involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed amendments are administrative in nature and do not change the basis for any technical specification that is related to the establishment of, or the preservation of, a nuclear safety margin. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above discussion and the supporting Evaluation of Technical Specification changes, FPL has determined that the proposed license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Indian River Junior College Library, 3209 Virginia Avenue, Fort Pierce, Florida 34954-9003

Attorney for licensee: J.R. Newman, Esquire, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036

NRC Project Director: David B. Matthews

Florida Power and Light Company, Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251, Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4, Dade County, Florida

Date of amendment request: May 23, 1995

Description of amendment request: The licensee proposes to change Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Technical Specifications (TS) by changing the setpoint presentation format for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation setpoints contained in Technical Specification Tables 2.2-1 and 3.3-3. The approved Westinghouse five-column instrument setpoint methodology currently being used to establishing those setpoints would be retained. The intent of the amendments is to eliminate the need for minor administrative license amendments to these tables that do not impact either the Trip Setpoints or the Safety Analysis Limits.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

No changes to the Reactor Trip System instrumentation setpoints, ESFAS instrumentation setpoints, or the Turkey Point Plant licensing basis (NRC-approved, Westinghouse five-column setpoint methodology, as documented in Westinghouse topical report WCAP-12745P), is being made. The changes proposed reduce the level of detail in the Technical Specifications and place that detailed information in controlled procedures, drawings and the Final Safety Analysis Report. Since the setpoints and methodology remain the same, the changes proposed by this submittal will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

(2) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

These proposed changes remove from the Technical Specifications a level of detail which will be maintained in controlled procedures and drawings. The Turkey Point Plant licensing basis (NRC-approved, Westinghouse five column setpoint methodology, as documented in Westinghouse topical report WCAP-12745P), continues to be used to calculate the Reactor Trip System and ESFAS setpoints. No changes to Reactor Trip System or ESFAS instrumentation setpoints are proposed. Since the same methodology will be used to determine the setpoints and no setpoints are changed, the possibility that a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated will not be created.

(3) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The Turkey Point Plant licensing basis (NRC-approved, Westinghouse five column setpoint methodology, as documented in Westinghouse topical report WCAP-12745P), continues to be used to calculate the Reactor Trip System and ESFAS setpoints. No changes to the Reactor Trip System or ESFAS instrumentation setpoints are proposed. Since the same methodology will be used to determine the setpoints, and no setpoints are changed by this submittal, this change does not involve a reduction in a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 50.92(c) are satisfied.Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199

Attorney for licensee: J.R. Newman, Esquire, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 1800 M Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036

NRC Project Director: David B. Matthews

Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, City of Dalton, Georgia, Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366, Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Appling County, Georgia

Date of amendment request: June 6, 1995

Description of amendment request: The proposed change would revise Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.6.4.1.3 and 3.6.4.1.4 for the secondary containment drawdown. The revision would reduce the SR acceptance criteria to greater than or equal to 0.20 inch of vacuum from greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum. Also, the licensee proposed to change the Bases to reflect the proposed TS revision.

The licensee stated that the secondary containment performs no active function in response to either loss-of-coolant accident or fuel handling accident. However, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the Unit 1 and Unit 2 standby gas treatment systems prior to discharge to the environment. This change will continue to provide adequate margin for the secondary containment to be sufficiently leak tight such that the conclusions of the accident analysis remain valid.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration which is presented below:

1. The change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The secondary containment serves a mitigation function and therefore this change does not increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated. The consequences of the previously evaluated accidents are not affected because at the wind conditions assumed in the accident analysis the building will be at a negative pressure and no exfiltration is postulated. Furthermore, the estimated wind speed at which exfiltration might take place (31 mph) is not a frequent occurrence (wind speeds of greater than 24 mph occur [less than] <0.5% of the time based on Plant Hatch specific meteorological data).

2. The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed. Revising the surveillance