General Design Criterion 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that structures, systems, and components important to safety be appropriately protected from the effects of missiles that may result from equipment failures. Application of the design criteria to turbine missiles is described in SRP Section 10.2 and in subsequent safety evaluations related to probabilities of turbine failures, turbine orientations, and surveillance requirements for turbine overspeed protection systems. In NUREG–1366, ''Improvements to Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements,'' the staff discusses the benefits, resultant costs, and the safety impact of performing turbine overspeed protection surveillances.

Although the design basis accidents and transients include a variety of system failures and conditions which might result from turbine overspeed events and potential missiles striking various plant systems and equipment, the system failures and plant conditions are much more likely to be caused by events other than turbine failures. In view of the low likelihood of turbine missiles, assumptions related to the turbine overspeed protection system are not part of an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. The turbine overspeed protection system is not relied upon in the design basis accident or transient analyses as a primary success path which functions or actuates to mitigate such events.

Probabilistic safety assessments and operating experience have demonstrated that proper maintenance of the turbine overspeed control valves is important to minimize the potential for overspeed events and turbine damage; however that experience has also demonstrated that there is low likelihood of significant risk to public health and safety because of turbine overspeed events. Further, the potential for and consequences of turbine overspeed events are diminished by factors such as the orientation of the turbine relative to plant structures and equipment, licensee inservice testing programs, which must comply with 10 CFR 50.55(a), and surveillance programs for the turbine control and stop valves derived from the manufacturer's recommendations.

Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the turbine overspeed protection system does not satisfy the final policy statement criteria and need not be included in TS. Licensees may propose to relocate the turbine overspeed protection requirements to the UFSAF requirements to the UFSAR and control changes to those provisions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of June 1995.

Brian K. Grimes,

Director, Division of Project Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

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[Docket 70–1257]

Finding of No Significant Impact and Notice of Opportunity for a Hearing Renewal of Special Nuclear Material License SNM–1227 Siemens Power Corporation Richland Engineering and Manufacturing Facility Richland, Washington

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering the renewal of Special Nuclear Material License SNM–1227 for the continued operation of the Siemens Power Corporation's (SPC) Engineering and Manufacturing Facility located in Richland, Washington. The facility manufactures low-enriched uranium fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors.

Summary of the Environmental Assessment

Identification of the Proposed Action

The proposed action is the renewal of SPC's special nuclear material license for 10 years. With this renewal, SPC will continue to operate the Richland Engineering and Manufacturing Facility to fabricate fuel assemblies for commercial nuclear power reactors. SPC is authorized to possess and use up to 25,000 kilograms of uranium-235 in compounds enriched up to 5 weight percent in the U–235.

The facility converts low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF_6) to uranium dioxide (UO_2) powder, presses the UO_2 into pellets, loads the pellets into rods, and assembles the rods into final fuel assemblies. Most of the UF_6-to-UO_2 conversion is performed using the ammonium diuranate (ADU) process; however, with this license renewal, SPC will significantly expand its existing dry conversion capacity and shut down most of the ADU process capacity. The environmental assessment considers both the impacts of continued operation of the ADU process and the impacts of the expanded dry conversion capacity, which are expected to be significantly reduced.

The Need for the Proposed Action

SPC performs a necessary service for the commercial nuclear power industry by fabricating fuel assemblies. Currently, the SPC facility is one of four such producers of low-enriched uranium fuel that operates within the United States. Denial of the license renewal application is an alternative available to the NRC but would result in either the expansion of production capacity or transfer of fuel production activities at another facility.

Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action

The continued operation of the SPC facility will result in the continued release of low levels of hazardous and radioactive constituents. Under accident conditions, the facility could release higher concentrations over a short period of time. The facility uses a number of controls to reduce the release of hazardous and radioactive materials to the environment and performs monitoring of effluents and the environment. These controls and the monitoring program are described below.

The radiological environmental impacts of normal operations and postulated accidents were evaluated for the SPC facility. These impacts are summarized following the description of controls and monitoring.

Effluent Controls and Monitoring

The SPC facility produces gaseous, liquid, and solid effluent streams. Gaseous effluents are controlled by minimizing the amount of airborne radioactive materials within the plant and by the use of stack scrubbers and High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters. Liquid effluents are controlled by the use of waste water retention lagoons and treatment systems that reduce the concentration of radioactive materials prior to discharge to the Richland city sewer system. Solid effluents are controlled by segregation of radioactive wastes from trash and hazardous wastes; containment of wastes in drums or boxes on site; treatment by decontamination, compaction, or incineration, as appropriate; and final disposal off site.

SPC monitors these effluents at or just prior to the points of release. Gaseous stack effluents are sampled continuously at isokinetic flow conditions, and the samples are analyzed for radioactivity. Liquid effluents are sampled at the lift station at the point of discharge to the sewer, and the samples are analyzed for uranium and other constituents. Solid wastes are surveyed prior to treatment or off-site disposal.

Action levels have been selected for each of these effluents, in accordance