The Inservice Inspection and Testing Programs, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a, are required by the SQN TSs. The proposed amendment, in accordance with NUREG-1431 and draft NUREG-1482 permits relief from an ASME code requirement in the interim between the time of submittal of a relief request and NRC approval of the relief. Any relief from the ASME Section XI code is required to be evaluated under the 10 CFR 50.59 process to determine that no TS changes or unreviewed safety questions exist. This evaluation process will ensure that code relief does not affect the ability of structures, systems, or components to perform their design function, affect compliance with any TS requirements or reduce the margin of safety. The proposed change to delete SQN TS 3/4.4.10 does not affect plant safety analyses or change the physical design or operation of the plant. The proposed amendment relocates the structural integrity requirements under the existing TS SR 4.0.5 to allow these requirements to be governed and controlled within SQN's ISI program. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Chattanooga-Hamilton County Library, 1101 Broad Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402.

Attorney for licensee: General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11H, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

*NRC Project Director:* Frederick J. Hebdon.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50–327 and 50–328, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee

Date of amendment request: April 6, 1995 (TS 95–06).

Description of amendment request: The proposed change would delete the technical specification requirement that limits and controls loads traveling over the spent fuel pool (Specification 3.9.7), the graph that relates the Load Carried Over the Shield to the Allowable Height Above the Shield Surface (Figure 3.9–1), the crane interlocks and physical stops surveillance requirements

(Specifications 4.9.7.1 and 4.9.7.2), and the related Bases information. These requirements would be relocated to administratively controlled procedures.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

 Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed TS change involves the relocation of a requirement that does not pertain to limitations or conditions of reactor operation or to equipment to mitigate design basis accidents or transients. SQN is proposing to relocate this TS based on NRC's final policy statement on TS improvement (58 FR 39132, dated July 22, 1993). Based on this criteria, the spent fuel pit (SFP) crane travel is not important to operational safety and may be relocated to administratively controlled procedures. By placing the crane travel requirements in administratively controlled procedures, adequate controls will remain in place to prevent heavy loads from traveling over fuel assemblies in the SFP. The administratively controlled procedure that controls the by-passing of the interlocks and physical stops is subject to the requirements of TS 6.5.1A. Therefore, the relocation of this TS will not involve an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

The proposed change involves relocating TS requirements to another administratively controlled document. No modifications to the plant are involved. Additionally, there are no changes to the operation of the plant or equipment proposed. Based on this, the relocation of this TS will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.

Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed change involves the relocation of TS requirements to administratively controlled procedures. The relocation of this requirement is based on the criteria endorsed in the Commission's Policy Statement on TS improvements as it pertains to 10 CFR 50.36. Additionally, this change does not alter the basic design and safety analysis requirements, as discussed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the deletion of this TS will not involve a reduction in the margin of safety.

The NRC has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

Local Public Document Room location: Chattanooga-Hamilton County Library, 1101 Broad Street, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402.

Attorney for licensee: General Counsel, Tennessee Valley Authority, 400 West Summit Hill Drive, ET 11H, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902.

*NRC Project Director:* Frederick J. Hebdon.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50–327 and 50–328, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Hamilton County, Tennessee

Date of amendment request: April 6, 1995 (TS 94–19).

Description of amendment request: The proposed change would revise the Action statement for Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 by inserting a new Action a, relabeling and modifying existing Action a to become Action b, adding a footnote referenced to Action b, renumbering the subsequent action statements, and adding information to the Bases that amplifies the action statements. The proposed new Action a would no longer address required actions for diesel generator testing. It would require that, should one of the AC electrical power sources listed be inoperable, then operability of the remaining offsite AC circuit be demonstrated by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. If two offsite circuits cannot be restored within 72 hours, the unit must be placed in hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30

The proposed change to Action b would address the testing requirements should a diesel generator become inoperable. It would require testing of operable diesel generators if the inoperability of the affected diesel generator has the potential to be the result of a common cause failure. A footnote would clarify that the common cause determination must be completed regardless of how long the diesel generator inoperability persists or Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 must be completed to verify diesel generator operability. The proposed change to the Bases would provide clear guidance on the use of common cause failure determinations to eliminate unnecessary diesel generator testing and would define when testing is required to verify diesel generator operability.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented below:

TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has determined