provided by regulatory requirements such as 10 CFR 50.54, ''Conditions of licenses.'' The adequacy of controls for relocated provisions which do not fit in the above categories will be reviewed and approved by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis.

License amendment requests should contain a commitment to relocate each selected requirement to a particular licensee-controlled document or program, (e.g., the UFSAR or the emergency plan). The commitment should also address the submittal of the revised documents to the NRC in accordance with the applicable regulation (e.g., 10 CFR 50.71(e)). In the amendment request, the licensee should clearly describe the program it will use to control changes to relocated provisions (e.g., 10 CFR 50.59 or 50.54(q)). Control of the relocated provisions in accordance with the applicable regulation ensures that NRC review and approval will be requested for changes exceeding the stated regulatory threshold (e.g., unreviewed safety question or decrease in effectiveness).

Licensees should note that this generic letter supersedes TS-related guidance contained in several previously issued NRC documents, such as regulatory guides and the Standard Review Plan (NUREG–0800). Commitments contained in the UFSAR or other docketed correspondence may need to be revised to reflect the deviations from these NRC documents. However, this generic letter addresses only the need to include requirements related to the affected systems in TS. Staff positions on matters other than TS content that are contained in the regulatory guides or other documents are not affected by the issuance of this generic letter.

The NRC has approved the relocation of most of these specific instrumentation requirements in various amendments issued to specific licensees. The improved standard TS also reflect the staff position that these requirements do not satisfy the final policy statement criteria for inclusion in TS. The staff has also concluded that these provisions are not related to dominant contributors to plant risk. Additional discussions follow for each of the selected relocated instrumentation requirements.

Incore Detectors

The relocation of requirements related to incore neutron detectors affects the TS sections entitled ''Incore Detectors'' or ''Movable Incore Detectors,'' for pressurized water reactors (PWRs), or ''Transversing Incore Probe,'' for boiling water reactors (BWRs). Incore instrumentation is used periodically to calculate power peaking factors in order to verify nuclear design predictions, ensure operation within established fuel performance limits, and to calibrate other nuclear instrumentation. The measurements are used in a confirmatory manner and do not provide direct input to reactor protection system or engineered safety features actuation system functions.

These instruments are neither used for, nor capable of, detecting a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary prior to a design basis accident nor do they function as a primary success path to mitigate events which assume the failure of or challenge the integrity of fission product barriers. Although the core power distributions (measured by the incore detectors) constitute an important initial condition to design basis accidents and therefore need to be addressed by TS, the detectors themselves are not an active design feature needed to preclude analyzed accidents or transients. The staff has determined therefore, that the incore detector requirements do not satisfy the criteria of the Final Policy Statement for inclusion in TS. Licensees may propose to relocate the incore detector requirements to the UFSAR and control changes to those provisions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Relocation of the incore detector requirements from the TS to the UFSAR does not imply any reduction in their importance in confirming that core power distributions are bounded by safety analysis limits. It is expected that licensees will continue to maximize the number of available incore detectors. Evaluations related to changes in incore detector requirements are expected to consider such factors as the need to identify the inadvertent loading of a fuel assembly into an improper location, the calibration of protection systems using incore measurements, and the allowances for measurement and nuclear design uncertainties. Should these or other considerations lead to the identification of a proposed change as an unreviewed safety question, the licensee should request NRC review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c).

Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation

Section VI(a)(3) of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 requires that seismic monitoring instrumentation be provided to promptly determine the response of those nuclear power plant features important to safety in the event of an earthquake. This capability is required to allow for a comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the unit. Comparison of such data is needed to (1) determine whether the plant can continue to be operated safely, and (2) permit such timely action as may be appropriate. However, seismic instrumentation does not actuate any protective equipment or serve any direct role in the mitigation of an accident.

The capability of the plant to withstand a seismic event or other design-basis accident is determined by the initial design and construction of systems, structures, and components. The instrumentation is used to alert operators to the seismic event and evaluate the plant response. The Final Policy Statement explained that instrumentation to detect precursors to reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage, such as seismic instrumentation, is not included in the first criterion. As discussed above, the seismic instrumentation does not serve as a protective design feature or part of a primary success path for events which challenge fission product barriers. The staff has concluded that the seismic monitoring instrumentation does not satisfy the final policy statement criteria and need not be included in the TS. Licensees may propose to relocate the seismic monitoring instrumentation requirements to the UFSAR and control changes to those provisions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation

In 10 CFR 50.47, ''Emergency Plans,'' and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, ''Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,'' the Commission requires power plant licensees to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Timely access to accurate local meteorological data is important for estimating potential radiation doses to the public and for determining appropriate protective measures. In 10 CFR 50.36a(a)(2), the Commission requires nuclear power plant licensees to submit annual reports specifying the quantity of each of the principal radionuclides released to unrestricted areas in liquid and airborne effluents and such other information as may be required by the NRC to estimate maximum potential annual radiation doses to the public. A knowledge of meteorological conditions in the vicinity of the reactor is important in providing a basis for estimating annual radiation doses resulting from