reporting requirements and the updated reference to 10 CFR 20.1302 do not change either the means of controlling radioactive releases or the effluent release limits. Therefore, there will be no change in the types and amounts of effluents that will be released, nor will there be an increase in individual or cumulative radiation exposures to any member of the public.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendments request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Calvert County Library, Prince Frederick, Maryland 20678.

Attorney for licensee: Jay E. Silbert, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

NRC Project Director: Ledyard B. Marsh.

Carolina Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50–261, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Darlington County, South Carolina

Date of amendment request: June 3, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The requested Technical Specification (TS) change clarifies the definition of operability of the charging pumps by adding a footnote to TS Section 3.2.2.a that states that the connectibility of the emergency power sources is not required for charging pump operability.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

This change request does not involve a significant hazards consideration for the following reasons.

1. The requested change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The requested change clarifies that the emergency power sources are not required for the operability of the charging pumps. Operation of the charging pumps is not considered in the assumptions for initiation of any analyzed accident and is not credited for accident mitigation in any analyzed accidents in the safety analysis report. Therefore, the availability of emergency power sources to the charging pumps does not affect the probability of occurrence or consequences of an analyzed accident in the safety analysis report.

2. The requested change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of

accident from any accident previously evaluated. The requested change clarifies that the emergency power sources are not required for the operability of the charging pumps. The design requirements of the charging pumps to provide reactor coolant inventory and boron inventory control are not changed. The operability of the emergency power source to the charging pumps is not a precursor to any accident scenario. Failure of the charging pumps is bounded by the plant design which strips the charging pumps from the emergency buses under certain conditions. Since the change does not involve changes in the operation of the plant, or physical or equipment changes or involve controls for accident mitigation equipment, the requested change will not create the possibility of new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The requested change clarifies that the emergency power sources are not required for the operability of the charging pumps. Since the charging pumps are stripped from the emergency buses in the event of a loss of power and safety injection, emergency power sources to the charging pumps are not guaranteed to mitigate the consequences of an analyzed accident. As a result, no credit is taken for the charging function in analyzed accidents and the margin of safety as described in the safety analysis report is unchanged. Therefore, the requested change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Hartsville Memorial Library, 147 West College Avenue, Hartsville, South Carolina 29550.

Attorney for licensee: R. E. Jones, General Counsel, Carolina Power & Light Company, Post Office Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602. NRC Project Director: David B.

Matthews.

Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50–454 and 50–455, Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Ogle County, Illinois

Docket Nos. 50–456 and 50–457, Braidwood Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Will County, Illinois

Date of amendment request: February 21, 1995.

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendments would revise Byron and Braidwood technical specifications associated with the reactor coolant system (RCS) resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) used to obtain hot and cold leg temperatures. The amendments are required because of proposed modification that will remove the existing RTDs and their associated piping and valves and replace them with dual element fast response RTDs mounted in the thermowells welded directly in the RCS loop piping.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed modification replaces the existing bypass piping system with thermowell-mounted RTDs. Because the hot leg RTDs are mounted directly in the scoops, temperature measurement inaccuracies caused by imbalances in the flow scoop sample flow are eliminated. The method of measuring coolant temperature with thermowell-mounted fast response RTDs has been analyzed to be at least as effective as the RTD bypass system. With the thermowells welded into the existing RCS hot and cold leg nozzles and the elimination of the bypass piping, the number of pressure boundary welds has been significantly reduced, resulting in a reduced probability of a small break LOCA [Loss of Coolant Accident].

The RTD response time is incorporated in the safety analyses. In particular, RTD response time is modeled in the OT[DELTA]T [Over Temperature Delta Temperature] and OP[DELTA]T [Over Pressure Delta Temperature] trip functions. The overall response time modeled in the safety analyses for the existing RTD bypass piping system is 8 seconds. The overall response time is the elapsed time from the time the temperature change in the RCS exceeds the trip setpoint until the rods are free to fall. More specifically, 6 seconds is modeled as a first order lag term and 2 seconds as pure delay on the reactor trip signal. The 6 second lag term includes such factors as: RTD bypass piping fluid transport delay, RTD bypass piping thermal lag, RTD response time, and RTD electronic filtering. The 2 second delay on reactor trip addresses such factors as electronics delay, trip breakers and gripper release.

Signal conditioning (filtering) of the individual loop [DELTA]T and Tavg signals is represented by [time constants utilized in the lag compensator for DELTA T] and [time constant utilized in the measured T_{avg} lag compensator], respectively, in the OT[DELTA]T and OP[DELTA]T equations in Technical Specification Table 2.2–1. With the current bypass manifold system, the filter is not required since the existing RTDs do not respond rapidly to local temperature variances within the reactor coolant loop. The bypass piping and manifold provide adequate mixing of the coolant, eliminating any local temperature variances. Therefore, the values of [time constants utilized in the lag compensator for DELTA T] and [time