systems interface with the source-range nuclear instrumentation, and operator ability to monitor and trend post-accident neutron levels is not adversely affected by the proposed change. In addition, the source-range nuclear instrument channels provide indication to the control room, plant computer and one of two channels provides input to Remote Shutdown Panel B.

The 0.5% instrument drift over a six (6) month period will not affect the ability to operate other safety equipment; nor, will it increase the probability of failure of the rod withdrawal inhibit. The inhibit function is triggered by a startup rate, and a 0.5% drift over six (6) months will not affect the instrument's ability to perform the inhibit function. Therefore, this change has no impact upon the possibility of creating a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated in the UFSAR.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed TSCR would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed revision to the TMI-1 Technical Specifications does not involve any physical changes to the plant, and does not impact on the safety analysis with respect to design basis events and assumptions. The only change proposed is in the surveillance frequency for Nuclear Instrumentation by revision of the appropriate Tech. Spec. tables. Startup rate instrumentation is not included in Technical Specifications 2.0, ''Safety Limits''; and, hence, all system Limiting Conditions for Operation(s) remain unchanged. Testing of the source-range nuclear instrument channels within six (6) months prior to a reactor startup will not decrease the margin of safety. Hence, the margin of safety for the plant is not diminished by this change request.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Law/Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, (REGIONAL DEPOSITORY) Walnut Street and Commonwealth Avenue, Box 1601, Harrisburg, PA 17105.

*Attorney for licensee:* Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

*NRC Project Director:* Phillip F. McKee

**GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-289, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania**

*Date of amendment request:* June 1, 1995

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed license amendment would revise Section 5.3.1.1 of the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1) to allow use of an alternate zirconium-based cladding material manufactured by Babcock & Wilcox Fuel Company to test the properties of the fuel in an operating core. Present TSs require fuel clad material to be either ''zircaloy'' or ''ZIRLO.''

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The test assemblies with the zirconium-based claddings are mechanically and thermal-hydraulically similar to the remainder of the reload batch and the rest of the core, so no failure probability is increased, nor is any operational practice changed which could introduce a new initiator of an accident. The only credible event which could occur as a result of this demonstration is clad failure of the test fuel rods. The number of fuel rods involved is such a small percentage of the core inventory that even a postulated failure of all the demonstration fuel rods from a cause related to the demonstration would not result in dose consequences greater than existing limits. A failure of the fuel rods from a cause not related to the demonstration would not result in consequences greater than those which would have occurred had the assemblies not been demonstrated assemblies. Therefore, this change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The mechanical and thermal-hydraulic similarity of the test assemblies to the remainder of assemblies in the core precludes the credible possibility of creating any new failure mode or accident sequence. The use of the demonstration assemblies does not involve any alterations to plant equipment or procedures which would introduce any new or unique operational modes or accident precursors.

3. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The demonstration assemblies meet the same design as the remainder of assemblies in the core. Existing reload design and safety analysis limits are maintained, and the FSAR analyses are bounding. No special setpoints or other safety settings are required as a result of the use of these two (2) test assemblies. The assemblies will be placed in locations which will not experience limiting peak power conditions. Therefore, it is concluded that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

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*Attorney for licensee:* Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

*NRC Project Director:* Phillip F. McKee

**Houston Lighting & Power Company, City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company, City of Austin, Texas, Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Matagorda County, Texas**

*Date of amendment request:* April 27, 1995, as supplemented by letters dated May 4, and May 25, 1995.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would change the tables associated with Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System, to eliminate the core exit thermocouples (CETs). The proposed amendment would also change the tables associated with TS 3/4.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, to require two operable channels of CETs, where each channel would be required to have at least two operable CETs per core quadrant. Each channel would also be required to have at least four operable CETs in at least one quadrant to support the operability of the subcooling margin monitors. In addition, the actions related to TS 3/4.3.3.6 would be changed to require that a report be submitted if one CET channel in a quadrant is inoperable for more than 30 days, and require a plant shutdown if both CET channels in a quadrant are inoperable for more than 7 days.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated?

*Change to Technical Specification 3.3.3.5:*