

companies, and a number of sales and service subsidiaries.

During the POI, ILVA was owned by the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale ("IRI"), a holding company which was wholly-owned by the GOI.

Spin-offs

In its questionnaire response, Dalmine reported that between 1990 and 1991, as part of its overall restructuring process, the company twice sold "productive units" to private buyers. According to Dalmine, these sales involved facilities that do not produce the subject merchandise. In the preliminary determination, we determined that the amount of potentially spun-off benefits was insignificant. We did not learn anything at verification that would lead us to reverse this determination. Therefore, we have not reduced the subsidies allocated to sales of the subject merchandise. (See Final Concurrence Memorandum dated June 19, 1995).

Equityworthiness

Petitioner has alleged that Dalmine was unequityworthy in 1989, the year it received an indirect equity infusion from the GOI, through ILVA S.p.A. ("ILVA"), and that the equity infusion was, therefore, inconsistent with commercial considerations.

In accordance with § 355.44(e)(1) of the Proposed Regulations (Countervailing Duties; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Public Comments ("Proposed Regulations"), 54 FR 23366, May 31, 1989), we preliminarily determined that ILVA's purchase of Dalmine's shares was consistent with commercial considerations because Dalmine provided evidence that private investors, unrelated to Dalmine or the GOI, purchased a significant percentage of the 1989 equity offering, on the same terms as ILVA. We did not learn anything at verification that would lead us to reverse this finding. Therefore, the Department determines that ILVA's purchase of Dalmine's shares was consistent with commercial considerations.

Creditworthiness

Petitioner has alleged that Dalmine was uncreditworthy in every year between 1979 and 1993. In accordance with § 355.44(b)(6)(i) of the *Proposed Regulations*, we preliminarily determined that Dalmine was creditworthy from 1979 to 1993. In making this determination we examined Dalmine's current, quick, times interest earned, and debt-to-equity ratios, in addition to its profit margin.

Specifically, although a number of the financial indicators are weak for certain years, none of the indicators are weak over the medium or long term, and when examined together on a yearly basis, the indicators support the determination that Dalmine was creditworthy in every year examined. (See also Creditworthy Memorandum, November 18, 1994). In addition, Dalmine received long-term, commercial loans from private lenders in several of the years examined.

We did not learn anything new at verification that would lead us to reconsider our preliminary determination. Therefore, we continue to find that Dalmine was creditworthy from 1979 to 1993.

Benchmarks and Discount Rates

Dalmine did not take out any long-term, fixed-rate, lire-denominated loans in any of the years of the government loans under investigation. Therefore, in accordance with § 355.44(b)(4) of the *Proposed Regulations*, in our preliminary determination we used, as the benchmark interest rate, the Bank of Italy reference rate which was determined in Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products from Italy ("Certain Steel from Italy"), 58 FR, 37327 (July 9, 1993), to be both the best approximation of the cost of long-term borrowing in Italy and the only long-term fixed interest rate commonly available in Italy. We also used this rate as the discount rate for allocating over time the benefit from non-recurring grants for the same reasons as explained in Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Steel Products from Spain, 58 FR 37374, 37376 (July 9, 1993).

At verification, we learned that the Bank of Italy reference rate reflects the cost for Italian banks to borrow long-term funds. Therefore, the reference rate does not incorporate the mark-up a bank would charge a corporate client when making a long-term loan. Long-term corporate interest rate data is not available in Italy. Accordingly, we have adjusted the reference rate used in the preliminary determination upward to reflect the mark-up an Italian bank would charge a corporate customer.

In order to approximate this mark-up, we calculated the difference between the average short-term corporate borrowing rate in Italy and the average interest rate on short-term Italian government debt, for each year in which Dalmine received long-term lire loans or non-recurring grants from the government. We then added this mark-up to the Italian reference rate used in

the preliminary determination to approximate an average long-term corporate benchmark interest rate. We also used these rates as the discount rates for allocating over time the benefit from non-recurring grants. See Certain Steel Products from Spain, 58 FR at 37376.

For long-term loans denominated in other currencies, we used, as the benchmark interest rate, an average long-term fixed interest rate for loans denominated in the same currency. (See section E—Article 54 Loans below.)

Calculation Methodology

For purposes of this determination, the period for which we are measuring subsidies (the POI) is calendar year 1993. In determining the benefits received under the various programs described below, we used the following calculation methodology. We first calculated the benefit attributable to the POI for each countervailable program, using the methodologies described in each program section below. For each program, we then divided the benefit attributable to Dalmine in the POI by Dalmine's total sales revenue, as none of the programs was limited to either certain subsidiaries or products of Dalmine. Next, we added the benefits for all programs, including the benefits for programs which were not allocated over time, to arrive at Dalmine's total subsidy rate. Because Dalmine is the only respondent company in this investigation, this rate is also the country-wide rate.

Based upon our analysis of the petition, the responses to our questionnaires, verification, and comments by interested parties, we determine the following:

I. Programs Determined to be Countervailable

A. Benefits Provided under Law 675/77

Law 675/77 was enacted to bring about restructuring and reconversion in the following industrial sectors: (1) Electronic technology; (2) the manufacturing industry; (3) the agro-food industry; (4) the chemical industry; (5) the steel industry; (6) the pulp and paper industry; (7) the fashion sector; and (8) the automobile and aviation sectors. Law 675/77 also sought to promote optimal exploitation of energy resources, and ecological and environmental recovery.

A primary goal of this legislation was to bring all government industrial assistance programs under a single law in order to develop a system to replace indiscriminate and random public intervention by the GOI. Other goals