amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360.

Attorney for licensee: Ms. L. M. Cuoco, Senior Nuclear Counsel, Northeast Utilities Service Company, Post Office Box 270, Hartford, CT 06141-0270.

*NRC Project Director:* Phillip F. McKee

## Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), Docket No. 50-245, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, New London County, Connecticut

Date of amendment request: May 26, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment will delete the old limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) and surveillance requirements and add new LCOs, surveillance requirements, and bases for the loss of normal power (LNP) instrumentation system.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

NNECO has reviewed this proposed change in accordance with 10CFR50.92 and concluded that this change does not involve a significant hazards consideration (SHC). The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposed change does not involve an SHC because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

The change does not increase the probability of a loss of off-site power event or the occurrence of any accidents which assume loss of off-site power. This is ensured by the LNP instrumentation system design which uses multiple sensing relays, redundancy, and qualified Class 1E components, as well as conservative operability and surveillance requirements.

Full LNP logic requires two sets of relays to trip in one of two redundant groups. One set monitors bus 14E and the other set monitors bus 14F. Separate sets are provided for loss of voltage and degraded voltage monitoring. This design minimizes the likelihood of an inadvertent full LNP initiation. To maintain redundancy in the instrumentation, two separate groups are provided, each group being powered from an independent DC supply. Partial LNP logic is also provided to detect a loss of voltage on a single emergency bus. Redundancy in the partial LNP logic is achieved by providing an independent logic for each emergency power train.

The proposed technical specification would require that the LNP instrumentation be maintained operable except when the unit is in cold shutdown or refueling conditions. If redundancy in the ability to detect a loss of voltage or degraded voltage and initiate a full LNP is not maintained, reactor operation would be permitted for seven days. In this situation, both full and partial LNP (and both emergency power sources) remain operable. An action statement of seven days, which is the same as the action statement duration for an inoperable EDG [emergency diesel generator], is justified based on continued operability of the other LNP group. Additionally, it allows a reasonable amount of time to perform repairs.

The time delays and voltage setpoints specified in Table 3.2.4 ensure that the emergency power source starting and loading times continue to meet the current technical specification requirements. Also, these time delays are long enough to preclude false trips due to anticipated voltage transients (e.g., during motor starts). The relay calibration surveillance procedure will establish acceptance criteria for each relay to ensure that the total times specified in Table 3.2.4 are not exceeded. The proposed surveillance testing and calibration frequency of every refueling outage is consistent with the requirements in the current technical specification.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

There are no new failure modes associated with this change since the proposed requirements will ensure the LNP instrumentation system is available to perform its safety function. Individual voltage sensing relays, when removed from their cases, would provide the tripped contact configuration. The proposed technical specification would allow relays to be placed in the tripped condition as long as it would not inhibit the LNP function or cause an inadvertent initiation. Additionally. since the design function to ensure that adequate power is available to operate the emergency safeguards equipment has not changed, no new accident or accident of a different kind is created.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The protective boundaries are not affected because the consequences of any design basis accident are not changed. Since the protective boundaries are not affected, the safety limits are also unaffected. The proposed change maintains the basis of the technical specifications by ensuring that adequate electrical power is available to operate the emergency safeguards equipment. By maximizing the operability of the LNP instrumentation without requiring high risk testing, the proposed change will improve the margin of safety as related to availability of electric power to safety related loads.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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*NRC Project Director:* Phillip F. McKee

## Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem County, New Jersey

Date of amendment request: January 13, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would revise the Administrative Controls Section (6.0) of the Technical Specifications (TS) for Hope Creek Generating Station to reflect organizational changes and resultant management title changes. As indicated on the marked-up pages in Attachment 2, PSE&G requests that: 1) Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer will be replaced with Chief Nuclear Officer and President - Nuclear Business Unit in TS 6.1.2, 6.2.1.c, 6.5.2.4.3.g, 6.5.2.4.4.a, 6.5.2.4.4.b, 6.5.2.6, 6.6.1.b, 6.7.1.a, and 6.7.1.c. 2) Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer will be replaced with Vice President - Nuclear Operations in TS 6.5.1.8.b, and 6.5.1.9. 3) In addition, General Manager - Quality Assurance and Nuclear Safety will be replaced with Director - Quality Assurance and Nuclear Safety Review in TS 6.5.1.8.b, 6.5.1.9, 6.5.2.2, 6.5.2.4.3.g, 6.7.1.a, 6.7.1.c.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed management title changes from Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer to Chief Nuclear Officer and President - Nuclear Business Unit or Vice President -Nuclear Operations, and from General Manager - Quality Assurance and Nuclear Safety to Director - Quality Assurance and Nuclear Safety Review are administrative in nature and do not affect assumptions contained in the plant safety analysis, the physical design and/or operation of the plant, nor do they affect Technical Specifications. Therefore, the proposed changes do not