flight and landing of the airplane. Effective measures against the effects of exposure to HIRF must be provided by the design and installation of these systems. The accepted maximum energy levels in which civilian airplane system installations must be capable of operating safely are based on surveys and analysis of existing radio frequency emitters. These special conditions require that the airplane be evaluated under these energy levels for the protection of the electronic system and its associated wiring harness. These external threat levels, which are lower than previous required values, are believed to represent the worst case to which an airplane would be exposed in the operating environment.

These special conditions require qualification of systems that perform critical functions, as installed in aircraft, to the defined HIRF environment in paragraph 1 or, as an option to a fixed value using laboratory tests, in paragraph 2, as follows:

(1) The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational capability of the installed electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF environment defined below:

FIELD STRENGTH VOLTS/METER

| Frequency  | Peak | Average |
|------------|------|---------|
| 10–100 KHz | 50   | 50      |
| 100–500    | 60   | 60      |
| 500-2000   | 70   | 70      |
| 2-30 MHz   | 200  | 200     |
| 30–70      | 30   | 30      |
| 70–100     | 30   | 30      |
| 100–200    | 150  | 33      |
| 200–400    | 70   | 70      |
| 400–700    | 4020 | 935     |
| 700–1000   | 1700 | 170     |
| 1–2 GHz    | 5000 | 990     |
| 2–4        | 6680 | 840     |
| 4–6        | 6850 | 310     |
| 6–8        | 3600 | 670     |
| 8–12       | 3500 | 1270    |
| 12–18      | 3500 | 360     |
| 18–40      | 2100 | 750     |
|            | I    | I       |

or,

(2) The applicant may demonstrate by a system test and analysis that the electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions can withstand a minimum threat of 100 volts per meter, peak electrical field strength, from 10 KHz to 18 GHz. When using this test to show compliance with the HIRF requirements, no credit is given for signal attenuation due to installation.

A preliminary hazard analysis must be performed by the applicant, for approval by the FAA, to identify electrical and/or electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term "critical" means those functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane. The systems identified by the hazard analysis that perform critical functions are candidates for the application of HIRF requirements. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions. Primary electronic flight display systems, and their associated components, perform critical functions such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed indication. The HIRF requirements apply only to critical functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements may be demonstrated by tests, analysis, models, similarly with existing systems, or any combination of these. Service experience alone is not acceptable since normal flight operations may not include an exposure to the HIRF environment. Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally insufficient since all elements of a redundant system are likely to be exposed to the fields concurrently.

#### Conclusion

In view of the design features discussed for the Twin Commander Model 695 Airplane, the following special conditions are issued. This action is not a rule of general applicability and affects only those applicants who apply to the FAA for approval of these features on these airplanes.

The substance of these special conditions has been subject to the notice and public comment procedure in several prior rulemaking actions. For example, the Dornier 228-200 (53 FR 14782, April 26, 1988), the Cessna Model 525 (56 FR 49396, September 30, 1991), and the Beech Model 200, A200, and B200 airplanes (57 FR 1220, January 13, 1992). It is unlikely that additional public comment would result in any significant change from those special conditions already issued and commented on. For these reasons, and because a delay would significantly affect the applicant's installation of the system and certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions without notice. Therefore, these special conditions are being made effective upon publication in the **Federal Register.** However, as previously indicated, interested persons are invited to comment on these special conditions if they so desire.

## List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols

#### Citation

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

**Authority:** Secs. 313(a), 601, and 603 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958; as amended (49 U.S.C. 1354(a), 1421, and 1423); 49 U.S.C. 106(g); 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR 11.28 and 11.49.

# **Adoption of Special Conditions**

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for the modified Twin Commander Model 695 airplane:

- 1. Protection of Electrical and Electronic Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operations, and operational capabilities of these systems to perform critical functions, are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high intensity radiated electromagnetic fields external to the airplane.
- 2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies: *Critical Functions:* Functions whose failure would contribute to, or cause, a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on June 1, 1995.

# Henry A. Armstrong,

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

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### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 94-NM-252-AD; Amendment 39-9285; AD 95-13-05]

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747 Series Airplanes Equipped with Rolls Royce Model RB211 Series Engines

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT. **ACTION:** Final rule.

**SUMMARY:** This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that requires modification of the nacelle strut and wing structure, inspections and checks to detect discrepancies, and correction of discrepancies. This amendment is