leakage. Tube rupture as a result of indications below the F\* distance is precluded because the tubesheet prevents outward expansion of the tube in response to internal pressure.

The relationship between the tubesheet region leak rate at the most limiting postulated accident conditions relative to that for normal plant operating conditions has been assessed. For the postulated leak source within the roll expansion, increasing the differential pressure on the tube on the tube wall increases the driving head for the leak; however, it also increases the tube to tubesheet loading.

For a leak source below the F\* Distance, the maximum assumed pressure differential results in an insignificant leak rate relative to that which could be associated with normal plant operation. This is a result of the increased tube to tubesheet loading associated with the increased differential pressure. Thus for a circumferential indication within the roll expansion that is left in service in accordance with F\* criteria, any leakage under accident conditions would be less than that experienced under normal operating conditions. Therefore, any leakage under accident conditions would be less than the existing Technical Specification leakage limit, which is consistent with accident analysis assumptions. Steam generator tube integrity must be maintained under the postulated loss of coolant accident condition of secondary-to-primary differential pressure. Based on tube collapse strength characteristics, the constraint provided to the tube by the tubesheet gives a margin between the tube collapse strength and the limiting secondary-to-primary differential pressure condition, even in the presence of circumferential or axial indications. The maximum secondary to primary differential pressure during a postulated LOCA is 1005 psi. This value is significantly below the residual preload between the tubes and the tube sheet. Therefore, no significant secondary to primary leakage would be expected to occur.

In addition, the proposed changes will not affect the ability to safely shut down the operating unit and mitigate the consequences of an accident because the proposed changes will not necessitate changes to the emergency procedures governing accident conditions or plant recovery.

Administrative and typographical changes are proposed to correct previous grammatical errors, to eliminate a parenthetical note that could cause confusion when applying the proposed requirements, and to make the terminology used in the Bases section consistent with the definitions provided in Specification 4.3.1. Those proposed changes will not increase the probability of occurrence or consequence of any accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications do not involve the addition of any new or different types of safety related equipment nor do they involve the operation of any equipment required for safe operation

of the facility in a manner different from those addressed in the UFSAR. No safety related equipment or function will be altered as a result of the proposed changes. Also, the procedures governing normal plant operation and recovery from an accident are not changed by the application of the F\* criteria. The F\* criteria will allow the use of an alternate method to plugging or sleeving to repair steam generator tubes with degradation in the tubesheet region. The F\* criteria ensure that both the structural integrity and leak tight nature of the steam generator tube will be equivalent to the original tube. Since no new failure modes or mechanisms are introduced by the proposed changes, no new or different type of accident is created.

Administrative and typographical changes are proposed to correct previous grammatical errors, to eliminate a parenthetical note that could cause confusion when applying the proposed requirements, and to make the terminology used in the Bases section consistent with the definitions provided in Specification 4.3.1. Those proposed changes will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.

3. The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Plant safety margins are established through Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), limiting safety system settings, and safety limits specified in Technical Specifications. There will be no changes to the LCOs, limiting safety system settings, or the safety limits as a result of the proposed changes. Application of the F\* criteria will allow degraded steam generator tubes to be repaired by an alternative method to plugging or sleeving. Steam generator tube plugging decreases the total primary reactor coolant flow rate and heat transfer capability of the steam generator. While steam generator tube sleeving only slightly reduces the reactor coolant flow rate, large numbers of sleeves can have a measurable effect on flow rate and can complicate steam generator tube inspection activities.

Application of the F\* criteria will allow a repair method that will restore the integrity of degraded steam generator tubes and will not adversely affect primary system flow rate or heat transfer capability. Application of the F\* criteria will preserve the heat transfer capability of the steam generators and will maintain the design margins assumed in the analyses contained in the UFSAR. The alternate repair method will also be less complicated, faster, and will reduce personnel occupational exposure significantly. Based on the above discussion it is concluded that the proposed changes will not significantly reduce a margin of safety

Administrative and typographical changes are proposed to correct previous grammatical errors, to eliminate a parenthetical note that could cause confusion when applying the proposed requirements, and to make the terminology used in the Bases section consistent with the definitions provided in Specification 4.3.1. Those proposed changes will not impact any margin of safety. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the requested amendments involve no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Waukegan Public Library, 128 N. County Street, Waukegan, Illinois 60085.

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Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50–313 and 50–368, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 (ANO–1&2), Pope County, Arkansas

Date of amendment request: April 4, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments revise requirements associated with the ventilation system that services both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

Criterion 1—Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated.

The control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning systems are not initiators of an accident previously evaluated. Extension of the allowable outage time for one inoperable control room emergency air conditioning system from 7 days to 30 days is acceptable based on the low probability of an event occurring that would require control room isolation and a concurrent or subsequent failure of the remaining operable control room emergency air conditioning system. An evaluation using probabilistic safety assessment techniques has shown the frequency of this event to be at an acceptably low level (4.67E-6/yr). The ANO-1 surveillance requirements for the control room emergency ventilation and air conditioning system has been updated for consistency with the ANO-2 requirements and are consistent with RG 1.52, March 1978, Revision 2. The relaxation in the ANO-2 Mode of Applicability for the control room radiation monitoring instrumentation is acceptable based on the fuel handling accident analysis dose consequences. The analysis assumes that the control room emergency ventilation system is actuated during a fuel handling accident in the containment building. This analysis also shows that the dose consequences to the control room operators are acceptable in the event of a fuel handling analysis in the