine Tripped'' and

(c) the Function for ''Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps (Control Oil Pressure)'' would be changed to ''Main Feedwater Pumps,'' and the Allowable Value is changed to ''Both Pumps Tripped''

3. In TS Table 3.3.11–1, Function 1.a would be changed from ''EFW Initiation—Loss of MFW Pumps (Control Oil Pressure)'' to ''EFW Initiation—Main Feedwater Pumps,'' and the Allowable Value is changed to ''Both Pumps Tripped.''

4. In TS SR 3.3.16.3, the CHANNEL CALIBRATION setpoint would be changed from an allowable value to an approximate setpoint.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed amendment extends the interval between successive refueling outage based surveillances to once every 24 months for those surveillances evaluated herein and, maintains the existing surveillance interval restriction for those systems and equipment not evaluated for extension. The reliability of systems and components relied upon to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents previously evaluated is not degraded beyond that obtained from the currently defined refueling outage interval. Assurance of system and equipment availability is maintained. This change does not involve any change to system or equipment configuration. Therefore, this change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The proposed amendment extends the interval between successive refueling outage based surveillances to once every 24 months for those surveillances evaluated herein and maintains the existing surveillance interval restriction for those systems and equipment not evaluated for extension. This change does not involve any change to system or equipment configuration. Therefore, this change is unrelated to the possibility of creating a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed amendment extends the interval between successive refueling outage based surveillances to once every 24 months for the surveillances evaluated herein, and maintains the existing surveillance interval restriction for those systems and equipment not evaluated for extension. The reliability of systems and components is not degraded beyond that obtained from the currently defined refueling outage interval. Assurance of system and equipment availability is maintained.

Therefore, it is concluded that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed extension of the refueling outage interval surveillances to once every 24 months does not degrade the reliability of systems and components beyond that obtained from the currently defined refueling outage interval.